

MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The Century Social Science Series

MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

BY

FREDERICK ELMORE LUMLEY

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY



New York and London
THE CENTURY CO.

**COPYRIGHT, 1925, BY THE CENTURY CO.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THE
RIGHT TO REPRODUCE THIS BOOK, OR
PORTIONS THEREOF, IN ANY FORM. 259**

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

DEDICATED AFFECTIONATELY
TO MY
WIFE AND SON

PREFACE

"In 1899 I began to write out a textbook of sociology," says Professor Sumner in the *preface* to his "Folkways," "from material which I had used in lectures during the previous ten or fifteen years. At a certain point in that undertaking I found that I wanted to introduce my own treatment of the 'mores.' I could not refer to it anywhere in print, and I could not do justice to it in a chapter of another book. I therefore turned aside to write a treatise on the 'Folkways' which I now offer."

This paragraph presents my own situation exactly—the years excepted. Two or more years ago I began work on a textbook dealing with the social order and its maintenance. I found before going very far that I wanted to introduce my own treatment of a number of "means of control." I could not refer to it anywhere in print, and I could not do justice to it in a chapter or two. I therefore turned aside to write out a description of some control-devices, which I now offer.

Let it be clearly understood at the beginning that each chapter title really reads, "Rewards as a Means of Social Control," "Praise as a Means of Social Control," "Flattery as a Means," etc.

The study is for students and the general reader. It will not contain much of interest and certainly nothing new for the scholar. In consequence, I have not been scrupulously careful to include the latest word in technical terminology. I would rather not have readers get hung up on new terms, strange terms, which often remain but terms. Hence I have gone along with the usual language in order that the reader may forget the medium and attend

strictly to the ideas which I have endeavored to set forth.

I realize fully that I am guilty of some repetition, but do not regard this as a heinous offense. Repetition is simply one method of stepping ideas down to where they may unfailingly be grasped by beginners; it is one method of reinforcement; it is the inevitable tax teachers have to pay if they compete successfully with the numerous and diverse appeals of the day.

After much study I am painfully aware that I have only scratched the surface of the symbol-mechanisms which I have attempted to describe, and I hope some day to elaborate on some of these beginnings and to conduct experiments which will give more certainty with respect to the *follow-through* to which reference is made at several points. I shall feel rewarded for the present effort, however, if I succeed in stimulating readers to reflect upon the intimate control devices which I have discussed and to isolate others.

I am indebted to many people for helpful hints. It would be invidious to single out any of them with the exception of Professor Ross and Professors Park and Burgess whose writings in this field are unexcelled and well known. I am under an unpayable debt to Professor Ross for carefully reading the manuscript and making many valuable suggestions.

Other helpers will suffer least by remaining anonymous; possibly the gentlemen mentioned would also. But all helpers will know themselves who they are and if by chance their eyes should light upon these pages, I hereby make most grateful acknowledgments. My wife, by relieving me of many duties, has been one of the chiefest of these helpers.

Having opened this preface with the words of one distinguished scholar, also a student of social control, I cannot find anything more expressive of my own feelings, in conclusion, than the words of another,—also from the

preface. In his classic study, "Social Control," Professor Ross says: "In taking up this task I have had no other thought in mind than to see things as they are and to report what I see. I am not wedded to any hypothesis nor enamoured of my conclusions, and the next comer who, in the true scientific spirit, faces the problems I have faced and gives better answers than I have been able to give, will please me no less than he pleases himself." I only wish I might have uttered these words *first*.

FREDERICK E. LUMLEY

The Ohio State University.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I INTRODUCTION	3
1. The Social Order	3
2. Disruptive Factors	7
3. Control Necessary	11
4. Two Methods	14
5. Classification of Mental Devices	18
6. Beginnings of Control	24
7. The Ethical Question	25
8. Our Study	27
II REWARDS	31
1. Definitions	31
2. Universality	33
3. Kinds of Rewards	36
4. The Technique	37
5. Effects	44
6. Merits and Demerits	50
III PRAISE	56
1. Definitions	56
2. Prevalence	59
3. Expressional Features	61
4. Grounds of Appeal	72
5. Effects	75
6. Merits and Demerits	79
IV FLATTERY	81
1. Definitions	81
2. Objections Answered	82
3. The Methods	86
4. Areas of Operation	93
5. Some Effects	99
V PERSUASION	109
1. The Need	111
2. The Forms	113

CHAPTER	PAGE
3. Substance and Subtlety	
4. Conclusions	
VI ADVERTISING	134
1. Definition, History, Volume	134
2. The Technique	138
3. A Social Control Device	150
VII SLOGANS	158
1. Kindred Terms	158
2. The Slogan	160
3. History	161
4. Areas of Operation	162
5. Characteristics	168
6. Effects	176
7. Appraisal	180
VIII PROPAGANDA	185
1. Introduction	185
2. The Media	192
3. The Method	201
4. Results	205
IX GOSSIP	211
1. Definition	212
2. Technique	217
3. Areas	219
4. Motives	224
5. Effects	227
X SATIRE	237
1. Definition	238
2. Forms	241
3. Sources	247
4. Objects	248
5. Effects	251
6. Efficiency	255
7. Future	256
XI LAUGHTER	260
1. Definition	260
2. The Methods of Laughter	262
3. The Laughable	266

CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER	PAGE
4. The Effects of Laughter	270
5. Conclusions	284
XII CALLING NAMES	288
1. Naming Processes	289
2. Classification	294
3. The Meaning of the Practice	299
4. Effectiveness	311
XIII COMMANDS	315
1. Definition and Classification	316
2. The Social Situation	318
3. Universal Use	323
4. Overt Features	325
5. Subtler Features	327
6. Appraisal	336
XIV THREATS	339
1. The Social Situation	340
2. Wide Usage	342
3. The Media	346
4. Force	351
5. Results	357
6. Merits and Demerits	359
XV PUNISHMENT	363
1. Definition	363
2. Universality	366
3. The Social Situation	368
4. The Theory of Punishment	369
5. Methods of Punishment	371
6. Appraisal	383
XVI CONCLUSION	395
INDEX	409

MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE SOCIAL ORDER

THE essential characteristics of *order* are arrangement and relationship. If these marks can be assumed for a given whole or unit, and if there is uniformity in nature, there appears an additional feature of enormous importance to man—dependability. These three qualities form the basis of prediction. These points are important enough to linger over for a moment.

By *arrangement* we mean that chosen units, whether worlds, marbles or atoms, are located in ascertainable places and present the appearance of a pattern. The keys on a typewriter are arranged; the pages in this book, the words on the pages and the letters in the words, are arranged; so with the goods in a store, the houses in a city, the parts of a machine. These are space arrangements. There are also time arrangements. Columbus discovered America *before* the American Revolution. The Civil War occurred *after* the French Revolution. The street cars now on the city streets are separated in space, they are now located in various parts of the city; but they are also separated in time, since one comes along after another. There may be much or little time or space between them.

But arrangement is not of great significance for man unless there is also *relationship*. Unrelated units make a junk-heap. It is really relationship that gives importance

to arrangement. By relationship we mean that units, of whatever type chosen, are continuous with each other, are able to run into, push against or otherwise affect each other; we mean that the explanation of any one of them would not be complete without showing its connections with others; we mean a condition of "tied-togetherness" such that the impulses or activities of any one flow across and set up impulses or activities in others; by relationship we refer to that ultimate indivisibility and inseparability of units which we discover everywhere about us. A stove is related to a house, a horse is related to a cart, an engine is related to the wheels of an automobile, a boy is related to his father. There are many varieties of relationship, but we wish only to emphasize the general fact.

On the basis of arrangement and relationship, we impute that quality called *dependability*. Units being found in certain patterns, and being tied together to some extent, we can rely on a measure of stability; we can rest assured. The house remains where we left it this morning so that we can find it again at night, the street car comes along at predictable intervals, the seasons come and go in well-known fashion, this book will not disintegrate and vanish while it is being held. But if there is change, as there always is, we can also learn to calculate its rate and so remain confident. The world would be a very horrible place in which to live if we could not depend on anything and could predict nothing. There is much that is undependable and unpredictable—some of us in paying our debts for example; and this part of our world is a most baffling and irritating part. But there is much that we can safely assume and rely on. The opposite of these features that we have mentioned would be chaos.

Now, these characteristics apply to that part of the world order which we have called society. There is a social order. Human beings are units, and they are arranged over the earth, some living here and some there, some living above

and some below, some living before and some after others. They are also related, tied together, continuous with each other, affected by one another in thousands of ways. Some are connected by blood relationship, some by religious aspirations, some by political enthusiasms, some by sex interests. In countless forms, what any one of them or any group of them does or fails to do, affects and determines what other individuals and groups can or wish to do. If some work, others can play; if some die, others will have to work or go to the poorhouse; if some worship, others are moved to do the same or the opposite. Our life-procedures are interlinked and interlocked in innumerable and complicated ways.

They continue to be interlinked and interlocked for longer or shorter periods of time. Always some people are organizing industries and perpetuating them, some are founding families and holding them together, some are moving according to the ways of creed and ritual, some are establishing schools and colleges and requiring the young to attend them. Look where we will in the social life about us, we see individuals and groups behaving uniformly, repetitiously, regularly. For all that fashions and fads, individual distinctions, novelties and differences, appear in such profusion, be not led astray; these are to the social order what the ripples and waves are to the ocean. Back of the ripples are the waves; back of the waves are the slow-moving tides; back of the tides are the mammoth currents and the almost changeless deep.

The social order has its "almost changeless" deep. It is composed of these regularities, repetitions, uniformities in human activity-patterns which are structural and functional, and provide our social home. Sumner speaks of these activity-patterns as folkways and mores; sometimes these folkways and mores are enacted into laws. The folkways are the beginnings of social action. People have similar individual needs and begin to satisfy them in similar

ways in the same environment. This procedure makes folkways. The people did not *intend* to make folkways; they intended to satisfy their personal needs. But in doing this, they acted uniformly, repetitiously; they made mass action. "The folkways, at any time," says Sumner, "provide for all the needs of life then and there. They are uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable. As time goes on, the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so. A sanction also arises from ghost fear. The ghosts of ancestors would be angry if the living should change the ancient folkways."¹

People are caught in the folkways before they know it, just as they acquire habits before they know it. Whenever they become aware of the fact that they are "in" the folkways, and criticize them and approve them, and continue to follow them, these folkways become "mores." The mores are those folkways which have been examined, judged useful and beneficial and made into approved activity-patterns. Then, if these ways are deemed very essential, they are sometimes made into laws with definite and specified penalties for infraction attached. The whole then becomes what Sumner calls the "prosperity policy" of the group.

Every group, whether fraternity, university, city, state or nation, has its own network of folkways, mores and laws. Indeed, these are the basis of the group's coherence, of its existence. Take away these invariable and imperative uniformities, and the group dissolves; it ceases to exist. The individuals composing it continue to exist, but the group has passed into nothingness.

Because these ways have been long-standing activity-patterns, because they were started by ancestors, now

¹ *Folkways*. 2.

spirits, because they provide for the needs of the time and place, they are the approved and the *right* ways. They form a standard; they become a force. The young are brought up in them and imitate them. The old, in addition, teach them to the young and require conformance. Thus there is gradually set up a massive, stable, compelling social structure, a vast, inclusive, inescapable network of *ways* of life. The masses are comfortable in them, believe in them, support them and defend them. As we shall see, there is woe for such as depart in any sense from them.

There is a prevailing standard-complex for any inclusive group like a race or a nation. There are similar and consistent standard-complexes for lesser groups like churches, lodges, business organizations and sororities. The ways of these latter must conform, in the main, to the ways of the larger whole. Woe to them if they hesitate or diverge at any significant points.

Any society is a number of people interacting according to these widely prescribed ways, moving their bodies around in conformance with the plan-network, feeling in harmony with the prevailing and acceptable "feel," and thinking in the characteristic thought-patterns. The members of any given group *are* members by virtue of their harmonious and co-operative actions, feelings and thoughts. There is no other kind of membership. The older the society, the more harmonious, the more integrated, the more interlocked do these action-, feeling- and thought-patterns become. Observed at any point of time and in any given place, this is the social order.

2. DISRUPTIVE FACTORS

But a given network of interlinked and interlocked life-ways never becomes everlastingly fixed and unchangeable like cement. They "set" and harden, as we have seen, but they do not become utterly inflexible. The history of any

society, any organization, shows that it is ever being made and remade; change, to a greater or less degree, is always going on. What are the reasons for this? The answer is that there are always disruptive forces at work. We may speak of these as (a) external and (b) internal.

Noting the former first, we may recall that the physical environment, to which many of these structures are erected as saving adjustments, is not itself unchanging. We are all too well acquainted with the fact that it leaps forth into action extraordinary in quite unexpected and incalculable ways and places; and we know, to our sorrow, that it throws these life-patterns into confusion. Environmental manifestations like earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, droughts, devastating fires, occur at unpredictable intervals and wreck or fracture social organizations just as they do buildings. No social order, so smitten, has come out unmodified. The stories of Pompeii, Rome and Yokohama furnish pertinent illustrations. The environmental factors are always at work in quieter but none the less compelling ways as well.

Such forces are subject only to limited control by man, and, whatever control he achieves, he accomplishes mainly by introducing more flexibility, which means more intelligence, into his social system. But while he introduces more flexibility, he is always loath to have less structural invariability and well-grounded certainty. And here is where the internal disruptive forces appear. The membership of any group we care to name is always composed of two classes—those who insist upon and defend invariability, inflexibility, unchangeableness in the life-patterns, and those who insist upon and defend variability, flexibility and change. The first group, the routineers, is fascinated by the fairly satisfactory and comfortable adjustments of the *now*; they wish not to fly into situations which they do not understand. The second group, the innovators, usually composed of those who are not quite happy in the present

arrangements, is captivated by some vision of a possible and better future; they agree that conditions could not be much worse.

The everlasting struggle between these groups is at once the source of endless trouble and damage to the social order and also the basis of its salvation. Since the physical environment changes, the social order must change to keep intact; this is the point emphasized by some innovators. But since the network is so well integrated, since the whole is so large, since we cannot always know where we are going, it is better to stay where we are or move very slowly, say the routineers. Thus the battle of the ages goes on. If both groups were composed solely of scientists devoted wholly to discovering and applying the truth, the struggle would not be so bitter nor so destructive. But being composed for the most part of selfish, stupid, ordinary human beings, the battle is, at times, exceedingly ruthless and damaging. It is here that "man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn,"—angry, blindly loyal, scornful, insane, criminal. Nature is vicious enough in her attacks upon his social system, but man is far and away his own worst enemy. The historical record testifies unanswerably to this fact.

Within any society, some persons are always too dull to imitate successfully or to see the importance of imitating; some are too sick to imitate or to see the desirability of it; some are brought up in such impoverished environments that they never are confronted with good patterns or have much positive teaching; some definitely and positively repudiate the prevailing standard-patterns because insane or infatuated with a vision; some are taught specific anti-social, non-conformance ways.

To illustrate more precisely, take our own prevailing life-pattern. The majority eat three meals each day; but some eat four and some only two. These are variants, but their departures are not very serious; they incon-

venience few others. There are prevailing standards of dress; but some garb themselves too scantily. This is rather more serious because of the sex-taboo. We have prevailing standards of loyalty and patriotism; but some preach radical doctrines of various kinds and stir up excitement among many. This type of variation becomes insupportable to the loyal and the patriotic. Some won't work, some will steal, some will kill; this is variation from long-standing norms, and becomes intolerable because others have to suffer thereby. So there are no limits to the possibilities for divergence, innovation. Thus for many causes, some violate the accepted rules of the social game, thereby interfering with its smooth procedure and starting damaging impulses in all directions. We are not making wholesale condemnations; we are simply stating the fact that innovation is generally held, by those thoroughly loyal to the age-old usages, to be inimical to social order; and it will continue to disrupt it and confuse it until there can be a reconciliation between the routineers and the innovators.

There is and there can be no absolute standard for judging innovators, either in logic or experience, because conditions change. Consequently there have been and there are the greatest differences in the estimates of those who vary. One group admires and follows Jesus; another group does not. One age administers the poisonous cup to Socrates; another age worships him. One sect sends John Huss to the stake; another sect enthrones him and concentrates its loyalty upon him. Napoleon is a hero and a saviour to one nation; others fear, detest and struggle to eliminate him. The Bolsheviks are admired and supported by certain people in Russia; they are hated and abominated by certain people in other parts of the world.

The masses and their network of sacred activity-patterns and belief-standards are the line to which people have to hew—in practice. And the masses always thrust up standard and compromising leaders who manœuvre their fol-

lowers into attitudes of deeper and more uncompromising loyalty to the old code. For what the masses want is comfort and certainty in a tolerable order. They dislike change because that always involves an unknown. They do not wish to face unnecessary crises and be compelled to think and make choices. So they have always fought off and tried to destroy the innovators.

3. CONTROL NECESSARY

These disruptive forces, nature and recalcitrant men, create crises; they create the problem of social control. Now, *some* arranged set of relationships among human beings is necessary to human welfare. Theoretically speaking, what form it assumes is a matter of small moment; human beings are plastic and have been comfortably adjusted to a great many different social forms. But the form of the social order is not, emphatically *not*, unimportant in the eyes of any given group at any given time. The monogamous form of marriage, for example, is not unimportant to most of us Americans at the present time. Some Thibetans hold that polyandry is the best form, and they get along with it and would defend it with all their might. So is it with the economic order. In the United States we have grown up under the capitalistic régime, we have survived under it and grown rich—as a nation. Many detest it and fight it; but it is the prevailing and controlling form. So with political and religious arrangements. The masses, through imitation and teaching, are quite *at home* in these structures, quite generally believe that they are sacred, that is, untouchable, resent criticism of them and defend them with abandon. These arrangements are to the majority what the shell is to the turtle—a home, or what the skeleton is to any other animal—internal support. They are *one* kind of order.

Hence, towards the innovators, the routineer-masses

assume an attitude of hostility and organize to discover them, judge them and suppress them. We who are, for the time being, students and observers, have to descry, then, in human affairs (1) the slow-moving, largely blind, groping majority, (2) the aggressive and radical beckoners-forward, and (3) the belated stragglers at the rear—these three groups. And because of their numbers, and the leaders who believe in them and toady to them, the masses usually retain or strive to retain power over the other two, restraining and repressing the aggressive and whipping or kicking the slow. So we march. The assumption is that any sort of order is better than none and, as a rule, this is a sound assumption, the product of costly human experience during transitional stages.

The problem of social control arises whenever the aggressive or the slow come to the notice of the majority or the agents of the majority, or whenever there is conflict between any two of these three groups. In these ever-recurring emergencies, what can be done to maintain order, to avoid chaos? What is done? What ought to be done? The answer to the last question would lead us into the field of ethics and we do not care to go there at present. We are concerned with the other two questions, and especially with the second—What *is* done? An adequate answer to this question would provide us with a satisfying solution of an insistent problem—What is social control?

A satisfactory definition of “social control” has not yet been made. Perhaps we can enrich our conception of it if we point out some of its necessary ingredients. In the first place there must be some authority—and all that goes with it. In the second place there must be a clearly-defined and communicable program of action or attitude—with all that is involved. In the third place there must be an adequate communication system, a system that reaches the proper persons. In the fourth place there must be free and impressible individuals or groups who respond to and

re-embody the program and attitudes. We have the familiar stimulus-response pattern; but it is an infinitely complicated pattern.

In familiar language, social control means getting others to do, believe, think, feel, any one or all four, as we wish them to, using the term "we" to stand for any authority who can have his way with others. A stranger wants to "borrow" a dollar and succeeds at his little game; that is social control in the most elementary sense; it is social because it involves two people; it is social because there is effective communication; it is control because the tramp had his way; there was an effective transference of will.

The parent induces the child to retire. That is social control in the sense already indicated; and, in addition, in the sense that the family, a social institution, is able to govern itself; an authority—the parent, not merely an individual—is able to impose his or her pattern upon a member. It is social in the sense that the object of the effort is the advantage of more than one person. It is social in the sense that the family, if it can govern itself properly, contributes to the maintenance of the inclusive society by imposing the activity-patterns and standards of the latter upon the young. This statement may be generalized to any extent—the teacher with the pupils, the school board with the school, the denomination with the local congregation, the nation with the citizens.

Social control has usually meant that kind of life-pattern which a government, through its officers, imposes upon the citizen. But we have seen that social control means vastly more than that. We might speak of it as the practice of putting forth directive stimuli or wish-patterns, their accurate transmission to, and adoption by, others whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In short, it is effective will-transference. Ideally, social control would be in the hands and the interests of the inclusive group whatever it is; practically, however, it is in the hands of, and often in the

interests of, some few members who have usurped power and know how to use it. A little reflection will show that all social problems are ultimately problems of social control—capital and labor, prostitution, taxes, crime, international relations. When these are sifted to the bottom and their ultimate meaning is discerned, they are simply social situations requiring control.

4. TWO METHODS

Viewing the matter very broadly, we may say that there are two outstanding methods of procedure in this work of control, (1) the physical force method and (2) the human symbol method. For our purposes it is important to distinguish these two types clearly. Let us see what the methods would be in each case.

(1) When a workman wishes to impose his will upon a stone, he has to make applications of physical energy in some form. He cannot stand back and wish it away as is done in fairyland; he cannot command it to get up and move off. When the mother wishes to have a very young child take a bath, she is in the same situation as the man with the stone; she has to lift it up, carry it to the bath room and do the scrubbing. When the policeman desires to have the arrested culprit go to jail, he has to reckon, not only with the dead weight of the man often, but also with any resistance exerted, unless the prisoner volunteers to go along peaceably. In some cases, one policeman could not take a man to jail at all. There are many instances in our human relationships when order is maintained, will-transference is effected, by applications of physical force. Nothing else seems to succeed.

But, with physical control as the *only* means for the management of human beings, the maintenance of a *social* order would be impossible. Let us follow the series through, for purposes of contrast—in a world with nothing

but physical force to move men. If it is desired to take the culprit to jail, two or three policemen would have to be assembled at the spot, and be forced to pit their strength against that of the victim. But how would the two or three policemen be assembled? They would have to be forced there by others. They could not be *called* there. But who would the others be and who would push or drag them around to push or drag the several policemen to the required spot? Were that the only means of control we should have a series of relationships something like the following: Somebody would have to push somebody who would have to push somebody else who would push the policemen who would push or drag the culprit to jail. And the series leads back to—nowhere; it becomes utterly ridiculous to imagine it, for there is no end. With no means but this, we should all be on the level of pigs rooting each other out of the trough in order to get in and being rooted out in turn; the strongest would always win. It is all unthinkable, wholly absurd. But why is it absurd?

(2) The sufficient answer is that man has developed a quicker, a more economical, a more personality-respecting, a more order-preserving way of procedure—the symbol way. This method is so old and so familiar that we never reflect upon its marvels; we never try to guess what would happen to human affairs if it were eliminated. But, we must never forget that the use of this method, not only in control but in many other relationships of life, lifts man to a new level and distinguishes him from other creatures. If man lost this art, he would rapidly degenerate into some unimaginable form; his civilization would dissolve over night. The physical method is absurd because there is an infinitely better method. But what do we mean by the symbol method of control?

The gesture of pointing towards the door, for the purpose of conveying the idea, “Shut the door,” is a symbol. We can write the word “apple” on the blackboard and im-

mediately an image of an apple will come to mind; writing is all symbolism. We can wave the flag of our country and that activity arouses feeling and sentiments of loyalty. Now the flag is, intrinsically, nothing but a piece of cloth with certain colors and marks on it. Of itself it is very little; but it *stands for* or *points toward* something else which is very different; it *represents* the country. The olive branch has come to stand for peace. H₂O stands for water. A figure of a portly old gentleman with a high hat, "John Bull," stands for England.²

So throughout the centuries, people have taken gestures, sounds, writing, and many material objects such as engagement rings, badges, church spires and made them into substitutes for other things in order to arouse feelings, create attitudes, convey ideas and promote activities in others. When we read these words, we are not interested in the peculiar marks which they are, but in what they stand for, what they suggest, what they awaken within us. In themselves they are, like the flag, very little; what they awaken within us is the important part. We are most concerned with what they represent.

Man has gradually built up extensive systems composed of these symbols. A pantomime by some æsthetic dancers would be such a system. Language is such a system. The ritual in a church, a grand parade, the account books of a business firm, large libraries, are familiar examples of these symbol-systems. They are often very complex and stand for or call forth very complicated responses. They have been devised primarily for the purpose of moving people about in desired ways. The teacher says to the pupil: "Jimmie, go to the board and write out the lesson." This is a symbol-complex of sounds. If he extracts her meaning, if he gathers from these sounds the intention which she has for him and goes to work accordingly, we say that she has controlled him. Yet she did not *touch* him in the nar-

² Cf. Bode. *Fundamentals of Education*. 105.

row sense; she did not *force* him in the physical sense; she *communicated* with him by symbols—sound symbols in this instance—and had her way with him by this means. This is the human way.³

The economy in this method of control is obvious. It would be an impossible arrangement, as we have seen, if the teacher had to carry Jimmie to the board and then move his hands. It is very simple to *send* him there. But, of course, it is clear that he must be able to extract her meaning from the sounds, to get out of these symbols what she put in them. If he can do it but won't, that is one problem. If he can't do it but would, that is another and a very different problem. There are innumerable possibilities here. But we have to see that control by the symbol way is an enormous saving in energy—the energy of the controllers and of the controlled as well. It is a tremendous gain from the point of view of respect for personality. When we have to resort to physical force, it means that the controller has to carry a double burden. In addition, one is apt to encounter more resistance. Furthermore, one is never sure that the work is completed. But all of these points we shall amply illustrate later.

The *best* possible situation conceivable, in the work of control, is where the controller clearly and unmistakably delivers his message, the recipient clearly and unmistakably grasps its meaning, and then the body responds readily and accurately. There is nothing superior to this unless it be mind-reading, where the one to be controlled gains access to the controller's thoughts before he puts forth the energy to express them. Since mind-reading is quite unreliable at present, we have no hesitation in saying that there is no higher type of control than the one indicated.

Needless to say, however, we are all falling short of this level most of the time. There is much inability to deliver fully and accurately the message; there is much inability

³ Cf. Bernard. *Instinct*. 92, 107 ff.

—far more than we are willing to admit—to comprehend it exactly; there is much inability and unwillingness to respond to and reincarnate the message. Such failures immeasurably complicate and slow up the work of control.

If the above-described situation is the best known to man, the very *worst* situation is where physical force has to be employed, and where it is employed harshly and painfully. There are many reasons why it is the worst but we shall not stop to list them. We have only to say, in closing this section, that there is nothing for the human race to do but struggle on with the work of clarifying its message, with the work of perfecting its means of communication, and with the work of bringing into existence a race of young who are normal enough to learn the symbols and their meanings—these three kinds of work.

5. CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL DEVICES

Man has always had with him the problem of control. He has therefore gradually evolved a very large number of symbol-systems, devices, and mechanisms for the purpose of maintaining order. A familiar example is the *taboo*. A well-known instance of this is the denial of access to certain sacred places and objects. The place or the object may not be inaccessible in fact; it may be entirely accessible. But a barrier is interposed in the shape of an avoidance custom which is imitated, a warning sound which is understood, a gesture which is significant, or in some other way, so that the young grasp the social message and stay away. So effectually does this taboo work in some cases that young men have been known to die of fright when informed that they had violated the rule.

Another very interesting organization of symbols, a well-integrated network, is music. Certain people make harmonious sounds on an instrument of some sort. These

sounds are stimuli which arouse agreeable feelings and awaken definite ideas in the minds of the hearers. Often the muscles of the hearers' bodies are intrigued into rhythmic activities in unison with the sound impulses, and we have dancing. This is control.

There are thousands of such symbol-organizations or mechanisms which the human race has developed, consciously or unconsciously, for the purpose of applying pressure without physical contact. In his classic study of the subject, Professor Ross names public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion, education, custom, social religion, ideals, ceremony, art, personality, enlightenment, illusion and social valuations.⁴ Park and Burgess mention some of these and add taboo, myth, and the newspaper.⁵

In this study we have considered a different list. Its contents will be evident in the following chapters. With these devices before us, the problem of their classification is presented. Research has not advanced far enough yet to enable us to make an adequate classification. But we wish to suggest a number of standpoints from which the various devices may be considered and express the hope that some day satisfactory groupings may be made.

From the standpoint of *aim*, they may be roughly classified into (a) those which are directed to the work of elicitation. These are applied to evoke from individuals and groups more of the same thing or something better in the same direction. As examples we might think of rewards, praise, cajolery, persuasion, education. On the other hand are (b) numerous mechanisms calculated to restrain and repress the overly aggressive and to prod up the stupid and slow. In this category might be included gossip, satire, calling names, laughter, criticism, threats, propaganda and punishment. The classification is faulty,

⁴ *Social Control*. 89 ff.

⁵ *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. 854.

however, in that the same device is sometimes used for both purposes. For example, education often serves to *elicit more of the same thing*, but is also used to repress, to turn the young out of certain activity-patterns and into others. Commands are used to quicken the slow and also to restrain. With this difficulty in mind, we shall not attempt a hard and fast grouping.

It is very desirable to have a grading of social control instrumentalities from the point of view of the *ease* with which they may be used. Obviously they differ greatly in this respect. Many are competent to use the command who could not use the slogan. Propaganda is an instrument requiring unusual skill and a compact organization. Some find it easier to call names than to use cajolery or rewards. So it is all the way through. Now it is clear that much of the value of any instrument is in the using, and that there is great gain when the controls are applied by those who are thoroughly at home with them and master of them. We are very poorly informed at this point. Consequently amateurs are always trying their hand, like the small child with its father's old gun, with the most intricate mechanisms—with the inevitable bungling.

From the point of view of *cost of operation* there are wide differences, and a gradation is desirable from this angle. As Ross points out,⁶ punishment is cheaper than rewards; and so the matter appears on the surface. But the term "cheaper" might refer to the ultimate social gain as well as to the immediate money cost. We do not yet know whether, considering the amount of bad feeling engendered, punishment is ultimately cheaper. If there is room for doubt at this point, how much more room is there for doubt over the comparative costs of laughter, commands, persuasion and slogans! Investigations have not gone far enough to take us much beyond the guessing stage.

Yet this is a highly important matter relative to social economy. We certainly would like to know wherein we are paying too much for our whistle.

Another approach is from the angle of *authority*. We understand, of course, that all of these devices, to be effectual, must be backed up by, and make a manifestation of, authority. That is to say, they must grip the controlled so as to command attention and respect. But which ones will do this best is as yet very much a matter of opinion. Gifted persons can put as much pressure into a satirical remark as others can put into a fine or a threat. This point will receive some attention later.

These devices may also be classified according to their *clarity of meaning*. A command is more clear than propaganda; the meaning of criticism is more obvious than the meaning of laughter; plenty of children are puzzled about whippings whereas a word of explanation is often sufficient. There are numerous genuine differences at this point which would furnish bases of judgment in the work of classification.

The *degree of mechanism* necessary to make these devices effectual also provides a starting point for their consideration. Propaganda, aside from its gossip-aspect, requires an elaborate and costly mechanism, but persuasion may be quite face-to-face and simple. Advertising is a highly technical undertaking, whereas calling names requires nothing but a nasty vocabulary. Education, in any formal sense, is an undertaking for experts using precise methods and backed up by a highly expensive social organization, but flattery calls mainly for merely a ready tongue.

Another point of approach is the *degree of intimacy* involved. "The reader will hardly have failed to notice," says Professor Ross, "that in such forms of control as public opinion, law, suggestion, personality, there is a pretty direct and immediate management of one person by others.

But in other kinds of control something comes in between the controller and the controlled—some ideal, religious belief, symbol, or standard that is a necessary means in the business, and that is not originated for the particular occasion.”⁷

Applications of physical energy are of course direct and immediate enough. Most of the psychic controls are, however, dependent for their effectualness upon something already accepted such as an ideal or belief. But very probably, as Ross says, there are degrees of intimacy. Yet every device that we know anything about might be used in the home, for example. But even there different degrees of familiarity are maintained.

It would be possible, with further study, to group these control devices according to the appeal which they make to the *feelings* and the *intellect*. Some of them are almost wholly addressed to the feelings, some are calculated to quicken thought. They differ widely, and even fundamentally, with reference to this emphasis.

In a highly practical age, the most important basis of classification would seem to be in terms of *results*. Of course this depends upon what people want, upon their scale of values. Theoretically, the ultimate demand is for order, a well-integrated social order. Practically, we want our order, you want yours. We cannot always agree on what we want.

Results might be stated in terms of skill on the part of the controller, the dexterity of his manipulations; but that is not enough. They might also be stated in terms of the swift responses of people in taking the indicated places in the social system; but that would be an inadequate statement.

As a matter of fact, all of these various features are necessary elements in the results desired—skillful deliver-

⁷ *Op. cit.* 340.

ers of the message, adequate communication systems and satisfactory responses. If we have the first two and not the last, we are very far from establishing control. The character of the recipients of pressures has already been alluded to, but a further word seems necessary.

When a butcher selects an implement it is important that he know what he is going to cut. When a controller sets out to control it is necessary, from the standpoint of results, that he know the nature of the subjects to be managed. All can see that different means would be employed by an *intelligent* controller in the work of putting a baby to bed and preventing a raging angry man from committing murder. What do we know about the materials to be controlled? This raises the problem of the nature of man, his original and his acquired natures, his reflexes, instincts and habits. A vast amount of research has been carried on at these points, and the light is coming—slowly. When we know what we have to work *with*, we can be more sure of the results.

Yet, in so far as we try to make an intelligent selection of means in relation to ends, we have all human experience of success and failure to learn from, and this experience is not without its fruitful suggestions. All the devices for control have been used for centuries. Primitive people, we are told, very often use little punishment; they discipline well with banter and ridicule. In our own stream of civilization, there is some evidence that satire was thought to be very effective for certain types of innovators. At present we are strong for education. During the Middle Ages, ferocious punishments were meted out without stint. In the World War, the power of propaganda was rediscovered. The historical record is not quite devoid of information relative to this matter of results. But we shall deal with this subject in the concrete as we proceed.

6. BEGINNINGS OF CONTROL

“Any effort to understand the process of social control,” says Professor Groves, “must start the analysis upon the the lowest level of response, the reflex.

“The earliest form (Does he mean *effect*?) of social control appears in what is known as the conditioned reflex. Pavlov, a great Russian physiologist, studied the secretion of the salivary gland in the dog as affected by different stimuli. He found, for example, by feeding a dog meat and at the same time ringing a bell, that after a time the ringing of the bell alone would produce the same flow of saliva as that ordinarily following the stimulus of the meat. The two stimuli had become so related together that the sound of the bell had the same influence upon the reflex mechanism as the physical presence of the meat. This kind of reaction is known as the conditioned reflex. The associated stimulus may, however, have an inhibitory relation to the stimulus with which it is brought into habitual association and in this way a process of control is originated.”⁸

In a delicately articulated society, a highly complex order, these reflexes and the series of them which we call instincts, cannot always be allowed to discharge according to their nature; some of them have to be inhibited, some have to be re-attached. In the very young, the parents are the ones who do this work, the controllers; and training carried on by such controllers in the first years of childhood is very largely a more or less skillful attempt to build up conditioned reflexes, that is, to attach the natural out-reachings of the child to objects or values that are accepted and approved by the parents. This is also the work of the school, the church, industry and government.

What objects or values are accepted and approved by the parents, teachers, ministers and government officials,

⁸ *Personality and Social Adjustment*. 22.

are, as a rule, the products of a long selective experience. They are given value because they have contributed to the survival or happiness of those who prize them. It is felt by these officials that the young cannot survive, or at least, cannot live well without reaching after them. Another way of stating this point is that the outreachings of the young must be canalized into the folkways, mores and laws of the time. These are the conditioning factors for the natural expressions.

Social control begins in this simple manner. It grows ever more involved as the want-expressions of the growing young become more numerous. There is no escape from this conditioning activity as long as one remains where other human beings are. The process continues, with vigor appropriate to the need, as long as life lasts. It is by this process that little animals are made human. It is by the very same process, but with different controllers and different methods, that little animals are made over into very bad people. The same process, differently organized, makes a saint or a devil.

7. THE ETHICAL QUESTION

Control means restraint of course; it spells out limitation. It means prohibition from certain activities, thoughts and feelings; it means requirement of certain others. Very few natural, original impulses are allowed to discharge as they would outside of social organization.

Some readily submit to this volume of regulation and become quite at home in it; they do not feel it as a weight or as a limitation any more than we feel atmospheric pressure.

But many others resist. Some of them resist from impulse and call for open ways into which their native endowment may run. Others resist on principle, holding that all repression is wrong. What actually happens in this

latter case, however, is that they accept some authorities and refuse others; they can never get along without authority of some kind.

The question is always before us, then, as to how much or how little restraint ought to be imposed. We are always faced with the problem of how light or how heavy the hand of power should fall upon the individual shoulder. Since controllers are weak creatures and liable to make mistakes, and since they often bungle their methods and act like simpletons or fiends, and since we have not absolute standards for judging right and wrong, what criteria can be found for determining the amount of control that should be meted out?

There can be no general answer to these questions. We cannot say, until we have analyzed the situation, how much or how little, how light or how heavy, pressure should be imposed. We have to take each case of control by itself.

The mother *commands* the boy to stay in nights. Is it right to do this? There is the question of the effect of going out nights on his health, his attitudes, his studies, his companions, his future, the family régime, the community and society at large. Some analysis of all these factors must be made before an intelligent and moral answer can be given to the question. Should a boy ever be commanded? Should commands, as a control device, ever be used? We can find no satisfactory answers until we have analyzed all that is involved—which is a good deal.

So is it with all the other controls that we consider, and the others that are used. We have endeavored to open up the question, under the head of “merits and demerits,” when considering the specific instrument and its work. The only generalization that we care to make at this time is this: If the use of the control device, in a given instance, makes for increased confusion or secures what is inimical to social order as a whole, we may say that it is of doubtful

ethical value. We have tried to make this point clear in discussing punishment. The evidence is not so clearly defined at other points.

8. OUR STUDY

We have selected only a few of the symbol-organizations for investigation. And we have selected only certain aspects of these. We have given attention primarily to the structures—to use the unfailing biological analogy—of these devices, to the innumerable units of their make-up and their articulation. Since everything is on the move, we might interpret these structures as methods. We are especially anxious to see these instrumentalities *at work*. We wish to know, not only what they do but how they do it. Some history of their development, when it can be discovered, is included that the student may be eased into an intimate acquaintance.

In addition, of course, we are interested in results; we would like to have a more intelligent basis for using or refusing, approving or condemning, these devices. The artistry with which they are used does not furnish this basis, although the lack of artistry may do so. The results gained provide this basis; hence some attention will be given to them.

But here is an insurmountable difficulty—we cannot always or frequently make clear what we shall call the *follow-through*; we cannot always or often keep our eye on the device as, in use, it dissolves and transforms itself into the desired effect. This difficulty faces us everywhere. We utter a satirical remark. The recipient of it crumples up. Is the satire the cause, the only cause, of the crumpling? We laugh at some pompous person. He immediately assumes a humble attitude. Is the laughter the adequate antecedent of his humility? There is nearly always a hiatus, an inexplorable region, between the two sets of phenomena,

satire—crumpling. Nowhere is the need of further research more evident than here.

If it is desired to relate these discussions to the larger field of sociological investigation, we might think of what follows as a survey of certain *mores*. Certainly, with two or three possible exceptions, the devices considered are clear cases of the mores; they are popular usages which are generally deemed conducive to social welfare.

Again, we might regard the study as an examination of some fundamental faucets through which *public opinion* flows to the citizen. It is quite clear that gossip is one of these faucets; it is obvious that satire, formal and informal, is another; there is no doubt that public opinion reaches the individual by means of laughter, threats, rewards and praise. The social mind distils itself upon the people in these ways.

We would not go amiss if we interpreted the play of these devices as an index of tolerance—or intolerance, as the case may be. All persons, all the time are not subjected to these particular pressures; only certain ones at certain times; there is whimsical and incalculable eruption and subsidence in the play of these devices. What does this mean? It means that there are popularly defined, therefore often poorly defined, limits beyond which citizen-members must not wander. A great display of rewards and praise indicates that the ways of the recipients have been noticed and are approved. An outburst of satire, threats or punishment indicates that certain activities are noticed, disapproved and discouraged. In the former case, there is comfort, satisfaction, happiness, in the said persons; in the latter case there is discomfort, dissatisfaction, unhappiness, suspicion, rising prejudices, anger—intolerance. The appearance of these workings is a sort of social weather-gauge by which we may judge the degree of temperature, of fever, obtaining.

It is possible also to conceive this study as an examina-

tion of some forms of social conflict. When all goes well within the tribe or group, its teeth are held under cover. But when objectionable variants appear, the teeth are disclosed. Now, variation of any sort is an indication of conflict; it is a separatist movement with a possible fly-back. The minute it is observed there is a rush for these faithful old instruments. Then the variants must defend themselves. This is conflict. It may be mild, a war of words; it may be severe, a war of "blood and iron."

Other ways of conceiving this study might be mentioned. It is perhaps sufficient to say, finally, that we view it as an attempted analysis of some means of social control—a process of unparalleled importance within the general social process. And we ask our readers to keep constantly in mind a picture of the social situation which, by way of remembrance, may be briefly sketched. In the center is the mass of the people trudging along, half awake and fairly comfortable, according to an age-old pattern which is measurably acceptable; the various life-marchers are fairly tolerant, genial and amiable.

On the outskirts, however, are those persons who, for countless reasons, go astray. They diverge from the general course by reason of selfishness, greed, love of adventure, timidity, stupidity and what not; they manifest this divergency by stealing, murder, uttering heresy, refusing to work, boasting, strutting, breaking contracts, and doing many other things. These activities stir up the masses, or sections of them, who feel disgust, excitement, contempt, hatred, fear, loyalty, and express these states by efforts at control. The instruments they attempt to use in these instances are the subject of our discussion. We wish to see what happens in such emergencies.

A final word may be this. We believe that this study, and other similar studies, will have some value for students and for the general reader in at least two ways. (1) It will systematically remind them of what is in store

for them when they vary from the accepted code in any objectionable ways. This knowledge ought to help them to decide beforehand whether the gain from the proposed variation, to themselves or to any others, will be worth the probable price they will have to pay; they may decide whether they have the courage to carry it through. Thus they can be as nearly rational as it is possible to be with respect to a social contingency which frequently arises. Foresight has some advantage over hindsight.

(2) Again, we think there will be some advantage in being better informed as to the resources, the instrumentalities and their uses, available if, being utterly loyal and opposed to variation, they find it necessary or desirable to take a hand in the work of control. They can then select the devices which they can use best, polish them up, and prepare for the inevitable struggle.

In either case, it seems to us that a study of the numerous control mechanisms cannot fail to clarify the way of life for all of us who have to walk the narrow and winding path between the cradle and the grave with none too much light to guide us at best.

CHAPTER II

REWARDS

‘YOU call these toys? Well, you manage men with toys.’ These words from Napoleon, with reference to the ribbons and crosses of his Legion of Honor, appropriately introduce the subject of rewards as a means of social control. Not only are the words appropriate, but their source means much since Napoleon was so conspicuously able in his management of men. We may well take this theme, then, and work out some of its meaning.¹

1. DEFINITIONS

At the outset it is necessary to set down what we have in mind when discussing rewards. Obviously almost any addition to our stores that is valued may be received and used as a reward—a hair pin, a sand bank, a bit of cloth, a book, an automobile. Almost any *thing*. And this is so because almost everything has value to some one. But there are intangibles as well—a compliment, a promise of a raise in wages, an appointment to an office, a position of honor. These tangibles and intangibles are everywhere and every day employed in this way; they serve as rewards, and they influence people.

How, then, may we define a reward? In answer it may be said that a reward is something from a limited supply, or hard to obtain, not contracted for, and that may fail, coming to us in addition to the usual and expected compensations of life. These features require some explanation. First, rewards come from a limited supply. This

¹ Cf. Ross. *Social Control*. 39.

means that unless the goods of life are quantitatively limited, nobody regards them as prizes; if such goods are accessible to everybody, they are not held in high esteem, and hence are not exceptionally attractive. Second, they are hard to obtain because they are limited or because heroic effort must be expended to secure them, whence it follows that a legacy is not a reward in the sense here used. Third, rewards are not compensations contracted for. If gifts are made as the result of a contract, they are but due returns, they are a *quid pro quo*, they are wages. Fourth, there is an element of uncertainty in rewards in that, not being contracted for, they may fail to come; we may not measure up to the standard set by the donor; we may not fulfill the conditions which we had no part in making. Finally, rewards are something *in addition* to the regular and expected compensations of life; they are *extras* in that they cannot always be anticipated, and if not anticipated then they are not regularly expected, and if not regularly expected, then they do not fall to the level of wages, of an agreed-upon return for effort. Rewards must not be regarded by the recipient as fully merited, for then they fall to the level of wages, simply a just return. To keep them at the level of rewards, the extra gifts of life must be regarded as unusual and exceptional, as something really given, never as a wholly deserved compensation.

What we see, then, as we look out over the human process, is a vast amount of giving of this sort. We see so much of it that we are justified in speaking of a *social practice*. And it is this practice of giving extras that we take to serve as a means of social control.

There is another distinction, however, which must be noted before proceeding. The practice of giving extras in life has two aspects. In the first place, much giving of extras is done for the sheer joy of giving, and looks not at all beyond the act. We give a hundred dollars as a Christmas present as an expression of our affection, as a way of

telling the other party how much we love; nothing else is in mind. The party does not expect the gift; we do not give a hundred dollars to all persons that we love; we give this sum not in place of other transferences usually accepted and expected; other kinds of behavior might have caused us to withhold it, so there is an element of uncertainty in it; hence it is a true reward, but it is only one kind.

In the second place, there is the practice of giving extras which definitely and surely looks beyond the single act. Such giving is not merely from affection, although affection may not be lacking. We continuously give extras for the purpose of stimulating in the recipients and others additional effort of the same kind or effort of a different but approved kind. We give because we want people to behave differently, that is, we give because we want to control them, and we take this means, knowing full well, from ages of experience, that it is an effectual way. The former kind of rewarding is distinguished from this, then, by the fact that nothing specific, probably nothing at all, is expected in return by the donor, whereas in the latter case something very definite is expected in return. In the former case, rewards would be given anyway; in the latter case they would never be given unless some sort of conduct, approved by the donor, were forthcoming or expected.

2. UNIVERSALITY

We have in mind, then, a *practice*. How widely extended is it? We have spoken of giving extras, of exceptional giving, of something that is uncertain. How, then, can we name something so irregular, a practice? The answer must be found in social life. Do people give extras regularly enough to constitute a usage?

In the home there is a very large amount of such distribution. The parents make donations to the children; the

children make gifts to the parents; the children make gifts to each other; various members of the countless families make gifts to friends and neighbors. Certain days in the year, such as Christmas and birthdays, are especially devoted to exchanges of this sort, but the giving is far from confined to such occasions. Hardly a day passes in many homes that some gratuity is not handed out. If one were to make a computation as to the amount and value of the exchanges made in homes, the total would be vast indeed. And it is incontrovertible that a very large amount of this is for the definite object of a *change in conduct* or a continuance of approved conduct.

On the playground there are many extras distributed. The leader gives one player a preferential position of some sort; he tells another a secret which is not generally confided; he hands out some praise to a third; he donates a ball to a fourth. Thus the players are kept in workable humor and the leader maintains his place.

Enlarging our field a little, we may speak of athletics in general. Every specialty has a class of devotees of its own and every class has something in the shape of prizes. Prizes for walking, for running fifty yards, for running one hundred yards, for running two hundred yards, for jumping, for kicking, for wrestling, and what not. There are countless extras held up before the envious gaze of the young. What are they held up for? The sheer joy of the donors? It is clear that they are held up for the purpose of stimulating excellence in this field.

The educational system has countless prizes to award and the number is increasing every year. From the kindergarten to the graduate schools of the great universities, this prize-giving goes on. We may recall the fellowships, scholarships, assistantships, prizes in course, extra privileges, degrees *cum laude* and *summa cum laude*, the various kinds of degrees and all the rest. These are never given from sheer generosity, but always to control.

The church has ever been a husbander and manipulator of rewards. Has it not always professed either to give the sinner that inestimable boon, the forgiveness of sins, or to offer its good offices thereto? Has it not always held out the hope of greater life-satisfaction would people but behave? Has it not emphasized the hope of immortality—that priceless and indescribable reward for which no return could be adequate? Perhaps the church, more than any institution, has appealed to the bargain-hunting crowds in the past, offering something so great and unpurchasable that a painfully righteous life for a few short years on earth appeared as nothing in comparison.

The game of politics has never been carried on without rewards of various kinds. One faithful worker secures a postmastership, another an appointment as collector of internal revenue, another a secretaryship to some high or petty official, another is attached to a commission. Thousands of offices are handed about every time an election changes the chiefs of government. What is called political patronage is but a simple device for the purpose of holding together a corps of workers who will always be available to help deserving candidates. The ward boss hands out the drinks and the cigars and allows the neighbors to loaf about. For the sheer joy of giving? Rather we think for the hold gained on voters.

In the world of industry there are preferments of place, of kind of work, of opportunity, of salaries. The best examples, however, are the bonus systems, the profit-sharing plans, the pension schemes and stock distributions. The profits system is held to be necessary as offering great money returns for ingenuity, effort and skill. There is clear testimony to the value of extras in life in the argument that without this system, industry would break down.

In the realm of what we call "society" there are countless donations. There are gifts of invitations to wealthy homes, to exclusive parties, to banquets, to official positions

in clubs and the like without end. There is in addition the almost universal practice of "tipping."

Without doubt there is so much of this giving of extras all over the world at the present time that we are amply justified in speaking of the practice as universal. Has it always been so? The answer, we think, is quite plain. This is no new thing gotten up in our age. We can find innumerable examples in all the ages. Christmas is not new; birthdays have always been; bonus systems have a history; politicians have always had their henchmen; the hope of immortality was not born yesterday. Rewarding, then, is an old and widely-used device.

3. KINDS OF REWARDS

A survey of this usage reveals an infinite diversity of gifts. We may note that almost everything, tangible and intangible, has been used, provided (a) that it was limited in quantity, and (b) wanted by anybody. A classification might be made from many angles. The following is the simplest that we can make.

(1) We have those childish-satisfying offerings such as sugar-plums, tips, better jobs, cigars, drinks, boxes of candy, flowers, in other words, "toys"—all of which are trivial and inexpensive, but very effective as our experience proves. A world without such things would be a very dull world or somewhat anarchistic. The social order would suffer a severe jolt were these "toys" to be withheld. As we know, an extra privilege puts new life in the student; a cigar pulls over an order for goods; a drink wins a vote; a box of candy has been known to affect the course of true love. The totality of these individually insignificant rewards makes an immense and powerful social movement in the interests of social control.

(2) Then we have the more enduring, infrequent, more limited and highly prized rewards such as election to ex-

clusive societies, awards like the Nobel prize, academic degrees, appointment to high offices, and great wealth. These are expensive, in contrast with the cheaper ones just noted, and are often the unconscious or indirect objects of life-long effort. They can be found only in a highly civilized and complex society where contacts are more frequent, competition is keener, and where there is wealth to provide such gifts.

In passing, it may be noted that the development of democracy threatens, at certain points, the distribution of such distinctions, for democracy is opposed to classes and these gifts and the accompanying privileges help to make and consolidate classes. Doubtless it will be possible some day to work out a social order where the only reward obtainable will be the sheer joy of having participated creatively, where the impulse to workmanship will have been satisfied, and no one will wish anything more. But we are far from that paradise as yet. People still like toys—and the social order has to be kept intact.

It may be inquired, however: Since, by definition, rewards are limited in number and uncertain as to being given, how is it that such an arrangement keeps vast numbers quiet and orderly? It is known, in advance, that only a *few* will be lucky; why, therefore, is the scheme as effective as it is? The answer, we think, is quite obvious. "Hope springs eternal in the human breast." Each struggles—and hopes to be fortunate. Order is maintained, then, by the hope of reward, by the hope of gaining some of the spoils, some of the many and diverse extras of life.

4. THE TECHNIQUE

Rewards lose their value and cease to be such if not given with some circumspection. Careless or indifferent giving is fatal. There is an art in giving that becomes an integral part of the gift, and into the nature of that art we must look

for a little. The features are too numerous to be listed here and given adequate treatment; we shall mention those alone which seem to be most important.

(1) Rewards are dispensed by relatives, friends, or persons known to be in authority. We are reluctant, and wisely so, to accept gifts from strangers. Suspicion is always aroused in this case and some of the control-advantage is lost. But relatives, friends and higher-ups are already, to some degree, vouched for and their gifts do not necessarily arouse questioning as to motive. The control is thus applied indirectly and more effectively. One's resistance is at the lowest point in relation to such persons.

The sending out of gifts from the lower to the higher levels in society is not effective. The poor cannot give anything that the rich do not have or can buy; they cannot, therefore, affect the rich very much in this way and if they try it, they immediately arouse the suspicion that they are "pulling one's leg." The rich, however, give out of their abundance, and the poor add to their little, the gift taking on added significance and value as it penetrates to lower and lower levels of poverty; it takes on added value by comparison. If a child of a poor family presents an expensive gift to father on his birthday, it is not good technique because the father knows at once what the aim is and is put on guard. Conceivably, the child may have had no ulterior, that is to say, control-motive, but the father is most apt to suspect such and be guided accordingly.

If rewards come from others than those who have, or those who have the power to obtain, them legitimately, they are apt to be suspected and fail to be instruments of control.

(2) The circumstances under which rewards are given add to or detract from their value as control-devices. If a prisoner who has been sentenced endeavors to make a present to the trial judge, that is poor technique. The judge can hardly reverse himself and may be too upright

to do it if he could. If the present were offered before the sentence had been given, it would be construed as a very serious offense. To give presents or extras in order to press officials to do faithfully what they are already paid to do and expected to do, is bribery. To persuade people to do something other than they are paid to do and should do is akin to bribery. Such present-giving is very dangerous in society, and rightly put under the ban.

Festive and ceremonial occasions provide unparalleled opportunities for the distribution of rewards. Academic degrees mean more when bestowed at commencement than when granted within the terms. The Nobel prize has more value to the recipient when a special occasion is made for the gift and the papers carry full reports. The money, of course, means the same, no matter how received. But the Nobel prize is more than the money; it is public gazing, craning of necks, whispered words of approval, and general satisfaction as well. Of course, gifts may simply be handed out as the street advertiser hands out samples, but they have their lowest control-value when so distributed. Indeed, so much of the gift is in the giving that great satisfactions sometimes are, and, indeed, can almost always be, gained by stressing the occasion rather than the gift.

This point is well illustrated in the giving of "toys," as Napoleon called them. Here the ribbons or medals are intrinsically of very meagre value; it is the occasion that counts most. The Victoria Cross is not easily secured, that is true, and therein is part of its value. But a Victoria Cross sent through the mail would be something of a disappointment. If these rewards were always sent through the mail, they would not evoke so much heroism on the field of battle. A prize, to be a prize and to be highly valued by the recipient, must be understood and valued by the non-recipients as well. The *occasion* is the time when the meaning and the values of the gift are set forth in detail, is the time when all observers are made to wish that

they too were fortunate. Gifts have their control-value heightened enormously by being distributed at impressive occasions.

(3) A feature of the technique, suggested by what has just been said, is to accompany the gift with some wholesome advice. This advice is offered to the recipient of the gift, but it is also offered to the hearers in addition, although not ostensibly so. The recipient is told that rewards come only to those who strive and display ability. That is equivalent to saying that other rewards are ahead if he continues as he has done. It is a method of pointing out to all listeners the same truth.

Sometimes the gift is trivial while the occasion and the sermon are the real benefits. Much preaching accompanies the distribution of rewards. The children at the Sunday School Christmas entertainment receive their trivial cards or cheap books; that is one thing. But they are brought up before the whole school, their names are sounded forth, and they are lectured; that is another thing. We always have "commencement addresses" when degrees are awarded. Why? It is just another occasion when what has been left unsaid during all the years in college may be gathered up and delivered—before the parchment.

(4) It is noticeable also that the giving of rewards is accompanied by much praise. It is customary to call attention to the great abilities, the incalculable sacrifices, the rare service, the high and worthy character of the recipient. These tributes, no matter how much overdone, are accepted by the recipient and applauded by the observers. If the recipient of the gift knows that they are false and is disgusted, yet he cannot publicly repudiate them, which is, to all intents and purposes, the same as graciously accepting them. He has to remain quiet, or if he makes a few apologetic confessions of unworthiness, nobody takes them as such. But the observers are affected and that lays a foundation for control. They imagine themselves as re-

ipients, feel the satisfaction of such and thus make themselves over into excellent subjects for the operation of this and other control-mechanisms.

(5) Some pains are usually taken to make rewards suitable, and this is another feature of the technique. A reward that is not wanted, is, of course, no reward. Then, in the framing up of acceptable gifts, some attention is given to the preferences of the recipient, his tastes and wishes are taken into account.

But what is acceptable to any given recipient depends largely upon education. He wants what others want. His prizes are other's prizes. What is currently offered is what he learns to want—is suitable for him. Thus, by advertising, by usage, almost anything can be made acceptable.

There is the problem of suitability to the recipient, but there is also the problem of suitability for the occasion. The gifts themselves are more or less skillfully selected with reference to what is fitting for such a situation. For deeds of heroism on the battlefield, one receives a medal let us say. But why a medal and not an office in the government or a trip to South America? The answer lies partly in what is customary and partly in the canons of good taste prevailing at the time. A medal may always be kept and displayed; it is an imperishable evidence of achievement and public recognition; on it can be inscribed the name, date and deed; it is a permanent monument, whereas the government position may be temporary and the trip is soon expended and gone; only the memory remains as a reward and that is the sole and hidden property of the recipient; the public cannot share it indefinitely; it is not a perpetual mark of distinction.

For four years' work in college, why not a farm or a fortune? What is appropriate about a "sheepskin"? The answer, as before, lies partly in past usage; that has always been the customary and appropriate way; the "sheepskin"

has long been associated with, and derives its value from, the sort of goods it represents; it has the appropriateness of the imperishable as against the perishable.

But there is more; society cannot afford such expensive rewards. In all rewarding, therefore, there is a certain very important implication, namely, that the reward must never be thought of as pay. Intelligent donors take every precaution at this point; they guard against the inference that this is fully deserved. And they erect this safeguard by reducing the intrinsic value of the gift until there is not the faintest excuse for trying to equate the reward and the service rendered. Let us see how this is so.

The deed is some heroic labor, an incalculable sacrifice in battle, let us say. How could society *pay* for such service? There is no possible way of making a *just* return. No amount of wealth, no office, no privilege, could ever be regarded as adequate. What is the donor—in this case, society—to do? Would it be advisable to allow the service to go unrecognized, unvalued, except within the bosom of the hero where virtue and sacrifice are supposed to be their own reward? No. Long experience has demonstrated that society has an opportunity here relative to social control. That experience has shown that *under proper conditions*, a “toy” is all that could be desired; a toy provides the recompense and leaves no unsatisfied craving within the bosom of the hero. A toy is of more value than wealth, office or privilege—provided; provided that it comes from a limited supply and therefore is a permanent source of distinction; provided not everybody can wear it, but it can be used so that everybody can gaze on it. For frail human beings, this is more than due return.

Thus, as one looks over the most prized gifts of life, there is something approximating to the rule that as prizes increase in public worth they tend to decrease in intrinsic value. And in the giving of the Victoria Cross, for instance, society just comes out in the open and frankly says:

“We can’t begin to *pay* you for this inestimable service; we do not have the wealth available for that. We present you with this cross, worth nothing at all intrinsically, as a token of gratitude, as a symbol of the affection of a proud people, a simple but beautiful expression of loving appreciation. Our real reward for you is gratitude and love; this cross is but a small material testimony to the existence of a vast immaterial good.”

The very contrast of values, the sharpness and greatness of it, is of immense importance to the impressiveness of the occasion. The recipient is impressed and all onlookers as well.

In every such case, great care is taken to avoid the ridiculous. It would be inappropriate because comic to give a one-armed war-hero a baseball bat or a piano. It would be highly unsuitable for an employer to present his workmen with some scalps as a bid for good work and good will. The child who wished to influence grandpa could not do so by presenting him with a football. Hence, all the way through the list, certain canons of suitability are observed in the presentations. The making of rewards is, then, very largely a conventional procedure. And according to these canons of taste, to give acceptably is a very high expression of art. Society cannot *pay* its distinguished citizens. With perfect simplicity and good faith, it falls back on tokens as simple and beautiful expressions of its appreciation.

(6) Another feature of the technique, already implied in what has just been set down, is the almost universal appeal, *in the giving*, to pride and vanity. The procedure of distributing rewards is made an occasion for distinguishing people, holding them up as worthy examples, giving them unusual and particular consideration. Thus the recipient of an academic degree is brought up before the audience, is put on the platform in plain sight, is requested to stand up and be seen, is robed or hooded in full view, is given the

token before all envious spectators. Not all giving is attended with such public features, but the ceremonies, as we have seen, are necessary if the reward is only a token.

Now, wherever this ceremonial feature is included, the sense of self is heightened (unless the hollowness of it all is suspected) one's native desire for recognition is satisfied, one's ambition to be "somebody" is fulfilled. There is a new sense of importance, of position in the social scale, and of power over others. All of which is very gratifying to most people. One feels that, after all, the struggle or sacrifice was worth while.

5. EFFECTS

So much for the device itself. Turn now to consider the effects of rewarding people, especially in relation to social control. Most people and most organizations give with an end in view, namely, to manage people; at least this is one purpose of their giving. A device erected for this purpose has its worth tested, not by its beauty, its intricacy, the time involved in constructing it, but by the work done. Our most important point, then, is the making of some sort of calculation showing that this device works, that it produces desirable results in the direction of social order.

(1) The practice of giving rewards is a method of sinking the social will deep into the source-springs of human conduct; it has exceptional penetrative powers—like some medicines. It is obvious that control-methods lose in effectiveness in proportion as they lack this quality of penetrativeness; they lose in worth as their point of application is external; they lose to the degree in which they fail to grip the controlled. An automobile can be controlled externally; it can be pushed about from place to place. It is more valuable, however, when the power is exerted internally, and self-applied. A man can be controlled externally, and many individuals are so controlled; but he is a pillar of

the social order only when he is controlled from within, when he is self-starting, and reacts in the proper direction *of his own accord*.

Now, rewarding attains this very result. It is one kind of power that penetrates to the innermost recesses of our lives. It is an almost sure way, among normal people, of setting off explosions within and starting activities which readily canalize themselves in approved ways. It is an evocative method of a superior sort. And it does this sort of work because it corresponds to a fundamental need, the need of ever-increasing return for effort expended. Inertia appears when the gain from effort is estimated more lightly than the cost of the effort. By providing an ever-extended series of extras, in the shape of desirable goods, the person is kept from such a conclusion; his attention is kept riveted to the gains of life and never allowed to wander in the direction of the costs; he is kept from pessimism and its accompanying slowing up of activity and dying down of zest in life. We hold that this sort of work is of a most penetrative character.

(2) The giving of rewards actually releases unsuspected stores of energy and funds of ingenuity—priceless goods in the struggle for existence. To show this we may refer to some conclusions of large employers of labor, since the world of labor exhibits the high cost of inertia and stupidity better than other departments of social life, and since, in this field, actual measurements are possible and have been made.

The various forms of reward being experimented with in the field of industry are, to name the more important, the bonus system, premiums, profit-sharing, piece-work payments and stock ownership. There are many varieties of the bonus system, but we think of it as a whole and select it merely to illustrate and establish our contention.

A superintendent in one plant affirms that the bonus system provides a constant incentive, decreases the selling

costs and produces a decided improvement in attitude.² Another high official assures us that the scheme helps the industrious workers to weed out the drones, that each man does twenty per cent more work, that it decreases the unit cost of production, that it satisfies the workers and, of course, decreases restlessness.³ The vice-president of the Thomas A. Edison Co., Inc. states that this company gives a bonus for exceptional zeal and ability and he "notes a big improvement in the work and morale of our sales-promotion and advertising departments since the plan was started." He speaks of specific gains such as increased punctuality, concentration on work and accuracy.⁴ By "paying members of a department a bonus of one per cent of their wages for each one per cent increase in production, made over a predetermined amount," the Packard Motor Car Co. gave an unexpected and gratifying impetus to individual performance, to the spirit of teamwork, to the desire for promotion, to inventiveness, to production, towards cutting costs and towards more quiet and good will among the workers.⁵ The Fisk Rubber Co. experimented with office boys and found that a bonus caused them to move more rapidly when on errands, made them more alert, kept them where they were to be had when wanted and enabled the establishment to get along with less help.⁶

This sort of evidence might be assembled in volumes for there is an enormous amount of experimenting with the bonus and other types of reward in industry. These cases show conclusively what is accomplished in this way. They prove, beyond question, the effectiveness of the method.

What human beings *could* accomplish in the various fields of their interests, if they worked to capacity, if they released *all* their energies and talents, is not within our feeble

¹, April, 1924. 400.

² *System*, Sept., 1924. 344.

⁴ *System*, Dec., 1921. 702.

⁵ *Industrial Management*, Jan., 1923. 43.

⁶ *Industrial Management*, Oct., 1921. 231. Cf. Pittsburgh Survey. 3: 184.

powers of computation. These examples, and some of our own experiences, prove that much more could be done, in most instances, than is done. If, therefore, we take a certain level of action or attainment and then devise a scheme for pushing that level higher, we have an effective instrument. A device that discovers the "untouched possibilities," that gives "encouragement to all who strive to translate ideals into concrete form and make more common beauty and knowledge" is an effective means of control.

Any one of us out of his own experience knows that a suitable reward, or the possibility of it, gives a decided thrust forward in time-rate, calls out undreamt-of talents, concentrates our energies and, withal, operates as an explosive element in our lives. Our feet have covered the distance to the store in half the time, our lessons have been learned better, our good will has been enlisted, and a million other changes have been effected in our conduct—by the hope of a reward. This is not theory. This we know.

(3) The giving of rewards operates to enlist the whole being in the enterprise. This is implicit in what has been said in discussing the release of unsuspected energies, but there are additional points to be noted of a somewhat different character. The offering of a reward is a way of focusing energies and talents upon the task in hand. For one thing attention is held, as we have said; and that means infinitely more than most of us suspect in bringing things to pass. For another, a tendency to settle back in the contentment of mediocrity is counteracted. Again, the creeping paralysis of discouragement is neutralized. Finally, one works with the knowledge that slipshod performance does not win prizes.

Wholesome guiding attitudes are evoked. The hope of rewards does very effective work in dissolving anger, which is a socially dangerous and upsetting state of mind. To control anger is one way of maintaining order. For one thing the hope of a reward shifts attention from the object

of anger and thrusts in something at which a person cannot be angry. It proves good will where none had been supposed to exist. It demonstrates that the angry person is not utterly forgotten and neglected.

Offering rewards is a way of offsetting the paralyzing effects of self-depreciation and hopelessness. In playing golf, the occasional "perfect drives" provide an effectual antidote to the frequent "slices," "toppings" and other bunglings, and keep the golfer at the game. So the occasional rewards provide reasons for taking courage and trying again—an infinite gain socially. Social morale would suffer an immeasurable slump but for the regeneration produced by the gifts that come now and then, and the hope that bridges the gaps between them.

Contempt, disgust, cynicism and other anti-social attitudes are dissolved by the practice of rewarding. Most people are not foolish enough to be contemptuous of a scheme which has many possibilities within it for them, and ever enlarged possibilities at that. One retains an attitude of disgust only with that which is barren and unnourishing. Cynicism thrives where the form of life is circular, and the same thing comes over and over again. It is beaten out by a system which provides *extras* of value, novelties, ever richer satisfactions; a system which continually thrusts evidences of the non-circular form of life under the eye. In the light, therefore, of these modifications of attitude, we hold that rewarding is proved effectual.

(4) The practice of giving rewards points out the socially desirable paths and objectives in which, and toward which, self-starting persons would do well to direct their energies and abilities. The rewards of life are like flags on the putting greens; they tell where to drive. Rewards are placed beside the great value-objectives of human existence; they mark the location of the imperishable ends of human beings. Let us see how this is so.

The path of life and the great objectives are none too

clear for most of us. Just what we ought to do with our energies, when released, is not always obvious. The only light we can get on this problem is from human experience, our own and that of the procession of men down through the ages. Our own experience gives us some help but very little in comparison with what the experience of the race can give. Now what the race has found out that is of value to us, it has marked with a reward. Where are the prizes placed? Is there a prize for stealing property? Is there a medal for making people unhappy? Does one get a good name for destruction of any sort? The war medals may seem to be exceptions but they are not. The medal is given not for killing enemies but for heroic endeavors in behalf of home and country. Unfortunately, the killing seems indispensable yet. But we must keep in mind what the reward is for. It is for loyalty, sacrifice, service, bravery, courage, ingenuity, willingness—in that particular situation. The reward is placed beside these values, and never beside their opposites. If one seeks a prize, then, one does not find it in the realm of the anti-social, but rather in that region where past experience has found the goods of life to exist.⁷

Having performed an act, one looks up to see, just as the baby does, how people are taking it. If they come forward with the thumb-screw and the stake, one gathers that such behavior is disapproved; one learns that the best life-direction is not that way. One learns that such conduct is, roughly speaking, dangerous or unprofitable to the performer. If, on the other hand, the group appears with a medal, a book, a better position, great acclaim, then one knows that such conduct is highly approved and is desired. And again, such conduct, roughly speaking, is wholesome for the performer. There are countless exceptions to this rule, of course, but there is a crude indication of what path one had best choose, crude yet priceless.

⁷ Cf. ROSS. *Social Control*. Chapter on Social Valuations.

Thus, rewarding is a kind of speaking, a voice out of the past, and it says something like this: "We approve of that and want more of it. Do more of the same thing. You are on the right road, keep on it. Do it again and do it better." Is such guidance not valuable to one who cannot see his way clearly? So rewards point towards the imperishable goods and objectives of group welfare.

Of course it does not follow that failure to be rewarded is proof of being on the wrong road. Group judgments are not yet infallible. That may simply mean slowness of appreciation and understanding. One is not always justified in changing one's course because prizes, in the form expected, do not come. However, one thinks twice in such situations in order to be sure.

6. MERITS AND DEMERITS

(1) The merits of this method of control we have already sketchily set forth. We have noted how deeply it penetrates, how completely it enlists the whole being, how it aids in the release of unsuspected abilities and energies, and how it roughly points out the direction in which social welfare is thought to lie, and how it dissolves and neutralizes many forms of anti-social attitude. These are the outstanding excellencies of the method of control.

(2) Not all is gold that glitters, however, and there is something to be said on the other side. There are a number of grave defects in this manner of managing people which must not be overlooked. We wish to note several.

(a) It is a very expensive method. The cost in money or goods is prohibitive of universal use, not enough wealth being available in the world to satisfy the demand. To a degree and for a time, the expense may be kept down by presenting "toys" that have had the sacred breath of the public blown on them and have thereby been made priceless. There is a very decided limit soon faced, however, for

what everybody can have and begins to have, is no longer a prize. A Croix de Guerre on the bosom of every third man met in the city streets would be enough to nullify its value. Under such circumstances, countless persons would take some pains *not* to receive a medal.

(b) As in the field of wages, so here; the law of diminishing returns is soon encountered. It is well known that there comes a time for all of us when a given increment of return is not and cannot be followed by a correspondingly great amount of effort and skill. The curve of response falls rapidly after a certain, and personally known, point of eminence is reached. The first Croix de Guerre, of course, is almost priceless; the second would not call forth an amount of sacrifice and bravery equal to that of the first occasion. The receipt of the tenth Croix de Guerre would not awaken a tremor.

So we have another point with reference to the expense. Society finds it necessary to increase the number, variety and the value of the prizes all the time in order to draw forth a continually increasing expression of effort and talent; but the prizes have to mount up more rapidly than the efforts and talents. Thus society finds itself, after a time, whipping a dead horse. There is no limit to human wants—that is true; but one continually judges that one is worth proportionately more all the time and that an increase in rewards is merely just compensation. This attitude is socially dangerous. It leads directly, if not neutralized by ever more valuable offerings, to universal sabotage and this, of course, is killing the proverbial goose.

(c) There are enormous administrative difficulties. One of the greatest problems is how to avoid rewarding the undeserving, and towards the solution of this difficulty little advance has been made. As matters now stand, the presentations seem, to many, largely a matter of luck. Sometimes the parents give lavishly for meagre effort, while at other times they give little or nothing. In the school sys-

tem the same difficulty appears, and also in the civil service. To some people this is a zestful fact; to others it is a very discouraging fact. More than this, we know altogether too little of the nature of demand in this realm and fail to single out that which is really prized or that which is suitable.

(d) Rewards may easily, and do, form a basis for undesirable class distinctions. The gaining of a reward often produces a feeling of superiority and difference which goes ill with a democratic order. This result is not so bad when there is genuine worth in the direction of effort and in the type of talent-display. The harm comes where unmeritorious activities are, by fancy's trickery, highly rewarded.

The feeling of superiority and difference becomes the pivot around which the rewarded revolve, and they thereby separate themselves out from the unrewarded and develop traditions and doctrines which are divisive. They are apt to regard themselves as superior and different not because of their service, which is the real difference, but on the basis of their prize; and this conclusion is vicious because of the difficulties in correctly apportioning rewards and because of the luck element. Such a conceit is socially damaging.

(e) Over-rewarding encourages parasitism. The giving of tips, after it has become general, is of no benefit to the recipients nor to anybody else. It does not evoke more and better service—unless the tips are exceptional, continuously exceptional. Such a practice does but encourage expectancy and dependence. Pullman car porters are paid a low wage with the understanding that the public will make up the deficiency. The public does make up the deficiency—but gets nothing in return; a parasitic condition has been developed. And this is a very widespread evil.

In philanthropic work the same difficulty is encountered. It has been found doubly easy to develop a permanent attitude of expectancy of something for little or nothing,

and a corresponding feeling of dependence that, in the long run, proves inimical to both the recipient and the giver. Such promiscuous giving does not evoke what society wants; it evokes something that society does not want.

In the minds of many workmen, the inauguration of a bonus system or some other method of rewarding in industry, is interpreted as a confession that the wages are "short."⁸ When this suspicion is aroused, the device is anything but evocative in the right direction. When a method of control calls out suspicion when intended to elicit trust; when it develops a sense of dependence and a willingness to be dependent—such a method can hardly be called efficient or desirable; it becomes a form of bribery.

We have finally to consider a question which has been lying in wait all the while ready to leap forth and crush the whole argument. It is objected, to all that has been said, that rewards are given *after* the display of energy or talent, and are therefore not the efficient evocative controls that we have supposed. It is argued that rewards come as a consequence and not as an antecedent, as a result and not as a cause.

At first glance, this argument looks plausible—and fatal to what has been elaborated. In a specific and narrow way, it states a truth; rewards do come *after* the display. The defect in the position, however, is in the assumption that a given reward, like the Victoria Cross say, is merely and specifically offered as a compensation for a particular bit of bravery on a given day. That is one feature of the reward, but a very small one. The real significance of that gift is in its future effect on the recipient. The hero is not being paid for something but being advised as to the *type* of conduct that society prizes; he is rewarded as much for what he is yet to accomplish as for what he *has* accomplished. The particular prize is backward looking, but the giving is forward looking. It directs the recipient's

⁸ Clark. *Common Sense in Labor Management*. 104.

attention to the sort of behavior that society is interested in and wants repeated.

The effect is far greater and more significant on the onlookers and all those who hear of the giving. They have done nothing as yet to merit a reward, but they thereby gain the notion that they *may* do something worth while. Rewarding has no backward look at all with reference to the persons whom it is most desirable to impress. The bystanders are filled with hope, and hope always looks to the future. The bystanders are made—if the technique of giving is good—to want such a prize and to strive for it. And we have already shown that rewards are set up beside the great needs of mankind, in the fields of literature, science, history, invention, public service, and the hopeful, desirous bystanders have, in this bestowal, pointed out to them clearly the way of worthwhile achievement. We conclude, then, that this objection has little weight.

The future of the practice is of concern to all. It is safe to say that we have not made more than a beginning in testing out its possibilities. There are many signs that the giving of rewards is on the increase. We have such evidences in the daily reports of new foundations for encouraging brilliant work and in the rapid increase in the number of prizes offered in a thousand different forms. There is a growing belief in the efficacy of this way of managing people. The guardians of order believe in it; unfortunately the destroyers of order know its values. Both use it in the desperate struggles of life. It is found to be a double-edged sword.

On the other hand a wider use of the educational method will inculcate the truth that, in the last resort, virtue, bravery, skill and such other goods, are *their own reward*. Education will gradually instill the notion that there is ultimately a hollowness and a mockery in working only for rewards and living by the support of an accompanying hope. The law of diminishing returns will be more widely

recognized, the difficulties of administration will be more fully appreciated, the dangers of pauperization will be more clearly discerned. As matters now stand, there is a hit-and-miss rush forward, by individuals, by groups and peoples, to set up ever more in the shape of rewards. And all this in the face of the kind of education which will make them unnecessary. All we have tried to show in this chapter, however, is that the practice is now widespread and probably favorable to the maintenance of social order.

CHAPTER III

PRAISE

AN explorer of the Libyan desert, writing of the bond that exists between the camel-driver and his faithful "ship of the desert," says: "On march the camel goes best when his driver sings. These songs, or chants, almost invariably concern the virtues of the ungainly but intrepid beast. His praises are sounded in the most extravagant terms, and the animal seems to like it."¹ We may smile at this assertion and dismiss it as a pretty fancy. But if the writer had said: "On march the *man* goes best when his driver sings. His praises are sounded in the most extravagant terms, and the man seems to like it, in fact does like it, and responds acceptably to it," we would have to agree that he was not indulging his fancy but rather stating the sober truth. We would have to admit this because we all have internal evidence. We all go best when our praises are sung. It is worth while, then, to examine this device in relation to its effects upon the "ungainly but intrepid beast" called man.

1. DEFINITIONS

Praise is the expression of hearty approval in sincere and appropriate terms. Of course this assumes that certain excellences in others are selected as the objects of such commendation and approval. Praise is one way of approving, just as blame is one way of disapproving or condemn-

¹ Hassanein Bey. "Crossing the Libyan Desert," *National Geographic*, Sept., 1924. 255.

ing. And in this discussion we have continually in mind, not so much the objects approved, as the approval attitude and its manner of revealment.

Deliveries of praise are regarded as one type of reward by the recipients. Although so universally administered, as we shall presently show, praise is not a good that may be regularly expected. It falls within the category of rewards in that it is an "extra" received like any other reward upon occasion. It works to the same end. It is much less tangible, more difficult to apply and possibly less permanent. It serves only temporarily as a badge of distinction.

As with rewards, so with praise, two general classifications may be made from our point of view. Much displaying and approving of excellences is of the spontaneous and disinterested sort that looks no further than the event. Just as some rewards are given solely as expressions of ecstasy or affection, so much praise is simply joyous tribute, grateful acknowledgment, hearty commendation, and has no other significance.

But there is a vast amount of hearty approval that is expressed for the single purpose of giving a fillip to human enterprise, to human enterprise canalized in certain directions approved by the praisers. The mother may say to her child: "You are worth your weight in gold,"—a distinguished religious leader spoke in public of the decided influence of this very tribute on his life—and then give it an all-enfolding embrace for emphasis; and she may do this without entertaining for a moment the idea that the child will react in good will for the rest of the day. But if the mother *wants* the child to react in good will for the rest of the day and deliberately selects this compliment as a means towards that end, she is employing praise as a method of control. It is our view that, while there are oceans of purely lyrical praise there is also an immense volume of praise uttered for no other purpose than that of

control. Our discussion centers, of course, about this latter type.

An objection, considered in the last chapter, must be mentioned and dismissed in passing. Some would say of praise, as of rewards, that it is applied *after* the act and therefore could not be in any sense a *cause* of it. The answer is the same as that made in discussing rewards. The answer is that praise is not administered solely for the purpose of approving the single heroic act or brilliant invention. Praise is a gesture of approval of that *type* of life. It seizes on a concrete event only for the purpose of illustrating what is desired as a general rule. The particular bit of behavior praised is past and done, but praise is a popular argument that such behavior should be made the prevailing practice. Working in such fashion, praise functions in our social life as a true cause.

Discovery and classification of the innumerable subtleties discernible within this omnipresent but elusive practice, is very difficult and not yet nearly completed. One or two tentative suggestions may be included to help out the definition. We praise people—that is, their personal excellences of all sorts—to their faces. We praise—also to their faces—their approved achievements, such as writing a book, saving a situation in battle, rescuing victims of fires or hold-ups. Then—speaking to certain people—we praise the qualities and achievements of *others*. The first two types awaken pleasurable feelings and provide a powerful stimulus to repeat the approved activities. The third type produces a sense of inferiority and at the same time suggests types worthy of imitation.

A further point to notice, relative to definition, is that praise seems to appear on three main levels. There is first the praise of *thanks* which is mostly within, or closely connected with, the purely lyrical form. In this manner we express our gratitude for what has been done, and thereby make an acknowledgment, public or private, of the

worth observed. Many ingredients are found here, such as an effort to do justice to another, balance accounts with another, offer the most acceptable form of encouragement, assure the praiseworthy one that we are observant and grateful.

In the second place, there is the level of *commendation*. In this type there is obviously less emphasis on the desire for expression and more on the desire for impression. That is, the praiser steps more into the background and gives the position of prominence to the praiseworthy. Commendation has to do more with particular values.

The third type is *worship*. In this there is the further effacement of the praisers and the greater exaltation of the praiseworthy. It is the kind where there is the most complete, almost abject, abandonment of the praisers to adoration. In general, it must be remembered, praise flows from superiors to equals and inferiors. But this topic will be touched on in comparing praise and flattery.

2. PREVALENCE

In the home an immense amount of management is accomplished in this way. Some parents are very skillful in evoking the desired behavior from their children by praise. They provide a continuous bath of this stimulating sort. The boy is graciously informed that he has piled the wood up neatly, that his clothes look well, that he has fine manners at table; the girl is heartily assured that she graces any company, that she is very beautiful, that some one commended her exceptional taste in selecting hats; husband proudly announces that "Mother" is the best cook in seventeen states, and "Mother" tells the husband that he is the best provider she knows. In describing the education of John Marshall, Morison tells us that his "praises had been so often sung by his father and brothers that the belles

of Yorktown were all of a twitter to meet him.”² In some families, the machinery runs without a hitch from day to day largely because of these amenities. Oftentimes little else is employed to maintain order.

Praise seems to be appreciated very early in life. McDougall says: “One of my boys, who learnt to walk when eighteen months old, delighted in the applause that greeted his first steps, and, every time that one of his many excursions across the room failed to evoke it, he threw himself prone upon the floor with loud cries of anger and displeasure.”³

The good teacher knows how to employ this device. It is not uncommon to hear such approving words as: “You read that poem well, Jimmie,” “You are an accurate figurer as well,” “That is a fine theme, Ethel, and I am sure you are going to be a writer some day.” The vigilant instructor notes all of the excellences revealed and lets it be known that they are noted. There is no school realm, from kindergarten to graduate school, where the approving word does not produce a marked effect.

On the playground, the leader assures the faithful player that he is a “wonder,” that he is “the best ever,” that he is really a “fine chap” and that he will “win the game.” At the community “sing,” heightened morale is easily produced by such compliments as: “I never heard such good singing,” “I am sure you can sing this *hard* one,” “You make the rafters ring with good music.” There is no end to the stream of compliments gushing forth in those realms where leadership does not maintain itself by institutional authority. What singing-master can enlist the whole being of his chorus without words of praise?

Of course nothing is more commonplace than the glorifying words used in the game of politics. The voters are praised by the candidates for their loyalty to the party and

² *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1920. 49.

³ *Social Psychology*. 63.

to the country. The party program is lauded to the skies for its timeliness and completeness. It is observed, with adulatory phraseology, that the people have supported saving doctrines and repudiated alien sophistries. Leaders compliment each other in public and thus add to each other's prestige. The masses are sometimes led to lift up their voices in adoration of official pyrotechnics. They shout approval of political "stands," pronouncements and decisions.

In the realm of religion, however, we have the most elaborate and highly organized expression of this art. What would religious worship amount to without the hymns, psalms, chants and other choral expressions? Nothing would be left but a tiresome sermon or lecture, often. Masses of people gather, in part, for the express purpose of praising their deities. Excepting the songs of romantic love that are the perfection of human tribute, no kind of praise attains such volume and lyric purity.

But is it all a form of joyous relief and thanksgiving? Some of it is that—and nothing more. But down through the centuries, people have praised their deities because they have believed that such praise had an influence over them and changed their courses of action. That is, they have regarded this sort of expression as a control device. And the volume of praise has remained so long as the belief has remained.

We find this practice in the industrial world, in the ceremonious relations of ordinary social intercourse. We may speak, then, of praising as a practice within the human family. What is its significance? In answering this question, it is necessary to take note of certain mechanical and other features.

3. EXPRESSIONAL FEATURES

An analysis of this art of control reveals a number of very important features which we must briefly notice.

(1) The gestural manifestations of praise are various and numerous. We often express our hearty approval of a speaker's words, an athlete's performances, a dramatist's histrionic abilities, a musician's technique, and of other forms of excellence by enthusiastic handclapping, stamping the feet, drinking a toast and in other ways. Steele once wrote a letter "to a very witty Man, over-run" with a tide of tribute, in which he said: "Men will praise you in their actions."⁴ What actions he had in mind, we are left to conjecture. He may have had the various kinds already mentioned in his thought, or he may have had reference to the larger program of life wherein people praise by copying others. There is also the praise of dancing, music, and those silent forms of tribute such as paintings, photographs and statues, executed by loving hands and placed about in public places.⁵ We know of a lady in this country who, because of her high regard for certain of our noble women and because of her desire to make them live again and provide norms for the present generation, goes about acting their parts in public entertainments. With a pretty conceit, Hood speaks of the girl who "stood amid the stooks, praising God with sweetest looks." While this is a case of poetic license, it suggests the possibilities of subtler gestural or pantomimic manifestations of praise.

(2) The oral form of praise has been and is the most outstanding and we usually think of that form when we mention the subject. We can take space for only a few varieties of so highly developed and variegated an art.

(a) Exclamations are often laden with praise. We give "three cheers" to our heroes. We shout "attaboy," "bully for you," "well done," "hear, hear," "that's right," "bravo," and countless other stirring and bracing, if somewhat common, compliments to speakers, runners, climbers, and others of our group doing approved things. Rather

⁴ *Spectator*. No. 38.

⁵ Cf. Cooley. *Social Organization*. 64, 66.

striking ingenuity is often exhibited in coining suitable expressions of this sort.

It is important to note that there are situations in life, rapid-action situations, where the praise, to be contemporaneously or simultaneously effective, must be of the quick-fire sort. A formal address of eulogy would not help a one-hundred yard runner in the act, a distinguished virtuoso to play, a marksman to hit the bull's-eye. Formal address is too slow to meet the requirements of such situations. Hence the condensation of praise into exclamations. These are appropriate terms for the occasion, and they are always very hearty. No form gives more encouragement. In no form, perhaps, is the cause so immediately and clearly connected with the result.

(b) Much praise is of the straightforward, face-to-face, conversational type, and is amply illustrated by the examples given while discussing the universality of the practice. Without circumlocution, without slipping into exalted verse or stilted prose, avoiding eulogy and vulgarity, the proper tribute is given in frank, direct and easily understood terms as between intimates. The feeling element is there in tide, but is controlled in the interests of dignity and truthfulness. Of course, the highly emotional find difficulties in keeping themselves within the bounds of this form, holding themselves to a chaste level.

(c) Then we have the formal and stately address, a rather stereotyped utterance by a distinguished personage on a notable occasion. Examples of such occasions are those when awards are made to distinguished scientists, artists, novelists, poets, journalists, and other thinkers. Other occasions are the numerous memorial days of the various peoples.⁶ At such times, rewards and praise coalesce and form one dignified and impressive manifestation of public approval.

⁶ See an address by President E. A. Alderman on President Wilson. *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1924.

On such occasions, some capable individual is chosen as the mouthpiece for the expression of the public tribute. He prepares the way for the presentation of the prize or token by recounting the story of struggle and achievement culminating in this triumphal day. Words are never spared, qualities are not neglected, successes are not ignored, that the person honored may seem, to the indifferent and ignorant public, to be fully "worthy of this distinction." Thus there is always this *public* aspect of the occasion. A little group might take the distinguished person down into a cellar and there, in darkness and isolation, confer the honor. No. The central idea is not the honor, nor the person honored, but the pointing out to all of the *road* to honor. A public occasion of this sort is the same as saying: "This way lies the highway to public esteem and adoration; walk in it."

Public crises are also occasions when the force of praise is mustered, in this formal manner, for social ends. General Gouraud, a famous French general, addressed the combined American and French armies before the expected drive of the Germans in July, 1918:—"In your breasts beat strong brave hearts of fine men. Nobody will look behind, nobody will fall back a step. Every one of you will have only one thought; to kill; to kill many of them until they have had enough of it."⁷

(d) There is also the more obviously choral praise that we call worship. This is the sort exhibited where assemblages lift up their voices in lofty tribute, using the purely lyrical utterances, framed in earlier days, as their vehicle. We are all familiar with the chants, the "Te Deums," the thousands of strikingly beautiful and abiding hymns and psalms. These have been our language of praise for generations. We might speak of this as mass-production praise.

There is a local aspect to this sort, as may be illustrated

⁷ Metter. *Leadership*. 16.

in the worship of a single congregation. But there is a broadly inclusive aspect as well, where thousands of congregations are carrying out the same form of service. One might think of the whole church as engaged in essentially the same undertaking. But there is also this inclusive aspect to secular or popular praise. A man does something worth public notice. Then the newspapers, editorially and otherwise, lift up a chorus of tribute that is, indeed, one of the impressive and startling arrangements of our time.

It is interesting to compare the forms of praise used by a crowd at football games shouting "attaboy," "bravo, Bill," and other like compliments, and the forms used by a crowd in the temple singing its honor to the Almighty. It is true that the language is less dignified, the vociferation is less united and tuneful—except as modern cheering evolves into the chant—the expression is less smooth, in the former case. But it is deeply sincere in both cases. It is the utmost that can be done in the situation. The football crowd is more spontaneously original in its expression while the assembled worshippers employ stereotyped and often meaningless phraseology.

(3) The written forms of praise are almost as plentiful and various as the oral forms. Without excellence in diction, this form is less effectual, for everything depends upon the language used. In the oral form, the tone of voice and the pantomimic accompaniments help out the faltering speech. The written tributes call for imagination. Several varieties of this form may be mentioned.

(a) Perhaps the most serviceable and available type is the personal letter. It might be called conversation, or the face-to-face expression, at a distance. Whatever one finds, therefore, of praise in the daily exchanges, one finds in letters, the gestural and tonal features excepted. By using this form we may and do go into those intimate particulars of life, worthy of commendation, that one does not

desire to drag out before the public's intruding eye. We deal in affairs otherwise taboo. Some excellent illustrations of letter tributes may be found in the messages of Lloyd George, Grey of Fallodon and Theodore Roosevelt to Walter H. Page upon his resignation as ambassador to Great Britain.⁸ The volume of silent and personal tribute going through the mails of the world is evidently very great.

(b) There is an enormous amount of praise in books, magazines and papers. One may pick up, almost at random, any printed material and find this note sounded. A biography that did not contain some expressions of adoration would be hard to find. Some biographies contain little else. The magazines contain not only high tributes in the form of story and essay, but also, in many cases, book reviews which serve up honor in a variety of ways. Here is a review taken at random. "It has been long since the reviewer has studied a legal treatise with such lively and ever-growing interest as the work of genius before us. The author, who has already by this tentative work won the right to enter the ranks of our foremost civilists, combines in himself everything which is requisite for successful handling of the law—a rare, uniform, alert insight, happy facility, and ease in comprehension and exposition of the most difficult conceptions, genuine, deeply penetrating learning, combined with thorough originality—in a word, everything which destiny rarely confers. The work consequently yields an enjoyment and satisfaction seldom afforded by a legal treatise."⁹

When looking through some technical journals recently it occurred to us to select one copy and make a test for praise in the reviews. The example errs on the side of extravagance, probably, for it was found that there were just *seven* reviews, and it will be noted that there are

⁸ Hendrick. *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*. 2: 398 ff.

⁹ Small. *Origins of Sociology*. 47.

just seven tributes. "To one who can spend but a brief time in reading along the line of these problems, but who wishes a general survey of them all, there is no book that can be more heartily commended." "—an extremely illuminating and penetrating treatment." "The sample given indicates the originality, foresightedness, and statesmanlike breadth of an essay that no scholar or public man can afford to overlook." "The book would form an admirable syllabus for a course—" "The book is eminently worth while." "This very useful—" "A very full guide to the literature of the subject." "It should be in the hands of—, and could profitably be read by all—."

Other ingredients were not neglected in these reviews, but the stream of praise flowing through them is quite obvious. And its suggestion is quite obvious, namely, buy and read these books, which is one kind of control.

Here are the assembled tributes, to one book by a noted American scholar, found on a single page of a magazine. "A remarkable work." "A cleverly written book by a clever man." "No one interested in either history or politics can afford to neglect Mr. —'s views." "No more fascinating study of a topic so grave is often printed." "A very stimulating study."

This illustration makes the point more clear. In the first case the scholars who wrote the reviews are the recommenders; they are the ones to direct the attention of their fellows to valuable aids in service. In the latter case, the publishers are the recommenders, and they select this means of cultivating a buying constituency, of controlling other people in their own interests.

Of course there is no end to this sort of expression. These reviews are hollow and lack specification; they are quite stereotyped and may be applied with equal appropriateness to almost any books. But this does not militate to any extent against their effectiveness. They are the blowing of a perfumed and intoxicating breath towards the

authors, would-be authors and buyers; they are a powerful excitant.

It is a familiar fact that the newspapers contain notices of a complimentary nature almost every day. The level of "personal mention" is an elevated position which countless citizens regularly strive to attain.

Poets write verses of tribute. Who can forget this from the pen of James Whitcomb Riley?

"My mother she's so good to me,
Ef I was good as I could be,
I could n't be as good—no, *sir*:—
Can't *any* boy be good as her."

This was written too late to have any effect on his mother; but it had some effect on him, and on other mothers and other sons. Thousands of tributes to Shakespeare have been written.¹⁰ Shakespeare derived no personal stimulus from this avalanche of praise; but hosts of other writers have been cherishing the secret hope that they might some day be worthy, and have been working to that end.

Novelists write stories of praise; essayists write essays to do honor, dramatists compose plays that glorify causes and persons; short story writers depict scenes in the lives of the successful so that readers may worship. The volume of praise has grown steadily with the number of books, magazines and newspapers, and it is reasonable to assume that the influence on social morale has been very great.

(c) Praise finds a channel in inscriptions. A familiar example is the epitaph. We well remember the childish ambitions created by discovering the following inscription in the village cemetery: "Too good for earth, God called her home." This is somewhat tawdry, if not essentially blasphemous, as an example of remembrance, but it awakened naïve enthusiasms nevertheless. A survey of the

¹⁰ See Hughes. *The Praise of Shakespeare*. Many passages.

tombstone realm would reveal a vast amount of this type of laudation. In the porch of Wolverhampton Church is this:

Near this place lies
CHARLES CLAUDIUS PHILLIPS
Whose absolute contempt of riches,
And immortal performances upon the violin,
Made him the admiration of all who knew him."¹¹

One of the finest examples of personal eulogy ever written is that from the pen of Milton.

"An epitaph on the Admirable Dramatic Poet, W. Shakespeare.

"What needs my Shakespeare for his honour'd bones,
The labour of an age in piled stones?
Or that his hallow'd relics should be hid
Under a star-ypointing pyramid?
Dear son of Memory, Great heir of Fame,
What need'st thou such weak witness of thy name?
Thou, in our wonder and astonishment,
Hast built thyself a life-long monument.
For whilst, to the shame of slow-endeavouring art
Thy easy numbers flow; and that each heart
Hath, from the leaves of thy unvalued book,
Those Delphic lines with deep impression took;
Then thou, our fancy of itself bereaving,
Dost make us marble with too much conceiving;
And, so sepulchr'd, in such pomp dost lie,
That kings, for such a tomb should wish to die."

Does the fact that, according to an anonymous writer, "he cannot read his tombstone when he's dead," make this post-mortem praise of no effect in human society? Are these epitaphs but "carved futilities," as Ibañez characterizes them? The answer, we judge, is plain: they continually arouse hopes, awaken enthusiasms, support stirring ambitions and in many other ways give impetus to the civilized efforts of man.

A bare monument gives the story in broad outlines, but the inscription is the commentary thereupon; it is but a

¹¹ Boswell. *Life of Johnson*. 1:101

filling in of the significant details, a specifying and particularizing for the benefit of unimaginative readers. We recall, also, the deep impression made by the words on a plaque dedicated to one of the heroes of the *Lady Elgin* steamer tragedy, and placed in the gymnasium of Northwestern University. The tribute is simple but forceful; its language is restrained but effectual. Can it be that this is a carved futility for the throngs of young people who pass through the spacious halls of that magnificent building from year to year? At any rate, those who placed the tablet *expected* that it would help awaken the spirit of heroism in the bosoms of the students. Westminster Abbey looks backward, it is true; but it looks forward, as well, to the making of the kind of men and women that shall make England.¹²

(d) Another written form is the testimonial. The most prevalent example of this type is probably the patent-medicine attestations found regularly in our newspapers. What do these testimonials say? Universally and with one accord, they harp on the theme that but for "Dr. Quicksilver's" lotion, tablets, salve, belt, rays, and what not, the writers, their children, their friends and neighbors, would have perished long ago and miserably. Do these adulatory testimonies stimulate "Dr. Quicksilver" to ever greater efforts in his own interests? They do. Do they start and enlarge the flow of silver to the pockets of the said doctor? The answer is most significant when we recall that this patent-medicine advertising discovered to aggressive vendors the *power* of advertising in other fields. Millions are duped every year by these affirmations in praise of many nostrums and their promoters.

(e) The book dedication is a very interesting and effectual type of praise. To illustrate it we select some paragraphs from Boswell's "Life of Johnson" which was inscribed to the distinguished painter, Sir Joshua Reynolds.

¹² Cf. Bradford. *The Soul of Samuel Pepys*. 11-12.

“MY DEAR SIR,

Every liberal motive that can actuate an Authour in the dedication of his labours concurs in directing me to you, as the person to whom the following work should be inscribed.

“If there be a pleasure in celebrating the distinguished merit of a contemporary, mixed with a certain degree of vanity, not altogether inexcusable, in appearing fully sensible of it, where can I find one, in complimenting whom I can with more general approbation gratify those feelings? Your excellence in the Arts over which you have long presided with unrivalled fame, but also in Philosophy and elegant Literature, is well known to the present, and will continue to be the admiration of future ages. Your equal and placid temper, your variety of conversation, your true politeness, by which you are so amiable in private society, and that enlarged hospitality which has long made your house a common centre of union for the great, the accomplished, the learned, and the ingenious; all these qualities I can, in perfect confidence of not being accused of flattery, ascribe to you.

“If a man may indulge an honest pride, in having it known to the world that he has been thought worthy of particular attention by a person of the first eminence in the age in which he lived, whose company has been universally courted, I am justified in availing myself of the usual privilege of a Dedication, when I mention that there has been a long and uninterrupted friendship between us. . . .”

We might have chosen a less stilted and particularizing example. That this, however, is a sincere and gracious tribute, no one can doubt. That plenty of authors since that day have coveted and worked for something similar, we may well believe.

(f) We shall mention finally the formal set of resolutions drawn up for an occasion. A person or a group is delegated to express by “resolving” the high esteem in which a colleague, fellow-citizen or “brother” is held, and then to bring the draft out for public approval, after which a copy may be presented to the person honored, with some ostentation, spread on the minutes, or published in the papers.

We wish the point to be clear that, despite the pessimists, the misanthropes and the grouches, there is steadily flowing through our social intercourse a highly significant stream of

praise. That it contributes decidedly to the ease and plasticity, the humaneness and the justice, the pleasure and the enthusiasm, of social life, we have no doubt. We fully believe that it is a very important factor in the maintenance of a livable and workable social order.

4. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

It is one thing to utter exclamations, give straightforward commendation, frame up and deliver heavy but sincere addresses, write letters, print books, inscribe tombstones, draft resolutions and otherwise shower people with tributes. It is quite another thing, however, to soak these showers *in* and cause them to water the roots of human energy and ingenuity. To be effective, in the sense in which we are considering it, praise must go home to the hearts and heads of the recipients and onlookers, work a transformation and reappear as socially desirable activities and attitudes. How praise is made to carry through and create good will, the will of the praisers, that is the problem now before us.

This is to say that the art of praise is much more than the mere mechanics already described. Another set of factors is involved. And what was neglected as to description of these factors when discussing rewards, is developed here and to be understood as applying there as well. We have to do here with the nature of man to which these mechanics are applied. We wish to mention two psychic qualities which are the grounds of appeal.

(1) The desire for recognition. In the possession of such a desire, most of us have already made a start and are on the way to meet those who offer rewards and praise. The significance of this desire is suggested by Professor Thomas. "A list of the different modes of seeking recognition would be very long. It would include courageous

behavior, showing off through ornament and dress, the pomp of kings, the display of opinions and knowledge, the possession of special attainments—in the arts, for example. It is expressed alike in arrogance and in humility, even in martyrdom. Certain modes of seeking recognition we define as ‘vanity,’ others as ‘ambition.’ The ‘will to power’ belongs here. Perhaps there has been no spur to human activity so keen and no motive so naïvely avowed as the desire for ‘undying fame,’ and it would be difficult to estimate the rôle the desire for recognition has played in the creation of social values.”¹³

But what is meant by recognition? It is not the same as “being noticed.” A jab in the ribs, a well-directed brick-bat, a barbed jest, are evidence that we are noticed, observed. Our desire is for something very different. We do not desire recognition that brings pain or loss. We desire recognition that has warmth in it, that brings pleasure. We desire the kind of recognition that is evidence of approval, that testifies to our worth, that expresses the esteem in which others hold us, that is unmistakably a discerning, considerate and friendly approach by those about us. As the glove fits the hand, rewards and praise fit this desire. It would seem as if this desire were little else than a search for these very goods. Rewards and praise are indisputable evidence that we are no longer “strange” in the group, that we are significant, that we count in some way, that we have attained what we call “standing.” There is enormous satisfaction to all of us in this.

(2) The desire for response. Professor Thomas speaks of this as follows: “The desire for response is a craving, not for the recognition of the public at large, but for the more intimate appreciation of individuals. It is exemplified in mother-love (touch plays an important rôle in this connection), in romantic love, family affection, and other

¹³ Park and Burgess. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. 489.

personal attachments. Homesickness and loneliness are expressions of it. Many of the devices for securing recognition are used also for securing response.”¹⁴

Is there any relation between this desire and the type of performance that we call praise? We note that all of the examples of craving cited by Professor Thomas are of such a nature that reward and praise ingredients would not be inconsistent with them. Indeed, it would seem clear that rewards and praise are the very essences of the satisfactions cited. What would mother-love be without these? It is difficult to think of romantic love apart from cherished compliments and loving tokens. It is obvious that family affection displays itself very often in this manner, and personal attachments that contain no such exchanges are neither very satisfying nor lasting.

Homesickness is due, in part, to the absence of the familiar. The same is true of loneliness. In the former case, the total environment is absent, including rewards and praise. In the latter case, the familiar and friendly persons are absent—including their tributes. One is often lonely in crowds, not for the lack of people, but for the lack of warmly responding people, the responding people who offer us what we want. It appears to us, therefore, that recognition and response, fed by everything except rewards and praise, would remain unsatisfied cravings.

So much for any specific case of response or recognition; the ingredients of rewards and praise, in some form or other, are hardly ever absent. But there is another point. We want response and recognition *to continue*, we want *abiding certainty* of our acceptance and standing in the groups. A spurt now and then is not sufficient. The stream must flow continuously. To change the metaphor, we want to have the *feel* of solid rock under our feet, the solid rock of public esteem and friendliness, and when we

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*

“fall from grace,”—the grace of certainty at this point—we fall far and hard.

We find that our most unhappy experiences have been those wherein people have refused approval and commendation. A snub, of itself, is nothing. But it hurts, nevertheless. Why does it hurt? Because it is a sign that the social weather is “roughing up a bit.” It undermines our certainty and sends us home to wrestle with misgivings and sleeplessness. We are suddenly thrown off our base of social approval and warmth. It is a sign that *our* particular social order is in a process of dissolution, and that we had better look to our status. We do not know how much we depend upon a continuous flow of praise and rewards until the flow stops. Then we face a dreadful emptiness into which no one cares to descend.

5. EFFECTS

(1) Were praise merely the spontaneous and joyous relief of emotional pressure, that is, merely the kind that we professed not to be interested in at the outset, it would still be of immense significance for the social order. In an arrangement where discipline and restraint constitute high walls which we cannot climb, it is necessary to provide harmless means for the release of repressed feeling. Praise is one of these harmless means. It compensates for much suffering. It operates toward the production of docile and obedient members of society. Persons who can sing out freely their appreciation of others, are not so likely to contrive violence.

(2) But the chief effects of praising are not found in the greater social amenability of the praisers to social discipline. The chief values are found in the re-invigoration of those to whom the praise is applied. We observed, in

connection with the study of rewards, that rewards single out the great objectives of civilization and thus clarify the path of individual action, they dissolve a great variety of anti-social attitudes and produce, in their stead, good will, enthusiasm, team-work, mass support, liberality, and other desirable states. This gain is clearly illustrated in the small weekly bulletins of local churches. The whole congregation is energized and directed by the pastor's steady flow of compliments. Here we find honorable and enthusiastic mention of faithfulness in attending the services, visiting the sick, giving to missions, and the like. The people, in turn, praise the pastor for his good-fellowship, his excellent sermons, his energy, his brilliance, and the rest. The whole church booms ahead in consequence of this mutual commendation. There is much exchanging of prizes and other gifts.

What we see occurring on a small scale in a local church, we may see on a large scale in society. The very same activities take place there in all fields, as we have before shown. And the effect is the same, namely, a booming ahead of various kinds of work undertaken. The whole people is kept in good humor, in an emotional glow, in loyal action, by this means.

(3) Praise is a suitable accompaniment and supplement to rewards for it specifies and particularizes in ways which rewards cannot. So giving a boy an apple for good behavior, a soldier a medal for war heroism, a citizen a job for voting right, expresses little more than general approval. But the recipients may not be able to associate the cause and the effects. They know that the giving is *after* the behaving, but may not connect the two. And bare giving cannot display the connection for them. But praise can do, and does do, just this; it points out unmistakably that the gift is related to specific behavior, and to nothing else. The recipient's doubts are cleared away. Moreover, the un-

certainties of the public are cleared up as well. This gain arises simply out of the fact that fine words are more revealing than the cruder symbols. Extreme care is usually taken to prevent the recipient and the onlookers from interpreting the reward as approval of some anti-social conduct.

(4) We think a prolonged and profound study of praise would show that it has had enormous survival value for the human species. When primitive man stumbled on this art, he hit upon an instrumentality that has been as valuable to the human race as the coat of fur to the bear and the sting to the bee. This idea has been implicit in all that has been said. It remains only to make it explicit. A point or two must suffice.

The praise of chiefs spurred men on to hunt and to fight. The hunting was more energetic, more aggressive and more successful. The benefits to the food supply and to clothing are obvious. Right through the centuries, praise has operated, as already suggested, to soften animosities and thus aid the work of social organization and co-operation. Its use must have reduced the amount of contention, irritation, quarreling, so fatal to the performance of the necessary duties and to social solidarity. "The greatest efforts of the human race," said Ruskin, "have been traceable to the love of praise." If one then knits praise into the list of factors stimulating men to cut down the forests, dig the mines, cultivate the soil, build cities, organize trade, and build up capital, institute welfare movements, and maintain education, one begins to see that the game of civilization would have lacked zest or even would have stalled, without this device.

(5) Praise has operated to create, elevate and maintain the admirable. Praise is really one method of defining the admirable, the worthy, the socially useful. The only other way is by experiment, and this is very costly. So praise

points out to the oncoming generations what the present and past generations have found worthy. The strongest attachments are made when one generation praises its works to another.

The value of praise in relation to creative work is well stated by McDougall. "Why is our conduct so profoundly influenced by public opinion? How do we come to care so much for praise and blame, the approval and disapproval of our fellow-men? This is the principal problem that we have to solve if we would understand how men are led to control their impulses in a way that renders possible the life of complexly organized societies. For the praise and blame of our fellows, especially as expressed by the voice of public opinion, are the principal and most effective sanctions of moral conduct for the great mass of men; without them few of us would rise above the level of mere law-abidingness, the mere avoidance of acts on which legal punishment surely follows; and the strong regard for social approval and disapproval constitutes an essential stage of the progress to the higher plane of morality, the plane of obligation to an ideal of conduct."¹⁵ His point is that, without praise, men would never do anything much but what is necessary, and such an attitude would dry up the springs of creative endeavor. With that attitude, no man would ever be so foolish as to sacrifice enjoyments of many sorts for posthumous fame. What a loss such an attitude would entail upon successive generations, it does not take very much effort to imagine. As Professor Ross says: "The coarse vital man may ignore the social stigma. The cultivated man may take refuge from the scorn of his neighbors in the opinion of other times and circles; but for the mass of men, the blame and the praise of their community are the very lords of life."¹⁶

¹⁵ *Social Psychology*. 188.

¹⁶ *Social Control*. 110

6. MERITS AND DEMERITS

(1) Much by way of merit has already been noted. We may add that the meed of praise is a very inexpensive type of control. It is so inexpensive that one wonders why more of it has not been employed. That so little, in comparison with other forms of control such as tortures and imprisonments, has been used, may be set down to stinginess of human beings, their littleness, their envy, and their ignorance of its great value.

Another merit is its universality of appeal. Praise is of such a character, and we are of such a character, that it touches everybody with good results, unless it be the subnormal. No one but the misanthrope dislikes it. As Young says:

“The love of praise, how’er conceal’d by art,
Reigns more or less, and glows in ev’ry heart.”

Again, it warms and melts lives together, and saves them just as the huddling of the sheep saves them from the winter’s blasts. When people praise, they take a step or two *towards* those whom they praise; when those who are praised observe that they are complimented, they take a step or two towards the praisers. Thus praise is a unifier.

Praise has the advantage of operating quickly. If one discovers a deed of heroism, one does not have to hurry off and have a medal struck off before offering heartfelt and suitable commendation; joyous approval can be offered then and there. It does take some time, however, to organize a suitable public expression. The hope for praise keeps men at work over long periods and adds greatly to the continuity of creative endeavor.

(2) Many demerits, however, are easily discerned. For one thing, praise easily becomes indiscriminate. Resulting from heightened emotional states, often, praise is applied to anything and everything. The critical and tempering faculties are pushed aside. There is the faint praise

that really damns, and there is the extravagant adoration that talks only in superlatives and thus evolves into senseless mouthings and blatant nothings.

Of course it cannot be denied that this art can be used and is used to disrupt the *larger* social order the while it is serving to maintain a smaller organization. A family may use it to maintain its own solidarity in order to fight a neighboring family or the larger community, a tribe may use it to support its own morale in a war of aggression upon a neighboring tribe, a nation may use it for the purpose of solidifying its citizens for an attack upon another nation. Praise does inspire to crime as well as to service; rewards lead men to violence as well as to peace.

When applied to dangerous ends, however, there are always other forces set in operation against it. On the whole it may be regarded as one of the great underdeveloped natural resources of man. "The more one looks to Divine approval, the less store one sets by praise and blame. The Greeks of classic times, having no hope beyond the grave, were avid of praise. Hence a furious eagerness for distinctions, laurel wreaths, monuments, inscriptions, eulogies."¹⁷ In our times, when belief in immortality is on the wane, there is a revival of interest in praise and a more enthusiastic reaching after it.

¹⁷ ROSS. *Op. cit.* 90.

CHAPTER IV

FLATTERY

AN account of a reception at the court of Burmah says: "A herald lying on his stomach read aloud my credentials. The literal translation is as follows: 'So-and-so, a great newspaper teacher of the *Daily News* of London, tenders to his Most Glorious Excellent Majesty, Lord of the Ishaddan, King of Elephants, master of many white elephants, lord of the mines of gold, silver, rubies, amber, and the noble serpentine, Sovereign of the Empires of Thunaparanta and Tampadipa and other great empires and countries, and of all the umbrella-wearing chiefs, the supporter of religion, the Sun-descended Monarch, arbiter of life and great, righteous King, King of Kings, and possessor of boundless dominions and supreme wisdom—.' " 1

1. DEFINITIONS

This ridiculously formal and pompous ascription of glorifying epithets may help us to some extent in orienting ourselves for an examination of another widely used but elusive means of control. From the dictionaries we learn that "to flatter" means to please by artful commendation or compliments, by heaping up exaggerated tributes, by offering unreasoning and undeserved praise. In less dignified language, we speak of it as beplastering with praise, "laying it on thick," laying "the flattering unction to the soul," "gilding the pill," and the like. From the large assortment of descriptive terms employed to define this device, we gather that it is a richly variegated and diffuse

1 Spencer. *Principles of Sociology*. 2: 163.

means, differing with every user of it, but yet having enough consistency and unity to be gatherable within one category. Definition is difficult, but demonstration is easy. We shall work, therefore, by means of analysis and examples.

We have already endeavored to show that there is an art called praise. We shall endeavor to show later that there are arts called persuasion and satire. Now, somewhere between praise and the arts just mentioned, and covering an area of control left vacant by them, we find a fairly-well integrated network of devices to which we give the name flattery. Flattery is something more than praise, regarded merely from the quantitative point of view. It is praise gone "on the loose," so to speak, gone beyond the bounds of truth, and often, of propriety. Yet, regarded from the qualitative point of view, it is something less, as a rule, than persuasion or satire. It is persuasion without some of its argumentative insistence; it is satire without some of its sting. There is great difficulty in pointing out just when praise passes into flattery, or when flattery takes on the character of persuasion or satire. In certain lights, flattery may be regarded as satire in its ironic or romantic forms. Certainly a persuasive element is hardly ever lacking.

2. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

It is necessary, before proceeding to the discussion of the several aspects of flattery, to consider a plausible objection which is apt to be raised at the outset. We have already pointed out that rewards and praise *may* be for purposes other than those of control, may be purely unsolicitous joyous outpourings. Contrary to popular impression, however, flattery does not have any such dual character; it is never used merely to relieve high emotional pressure; it is never used except for purposes of control.

Now the objection is offered that flattery is not at all an effective control device since nobody is deceived by the heaping up of glorifying but inapplicable epithets or the performance of obsequious ceremonials. If a toothless hag—so runs the argument—is told that she is a beautiful princess and the speaker doffs his hat and bows very low, she does not believe it and thereafter take herself as a beautiful princess. If a stuttering “rube” is told that his oratory surpasses that of Webster, he does not thereafter believe that it does. Therefore, flattery is quite ineffectual as a control device.

In reply we wish to point out, first of all, that flattery is a very ancient art and seems not to be on the wane. There is something in the argument from survival. It has itself survived, but not merely *as* a survival like the appendix, a decaying and useless mechanism; it still functions vigorously in our time.

Secondly, we must carefully distinguish between being deceived by flattery and being otherwise managed by it. If we admit—as we do—that many are not deceived, we do not nullify the proposition that people are manipulated. Every day numbers of folks are controlled by devices about which they are undeceived. We all know that there is the very common experience of being flimflammed with such amazing skill that we really enjoy it. We all yield to inducements that we know are snares and cheats.

Taking up a third point, we may point out that there is so much of vanity, so much of craving for recognition and response, so much pleasure derived from being “stroked” and “fondled,” so much comfort extracted from being humored and petted, so much gratification gained from being fawned upon, in a cold and indifferent world, that untruth is continually swallowed in monstrous gulps with exquisite relish. Do we not frequently find ourselves cherishing delicate sweets extracted from the most innocent and casual remarks? Are we not ever making oc-

casions when it becomes quite easy for companions to hand out some glowing tributes?

In the fourth place, many of us, not being content with what comes along casually, actually *hunt* for flattery. How frequently one hears the rebuff: "Oh, now you are fishing for a compliment." If it is said that much of this fishing is done unconsciously, what better testimony to the existence of the craving could be found? It seems fairly certain that some forms of inferiority-complexes are compensated for in this way, this being one way of supplementing deficiencies in personality, a way of gaining wholeness and balance. There is, to be sure, on the part of some extremely righteous people, a rather haughty disdain and condemnation of this procedure; but flattery is not necessarily a wicked device, nor is it always utterly neglected by those who condemn it most.

Again, it is an inescapable fact that plenty of people *are* deceived. Their estimate of their own worth depends very largely on what others say about them. They secretly cherish the conviction that, however extravagant the compliments, however low the bows and soft the strokings, there is really "something to it"; they take all these performances as pointing directly at genuine merits. They cannot convince themselves, and see no reason why they should do so, that all these tributes are inapplicable. A very long time ago, Tacitus observed that "people flatter us because they can depend upon our credulity." Incredible liars are perpetuated by the conceited and the gullible.

Finally, we notice that people do not openly and angrily *repudiate* flatterers. Even when they know what the fawning hangers-on are trying to do, they remain silent. There is a vast difference between the reactions which we make to the speech: "You are a liar," and to the speech, "You are a wizard at cards," all the while knowing that both assertions are about equally untrue. We are made

angry by the first speech and happy by the second. This difference in type of reaction is fundamental in considering the relation of flattery to control.

The objector, unconvinced by the preceding arguments, may still say that failure to repudiate does not necessarily mean that we like these blandishing attentions, but simply that we know the futility of trying to escape them, especially if we are in a position to bestow favors. It is true, as he points out, that we demur, back away, "pooh-pooh," and make other deprecatory movements; but these are not often sincere. The clinching point is that we almost never flash forth brave and withering indignation. And this failure affords a partial explanation of the futility. There are not enough persons determinedly engaged in extinguishing these hollow attentions to make a social movement, to create a standard of good taste relative to this matter. The tide is rather the other way, and so the device continues to work. It was Swift who said:

" 'Tis an old maxim in the schools,
That flattery's the food of fools;
Yet now and then your men of wit
Will condescend to take a bit."

Dr. Charles W. Eliot, former president of Harvard University, tells of sitting one day at the club in company with Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes. "I mentioned," says Dr. Eliot, "that I had just parted with an Englishman who had spoken of him (Holmes) with great reverence and admiration. Dr. Holmes inquired instantly, 'What did he say? What did he say, Mr. President? You know I like to have it laid on thick.'"²

Pope spoke of "all-potent flattery, universal lord," by way of giving his estimate of its power. It would seem that there are only two classes of people who escape its snares—cynics, and truly modest people, of whom there are

² *A Late Harvest*. 38. Cf. the experiences of Lady Hamilton with Lord Nelson: Barrington. *The Gallants*. 143 ff.

very few in the world. We conclude that, as a rule, the *emptiness* of commendatory expressions does not at all militate against their effectiveness.

3. THE METHODS

In dealing with situations not amenable to praise on the one hand or persuasion and satire on the other, people have always used and still use flattery in lavish quantities. But because these situations are infinitely complex and changeable, flattery has assumed a countless variety of forms, a few of which may be noticed in passing.

"The art of flatterers," says Molière, "is to take advantage of the foibles of the great, to foster their errors, and never to give advice which may annoy." "The most skillful flattery," says Addison, "is to let a person talk on, and be a listener." Hazlitt informs us that, "There is no flattery so adroit or effectual as that of implicit assent." From Madam Necker we learn that "the most subtle flattery that a woman can receive is by actions, not by words."

Johnson "flattered me," says Boswell, "with some hope that he would, in the course of the following summer, come over to Holland, and accompany me in a tour through the Netherlands."³ Prescott notes that "others he flattered by asking their advice." Saint Simon tells us that Louis XIV "was flattered by certain confessions and certain confidences."⁴ In these quotations are found at least eight suggestions as to method. We shall give brief attention to these and then note some others.

(1) Taking "advantage of the foibles of the great" has been, for ages, one of the carefully studied practices of aspiring persons. And to the term "great" we give a somewhat larger meaning than Molière had in mind. We have reference to all of those who are in a superior position

³ *Life of Johnson*. 1: 360.

⁴ *Memoirs*. 365.

relative to the flatterers, whether parents, ward bosses, governors, managers or kings. By the term "foible" is meant some feebleness, frailty or weakness in character which provides an opening for the controller. If the craving for applause happens to be especially strong, that is a weakness which plays right into the hands of those who know how to offer tremendously satisfying tributes. The relation between this foible and flattery is obvious.

But there are many other weaknesses furnishing advantages which are not quite so evident. For illustration we might recall that Minnie Maddern Fiske always had a red carpet leading from her dressing room to the stage; Henrietta Crosman had a passion for ice cream soda; Sir Beerbohm Tree apologized to the whole company for any outbursts of temper; Maude Adams was always reserved in public because she believed in maintaining the romantic personality of the stage life. Then there were Andrew Jackson's stubbornness and prejudices, Roosevelt's volubility and histrionic arts, Washington's profanity, Lincoln's choice of companions and taste in anecdotes and Daniel Webster's promissory notes. Such characteristics furnished many opportunities for the flatterers.

How is this? The answer is that laying the carpet, providing the sodas, receiving apologies, supporting reserve, putting up with stubbornness, enduring profanity complacently—all of these activities are viewed as homage, as tacit admissions of superiority, as evidence that these people are *right* in what they do; that is, such behavior is equivalent to a high tribute, since the natural reaction to these weaknesses is usually something quite uncomplimentary. For a minister to take a king's abuse without retort is just a conventional way of supporting him in it, and thereby honoring him.

(2) The "errors" of the great are fostered in many ways. The workman who knows that his boss is superstitious about the number thirteen may aid in supporting the

view by bringing evidence desired by the boss; the preacher who is a conservative or a radical may have his parishioners praise him loudly for defending such views; the politician who labors under delusions with respect to tariffs, taxes, farm-credits, etc., may be encouraged by those who favor such views; the prince who is grossly immoral and endeavors to salve his conscience thereupon, may receive bits of corroborative argument and evidence from fawning companions; the parent who is a pronounced and narrow Presbyterian, Catholic, Jew or what not, may have children who congratulate him upon his integrity and loyalty, and bring books, newspaper clippings and other scraps of support for the attitude taken; the violent chauvinist may be toasted for his bumptiousness and boastings. Since there is no end to the errors of those in superior places, there is no end to the list of artful devices calculated to support such errors and thereby win favors.

There is the story of a man who stoutly claimed that he was not the slightest bit interested in what people thought of him. One day a gentleman approached and said: "I hear that you do not care a button for what people think of you." "Yes," said the indifferent man, "that is so." Said the gentleman: "Well, I did n't believe it for a long time, and so I have been watching you. I have come to the conclusion that it is true."

(3) Another way to flatter is to avoid giving "annoying advice." This method links up closely with the preceding method. For what is "annoying advice"? Plainly it is the kind that goes contrary to settled convictions or prejudices. The counsellor who dared to suggest to a "one-hundred percenter" the desirability of recognizing worth in certain immigrant attitudes, would be giving "annoying advice." The one hundred percenter's convictions on that point are already settled and "annoying advice" would be the kind that would unsettle them.

The parent who "knows it all about everything" would

regard any suggestions from children as annoying. Oftentimes professors take this attitude with respect to students, ministers take it with respect to certain members of their church boards, public officials take it with respect to citizens, conservatives take it with respect to liberals, "insiders" take it with respect to "outsiders." And the flattery consists in adopting an admiring, uncritical attitude to such superiors and thus encouraging them in their bigotry.

(4) There are those who flatter by "listening." We are all familiar with the talkers, the bores, the haranguers, the monopolizers of conversation. So dominating do these persons become, in certain groups, that many others just sit and listen, overwhelmed. But this, again, really amounts to a tribute to such conduct. It is not necessary that they agree with what is said; it is only necessary that they remain silent. The assumption made by the talkers is that what they have to say is regarded by the listeners as worth saying. They are thus led on. An attentive audience is a high and frequently undeserved tribute to a public speaker.

By listening, some people give "implicit assent" to what is being said. All of which draws the arguer on to ever more elaboration of his notions. He is encouraged by such an intelligent and "safe" audience.

(5) "Actions," of course, count as well as words. We are not prepared to say, with Madam Necker, that women are flattered more by actions than by words; we simply point out that both sexes are so flattered. The actions which serve this purpose are familiar to all. We all know that bowing, bowing very low, bowing repeatedly, kneeling, prostrating, standing at respectful distances, waiting the cue, nodding the head, wriggling ourselves through the numerous obsequious performances, have served and still serve as high forms of tribute. The gist of the matter is that by abasing ourselves we relatively elevate others, by assuming a position of inferiority we inevitably promote

the superiority of others, by deferring to them we admit their right to a precedent position.

But flattery does not inhere alone in such ceremonial actions. It is found in a countless variety of other modes of activity relative to other people. Goldsmith writes of

“A flattering painter, who made it his care
To draw men as they ought to be, not as they are.”

And needless to say there is a vast deal of this very thing in the realm of art. There is the photographing business that is bent upon “improving” all subjects, there is the portrait-painting business that has a similar purpose, there is the biography-writing game that ignores defects of character and of behavior and holds up a presentation through which something like divinity shines. The whole of romantic “art” is nicely calculated to please. From the slightly untrue it moves on toward the wholly false in what it presents. If it is beautiful, it does the work of flattery. Photography must flatter or cease business.

(6) If it is sometimes dangerous, or at least unpolitic, to offer advice, it is always diplomatic and complimentary to *ask it*. The boss who consults his workmen about the job in hand, the professor who asks his students about their views, the cabinet officer who seeks counsel from citizens, thereby pays a very high, if mostly undeserved, tribute. It is, perhaps, difficult to think of a more subtle or delicate form of flattery. This seeking of advice has an effect similar to that of a mild intoxicant. The one asked is amazed at the “humanness” and discernment of the seeker and is set on a new level of self and social importance. It makes little difference whether or not the advice is valued when it is given. The tramp who was asked if he could change a twenty-dollar bill, was forced to reply in the negative; but he could not help saying, “I thank you for the compliment just the same.”

(7) Overpraise. This method has been in our minds all

the time as we have mentioned those above. It seems like the central gilded thread in them all, except those in which no words are spoken. And yet all of these methods are a kind of "song without words" in that whether anything is uttered or not there is some clearly understood demonstration that serves the purpose. Just to make overpraise by words stand up along side of the other types given and to illustrate it, we quote some lines dedicated by the Earl of Oxford to Queen Elizabeth, who will be remembered, as nearly the opposite of what the verse pictures.

"What shepheard can express
The favour of her face,
To whom in this distresse
I doe appeale for grace?
A thousand cupids flye
About her gentle eye,
From which each throwes a dart
That kindles soft, sweet fire,
Within my loving heart,
Possessèd by desire.
No sweeter life I trie
Than in her love to die."

Here we have the clearest case of the imputation of qualities which were non-existent. Overpraise means to exaggerate by word symbols, to puff out and expand characteristics and attainments to that point where they are quite inapplicable. It is like saying that a foot contains twenty inches. The realist regards it, of course, as lying.

(8) Colton tells us that: "Imitation is the sincerest flattery." It has probably been clear to the reader, although yet unmentioned, that the chief feature distinguishing praise from flattery is *insincerity*. As long as people mean what they say, no matter how extravagant they may grow in their panegyrics, it is praise. But when their tributes are void of conviction—and no one knows exactly when such a stage is reached—they become flatterers. Now sincerity, in the above quotation, may have reference to "true." The statement may then mean that in so far

as one copies exactly the practices or attitudes of others, one is paying tribute in the least insincere manner possible, that is, one is really praising. Or it may mean that one is flattering in the highest possible way, is going to "the limit" as to methods of adulation.

Whatever the meaning of the quotation, we can see that imitation is a very high form of compliment. We can think of nothing more laudatory than exact reproductions of people's views or practices because the final test is *action*. We may confess similar views, we may profess the same creeds, we may vociferously proclaim identical principles; but the final proof of our admiration and adoration is the adoption of identical action-patterns. Whether we regard them as worthy or not is beside the point. The flatterer probably does not esteem them highly, but yet adopts them because that is the superior method of gaining his end. Imitation means an abandonment to the pattern of another. It goes beyond words. It goes just as far as human tribute can go.

(9) Another method of flattery is "well-seasoned abuse and ridicule" of rivals. Any one who takes a pronounced position is most highly honored if his companions turn their guns upon opponents. This is a very common type in the political and religious fields. We flatter our own race and acknowledge its superiority by hurling uncomplimentary epithets upon other races. We pay high tribute to our own political party by decrying other parties. As other groups, individuals, opinions, attitudes are degraded, those with which we are affiliated, at the same time, rise. Reputations always hang in the balance. If one side goes down the other one goes up.

We now have before us information that will make the following statement clear. "Flattery," says Bogardus, "is a shrewd form of indirect suggestion. It operates to inflate the subject's estimate of himself, but more fundamentally it is an overpowering stimulus to all the mechanisms that have been organized in a person's life around

his concept of self.”⁵ There are numerous other methods but these are sufficient to refresh our memories as to the general trend.

4. AREAS OF OPERATION

A constant feature of all social groupings is the superior-inferior relationship or co-ordination. In the family we observe the parent-child and the husband-wife relation. The school shows us the teacher-pupil form. Other examples are the leader-follower, pastor-people, physician-patient, master-servant, boss-workman, author-reader types. No matter where we stand in society, the very bottom and the highest point excepted, we are always in the relation of superior to some below us and of inferior to some above us. In our relations with the same person, say a bosom friend, we are sometimes above and sometimes below.

Another constant type of relationship is that of “in-out.” No individual can be a member of all groups all the time, nor can any one be wholly isolated. Therefore, all people are “in” some organizations and “out” of others, and that status has much to do with attitudes and strivings. As a general rule, most people are trying to change these relationships *in the direction* of “above” and “in.” That is the prevailing tendency in life’s flowings.

Now some of these relationships of above-below and in-out, do not rasp our sensibilities nor arouse our longings. The author-reader, the physician-patient combinations are examples. These produce no irritation, no unrest, no suffering. There is no constant urge to reverse them. In many cases, also, the status of outsider does not distress, since there are many organizations which people would not join if invited to do so.

But a number of these relationships are the direct cause of extreme uneasiness. At times, the teacher-pupil rela-

⁵ *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. 132.

tion is almost unbearable; very often the boss-workman relation is the source of great irritation; now and then the fact that one is "out" of something arouses intense longings. Being a slave, a student, a workman, that is, being "under" some one else, frequently produces an attitude of rebellion and begets revolt. In other words, these positions awaken an almost uncontrollable desire to have them reversed.

The unrest takes one or more of many forms, such as activities directed toward escaping bondage, mounting to the superior position, turning the tables on superiors and letting them down and innumerable minuter subtleties. These are familiar social facts. The question we have to consider is this: Does flattery play any part in the efforts of those who try to reverse this relationship, try to get "up" and "in"?

We shall forget, for the time being, the superiors, that is, those who are "up" and "in" and focus our attention upon the "downs" and "outs," at whatever level they may be in any given society. Let us be very observant of their behavior.

As a general rule, praise and rewards descend from superiors to inferiors and from those who are "in" to those who are "out." As a general rule, also, flattery flows *the other way*.⁶ Let us not fail to keep this point firmly in mind.

Now what is the meaning of these movements? Why is it that rewards and praise flow downward and flattery flows in the reverse direction—as a rule? In attempting to answer this question, we have to ask another, namely: What are the devices, means, instrumentalities, weapons, or whatever one wishes to call them, *available*, effectively available, for those who wish to mount upward or to get inside? What resources do people ordinarily have for escaping inferiority and isolation? They do not have supernatural facilities for this change. They must employ

⁶ Cf. McDougall. *Social Psychology*. 198.

instrumentalities within the culture. They must employ devices that *they can use* successfully. We have already spoken of rewards and praise. We have yet to discuss persuasion, satire, slogans, commands, calling names, and others. What ones of these can best meet the needs of the badly disadvantaged "downs" and "outs"? When one carves, hews, bores or digs, one selects the appropriate tool. In the work of changing one's social position, what is the fittest tool?

Roughly speaking, there are just three main methods—tools—by means of which one may move "up" and "in." These three are *merit*, *force*, and *pull*. In struggling upward and inward to the coveted positions in society, ever larger numbers, we are happy to point out, are employing the method of merit. They are equipping themselves in countless ways to grace and fill their better positions, and they do not want these better positions until they are fitted for them. But sometimes, indeed, very often, superiors and insiders fail to recognize and reward merit. What then? Many become introverts and console themselves with some sort of comforting philosophy or theory. Others may adopt pull or force.

Now we would support the proposition that flattery is often a conspicuous feature in what we have called "pull" in unmerited ascent. And we would argue that flattery is peculiarly fitted to aid in this type of enterprise. Supporting this view negatively first, we shall say that, in such a situation, flattery seems to be about the easiest and least dangerous of all the methods. Let us work by a process of elimination, beginning with the sharper and severer instruments. Can the inferior or the "out" employ force? That depends upon how numerous, how well organized, and how well supplied they are. A general downfall of the superior, that is, a revolution, has been worked before and is always a possibility. But this is a dangerous expedient since it usually involves the inferiors as well and precipi-

tates them into other sufferings, often worse than those previously endured. Speaking in a narrower sense, however, punishments can be employed *only* by those who possess authority, that is, by the superior and the "ins." This is quite obvious. We may say, then, that this is not a wholly efficient or available instrument for inferiors and "outs."

Are the inferiors and "outs" any better equipped if they choose threats? The answer is clearly in the negative, because that would antagonize the superiors and produce a recoil in the form of greater oppression, as it would also anger the "ins" and cause them to shut the door with a bang—and then bar it forever.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the other "toothed" instruments mentioned. People cannot satirize their way "up" and "in." They cannot criticize their way to higher levels unless the criticism is a clear demonstration of merit. They cannot employ commands to advantage, for then they must have authority which is in possession of those "above" and "in," which is part of the very thing they struggle for. These instruments hinder social climbing and make it almost impossible. They do this partly because they are worked from below and outside, and because they antagonize and harden the hearts of those to whom they are applied.

Advertising, propaganda and slogans are serviceable in this work, but largely because they are displays of merit. As we shall show, they depend for their success more upon skill than upon the weaknesses of those to whom they are applied.⁷ Besides, they are very costly and that is a consideration which the inferiors cannot neglect. Thus the negative argument in favor of flattery is made by pointing out the unavailability of the other means.

Positively speaking, flattery is the best instrument because it is cheap and because it softens and mollifies the superiors and insiders. Its use gives some evidence—how

⁷ See chapters on these topics.

much, we have already indicated—of a desire for recognition on the part of the inferiors and outsiders, from those who are in the superior places; its use is an ipso facto acknowledgment that the superiors and insiders *are* now in the superior and inside positions. From what has been said earlier in this chapter we are now clear that the superiors and insiders are pleased with such propitiation. Far from being antagonized, the said guardians of the higher levels and inner circles soften towards the persons asking admittance *in this manner*. The use of flattery is an admission of the *right* of the superiors and insiders to be such and to hold such positions. It is a public acknowledgment, all the while it is a very subtle undermining of these positions to the degree that the guardians are seduced by the extravagant tributes applied. The use of flattery is the most subtle and successful way that human ingenuity has yet discovered for taking guardians *off their guard*, yet not hurting them. This craving for adulation is the fundamental weakness in the guard's armor; it is the flatterer's unique opportunity.

It may be objected that while people cannot use the means already mentioned in such emergencies, they still have recourse to rewards and praise, and therefore, need not employ flattery. In answer we may say that in so far as flattery is regarded by those who receive it as a form of reward or praise, the objection is pointless. Extravagant tribute, fawning, petting and the like are the flatterer's method of offering rewards and praise. And this method succeeds. One difficulty, however, in the way of using rewards and praise, in the better sense of these terms, is that the guardians of the superior and inside positions are usually already fairly well supplied with these gifts. There is not much more that the inferiors can give them. But we have already seen that, as a rule, rewards and praise flow *downward*, not upward, and hence are the instruments which superiors and insiders employ for the

purpose of keeping inferiors and outsiders content with their situation. The point we wish to emphasize is that flattery is about the only thing for which superiors and insiders are insatiable and which at the same time is cheap enough for inferiors and outsiders to use. Like drug addicts, the former require stronger and ever stronger doses. And it is very interesting to observe how naturally and easily the masses take to this art. Jean Paul Richter has reminded us that "it is easier and handier for men to flatter than to praise."

The term "social climbing" usually means trying to run with the "fast set" or gaining entrance to some "exclusive" group. We employ it here to describe all efforts to change one's position from what, at the time and in the circumstances, is held to be an inferior or an outside position of whatever nature. And of course we are thinking of flattery in relation to such climbing as those in the coveted positions object to. Flattery is not needed and is not used where, because of his merits, the superiors and insiders extend a warm welcome to the new-comer.

Quite generally through the centuries, those who have made comments on flattery have characterized it as a vicious influence. "There is nothing which so poisons princes as flattery," said Montaigne, "nor anything whereby wicked men more easily obtain credit and favor with them." Jane Porter says: "The flatterer easily insinuates himself into the closet, while honest merit stands shivering in the hall or antechamber." So it may be. Let us freely admit that it is a counterfeit key. But who of us expect people to have the fortitude and the scruple to stay "down" and "out" if they have a key, counterfeit or otherwise, that will open the door? Surely this is asking a great deal of those from whom so little is expected in other directions. Surely it is asking a great deal when the nature of the situation is made clear. And what is the situation?

Are we not familiar with the fact that large numbers of people, who are *now* in superior and inside positions, attained these coveted places, *not by merit* but by counterfeit means? Into any realm, educational, religious, political, industrial, we can go and find droves of these people. Numbers of them reached their goal by means of flattery. They flattered—that is to say, they “worked”—those above them. With what face can they make complaint if those below them follow in their footsteps? The whole arrangement is bad, a blot on our civilization, let us say with extremists. But the ethical question is somewhat beside the present point. We are chiefly concerned with the question of *efficiency*. And from the analysis carried out, we think there can no longer be any doubt of that. Flattery is possibly “the most sordid act that can be complied with,” as Steele phrases it, but it works, it helps people attain very much-desired ends.

5. SOME EFFECTS

We say the device “works,” and we have indicated, in a general way, what that work is. We must now examine this proposition somewhat more carefully and try to point out more precisely what is gained by those who choose to use it. Flattery is a device for the control of human beings. It must therefore, if it is at all effectual, produce some modifications in human activities and attitudes. Since, like propaganda, flattery has self-concealment as part of its art, we shall not be able to cast up the account in anything like satisfactory detail. We shall remain far from pointing out even the bulk of its accomplishments. Research has not gone far enough for that. But in justification of the main contention, we may note several points.

(1) In discussing the social area in which flattery operates most, we attempted to show that it is of service in helping the inferiors out of their inferiority and the out-

siders out of their isolation. We need not repeat this argument.

(2) Because of its soothing and mollifying qualities, flattery has operated to soften and humanize the attitudes of the world's taskmasters. In taking up this point, we pass from the "guardians" of the sacred and exclusive precincts of society already mentioned, to another superior group, namely, the chronic oppressors. We are thinking of those who, down through the ages, have had people intimately and exclusively within their power and who have been disposed to make more or less capricious and devastating displays of that power. There have been kings, princes, military leaders, judges, feudal lords, slave owners, police officials, industrial tyrants, religious autocrats and many others. The human race has endured a great deal from such superiors. The records of history are full of accounts of small and large scale brutalities perpetrated by them.

But there is some evidence to show, also, that such tyrants have not been immune to the flattery-infection, and have in consequence undergone decided changes in attitude. Death-dealing mandates of kings have been modified, the determination of whimsical princelings to have revenge has been extinguished, the harsh orders of military despots have been recalled, the lash of the slave-owner has been stayed, the malicious threats of police officials and petty officers have been revoked, the terrors of religious persecution have been mitigated. In countless cases, animal ferocity has been made to give place to clemency and humanity.

(3) In consequence of such momentous changes in the attitudes and activities of the world's taskmasters, the pitiable lot of the world's oppressed has been greatly mitigated. *Three* classes of people have been especially benefited, namely, slaves, women and children. If our contention that inferiors usually have little other recourse

except flattery, is sound, it will be quite clear why this is so. The lone slave is helpless before a brutal master—except as he can soften the attitude of that master. He can do that possibly by faithful service. But he can also do it, in many instances, by applying the “insinuating oil” of extravagant tribute according to one or all of the methods already suggested.

During the patriarchal régime, the position of women has been anything but agreeable. Where they have not been slaves outright, they have still been in a degraded state. Faithfulness in service, i. e. merit, might bring them nothing but indifference; unfaithfulness brought them brutalities beyond description. Shut up to the one avenue of escape, it is no wonder that they have sought to flatter their way out; nor is it any wonder that they have generally been held to excel in this art, for it has been a life-saver to them.

With respect to children a similar argument holds. Under the patriarchal system, they have been simply property to be retained or disposed of according to the whims of the owners. In a life and death struggle, one will use any means available for self-preservation. In the struggle for existence, the children have had to do much to lessen the rigors of patriarchal indifference and harshness, and one of their methods, always acquired very early, has been that of flattery in which they are generally unconscious adepts. As the cringing, crawling, sheepish looking dog returns to an irate master and performs so obsequiously as to neutralize the irritation and call forth good humor, so the children remain silent, give sly glances, fall trustingly into the hands, and execute countless other little artifices, which dissolve parental anger. The history of flattery in relation to the mitigation of the human lot remains to be written. When it is written, it will prove intensely diverting and highly revealing.

(4) Flattery saves from the agonies of self-distrust and

prevents many failures in life that would otherwise appear. It increases people's faith in themselves. It would not seem necessary—harking back to our argument about superiors and insiders—that such medicine should be administered. We must distinguish, however, between feelings of confidence, quiet assurance and other preservative qualities *and* positions of superiority in the social order. It is a fact that those in responsible positions often lack self-trust; and no wonder, for many of them arrived there, not by merit but by "pull." But even merit is consistent with a grave lack of self-confidence.

Thus it appears that people of all sorts in positions of importance need stimulating draughts from outside to energize them for their work. And much more good work, successful enterprise, is the product of praise and flattery than is yet measured out. Wives who know how to flatter their husbands and send them out to perform all day under the influence of this delicious stimulant, contribute more to whatever success attends the efforts of said husbands than they usually receive credit for. But if the work is no better and the success is not greater, measured by ordinary standards, there is great gain, for the husbands are, as we said, saved the frightful agonies of self-distrust. "He that is much flattered," said Johnson, "soon learns to flatter himself." Flattery may thus serve in helping to correct grave defects in human construction. Flattery engenders a silent and happy sense of superiority, a blissful state which in itself is no small asset to the social order. It is a poison to be sure, but like strychnine it is a tonic against heart-failure.

There is a danger here, however. Inordinate applications of flattery often develop faith in one's self to the point where the person has no regard for others at all. Too much "boosting" frequently leads directly to fanaticism. It has been said of Gladstone and of George Eliot

that they were continually "the worse" for too much of this stimulant.⁸ No doubt many others have suffered in the same way. We know the meaning of the phrase, "going to one's head."

(5) Flattery actually sets up ideals. The very exaggerations of speech by which it is usually characterized serve to indicate goals towards which people may work. Eulogy contains many suggestions of "possible selves" which people may realize or strive to realize. Thus flattery has unlimited possibilities in suggestion. The hag, if told that she is a "peach," may thereby be stirred to realize a "better self."

Some people are said to dress themselves in rather luxurious garb for the express purpose of setting up a standard of excellence, beauty and taste to which they try to make the inner person correspond. A "garment of praise" can provide a similar standard, and that it often does we can hardly doubt. This appears from the fact—frequently mentioned in this book—that our own conception of our worth is so much in the keeping of others.

Parnell has said that flattery gives "new colors and complexions to all things."⁹ It helps to make an unreal but much admired world. It keeps people walking amidst fairies and other kindly genii. There are never any griffins, devils, dragons and other horrible monsters in this realm. The very extravagance of it helps to build a mythical region to which people gain entrance as a way of escape from an untoward situation. Flattery helps to build the mythology of life which is such an effective factor in social control.

(6) Flattery cushions many contacts of life and aids in substituting kindliness, tolerance, pliability, reasonableness for harshness, rigidity, stiff formality, and stubbornness.

⁸ *Living Age*. 278: 185.

⁹ *Spectator*. No. 460.

People are more *approachable*; there is less of stupid standing on dignity, in relations soft-soaped by flattery. The attitude of concession is encouraged.

It may be urged that if these undoubted gains are to be had at the price of lying or other false representations, they are too costly. To which it may be replied that no price has usually been thought too great for self and social preservation, and no one will question the immense value of approachableness, reasonableness, tolerance and the like in cementing human beings together and strengthening the social order for survival. This is to say that the end justifies the means.

But the means is not so reprehensible after all. We have already called attention to the fact that few are *deceived* by flattery. That is to say that when everybody flatters in one or more of the ways indicated, and everybody knows that it is being done, we are hardly justified in characterizing the practice as *lying*. It is simply a conventional arrangement, a social understanding, with a life-saving feature. It is not lying any more than dressing a misshapen body so that it will not seem so, is lying.

(7) We must admit, however, that flattery adds to the humbuggery, sabotage and parasitism of the world by "raising an opinion," to use the words of Johnson, "that honor may be gained without the toll of merit." Undoubtedly the belief is now, and always has been, very widespread that the "pull" method of gaining social position is only mildly objectionable. At least it is always very popular. There seems to prevail in our culture system the insidious suggestion that if you can "get there" or "stand in," it is all right to do so, fitness or no fitness. If you can "get by" the teacher and secure your diploma, if you can get along with the boss and do less work for the same pay, if you can win public office and capture prestige without qualifying in any way, if you can gain a fortune without rendering your fellow-men an equivalent, if you can be a

popular preacher and deliver nothing but chaff, it is all right, and you are a success. Every way and every day, these things are being done, flattery playing its discreditable rôle in connection therewith. The detestable lengths to which even honorable people are sometimes driven are suggested by the keen-phrased Swift:

“Where Young must torture his invention
To flatter knaves, or lose his pension.”

Parents succumb to the wiles of this art and fail properly to train their children. Thus the children gain the notion that flattery works. Then the school has to meet this device, industry has to meet it, politics has to meet it, religion has to meet it. All up through the series, as long as life lasts, and in all relations, there is a consciously or unconsciously striving self, asserting itself in this manner. A tradition of effectuality is thereby established. Society becomes honeycombed with sinecures and spotted with misfits.

The only way of escape is to remove seducible officials of all varieties from office. But besides being impossible, since we lack criteria for detecting seducible officials, the elimination of all such would leave our society under the guidance and rule of severe disciplinarians, rigid automatons, untouched by the milk of human kindness and tolerance. Such a society would be even less desirable to inhabit than the various Utopias, that have been constructed from time to time—in which nobody would care to live.

Society is thronged with humbugs and parasites largely because such persons have learned how to “pull the leg” of superiors and find this road to life’s satisfactions much easier than other roads. Flattery is thus not only the most available method of making life tolerable for inferiors but is also the line of least resistance. We are not surprised that this art is employed so much. The wonder is that it is not employed more.

(8) In conclusion we wish to point out something of the relation flattery bears to democracy. It is clear, of course, that flattery is ineffectual where contacts are impossible. In India, for example, where caste lines are rigidly drawn, the use of flattery is narrowly confined to each caste area; it cannot operate *across* the caste barriers. Where one has no access to superiors, flattery cannot perform. But in a democracy, the caste lines are down; all persons are accessible, in some way or another, to all others; contacts are much more frequent. Hence we would expect flattery to be much more in evidence everywhere.

Is it so? Do we, in reality, find flattery much more in evidence? One feature of democracy militates against its use, namely, the ease of ascent by unquestionable means. No position is too high, in a democracy, to aim at and win on one's merits. But there are many other features that favor its larger use. One is that at any given time in good-natured, gullible democracies, there are so many amateurs, windbags, weaklings, dotards in positions of influence, and these are easy marks for the sycophant. These have to maintain their positions chiefly by catering to the whims of childish changeable people. The more readily, then, do they lend itching ears to what the climbers have to say to them. The social situation favors their *susceptibility*, and at the very same time it favors the *flattering approach*. This is a very sorry conjuncture from the viewpoint of the general good. But it is an unavoidable conjuncture until such time as democracies learn the art of selecting leaders who are immune to such influences—if there are or can be any such paragons.

According to this view, there ought to be more flattery as the democratic movement waxes. At first thought, it appears that there is actually less of it. Have we not, therefore, a fundamental contradiction here? The answer, it seems to us, is found in the relative *decline* of overpraise, the orally extravagant form of flattery—which is

the more obvious type—but a *multiplication* of the other methods already noted above. There is no available scientific proof of this contention, but it seems reasonable that the increase of opportunity for its use—as just suggested—cannot fail of improvement since human nature is what it is. There are more contacts, there are more official positions, there is more glory available to the common man—and there are more hungry people. This combination spells out just one result—more flattery; but it has, as education advances, as human versatility multiplies, as the detestation of it increases, vastly more subtlety, more sinuosity, more deviousness. A study, more scientific than this aspires to be, would clearly show this.

For flattery, rewards and praise, like candy, are their own authority. Something depends, of course, on their methods. Most depends upon their taste, and they universally taste good. Their ultimate argument is subjective. If we want these things, we yield to their influence. No reasoning demonstrates that the high-mounding wine is not intoxicating. No elaboration proves that flattery is not seductive. It is its own internal evidence. It may be a depraved taste that craves it, but there are many depraved tastes, and, no matter how depraved the taste, it has its own criteria for determining what satisfies.

The power and work of flattery in human relations have now been indicated. Those who regard it as a blessing, in disguise possibly, in that it contributes to the plasticity and “humaneness” of society, will accept the situation as they find it and ask no further questions. But those who are struck by the insincerity of it and the widely prevailing hypocrisy resulting will wish to know of antidotes. They will be anxious to know whether flattery is itself uncontrollable.

In answer we may say that the operations of flattery finally face two unsurpassable barriers. In the first place, flattery can be overdone. In its milder and more artistic

forms, it provokes no opposition, for it does not go dangerously "to the head." In its more extravagant administration, it produces intoxication—paralysis—so that those who look for favors look in vain. Chronic inebriates of all sorts and everywhere finally become helpless to grant the favors sought. They often develop a violent antipathy to the intoxicant and resist the administration of more.

In addition, there are many other forms of control operating in society. The flatterer is not a wandering anarchistic being, unaffected by other forces. He is subjected, if he goes too far, to other forms of control, such as calling names, satire, laughter, criticism, threats, and others, and is thus held within customary bounds or driven to subterranean methods. And unless he is a hardened sinner, impervious to all outside influences, he must soon yield up the use of this device. There is thus safety in numbers—of control devices.

CHAPTER V

PERSUASION

DURING the World War, Ambassador Page attempted to convince Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that English support of Huerta in Mexico was wrong. His brief description of the method adopted is worth quoting. "The Lord knows," he explains, "I've told him plainly over and over again and, I fear, even preached to him. At first he couldn't see the practical nature of so 'idealistic' a programme. I explained to him how the immemorial 'policy' that we all followed of recognizing momentarily successful adventurers in Latin America had put a premium on revolution; that you (President Wilson) had found something better than a policy, namely, a principle; that policies change, but principles do not; that he need not be greatly concerned about the successor to Huerta; that this is primarily, and ultimately, an American problem; that Great Britain's interest being only commercial is far less than the interest of the United States which is commercial and also ethical; and so on and so on."¹

In trying to haul Virginia into the Union, it is said that "the influence of Washington and Randolph, the patient arguments of Madison and Marshall, and it must be added, some rather questionable manipulation, finally secured a majority of ten for the Union."²

A front-page editorial on one of the numerous local church sheets presents the following inducements:

¹ Hendrick. *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*. 1: 185. See a fine example of direct personal persuasion in Saint-Simon's *Memoirs of Louis XIV and the Regency*. 113.

² Morison. "The Education of John Marshall," *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1920. 50.

THE WILL TO VICTORY.
EVERY-MEMBER CANVASS SUNDAY.

Read and digest these seven large facts.

(1) We have 650 active, resident members and 485 pledges. Since some pledges cover two or three people, we cannot count much on new pledges, altho we expect every member to give.

(2) The budget of . . . thousand dollars is absolutely VITAL. If we fail to reach that our work is badly hampered. Do you wish us to dismiss workers or go without heat or light?

(3) Increase of present pledges by thirty percent is positively essential. We have only . . . dollars pledged. That is a hard fact.

(4) Other churches of our size and wealth raise vastly more than we ask. There is not much sacrificial giving among us at present.

(5) 'Shall a man rob God?' asks the Bible. When we spend more on ourselves than we OUGHT God's cause suffers. This is not right.

(6) Not only do we give as we are blessed, but we are blessed as we give. Every person who ever tithed, prospered. Try it.

(7) A sound financial budget, fully subscribed, is the basis of all future work. We cannot go on to the new building, the new organ, the new workers, the larger community service, until this . . . thousand dollars is solidly met.

PRAY OVER THIS, THEN ACT.

Canvass Committee.

These three examples reveal almost every feature of that variety of social influence which we call persuasion. They illustrate the use of the conversational method, of argumentation, of preaching, of pleading, of the presentation of facts, of so-called "knock-down arguments," of coaxing, of the appeal to fear, to a sense of rivalry, to religious belief, to illusions, to ideals, and "questionable manipulation." Many of the mechanical features of persuasion are suggested, as well as the grounds of appeal. With these hints as to the nature of our subject, we may proceed to analyze and further illustrate this involved mechanism, and suggest some of its effects in relation to social order.

1. THE NEED

We have seen that rewards and praise generally flow downward, from those who have to those who have not; we have observed that flattery flows upward. Persuasion flows either way. Defined inclusively, it is so versatile a device that it serves in a great variety of ways and situations. In general we may say that it is used in social situations where there promises to be or is a sharp disagreement. We must examine such situations for a moment.

Rewards and praise are given for conformance. We first came upon social *division* and *disagreement* when dealing with flattery. But here the basis of disagreement was largely traditional and sentimental—the flatterers having no solid reasons for being up and in, their oppressors having no sound reasons for keeping them down and out. And if the breach is healed, it is healed by balms, anodynes and soporifics, all arriving at accord because more or less intoxicated. No fundamental issues are settled; they are just plastered over.

Very different, speaking generally, is the situation in which persuasion is employed. The basis of difference here is not, on the side of the innovators at least, traditional and sentimental. The controlling conformers may rest here, but the variants innovate *on principle*. They diverge, not because of mere personal desire, but because they think the system itself is bad and because it ought to be destroyed for their own and others' good. They see no sense in the invariable uniformities; they are done with illusions; they ask for light; they want reasons.

In this we are not drawing a picture of any unusual person. This sort of individual is about us every day—the student who says that much of his course is bunk and who loathes the whole dreary business of formal education as did Stevenson and Spencer; the boy who says that much

of what is taught in the churches is lies and he suspects that all of it is; the radical who breaks forth with evidence that the whole political system is designed and twisted to maintain the power and privileges of certain classes; the liberal lover who comes out with a broadside against a marriage system erected in the dark ages and stupidly adhered to now. From the girl who chews too much gum and the boy who wonders why he can't whistle on Sunday, all the way through thousands of increasingly serious variants to the uncompromising revolutionist, this type persists and is familiar.

That these innovators are highly inimical to the social arrangements from which they revolt, the guardians of those arrangements know all too well. They have seen destructive storms come out of clouds the size of a man's hand before. They cannot, in all conscience, stand back and see such persons gather disciples, organize bands of messengers, carry their heresy about and overturn the world. The mother cannot endure the thought of her boy going to hell for infidelity. Sworn officers of the law cannot remain passive while radicals storm the citadel. It is too much to ask the faithful and the loyal to listen to the arguments of the innovators and learn something from them. They must act at once to restore order; then they may listen—if they please.

So far as our study is concerned, this is a new social situation. What can be done about it? What type of control instrument does such a crisis call for? Ideally, it ought not to have occurred. But now that it has occurred, what can the guardians do about it? Rewards and praise will not meet it for those who vary on principle, and from deep conviction, scorn rewards as bribery and praise as a sham. Flattery will not meet it for such persons despise flatterers and see through their painted masks. Panicky guardians and their blind followers generally fall to commands, threats and punishments, whereupon everybody gets

angry. Self-composed and reasonable guardians seize first the weapon of persuasion. We are now to observe their use of it and what they accomplish.

We must not expect too much since we are observing actual practice. The most sensible of guardians and the most "scientific" of radicals often become "heated." Under such circumstances they do not stick to the point, they do not always confine themselves to adducing evidence, they do not always hold their faces steadfastly toward the light. Frequently they are overcome by a zeal to win—a passion fatal to logical inference. It is, therefore, very difficult for analysts to keep the rim on persuasion, that is, to know when it is persuasion and when it is not. But the main outlines of this device we hope to set forth.

2. THE FORMS

(1) Persuasion by means of *gestures* is very widespread and easily recognized. Each group develops a number of signs which signify inducements in various situations, but there are many almost universally recognized and comprehensible manifestations. Longfellow reminds us that

"He speaketh not; and yet there lies
A conversation in his eyes."

The power of the eyes is well stated by Tennyson thus:

"While thus he spake, his eye, dwelling on mine,
Drew me, with power upon me, till I grew
One with him, to believe as he believed."

Subtleties of this sort might be enumerated at great length. We have space to note only those more obvious types such as nodding the head in the significant way, holding out the hands with palms upward as if to say, "Come," beckoning, walking away as if to suggest, "Come along with me," and encouraging approach by smiles.

We are all familiar, as well, with such movements as

tearing the hair, shaking the head, leaning out over the audience with outstretched hands, and pointing; such bendings of the convictions of opponents as the hunger-strike, the boycott, and the infinitely complicated organizations of behavior such as are employed to display depression, disappointment, exhilaration, hope, expectation, strong desire, amiability, blandness.

There are many varieties of demonstration—the laboratory test being a significant example—which are primarily designed to correct and convince. A demonstration of an automobile or any other machinery, the working of a playground as a corrective for juvenile delinquency, the operation of a municipal water system as a better public service, the service of medical skill and science as an antidote to disease—all of these and hosts of others, of large and small proportions, are often aimed as inducements, are used as persuaders.

Individuals and races differ greatly in their manifestations. The Mediterranean peoples appear to make large use of gestures. As we observe them in communication, it seems as if their lithe bodies and versatile hands say more than their tongues. “When the Cardinal in the Vatican,” says Mrs. Meynell, “with his dramatic Italian hands, bids the kneeling groups arise, he does more than bid them. He lifts them, he gathers them up, far and near, with the gesture of both arms; he takes them to their feet with the compulsion of his expressive force.”³

Further elaborations of these persuading gestures are found in the dramatic arts. Here we often have highly skillful and moving presentations, compulsive gestural forms, for the overcoming of hesitation, backwardness, hostility and other forms of opposition.

(2) Oral Features. In making the transition to oral forms of persuasion, we must speak first (a) of the tone of the voice. Tone is made by certain muscular move-

³ Cf. McPherson. *The Psychology of Persuasion*. 126 ff.

ments; therefore it might be thought of as a gesture. The movements are invisible, however; therefore we must think of the tone as an oral device. It is a hidden gesture translated into sound. It is the modulation, the pitch or intensity which sounds have, and it comes to be as meaningful as any other symbol. Without tone, oral persuasion would dissolve into noise.

The Chinese are said to have five tone classes (in Canton, ten tones) in their language, any word meaning one of five different things according to the tone used. Other languages are not so rich in tonal possibilities, perhaps, but at worst there is great resourcefulness for persuasion here. Pope speaks of

“Persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs,
Silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes.”

We have all heard of, and also doubtless have heard, “pleading tones,” and while we cannot describe them to a person unfamiliar with them, we know their power; they penetrate deeply into our being and grip us. A singer without exquisite tones wouldn’t be singing. A preacher with a harsh, rasping voice or with one that is high, thin and penetrating like a knife, possesses almost insurmountable drawbacks in persuasion. On the other hand, the deep, rich, full, resonant tones are much of the singer’s stock in trade and not a little of the speaker’s. The series of sounds, “Come with me,” express persuasion or command, according to the tone used. “You ought to go,” may be uttered in such a pitch as to convey little of force or desire. There is a powerful impulse in the tone properly modulated.

(b) We have all heard of the “convincing talker.” He is one who, combining ease and grace, presents facts and arguments with such assurance, such plausibility, and in such profusion, that listeners are held fast and speechless. We meet this type in the salesman, the after-dinner speaker, the minister, and the political leader.

(c) *Conversation* is one type of communication that is often employed in this direction. Professor Matthews makes a distinction between talk and conversation. "Talk is all in the day's work; it is practical; it consists of question and answer; it lends itself lightly to the interchange of facts and the swapping of stories. Conversation is another thing altogether, or rather it is the same thing elevated and glorified. . . . Talk might be called one of the mechanical arts, whereas conversation is one of the fine arts. Only a man born to the craft, specially gifted for it, trained by years of practice, enlightened by the example of the masters of conversation, can take a subject, 'follow it out in all its ramifications, play with it, embroider it with pathos or with wit, penetrate to its roots, and trace its connexions and affinities.' " ⁴

But he is thinking of it as an informal lecture. We are thinking of it as a dignified though informal exchange alternating between two or more persons who occupy more or less equal levels. Because its subject-matter may be anything of interest at the time, save the wholly trivial, it is easily directed to the application of pressure. It is a game of thrust and parry, during which thought-positions are modified and corrected.

(d) If conversation becomes organized about one topic and there is more or less sustained effort to remain within bounds, it easily and imperceptibly passes into a *discussion*. The relations are still very personal; there is opportunity for all to participate; arguments are considered more or less on their merits; facts are challenged; fallacies in reasoning are pointed out and a rather sincere effort is made to arrive at the truth involved. In fact, a discussion has but one main objective—to reveal truth. We talk over a disputed point with another person; we discuss the question with several persons, and the intention is to weigh down one side so heavily that opponents must agree, must

⁴ *The Tocsin of Revolt*. 153.

be converted. Discussions last as long as the time allows, or until the argument is ended. Discussion groups are very popular at this time and they are serving a great educational purpose.

(e) More strictly limited as to time, form of the proposition, order of speaking, type of speech, and in other ways, is the *debate*. This is a very formal procedure, conducted according to parliamentary principles. A subject is stated, in the form of a resolution. Persons select, or are chosen for, the negative or affirmative sides. Some arbiters are appointed to scrutinize carefully the evidence presented from both sides, and render a decision accordingly. As a rule, the arguments are labored, and the aim seems to be to get as many facts assembled as possible. There is little lightness, nimbleness, anecdote, repartee. Each side aims to be a master of logic and evidence. A decision rendered in favor of the affirmative does not mean that the negative is converted; at least there is never any public confession of conversion. The debate is not primarily arranged to convince the debaters; it is really a dramatization for the benefit of the hearers.

We have debate in its most pretentious form in our legislative halls. This is the accepted method of procedure by which law-makers are supposed to be corrected in their views. Observed at any one moment, the legislative assembly gives the appearance of a lecture room, with the lecturer presenting his proposition. But looked at in the large, the single speech is but one of a series, for and against, a given proposal, bill or resolution. Many conversions take place under the influence of such presentations. While the rules of procedure are strictly defined, and the whole is of an extremely formal character, the subject matter is more or less momentous according to the educational attainments, the skill in public speech, the temperament of the debaters, and the social situation under consideration. It is fair to say that as things now are there is a vast amount of un-

truth presented as truth, an enormous amount of fallacious reasoning passed for logical argument, a great deal of unction, pathos, sentiment, substituted for cold, impartial argument. But the whole arrangement is set up for the purpose of swaying the members and inducing them to vote "the right way." There is little other service that this device can render—except as a steam-valve.

(f) There are many varieties of *lectures*. What we have in mind here is the skillful arrangement and presentation of facts and arguments relative to some particular subject. One person does this before a class or larger audience. The point is clearly defined, the objections are answered, the facts are assembled, the reasoning is sound and the whole proceeding is directed to the enlightenment of the mind and the consequent modification of conduct. The listeners are expected to agree to the facts, follow the reasoning and accept the conclusions. Sometimes, as in the public forum, the listeners are permitted to ask questions and take issue with the conclusions, after the address has been made. Then the meeting takes another form; it becomes a discussion group or a debate, and sometimes a wrangle. Few lectures, apart from the purely scientific or philosophical disquisitions, measure up consistently to this high level. Most of them are tinctured with sentimental ingredients of various kinds. Chautauqua and commencement addresses provide sufficient illustration.

In these and other types of persuasion, the attack is made primarily upon the intellect. An attempt is made to *reason* people out of one position into another. The judgment is confronted with differences that must be reconciled; for the harboring of obvious incompatibles creates a strain which is painful. Such deliverances are sober, critical, logical, factual, dignified. The aim is to *convince* by enlightening, the understanding being that once people are thus convinced they will sooner or later respond in the desired manner.

But a very large number of familiar mechanisms function in a different way. These stormings of individual and group strongholds are *by way of* the feelings, the prejudices, the cherished aspirations and other weaknesses of the subjects. Such deliverances and presentations contain much unction, pathos, sentiment. They are usually unreliable as to fact and devious as to logic. The object is to secure the desired response, not by the stimulation of calm ratiocination leading to self-conviction, but immediately, unreflectively, spontaneously. The aim is to quicken people to action, not thought. We mention but a few of these devices.

(g) Under flattery we were tempted to note cajolery, wheedling, coquetry, coaxing, and others. These are all essentially forms of persuasion with over-praise and unwarranted deference as prominent ingredients. Flattery is their subject matter very largely, while persuasion is their form. A very large amount of persuasion-pressure is applied in this way during the daily exchanges.

(h) When an argument or a debate, among several people, drifts from its formal standards, departs from its stereotyped method, becomes surcharged with emotion, is carried out in a quarrelsome manner, rakes up personalities, changes its subject matter or method as opportunity offers, and is designed for immediate triumph, we might name it a *wrangle*. Wrangling may be carried on at a high level, may be factual and logical and orderly; then it cannot be distinguished from a discussion or a debate. In England a debater was often called a wrangler. But most frequently the disputants grow angry or at least excited and peevish; then they become quarrelsomely insistent, noisy, overbearing, unreasonable. At its lowest level such a proceeding becomes a brawl.

Households slip into this method of applying pressure very often; church boards are sometimes guilty of using it; courts of law occasionally disgrace themselves and cause

justice to miscarry by an unfortunate move in this direction. Over three hundred years ago Burton said: "Our wrangling lawyers are so litigious and busy here on earth, I think they will plead their client's causes hereafter—some of them in hell."⁵ Nor are modern lawyers above this means of gaining a decision. They will grow insulting, they will quibble, altercation and jangle—if only they may have their way. Judges are regularly called upon to discipline such lawyers.

(i) We are all familiar with the practice of *pleading*. This term has a legal significance first of all, and means to attempt to persuade a judge or jury by argument or by supplication. When argument is the predominant feature, the attack is upon the intellect; but when supplication is the chief ingredient, the attack is upon the feelings of the listeners. In supplicating, one throws oneself on the mercy of the authorities, or one assembles evidence indicative of extenuating circumstances, or one introduces excuses of all sorts; in short, one makes a justification, a defense, by way of the sympathies. And it is this feature of the device that we single out for emphasis here.

Probably the master pleader, in the familiar and inclusive sense in which we are using the term, is the evangelist. The devices employed by him are altogether too individual, subtle and various even to be mentioned. Certain very general features alone can be set down. The main idea seems to be to cause an emotional overpowering that will effect a surrender to the pleader's suggestions. The perfection of this art is found, possibly, in the combination of a sermon, some appropriate music, public testimonies and the "invitation."

The sermon is "soul-stirring" in that, with divine authority assumed, the minister goes on with the juggling of fact and fancy, a terrific indictment of human weakness and personal guilt; a parading of man's hopelessness,

⁵ *Anatomy of Melancholy*.

plausible argument about God's mercy and the plan of salvation. Hymns are enthusiastically sung in harmony with this theme. Some of the saints are called upon to testify with respect to their condition "before and after." Then there is a wooing, soothing, fervent appeal—gestures prominent—to "Come now." One of the accompanying hymns has frequently been "Almost Persuaded." As the writer knows full well, there is tremendous compulsion in this combination. The millions that have been gathered into the fold, during the ages, under the spell—for that is what it is, a "spell,"—of such an organization of pressure, furnish sufficient evidence of what we have said. Only the most stubborn, the most self-possessed, the most cynical, the most enlightened and critical, have been able to resist.⁶

(j) Then there is a line of activities directed primarily to overcoming opposition by incessant attack. The essential nature of this device is suggested by an old proverb which says that a "continual dropping on a rainy day and a contentious woman are alike." We prudently pass the ugly thrust at the female sex and lift out the core—"a continual dropping" of words; day in and day out, a wordy bearing down on others, an inconsiderate and uninterrupted chattering, an incessant pop-gun battling for conquest.

If we think of the incessant chatter first, and then add a dash of feverishness, petulance and even quarrelsomeness, we have this means defined. It is not wrangling because it is largely one-sided; and it is more continuous. The wrangle may last for an evening and then be over; the contentious patter is interminable. Every contact is but an opportunity to burst forth. One cannot reply because there can be no acceptable reply, because there is no breathing spell in which to make a reply, and because every attempt at reply is but an excitation to further factiousness. In the end one is simply worn down.

⁶ For the power of Whitefield see Green, *Short History of the English People*. 763 ff.

(3) The devices noticed are mainly operable in face-to-face relations. By *writing* one gives these means of persuasion very wide extension. The difference here is chiefly in the medium of communication employed, and of course the gestural and tonal features are lacking. But arguments, debates, wrangling and others, may be sent through books, magazines, newspapers, letters and pamphlets, to the uttermost parts of the earth. There is an advantage gained by literary form and that, in the hands of the artist, is very great. Yet attention may wander, the people may refuse to read, the response may not be so immediate, the imagination may be sluggish. All long-range persuasion has to take these difficulties into account. Written persuasion *must* be vastly more reasonable than the oral need be to be effectual.

3. SUBSTANCE AND SUBTLETY

We have now surveyed the *externals* of these arts and have made but passing and incidental references to the inner processes awakened. It is now necessary to examine more carefully this more obscure phase of the persuasive activity. A sermon does not always secure conversion, a debate does not always change the opinions of the listeners, a piece of fiction does not always modify habits—in the direction desired. We have seen the persuasive movement begin. But how does it carry *on* and *in*, and transform itself into the sort of conduct that the persuader wants? We have now to enumerate certain artifices which *successful* persuaders employ, according to the time, the temperaments of the subjects, the urgency of the situation, and other governing factors. Knowledge of, and ability to use, these subtler devices determines the difference between the accomplished persuader and the bungler.

It is understood, of course, that the force has to be projected upon the intellectual and emotional components of

belief and action. The will of the operator must be transformed into the will of the subject. And so essential is the emotional content that some one has been moved to say: "Without emotion, no persuasion."

(1) The appeal to fairness. An agitator was once about to be mobbed by an excited crowd when he called to the people that they were not playing fair. He secured their attention long enough to say that *they* wanted to do all of the talking and were apparently unwilling that he should do any. He wanted, he said, only five minutes. Such a request was not unreasonable; it was granted.

Now this was a deft probing for some basic human quality that would respond in the way desired. In this case, it was an ingenious appeal to a deep-lying sense of justice, a fundamental recognition of the importance of rights and privileges, and the probing touched the right spot.

Such a method works right along. Boys and girls, men and women, even of the most obstreperous and ungovernable sort, providing they are normal, have been and are regularly changed in activity-direction by the appeal to fairness. We are all acquainted with the calls for "fair play," "fair fight," "rules of the game," and can rely, in general, on a certain type of reaction when these ideas are brought to the center of attention. "The social group," says Ross, "by drilling its members to observe certain forbearances toward one another, *manufactures* conscience."⁷ It is this manufactured conscience that can be invoked in even very desperate cases of anti-sociality.

(2) Awakening the sense of responsibility. Fairness is simply a readiness to concede equality of opportunity. The sense of responsibility is a feeling of connectedness with what is around one, a feeling of connectedness that pays respect to one's own importance. In "feeling responsible" one recognizes and admits that one is linked into a life-

⁷ *Social Control*. 28.

series in a significant way. To awaken the sense of responsibility, then, the persuader seeks to direct attention to this linkage.

President Wilson's address to the students of the Naval Academy shows us one way of performing this operation. "Once in a while when youngsters here or at West Point have forgotten themselves and have done something that they ought not to do and were about to be disciplined, perhaps severely, for it, I have been appealed to by their friends to excuse them from the penalty.—'You know college boys. You know what they are. They are heedless youngsters, very often, and they ought not to be held up to the same standards of responsibility that older men must submit to.'

"*And I have always replied, 'Yes, I know college boys; but while these youngsters are college boys, they are something more. They are officers of the United States. They are not merely college boys. If they were, I would look at derelictions of duty on their part in another spirit; but any dereliction of duty on the part of a naval officer of the United States may involve the fortunes of a nation and cannot be overlooked.*

"*Do you not see the difference? You cannot indulge yourselves in weakness, gentlemen. You cannot forget your duty for a moment; because there might come a time when that weak spot in you would affect you in the midst of a great engagement, and then the whole history of the world might be changed by what you did not do, or did wrong. . . . I congratulate you that you are going to live your lives under the most stimulating compulsion that any man can feel, the sense, not of private duty merely, but of public duty also. . . . I wish you godspeed, and remind you that yours is the honor of the United States.'*"⁸

(3) The appeal to pride. In the preceding address there is not only the attempt to link the students into the larger

⁸ Quoted in Winans, *Public Speaking*. 207.

social system in a significant manner, but the attempt to impress upon them the immense significance of that relationship. They were *officers*. That was a great thing in itself. But they were officers in the United States. That was a much more important thing. To be a very significant person in so large a concern, touched them deeply. They could not afford to treat that honor lightly, much less ignore it.

Pride is essentially a feeling of self-respect, awakened in part by complimenting one's own achievements and by offering convincing testimonies of public esteem. It attaches itself to many different qualities, good looks, physical strength, athletic ability, public recognition and so on. The way to it, then, is to keep these qualities in the foreground of attention. A boy is led away from his sloppy habits by being told that he has a fine physique, a man is dissuaded from cruelty by the reminder that he has always been regarded as merciful; a girl is restrained from waywardness by insisting on the fact that her family has always maintained an honorable name in the community.

(4) The appeal to sympathy. Much has been said and written upon this subject. We need not go into the intricacies of the matter. It is enough to say that many people are endowed with the ability to give affection spontaneously, to display tenderness towards weakness, to be generous towards the unfortunate. And this is a quality that can be appealed to in the interests of a modification of activities.

The methods employed are numerous. Examples are the rehearsal of tales of suffering and misfortune, the picturing of destitution attendant upon sickness, hunger, unemployment and the like. Andre Tardieu tells us of the effect on American opinion, relative to the World War, of the wounded soldiers—French soldiers—in this country.⁹

Missionary money is raised in this and other countries by moving descriptions of the hardships, separations, self-

⁹ Cf. chap. on Propaganda.

effacements, of the young people going out to foreign lands. The people who give this money do not spend it for other purposes; that is the modification they undergo. Millions are raised for philanthropy by touching stories of destitution, infant mortality, dark rooms, and the like. As we write, there is a pamphlet lying before us with the caption, "Sick Hearts," an appeal in the interests of an anti-tuberculosis campaign, and also in the interests of a magazine which is devoted to this cause.

Labor legislation is spread on the books of all the states by graphic displays of the frightful conditions of children and women in mines and factories, by wrenching details of congestion in cities, by heart-rending cries about farm conditions, by touching exhibitions relative to venereal diseases, by incontrovertible figures relative to crimes, insanity, idiocy and the rest. When one awakens sympathy for any movement or cause, one opens the floodgates for a tidal wave.

(5) Stirring up prejudices. This is a very common way of moving people in the desired direction, the while they think they are moving voluntarily. All people are well supplied with prejudgments, preconceptions, fixed and set notions, that can be touched off as the powder by the match. A persuader can always get the desired adverse reaction instantly from one who hates negroes, Chinese and other foreigners, by commendatory reference to them. Republicans can be brought into line by stories of Socialist success; capitalists can be united by references to labor aggressiveness; theological conservatives can be rallied by amassing evidence of "modernism" in the schools and churches. The mere mention of the hated classes calls up hate—if that is the desired reaction. The mere announcement of the fact that the detested classes are organizing is enough to call forth steps towards organization of the detesters—if that is the end sought.

The writer, in company with a colleague, visited an *Ar-*

menian restaurant in Chicago. The place was small, on the second floor, and was presided over by an old man who cooked and served as well. After the excellent meal of foreign dishes, the small cups of coffee were set on the table. Without reflection the colleague spoke up: "Ah, *Turkish* coffee, fine." The response was electric in its swiftness and severity. The old man straightened and looked terrifyingly at the offender, and might easily have proceeded to violence but for some soothing friends who knew him. When we left he told the culprit not to come again.

Now, if the gentleman had set out deliberately to incite this old sufferer of a race's cruelties to fight, he could not have succeeded better. The powder, in the form of the fixed attitude towards the "unspeakable Turks," was there. A thoughtless, really appreciatory exclamation, touched it off.

(6) Kindling the desires. The young woman is reminded that she wishes to be beautiful, strong, successful and popular. She is assured—persuaded—that somebody's toilet cream, hat, tonic or "rays" will enable her to realize her ambitions. The cultivation of old wants and the evocation of new ones is such a large feature of the advertising business, however, that we shall enlarge on this point in that connection.

(7) Drives on fear. More manipulation of men is wrought by fear than this world dreams of—to adapt a famous quotation. City populations are regularly induced to support bond issues, and submit to higher taxation, by statistics of increased criminality, by warnings of plagues due to insanitation, by newspaper notices of automobile congestion and the like. Nations are aroused into feverish legislative activity by scares of timber shortage, immigrant "invasions" and by announcements of war preparations. In a thousand ways, people can be "scared" into doing the desired thing. And there is enough argument, and enough

plausibility in the argument usually, to entitle the drive to be called a form of persuasion.

(8) There is the subtle argument of a challenge. Against opposition to a given course of action, we may lodge the challenge: "I bet you can't do this." At once the desire to do it is quickened and the undertaking is attempted. Students may be told that it is doubtful if they can "get" the assignment; workers may be warned that this task is probably too hard for them; nervous patients may be assured that their recovery will require more determination and sacrifice than they are capable of. A vast amount of desirable modification of people's attitudes and practices is continually effected in this manner.

But we need not attempt to exhaust the list. Scores of other qualities and characteristics of people, to which persuasive appeal is made, might be noted. There is curiosity, self-confidence, interest in conflict, delight in competition, imagination, and the rest. "To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds," says Le Bon, "is to know the art of governing them." There is the use of authorities as, for example, the appeal to John Wesley by Methodists, the reference to the statutes by lawyers, the reliance upon scientific pronouncements by teachers. There is *a way* to lead people into almost any path—if it can be found. This is the proposition that the evidence seems to justify.

4. CONCLUSIONS

(1) That persuasion is an effective control device, we have now shown, theoretically. Practical confirmation, however, is within the range of everybody. It is used by people almost every day, if there is any attempt to move anybody in a different direction. The child is induced to eat this food rather than that, the father is pressed to drive west when he wants to go east, the workman is dissuaded from leaving his job, the law-maker is converted to the

program of excluding aliens, the neighbor is remade on the playground proposition, the mayor is brought around to a different attitude. Wendell Phillips compelled a conservative but cultured audience to applaud Nihilism. Page, House and others brought Americans and Englishmen together over the Mexican policy, and the English authorities were induced to remove the British minister from Mexico.¹⁰ George William Curtis delivered his speech on "Liberty Under Law" in 1876, and was supposed by so learned a man as Edward Everett Hale to have turned the nation from civil war over the contested presidential election. Such evidence as this might be piled up indefinitely.

(2) The merits and demerits of persuasion may be given a word. McPherson says: "As a form of expression, persuasion of every kind is peculiarly liable to become degenerate and perverted. The false rhetorician makes of it an art of sophistry, and uses it to exploit his neighbors and serve his own interests. He invokes the aid of arguments that he knows to be flimsy and specious. He drags in illustrations and images merely to attract and allure, or turn the hearer's attention from the point at issue. He disguises unfavorable or unpleasant facts in the garb of plausibility. He flings ridicule at his opponents that he may stimulate the unconscious desire of his audience to feel superior. He appeals flamboyantly to emotions that are not inherent in the subject matter, and represents situations and events falsely, in order that he may arouse the emotions favorable to his purpose. And especially he plays upon his hearer's impulses and desires, which work to a large extent unconsciously, their love of power, their vanity, their greed, their hopes and suspicions and fears."¹¹

This writer is discussing primarily the public speaker and his attitudes and methods. But the private speaker, that is, the speaker to individuals and small groups, is

probably guilty of grosser exploitation. He is usually not trained to any standards and will resort to any trick. Numerous subtle openings are presented to him such as evidences of mental confusion, inability to reply adequately, exhibitions of impending conviction, disclosures of felt guilt, manifestations of feelings of inferiority, confessions of disappointment, hope, fear, and the like—openings for the insertion of his hooks, which do not come to the public speaker. It is a rare private persuader, indeed, who will not take advantage of such opportunities.

If we were to make an ethical distinction, as to the levels of persuasion, it would be at this point. The higher form is that of the direct appeal to the intellect and the higher emotions by the assembling of facts and logical reasoning, leading to self-conviction and self-action. The lowest form is that of exploiting the unconcealable weaknesses of hearers such as superstitious beliefs, ignorance of the facts, stuttering speech, readiness to cry, past depravities and the rest. It turns the taps of emotion and causes an overflow which sweeps the subject along whither the leader would have him go, like a log down stream. Between this highest and lowest form may be found all shades and degrees.

But there are some merits worthy of notice, in addition to the incontestable merit of the higher type just mentioned. First of all, it gets results, as we have just said, and that is a favorable feature to a hurried and utilitarian people. The method of exploiting the weaknesses of the controlled may be wholly objectionable, and yet the end a worthy one. At least that is a partial justification. In the second place, it is not an expensive device to employ, at least in the primary group. It takes patience, to be sure, but otherwise is not costly. The expense piles up, however, when one resorts to long-range persuasion as in education, political campaigns and advertising. Again it is a fairly easy art to learn. There is the advantage, also, that most of those

to whom it is applied, little children possibly excepted, know that a more painful instrument of control is just around the corner in readiness, and are therefore, somewhat more "reasonable."

Best of all, persuasion, when it takes the form of argument, soundly logical, from widely-gleaned assemblages of facts, analysis, inference, conclusion, when the aim is first to arrive at the truth and next to act upon it, and the humanitarian sentiments are touched—this form of social control is the noblest of all the forms, a superior without peers. There is nothing more human, nothing more beautiful, nothing which respects the personalities of the controlled more thoroughly, nothing which leaves such lasting and desirable attitudes in the controlled themselves, nothing which so engages the higher faculties and capabilities of controllers and controlled alike, nothing which so harmonizes and intermixes human aspirations and ideals. Persuasion, in its highest form, is the control par excellence.

(3) This consideration leads us to make a remark or two on the future of this device. Since this form of control is the highest form known to man, since it is reason calling to reason, we may expect a slowly but steadily increasing employment of it as education becomes more universal and thorough. Inasmuch as there can be no valid criticism of "men reasoning themselves together and into action," and since grave objections may be lodged against all other means, the latter must decrease while the former increases. As human beings grow more intelligent they will listen more to, and be governed more by, reason, by persuasion in its highest form.

The ultimate persuader must come to be the facts of life and sure inductions from them. Less and less do we wish sentiment, pathos and personal bias to distort the view and twist the logic of life. Yet sentiment, pathos and personal bias are themselves unbanishable realities which cannot be ignored. Reasonable men can be controlled by rea-

son; sentimental men cannot be so governed. People will, for an indefinite period, love their countries and do ridiculously patriotic things, they will have determined opinions as to the value of one race or creed over another, they will cry over and sympathize with other sufferers. Social control includes the proper canalization of feeling tides and their harnessing to the approved work of the world.

But the feeling tides create the problems of control. Were human beings thoroughly rational, we might not have the serious difficulties that daily confront us. We have perplexing social questions because we have eccentric, excitable, temperamental, impatient, dashing aggressive people who make issue with the prevailing order. And the ultimate criteria for determining the value and morality of all control devices must come out of human experience, society's experience, in dealing with such persons. A society that goes off into hysterics over an innovator of any sort, and sets out to repress rather than understand, is performing as stupidly as possible. We have now found out—all people find out—that repression does not extinguish, does not make the situation as it was before. Here is a lesson in reason. We have also found out that, in a crisis, reason can usually get the better of feeling, and can direct it in acceptable ways. Here is another lesson in reason. These are evidences of the triumph of reason in the world of control.

It has often been thought that the maintenance of the old or the established order is fundamental. But reason shows us that there is a condition superior to that, namely, the maintenance of an *orderly changing order*, an order in which geniuses can survive and thrive. This kind of order is sometimes described as "liberty under law." The very essence of such an order is the triumph of persuasion of the higher type. Force is not compatible with such an order; threats are beneath it; satire and laughter are too indiscriminate for it; rewards and praise are inconsistent with

its standards. In such an order, men will regard each other as *worthy* and *capable* of being persuaded by “the appeal to reason”; they will understand that any lower control is a failure; they will have time to reason things out together. All other mechanisms of control will be recognized for what they are, namely, short-cuts, side-steppings, and not ultimate solutions.

CHAPTER VI

ADVERTISING

1. DEFINITION, HISTORY, VOLUME

(1) The word “advertise” is derived from the Latin term meaning “to turn the attention to.” It has retained all of the original content but has added a great deal more, as we shall see. Not all attention-getting devices are advertising, however. It has been briefly defined as “spreading information through the printed word and picture.”¹ But any one can see that advertising is much more than spreading information. And it is well known that spreading information is not always advertising. The aim of advertising is to sell goods and services, and the spreading of information is wholly incidental thereto.²

Advertising has been described also as “selling in print,” which means that it is selling through the eye and the imagination. It is presenting some commodity to the people in such a way that they will buy it. It is mass selling, a method of causing people to hand over their hard or easily earned money in exchange for what the advertiser has to offer. “Good will” advertising, such as that of certain public service corporations, has as its ultimate objective the sale of services. And if such advertising did not enlist and soothe patrons and increase income it would be withdrawn at once.³ There are many other definitions but these will serve to make the point clear for us. They inform us that advertising is a method of furthering exchange. It is high pressure exchange.

¹ Hall. *The Advertising Handbook*. 1.

² Starch. *The Principles of Advertising*. 4.

³ Cf. Calkins. *The Business of Advertising*. 8. DeWeese. *Practical Publicity*. 14 ff.

(2) Advertising is not any new device, although its modern volume and methods are so impressive and so different, relative to earlier advertising, that we might almost speak of it as a late invention. The idea, however, is very old.

In the pre-printing stage, advertisements were, of course, handwritten and inscribed announcements, placed on the walls of buildings and on papyrus. The oldest known advertisement is that on a bit of papyrus found in ancient Thebes, offering a reward for the recovery of a runaway slave. Many attention-getters of this sort were used in Greece and Rome. And this device amounted to a "turning the attention to," "a spreading of information by means of print." The slave-owner was willing to buy back a slave for money. Goods were sold in the same way until late times.

Then came the printing-press and advertising was given a tremendous impetus. Handbills were multiplied and circulated more widely. The first newspaper was published in 1609 and opened up an unlimited field of appeal.

The modern period, so the historians of advertising tell us, began about 1850. This was the period of phenomenal expansion of printing. Newspapers multiplied in all civilized countries and circulated ever more widely. They came to be the chief medium for advertising. Magazines increased in number, size and circulation and also came to be an excellent medium. Advertising agencies appeared to "wholesale" this service and force it along as the hot-house forces plants.

The date 1911 is significant because of the enactment of "The Printer's Ink Model Statute." With enormous expansion of selling by this means, many unscrupulous practices developed. With the rapid increase of newspapers and magazines after the Civil War in this country, there came along a flood of patent medicine and other objectionable advertising. It was this type that really revealed the tremendous power of the new method of obtaining busi-

ness, although it burdened it with an odium from which it is only now being freed.⁴ The whole movement promised to be self-defeating, following Gresham's law of money (bad money drives out good money); fraudulent advertising threatened to drive out or to nullify the effects of truthful advertising. If nobody could tell the truthful from the fraudulent, then everybody would be suspicious and avoid it all.⁵

This was the period when the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World organized a Vigilance Committee for the purpose of uncovering the unreliable type and establishing a censorship. Most of the states now have laws under which the mendacious advertiser can be prosecuted and made to suffer for his misuse of power.

"The difference between advertising then (say 1905) and now (1915)," says Calkins, "is the difference between a sailing vessel and a steamship."⁶ So rapid has been the recent advance that even the latest dictionaries and encyclopedias are quite out of date in attempts to define advertising.

(3) The volume of advertising is now of immense proportions. Some figures will help out the imagination somewhat. In the United States ten thousand firms now do *national* advertising. In 1921 over fifty firms spent as much as \$264,500 each. In 1922 there were 22,353 newspapers and magazines carrying large amounts of advertising. The great mail order houses commonly send out upwards of four million large catalogues twice each year, in addition to numerous smaller departmental circulars. Some authorities estimate that a grand total of over one billion dollars is spent annually for this purpose. About three thousand square miles of printed space are used. One page for a single issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* cost \$350 in 1923. For a page in the *Saturday Evening Post*

⁴ Cf. Calkins. *The Business of Advertising*. 3.

⁵ Cf. Calkins. *Op. cit.* 4.

⁶ *Op. cit.* Chapter VIII.

the charge was \$7000. One edition of the *Saturday Evening Post* (April 28, 1923) contained a total of 172 pages—26 being devoted to reading matter. This one issue brought in a half million dollars. In a large newspaper, a page costs approximately \$1500 for a single issue.⁷

We are all familiar with the wayside billboards. We have the impression that they are omnipresent. It is impossible to look in any direction in the modern city without facing one of these devices. As for the country-side, they never end, at least along the main highways. Every conspicuous place, every place where people foregather, or might have a spare moment for glancing about, has become valuable for advertising purposes. Since it seems necessary, for those who have eyes, to keep them open in modern society, only the blind man and the somnambulist remain untouched by billboard philosophy.

More wonderful than all these facts, perhaps, are those pertaining to electrical or night advertising. Wrigley, of chewing-gum fame, has spent over forty millions of dollars to put his products into the mouths of people. Of this amazing amount, the largest appropriation was for the most famous advertisement in the world, at 44th Street and Broadway, New York City. It cost \$100,000 per year rental, and many sign-boards in Times Square, New York, pay enough rental to make the buildings on which they stand worth more for their outside than for their inside. One of these buildings carries three signs which cost the advertisers \$14,000 each month. A shoelace company finds that it can afford \$3000 each for signs in the "Great White Way." The Ide collar sign at 47th and Broadway costs \$6000 per month and burns 4000 lights. The Socony display at Columbus Circle costs over \$5000 each month and uses 5600 lights.

The size of some of these signs is impressive. Macy's store has four signs, two 24 by 79, and two 24 by 67 feet,

⁷ Cf. Starch. *Op. cit.* 32.

burning 4282 lights. The letters are 18 feet high. Gotham National Bank has the distinction of having the highest sign in New York. It displays two signs which are 347 feet above the street level. Each sign is 68 by 80 feet, with 12 foot letters spelling out the bank's name. The "M" uses 61 lamps and the "I" 18.

The materials going to make up these signs are estimated in startling figures. The bank sign just mentioned required 80 tons of steel and a ton of rivets, and it will stand a wind-pressure of 35 pounds to the square inch. There are 9 miles of main cable in the Socony sign already mentioned. Macy's signs required over eleven miles of wiring. Signs are usually painted three times a year. Spectacular signs, like those in Times Square, are inspected four times nightly so that burned-out lamps may be replaced. In New York between the Battery and 135th Street, there are 9500 outdoor signs, using 350,000 lamps.⁸ To turn the phrase, these are "signs of the times."

These are but a few of the amazing facts suggesting the immense volume of advertising. When one includes the amounts in other cities and in other countries and all kinds, a grand total expense of unbelievable proportions is rolled up. One gradually awakens to the reality of this tidal movement in modern society.

2. THE TECHNIQUE

And how does it all come to pass, this tidal movement? We may say at once that it did not come without promotion, without determination, without skill. To gain a clearer notion of its significance in modern life we must examine its methods of operation carefully for whatever control is gained is effected by means of wits applied to other minds.

(1) To begin with, there must be goods or services to sell. The manufacturers of these goods, and the goods

⁸ Cf. *Literary Digest*, Feb. 23, 1924.

themselves, are the first link in the chain, an elemental feature in the technique. The goods or services may be in demand at the time; this makes the problem easier. There may be no demand for them at all; a call for them must be created. Attacking that stronghold are the goods and services and the determined sellers. It is the function of the creators of goods or services to send out a reliable and purchasable product, a product which will meet the need that is created. More and more producers are confining themselves to this task—the making of satisfying commodities. This task demands more of their ingenuity because of the growing competition in any field, unless it be an absolute monopoly. Excellence of goods and services is the producer's aim.

(2) There has appeared on the scene, coincidentally with the gradual withdrawal of the producer from the selling field, the advertising agent. This is not necessarily a man; it may be an organization of men, all specialists. There are above five hundred of these organizations in the United States, and some of them are very large and powerful. They have at least three departments. One gets in touch with the producers to secure the accounts and learn something of the business that can be used for advertising purposes. The second takes these facts or stories and works them up into a highly artistic form, puts the "appeal" into them. The third department communicates with the various mediums—newspapers, magazines, billboard owners—and arranges for space.

But this is the merest skeleton of an organization. The most effectively constituted agencies have at least eight departments, and all contain or are presided over by the ablest managers, artists and artisans that money can buy. These departments are soliciting, planning, executive, copy, artwork, typography, rates, merchandizing and investigational.⁹

⁹ Calkins. *The Business of Advertising*. 53.

(3) Another link in the chain of influence stretched from producer to consumer is supplied by the large number of highly skilled craftsmen whose business it is to actually produce the quantities of advertising matter according to the copy prepared by the agencies. These include the printers, process engravers, manufacturers of special papers, the electrotypers and yet others.¹⁰

And with all this in mind it will be obvious that an enormously large, remarkably silent, and exceptionally efficient organization is always behind the announcement of certain products which may be offered for the public's use. One finds no greater skill, no more ingenuity, no more resolute determination in any department of our social life than in the realm of advertising.

(4) When the advertising is prepared, what is done with it? This is a very important feature of the technique. It would serve no end if it were taken out and dumped in a ravine. It must be put in the "way" of people. The main idea of the advertiser is to "get in their way." And the next thing is to stay in their way, and the next thing is to never get out of their way—the way they walk, the way they ride, the way they look, especially. Advertising is aiming at the *eyes* of people. No other sense can be appealed to with such advantage. Get the eye and keep it, that is the motto. Consequently, advertising must be placed where the most eyes fall.

As a result of the long observation and calculation of skilled men and women, advertising is placed where the people pause for a moment, as at transfer points; in the direction in which their eyes wander when the owners are riding on street-cars, in the trains or automobiles; wherever they congregate for a time as in theatres, baseball parks or along the streets; beside whatever they read, whether it be the news of the day or some magazine thriller. In short, advertising is for people, for their eyes, for their

¹⁰ Cf. Calkins. *Op. cit.* 90.

minds; it is for minds by way of the eyes. Advertising might be defined as eye-bombardment to sell. This is the method: put the name, nature, uses and advantages of the goods or services before the eyes, everlastingly before the eyes. And the lengths to which modern advertisers will go to "get the eye," to seize it, to fascinate it, are well known to all. One good lady said that she always felt, when reading the modern magazines, that she was at an undress ball where the men all came in their B.V.D.'s and the women in their Nemos. Wherever the eyes fall or can be made to fall, there are small signs and large signs, "striking" signs, to appeal to the elemental or cultivated appetites of human beings; there are signs in front of them, signs to the right of them, signs to the left of them; there are contented and even highly delighted people to smile at them, point their fingers at them, look down upon them, argue with them.

Thus it is, indoors and out of doors, horizontally and vertically, on the ground and in the sky, during the day and throughout the night, there are eye appeals accomplishing their work. There is no escape—except blindness.

In addition, the print and color effects are organized to attract the eyes of the people. No amount of expense is regretted if the appearance of the advertisements can be improved in the direction of getting people's eyes. The factors here are size, visibility, gripping color effects and general attractiveness. Many marvelously beautiful art effects are achieved and placed where the people will see them. The "pulling power" of reds and blues is well known and used.¹¹

The mediums employed are those which will reach the people. They are newspapers, magazines, billboards, street-car cards, books, leaflets, circulars, calendars, blotters and even smoke in the sky. These are highly important features of the technique or method of advertising.

(5) The technique of advertising has its extraordinary

¹¹ Cf. Hollingsworth. *Advertising and Selling*. 96.

skill displayed in its manipulation of the psychic processes by these mechanical means. The psychology of advertising has received the attention of the ablest investigators and is now well understood. All of the means we have noted so far are approaches to the mind; they aim to break in and take possession. And it is important to see how this is done. There are many ways of stating the method. It will be sufficient for our purposes to recall the five functions of advertising and elaborate somewhat.¹² These functions are (a) attracting attention, (b) arousing interest, (c) creating conviction, (d) producing a favorable response, and (e) impressing the memory. By working out this mental process in each of us the advertiser expects to occupy the center of consciousness and thus sell the goods or services.

(a) Attracting the attention is obviously the first step, the first great necessity. One cannot sell goods or services to inattentive people. The principles of success here are fairly well understood. The guiding principles for this task are those which have been tested and found to work. There is the principle of magnitude or density, by which large type and pictures serve to become the most eye-arresting features in the visual area. There is the principle of isolation or counter-attraction which says that the representations should stand out alone or be confined to one feature. There is the principle of motion or suggested motion which is applied by means of arrows or lines carrying the eye from any point where it may happen to fall, to the point desired by the advertiser, or by pictures of people actually doing the thing desired as, for instance, eating candy, smoking cigarettes, sipping drinks, entering an automobile. Then one finds the principle of contrast operative, for example, in the case of a man dressed in an

¹² For a different statement see Hollingsworth, *Advertising and Selling*. Chapters IV-XII.

Indian Blanket and parading the streets of a modern city, or in the case of an "inverted position" or that of a large amount of white or black space surrounding the focal point. And the principle of sex is not overlooked, but rather used a great deal to get the attention of men, as in the picture of a charming lady handling a tie or some other feature of men's attire. The devices expressive of these principles for catching the attention are literally "too numerous to mention."

(b) Arousing interest is the second step. The attention once caught, the next problem is to keep it, and this is accomplished by the form of the appeal to our characteristic traits—including the weaknesses. And perhaps there is no part of the technique which has received more searching analysis. The original and acquired endowments of man have been exhaustively studied to uncover the unfulfilled wishes, the appetitive out-reachings, the forceful cravings, the tastes, the possible wants, the habits of life, the prejudices, the power of conventions and the general malleability of man. The most common ways in which these qualities in our lives are used by advertisers is by appeals to money-saving, time-saving, style, pleasure, convenience, comfort, luxury, health, pride, strength, exclusiveness, taste, sense of order, appreciation of tone, etc. No possible outreaching of men, women or children is neglected; no weakness forgotten. There are loud and flamboyant appeals to the slow and stupid; there are modest and chaste appeals to the refined and discerning; there are all gradations between these extremes. There are appeals to acquisition, curiosity, appetite, gregariousness, stupidity, sex, class differences and the like.

It is fully recognized that the average mental age of the American people is approximately fifteen years. The advertisers are well acquainted with the dominant characteristics of that mental age. They know quite well, as

*one writer puts it, that "most people have single-track minds when it comes to reading advertisements."*¹³

The efforts to retain attention and arouse interest are made directly; they are also made indirectly. For instance, a fire insurance concern may reap a harvest by calling attention to the losses of a recent fire, the patent medicine producer may suggest that some marvellous cures have been recently effected, the picture of an automobile accident may be made to hint at the necessity of procuring chains. In all ways, therefore, the attention is held until a trickle of interest is started; the external eye is held until the internal eye follows.

(c) A third operation is that of creating the conviction that the proffered goods or services will actually correspond to the outreachings already manifested in awakening interest. The process by which this result is effected is not yet fully understood, but some features are recognized. Inasmuch as any impertinent aggressions from any quarter may awaken antipathies and prejudices, great care has to be taken. If they *are* accidentally awakened then flattery is often used; the native "reasonableness" of the prospect is warmly complimented; a sharp diversion may be introduced so that this little mistake may be forgotten and the subject approached from another angle and more guardedly, the ruffled feathers settling down meanwhile. The mechanical features are organized for full impact, and to these are added the subtleties of personal persuasion.

One of the prominent features not usually thought of by the prospective purchaser is repetition. Advertisers have a maxim: "Repetition is reputation." Perhaps if we had to reduce the whole program to one word, repetition would be that word. This feature may be summed up in the doctrine that "The constant dropping of the water of publicity finally wears away the stone of indifference."¹⁴ "If

¹³ *Western Advertising*, Feb., 1920. 11.

¹⁴ DeWeese. *Practical Publicity*. 8.

you remind the people of your product by a car card," says one authority, "remind them again by posters as they step out of the cars, and remind them a third time by sight of the actual goods on sale, the chances are they will give in and buy."¹⁵

Hence, the everlasting reiteration of automobiles, hair-nets, soaps and the rest, makes these names and pictures mingle with the stream of impressions and finally float to the center, whereupon a want is born and the chances are people "will give in and buy."

Another closely connected feature is the authoritative manner in which advertisers approach buyers. To be convincing, they must come with conviction; they must come with an attitude of assurance and finality. This manner expresses itself in the definite and positive commands everywhere about us to "Buy," "Eat," "Save," "Take Home," and the rest. A brief search for this type of approach will provide a considerable surprise for those who have not previously reflected on how much they were being ordered about. Somewhere and somehow, somebody has appropriated the right to stand before us, stare us out of countenance, point accusing fingers at us, and otherwise gain ascendancy over us. In this way advertisers are constantly commanding us to do exactly what they want us to do.

It matters not what we have already done, there are always duties uncompleted; their requirements for us never cease. If we have two automobiles we ought to buy another; if we have already eaten a loaf of bread, we have eaten the wrong kind. In a thousand ways the advertisers invade our private lives and issue never-ending ultimatums. With some people this everlasting peppering with commands inspires opposition. With the majority, however, it is effectual. Those who have been trained, religiously and politically, to swallow uncriticized propositions, are

¹⁵ *The World Tomorrow*, June, 1923.

the easy victims of this pressure; there are many who like to be ordered about.

Again the advantages and extraordinary pleasures to be derived from the use of somebody's beer, clothes-pins, talcum powder, gasoline, are "played up" with all the skill that painters, printers and writers can command. So artistically is this emphasis directed that people can actually be made to "taste" beef extracts, meats, candies and cakes; they can be made to "feel" soft rugs, radiant fires, warm gloves; they can be made to "smell" exquisite perfumes; the funeral can be made to appear so æsthetic and beautiful that people actually want to die. As one writer puts it: "Food advertising must have 'smack' to it. Does it make the mouth water, and does it excite the flow of the gastric juices?"¹⁶ And if the taste, feel and smell induced by the seller are satisfying—and they usually are—a long step has been taken towards creating conviction.

Advertisers never display or list the disadvantages and irritations attendant upon the use of their commodities. They never refer to automobiles that won't run, collars that do not fit, clocks that do not keep accurate time, cigars that leave a "dark-brown taste" in the mouth. And thus advertisers tell the truth but not the whole truth. In the language of literature, they are romanticists rather than realists.

In some cases if time permits, direct arguments are presented; facts and figures are offered in convincing—and incontrovertible—quantity and style. Comparisons are introduced; experiences with these goods are graphically portrayed, that is, the satisfying ones.

(d) When the people are convinced, the work would seem to have been concluded. It is a long step, however, from a state of mental agreement with the advertiser and the seller, to the act of hand-in-the-pocket or to-the-check-book. To be convinced, and to say "yes," are two very

different stages, and often a long way apart. All the conviction in the world would not be worth anything to the seller unless people bought. So the attempt is ever to "cash in" on conviction. And the technique of this attempt is very delicate and complicated, for it has to meet the most critical stage of the whole process. Indeed all else is but introductory to this.

A thousand subtleties are employed to help put the sale "across." There is the personal call and all that may go along with it of flattery, tenderness, coaxing, argument, lies, half truths, allaying of suspicions, banishing of doubts, offers to make tests, and the like. Here is where the real salesman shows his parts. A good salesman is the one who can "put it over." There is no other test under ordinary circumstances.

Then there are the "greatest on earth" occasions; the "bargain days," the "dollar days," the "week-end sales," the "January and August clearances," the promise of higher prices. There are hints of scarcity, suggestions of rapid sales, announcements of remarkable opportunities. There is literally no end to the ingenuities employed in translating conviction into favorable action. We may suppose that if there is any moral twist in salesmen it will manifest itself at this point rather than "lose a sale." And if there is any justification of shady behavior at all, what could be better than the immense value of the article to the buyer, and the enormous effort and expense involved in getting him up to this point? But not for the moment imputing any wrong, it is only fair to say that the machinery is set to win if possible.

(e) But suppose that conviction is not converted into action; suppose interest is not translated into conviction; suppose that attention does not even sprout interest,—then what? Will the sellers give up and say the job is hopeless? Modern advertisers do not say that. They may fail once, but they will not always fail, for there are always those

who have not yet heard their gospel; there are always others to whom appeal may be made. They do not care anything about you and me as individuals. They care about so many possible purchasers to the square mile or within a given area. They may fail this time, but they know of another human capacity to work upon—the memory; and they exercise the same perseverance, the same tenacity, the same methods to *leave* a favorable disposition, a favorable streak in the consciousness, as they do to create it in the first place. If people do not buy now they may do so later—if they can be kept in tow. Impressing the memory is a method of keeping people in tow. They must never be allowed to forget where to find this article if they should ever happen to want it. A shrewd technique has been built up to keep the memory, to “keep people in mind.”

All the means hitherto mentioned are memory aids. But there are additional features for this special task. The rules here are: Emphasize the distinctive quality and the name, a great variety of detailed devices being available; make use of a slogan, trade-mark or trade-name, something that is known to stick in the mind as a bur sticks in wool; invite inquiry by mail or telephone; explain carefully where the article may be obtained; warn against inferior substitutes; offer to supply on approval; attach coupons; leave samples at the door.¹⁷ “Lest we forget, lest we forget,” seems to be ever the fear of the advertiser.

Here we have the merest sketch of a master-art; an insistent, never-sleeping, unflinching, aggressive bid for the minds and the money of the people. Perhaps no better description, no better distillation, of its essence has been made by an impartial observer than the following from the pen of Professor L. P. Jacks.

“Has it ever occurred to the reader,” he says, “as he contemplates the beauties of an advertisement hoarding, or the seductive young ladies on the backs of magazines,

¹⁷ Cf. Hall. *Advertising Handbook*. 205 ff.

that he is there and then being practised upon by astute psychologists, that he is, so to speak, under psychological treatment, and not exactly in the way of psychotherapeutics. There are colleges in America and elsewhere, extensively equipped foundations where they study the art of advertisement, and psychology forms part of the curriculum. A careful study of their productions makes it clear that these experts know all about the group mind, herd instinct, the psychology of the crowd, the subliminal self, the suppressed libido, auto-suggestion and all the rest of it. Many of them are masters in the art of hypnosis, hypnotism being the master principle of their craft.

"Is it not a significant thing that the same methods which my spiritual adviser makes use of to tranquilize my soul, and my medical adviser uses to restore my shattered nerves, are also being made use of by these other practitioners to make me buy their whiskey or their pills? The hypnotic medium is a picture of the whiskey bottle so presented as to fix your eye and be unescapable, or some portrait of some cheerful Christian who has been brought back from the gates of the grave by taking pills. By exhibiting these objects in due season the will of the operator to sell whiskey is transformed into the will of the patient to buy it, transformed, mark you, without the patient knowing that any such transformation has taken place, which is hypnotism."¹⁸

So far as the advertiser is concerned this form of approach *is* hypnotism, and is intended to be. We are saved from that unspeakable calamity, however, by the fact that advertisers compete. Cigarette, automobile, clothes and soap makers compete with each other and to a degree neutralize each other's efforts, for the public cannot buy everything that the producer tries to sell. There has to be some choice, some individual responsibility.

Moreover, one type of goods competes with another.

¹⁸ "Is There a Fool-proof Science?" *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1924. 237.

Since all people cannot buy everything they want, they have to choose, not only between different lines of the same article, but also between different kinds of articles. If they purchase a house they cannot buy an automobile; if they buy a suit of clothes they cannot have a cook-stove; if the lady takes a fur coat she cannot secure a washing machine. Were it not for this fact, modern advertising would be the most colossal and ruthless hypnotic pressure the world has ever seen.

3. A SOCIAL CONTROL DEVICE

(1) What does it all mean? What is it all for? There is a very large amount of beauty—neglect the uglier features for the moment—in modern advertising; but it is not primarily a vast contribution of benevolent gentlemen to the development of the “City Beautiful” or of the country beautiful. There is a vast amount of work involved in it; but it is not mainly for the purpose of providing against unemployment. Huge quantities of material are absorbed; but they are not absorbed for the express purpose of keeping factories running. Many ugly and useless buildings, disorderly backyards, wretched dump-heaps and other “eyesores” are thankfully hidden from view; but it is not essentially an eye-sore obliterator. It spreads acceptable information about the latest scientific discoveries and inventions; but that is not its sole object, not even its main object. What is it for? Advertising first, last and all the time is a method which some people employ skillfully wholly for the purpose of extracting wealth from other people. And there is no intended aspersion in this statement; it is just a plain presentation of the essential truth. Advertising is primarily and solely for the purpose of persuading people to buy goods and services in ever-increasing quantities. It is one of the most perfect of the modern “extractive industries.”

Advertisers are not a group of public-spirited persons who are out primarily to make people happy, to build up their health, to give them luxuries, to make them efficient, to make them intelligent, to warn them of dangerous substitutes, to encourage them to work harder, to build up social morale. These good features may come and often do come; they are incidental in the advertisers' theory. Advertisers care not if they "drive people to drink" by their glowing pictures; they care not if they induce thriftless people to spend everything they get; they care not if they so work on the minds of the sensuous that they are led to overeat—except as all such contribute to buying. The advertisers wish to see an ever-enlarging stream of money flow from purchasers to producers, and finally to themselves. Advertising is a method of persuading people to allow advertisers to prescribe their material environment for them. And this is now done to such an extent that a genuine mass movement has been created. The response to advertising today is a big, obvious, startling reality.

Is it aggressive? Are advertisers ever satisfied with the extent to which the people yield? Let the eyes wander in any direction and the answer is there. Is it scientific? Let the cohorts of able artists, psychologists and skilled mechanics tell the story. Is it effectual, that is, does it make itself felt as a lively factor in people's consciousness and succeed in turning them whither the advertisers direct? Let the increasing volume of business, the regiments of skilled servants, the constant multiplication of factories and the piling up of billions of dollars be the reply. There is no clearer illustration of the follow-through process, of the cause-effect relation, in all our studies. Advertising gets people's money from them in colossal amounts; that fact is as clear as the sun at noon. For the money comes from the buyers, and the buyers are the users, and the users the people; and it is not stolen. It is handed over voluntarily, at least in a way that we ordinarily speak of

as voluntary. Whether hypnotized people can be said to act voluntarily is a nice point to test out in other connections. We assume that they need not buy unless they want to do so.

And yet people are not as a rule spendthrifts. They are not, as a rule, indifferent to the ownership of some capital. They will turn money into goods when they want goods more than money. But here is the point—they will turn money into *certain brands* of goods only when they are persuaded to want those goods more than they want other brands of goods. Advertising enables people to learn of the various brands of goods when they would not otherwise seek this knowledge. But the whole design is to sell these goods; to have people choose or think they are choosing between certain competing varieties of the same thing. There can be no doubt that advertising is one of the most efficient social control devices known. Some further points are, however, worthy of consideration.

(2) There is first of all, the testimony of unprejudiced students of the subject. We have already included the characterization of Professor Jacks. In the same vein Professor Park writes "We are living today under the subtle tyranny of the advertising man. He tells us what to wear, and makes us wear it. He tells us what to eat, and makes us eat it. We do not resent this tyranny. We do what we are told to do; but we do it with the feeling that we are following our own wild impulses. This does not mean that, under the inspiration of advertisements, we act irrationally. We have reasons; but they are sometimes after-thoughts. Or they are supplied by the advertiser."

"Advertising is one form of social control. It is one way of capturing the public mind. But advertising does not get its results by provoking discussion. That is one respect in which it differs from public opinion."¹⁹ The main points in this characterization are, the reality of

¹⁹ Park and Burgess. *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. 830.

the tyranny, the non-resentment, the accomplishment of results, the non-provocation of discussion, and hence the subtlety and effectiveness of the means.

(3) The very volume of it is incontrovertible evidence of its mastery over us. We have already given some statistics to help towards an appreciation of this point. In addition we might call attention to the enormous amount of it placed in Times Square, New York. In the parlance of the advertising men this is a twenty-four hour district with a circulation of 1,200,000 people every twenty-four hours. There are twenty-seven hotels and forty-six theatres in a five-block radius, and most of New York's 300,000 daily visitors pass there. That is the conclusive fact. The advertiser knows that if he mingles with the people he "has" them.

(4) No single event in recent years has so completely demonstrated the power of advertising as has the recent pressmen's strike in New York (1923). "Business men . . . report all lines of business very much affected by the inability of merchants and other promoters to advertise. New York merchants estimate that their business has fallen off fully fifty per cent, and many large financial houses which had plans under way for bringing out various bond issues, promptly postponed their offerings for the reason that they were unable to advertise." ²⁰

(5) Another bit of evidence may be presented in this way. We go down town some morning and enter a store. The place is jammed and we can't get waited on. We move to another store and find the same condition. All the stores are crowded. People are pushing and hurrying about. The streets are thronged as well. What does this signify? What was it that prompted three or four times as many people as are usually found in such places to gather there at this particular hour? Were they all seized with one accord at the same hour, on the same day, independently of

²⁰ *Finance and Industry*, Sept. 29, 1923.

each other and without any outside pressure, with a similar impulse? Was this just an uncanny accident? We might believe so if the occurrence were not so frequent, and so clearly associated with "announcements" of "Dollar Day" and "Bargain Counter" offerings. We know that "unparalleled opportunities" such as these can "draw" people. It would seem clear, then, that advertising has much to do with the bargain-hunting crowds.

(6) Control may be further illustrated by the appearance of new habits and customs. We know, of course, that habits and customs appear without any arguing, unfortunately. It is conceivable that gum-chewing might arise as a custom quite spontaneously and spread all over the earth. It is possible that smoking might get started and make headway in all directions of its own accord. Social life is largely made up of habits and customs that appear in this way.

But, relative to gum, it is important to note that it would not be Tutti-Frutti that would be used all over the world. Relative to smoking, it is worth noticing that everybody would not be craving for Camels. It is not the smoking habit or custom that one finds, but the Camel-smoking habit or custom. So it is all the way around. The people have become habituated to *particular brands*, and that means that these habits have been created for them. That is precisely what the advertiser attempts to do. He aims to get *his* habit adopted universally. The adoption of his habit is a testimony to his influence. For when his particular brand is adopted and a taste is created for it, and no other brand is thought to have any merit, then the advertiser may be said to have such persons in his control.

The list of new creations of this sort would make far too long a catalogue to be included here. Any one can think of dozens of them,—new habits and customs that never would have been adopted in the world but for advertisers. Conspicuous examples are the breakfast foods, the use of white

flour in cooking, the use of refined sugars, chewing gum, seasonal changes in clothes, the emphasis on style rather than quality of goods. The majority of our luxuries are of this sort. There seem to be thousands of our modes of behavior that have been dictated, not by our own creative intelligence working on the life situation, but by the advertiser. And here we have further evidence of advertising in control.

(7) Nor can there be any question about the fact that new *wants* are continually created by advertisers. In the previous section we have spoken of modes of behavior—externals. Here we wish to emphasize the internal or psychic aspect of this matter. And it may be said at once that customs and habits are the expression of wants. If people have new habits developed, a new want is presupposed; or at least, an old want is now making itself felt.

The family is driving into town from the country. A beautiful picture of a wonderful electric-washer faces them. Says the woman, "I had n't thought of it before, but would n't it be fine to have a washer! It would save my back and fingers. So very easy to do it all." A picture of the latest styles in dress appears. Immediately, the clothes I am wearing are criticized. I would like to have something more up-to-date. An automobile sign! "Such a relief to get out of the home and into the country; fresh air; we can buy our eggs fresh; a great health-giver." Such meditations and rationalizations express wants.

People become aware of new wants when those who desire to sell have already placed the suggestion. Then people can convince themselves that they ought to have these things. And so it goes. It is part of the advertiser's business to create new wants.

(8) There can be no question about the fact that millions of dollars worth of useless and valueless goods are "put over" by this means. We refer here to the hundreds of

untested, or insufficiently tested, contraptions sold to a hopeful public. Think of the carpet-sweepers that do not sweep; the stove-polishes that will not polish; the crockery-menders that will not mend; the pie-lifters that are ineffectual; the mouse-traps that won't stay set; the patent medicines that won't cure; the cheap dishes, clothes, knick-knacks, jewelry and the like that are a definite disappointment to the buyers. Of course it may be said that people only buy these things once. What is worth while noticing from our point of view, is that they buy even once; they are controlled that far. The evidence here is unmistakable.

(9) Another fact to be noticed is that manufacturers and advertisers are everlastingly talking of "results." They want results and must have them. They will not advertise unless they can get results. Now what are these results? Are they anything other than sales in sufficient quantities to make the business profitable? If the results mean profitable sales, then the people are manipulated and this is what we mean by social control.

In a burst of enthusiasm one writer says: "Advertising modifies the course of people's daily thoughts, gives them new words, new phrases, new ideas, new fashions, new prejudices and new customs. In the same way it obliterates old sets of words and phrases, fashions and customs. It may be doubted if any other one force, the church and the press excepted, has so great an influence as advertising."²¹

Freely admitting that modern advertising moves us powerfully, a central question remains: In what direction does it move us? It is incontrovertible that most advertising stimulates us to want new *things*, to have new words, new phrases, new ideas, new fashions, new prejudices and new customs with reference to *things*, to salable products. But "man does not live by bread," automobiles, superfine hairpins, matchless jewelry, unsurpassed cigars—alone. What about our wants, or the wants we ought to have

²¹ Calkins. *The Business of Advertising*. 9.

stimulated, for meditation, peace of mind, moral perfection, understanding, skill and numerous other priceless values? When the advertised goals of life are compared with the non-advertised, we are shocked into a realization that our personal development is lop-sided because of the tremendous pressure of this virile agency; we find that we are tricked into accepting something less than the best in life's goods. "We are hypertrophied on one side of our values," says Professor Ross, "and atrophied on the other." It is not clear, then, that modern high-pressure advertising is a clear gain in the social economy.

CHAPTER VII

SLOGANS

THE story is told of a Russian who found his country facing the gravest dangers and who saved it by shouting: "Pawn your wife and child and free your fatherland."¹ This idea acted as a powerful suggestion for the already intense crowd. It offered a program and led to action. Let us now make a study of phraseocracy.

1. KINDRED TERMS

Among the countless devices employed by those who aspire to master the human herd, one finds "watchwords," "catchwords," "mottoes," "shibboleths," and "slogans." The watchword was originally a password or countersign employed by guards and scouts in times of hostility. It served to distinguish friends from foes, insiders from outsiders. The medieval castles were guarded by the "ward" by day and the "watch" by night. Thus the watch was the one to be especially careful, for some means of recognition had to be used instead of sight. The "watchword" was the informing sign given to this official in seeking admittance; it was a testword, a declarative nightword.

Later usage is broader in meaning. The watchword is now a rallying cry or signal for action and, as such, is indistinguishable from the slogan. Sumner tells us that a "watchword sums up one policy or doctrine, view or phase of the subject. It may be legitimate or useful, but a watchword easily changes its meaning and takes up foreign connotations or fallacious suggestions. Critical analysis is

¹ Bechterew. *The Significance of Suggestion in Social Life*. 134 ff.

always required to detect and exclude the fallacy.”² Thus the watchword retains some of the obscurity of its original circumstance, although in a changed form. As a nightword it was clear-cut and unequivocal. As a dayword it has assimilated questionable and obscure features.

The “catchword” was originally the last word spoken by one actor and was the “cue” for the next speaker. It was also the first word of any printed page reproduced at the end of the previous page as an aid to the memory. But while the actor still has his cue, the printed page no longer has its catchword. The device has been caught up into the realm of larger social activities and additional meanings have been incorporated. The aim everywhere is to make sure that the attention does not wander, the memory become listless, and the loyalty stray. It is thus in the same category as the watchword and functions as a means of social control.

The “motto” embodies a similar notion. The etymology of the term discloses its imitative origin. Probably it was once just any word that was muttered or repeated to fix attention, arouse the feelings, exclude distractions, and thereby become declarative. In modern use it is any brief saying, a *multum in parvo*, offered as a standard or objective for popular action. Mottoes of the more intense sort, raised in certain circumstances, can hardly be distinguished from the war-cry.

It is of interest to note in passing that newspaper editors have been fond of mottoes. *The New York Chronicle* in 1842 put its energies back of the noble sentiment: “God and the elevation of the people.” *Bartram’s Cheek*, a Michigan paper, in 1859, was whole-souled for “Beauty and Business.” *Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly* in 1870 favored “Progress; Free Thought; Untrammelled Lives.”³ Other journalistic mottoes are bombastic, grandiose, or smart,

² *Folkways*. 177.

³ Hudson. *Journalism in the United States*, 1690-1872. 738.

as the case may be. But they purport to fix attention and epitomize a program and dazzle the eyes with a glorious objective. They are thus closely related functionally to the slogan.

The "shibboleth" is almost synonymous with the watchword. It is a Hebrew term signifying an ear of corn or a stream. But what interests us is the modern use rather than the ancient meaning. The story is that one of the Judges of Israel employed this word as a means of distinguishing the fleeing Ephraimites from his own followers, the Gileadites. It seems that the former, because of some defect, were unable to pronounce the "sh" sound in the word shibboleth and thereby gave themselves away.⁴

Originally, therefore, the shibboleth was employed to re-discover a loyalty already declared. It was in every sense a password. It was a purely arbitrary method of obtaining information as to mental attitude in a crisis. One who could speak the accepted word, i. e. pronounce "shibboleth," was recognized as a friend and supporter, a member of the "we-group." All others were known to be enemies. In this case one trembles to think of what must have happened to those members of the band who were tongue-tied or otherwise crippled vocally. But now, as then, in all times of stress and popular realignment, one must be able to shout the proper words without quibbling or stuttering, or take the consequences. A critical or hesitant attitude is no more tolerated in some quarters, than was lisping to that brave chieftain, Jephthah.

2. THE SLOGAN

Turning now to the slogan we may note first of all that it comes to us from the Gaelic and appears to be a term formed by the contraction of two words, "Sluagh" meaning an army or fighting group, and "Ghairm" meaning a call

⁴ *Judges*. 12: 4-6.

call or calling. Among the highlanders of Scotland, the "sluaghghairm" was the rallying-cry or gathering-call to assemble the hardy followers in times of clan danger or active aggression. It was variously the name of the clan and sometimes the name of the place of meeting. The loyal supporters of haughty chiefs, separated by mountains, rivers and local interests, were suddenly lifted out of themselves and swept together by "the slogan's deadly yell," as Sir Walter Scott has it.

Hence, however different their origin and original meanings, the verbal devices enumerated have evolved to practically the same point. They were and they are now, more than ever, instruments of the popular leader, the agitator and the conscriptor. And they are piercing and ruthless instruments as we shall see later. If any differences remain, they may be found in the probability that watchwords and shibboleths serve to cut sharply into the miscellaneous moods and interests of common life and secure attention. The mottoes, catchwords and slogans do this as well, but they also indicate some desirable objective and secure active participation in their attainment. After one is "in" and approved by means of the former, one must take up the task indicated by the slogan or catchword and "put it across."

By way of definition, therefore, we may say that a slogan is any brief, popularly received and reiterated challenge to immediate participation in competitive or conflicting social interactions. It is an appeal and a program. It is not found in the field of scientific investigation for there is no desire to gain adherents; there is no sense of crisis and urgency; in this region, the truth is wanted, not numbers.

3. HISTORY

But while the Scotch may have given us the term, the idea and the practice of using some powerful word stimulus to fuse and to fortify defensive and aggressive bands, are

ancient and world-wide. Says a recent writer: "From early times the slogan has been seriously applied to affairs, often deriving from the saying of a great man. Such a slogan was the *delenda est Carthago* (Carthage must be destroyed) of Cato the Elder at the conclusion of Rome's struggle with Carthage (146 B. C.).

"Slogans were also not unknown in the Middle Ages. Speaking of the Peasant's Revolt of 1377-1381 against the land-owning classes, Green in his History says, 'Quaint rimes passed through the country and served as summons to a revolt.' Such 'quaint rimes' were essentially slogans.

"Perhaps the most famous was John Ball's 'When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then a gentleman?' It will be remembered that this slogan was effectively revived by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain during his earlier radical days. When the English calendar was corrected in 1751 by the dropping of eleven days, opposition was aroused by the idea that eleven days' wages were being lost, and 'Give us back our eleven days' became a popular slogan.

"Nearer our own times, Nelson's signal at Trafalgar, 'England expects every man to do his duty,' affords an instance of a slogan that took hold upon popular fancy. 'Scotland forever' and 'Erin-go-bragh' are examples of national slogans."⁵

Thus, slogans are not a modern device, but have been put into circulation from time immemorial, and have served well to rally people, especially what Roosevelt called "the lunatic fringe," around the standards of those leaders who were fighting for a cause. The truth in the saying: "The world will belong to the best maker of slogans," has been demonstrated over and over again throughout the course of history.

4. AREAS OF OPERATION

The fields in which slogans originate and operate are as numerous as are the crises, causes and interests of the

⁵ *Living Age*. 322: 351 ff.

people. Since there are so many of these, we cannot undertake to name them all. We shall note only war, politics, religion, education, business and some more restricted areas. Examples from these departments will be sufficient to illustrate the method and power of the slogan as a means of social control.

(1) Originating in the brazen throat of war, the slogan has never ceased to be an effectual war-instrument. It has always been, and still is, impossible successfully to prosecute a campaign without it. A returned soldier wrote us in 1921 that the outstanding, ever-reiterated, clarion challenge to American soldiers—the slogan that helped the soldiers to associate readily and agreeably with all sorts of men, endure and even enjoy the otherwise deadening routine of military drill, master those weakening waves of homesickness that attacked their muscles at the most inopportune times, become knit up into an invincible and terrific engine of destruction, recover almost miraculously from serious wounds and illnesses, and finally to “put it across” while they were “over there”—that slogan was, “Get Germany.” That was the central theme to which studying, travelling, drilling, charging, and all other military operations were but minor variations. And “Get Germany” brought forth its brood of subsidiary slogans such as, “Put it across,” and “Over the top,” “They shall not pass.”

Not less powerful was the influence of this device upon the population at home. The thinking and unthinking alike were gathered into a tidal wave to “make the world safe for democracy.” The political, social and religious idealists were captured by the term “democracy.” The dull and meticulous were awakened and set at work by the term “safe.” That famous sloganizer, Benjamin Franklin, was unceremoniously resurrected and riveted to the game of selling War Savings Stamps. His manly voice, quit of its sepulchral accents, sounded forth, vigorous and clear, in the

motatoes, "Thrift is Power," and "Save and Succeed." These suggestions gathered in the close-fisted.

And in the campaign to "make the world safe for democracy" what could be more adroit and compelling than to sell "Liberty Bonds," a phrase most contradictory in any other setting. Thus it remains that Americans of the twentieth century, no less than the Highlanders of the fifteenth, needed slogans to prosecute a war successfully. War without slogans? One can as readily think of trains without engines or dinner without meat.

(2) The game of politics, whether of local, national or international proportions, would be a tame affair without slogans. Every election hatches a new set, some of them of local and some of national popularity and influence. No popular uprising has been significant without them. The French Revolution produced "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." The Reform Bill of 1832 was responsible for the appearance of two: "The Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill," and "To stop the Duke, go for gold," an exhortation with which London was placarded with the purpose of bringing about a run on the banks in order to prevent the Duke of Wellington from forming a government.

Other notable examples from English life are Disraeli's "Peace with Honor," an effectual hint sent out after the Berlin Conference, Colling's popular appeal, "Three acres and a cow," and the vindictive warning, "A vote for the Liberals is a vote given to the Boers," sounded at the Khaki General Election of 1900. "Your food will cost you more," and "Ninepence for fourpence," are examples still easily recalled.

Inextinguishable slogans, set going by the new social philosophy following mercantilism, were "Natural Rights," "Economic Freedom," "Free Competition," "Laissez faire," and "Laissez passer."⁶ The crowds in the early days of the Russian Revolution went about in an ecstasy

⁶ Hoxie. *Trade Unionism in the United States*. 246.

of self-abnegation carrying banners inscribed with the words, "No annexations and no indemnities."⁷

Famous slogans circulated in this country, at various times, for political and broadly social effect are: "No taxation without representation," "The full dinner pail," "Remember the Maine," "Less government in business; more business in government," "Labor produces all wealth," "Might makes right," "One big Union," "Workers of the world unite," "Make the world safe for democracy." Many other examples will be cited later to illustrate certain excellences and defects of this device.

(3) Modern business has appropriated the slogan and makes extensive use of it. No advertising campaign is quite complete without its employment. *Printer's Ink* recently compiled something over three hundred and fifty slogans that are *nationally* known. Those of merely local circulation number up in the thousands, but these are always subject to national recognition if they prove to be apt.

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the above-mentioned periodical states that "The slogan was coined as a means of stressing trade-mark significance in the advertising appeal." This may be true as an account of the introduction of this device into selling campaigns, but the slogan was *coined*, that is to say, was originated, in a very different manner, as we have shown.

Some years ago when Sir Horace Plunkett, the Irish promoter, was in America, one of his slogans became quite popular. He had announced it at home but it became current here. It was "Better farming, better business, better living." Examples of American origin are: "Matchless for the complexion," "Ask the man who owns one," "The watch that made the dollar famous," "That 's the spirit," (for a motor fuel) "Best in the long run," (for an auto tire). The significant fact here is that many of these have become so well known that further illustration is unneces-

⁷ *Living Age*, April 21, 1923. 151.

sary. But again, this device for business is not modern. The term "Monypolian" became a slogan and was used by the Hanses in 1582.⁸

(4) Athletic fans are well aware of the power of this instrument. Since struggles in this field are usually not of national importance, the slogans remain of local and temporary importance. On the Ohio State University campus we have, in turn and according to schedule, "Beat Michigan," "Beat Chicago," "Beat Illinois," and "beat" all the others as they come. Such slogans have often helped to make winning teams.

(5) Nor is this instrumentality neglected in the religious world. Large-scale and small-scale religious enterprise would be seriously crippled without it. America has throbbed more to this type of appeal than other nations, perhaps, because of the numerous warring sects and their former bitternesses. For example, one denomination has used, since its foundation over one hundred years ago, "Our Plea" as a rallying center for its own adherents and as a war-cry against others. It has continually proposed to "Speak where the Scriptures speak, and remain silent where the Scriptures are silent,"—a proposal demanding such limitations and restrictions from zealous people that of course it has not been fulfilled. "The Evangelization of the world in this generation" became the holy cry of hosts of young people in the last generation. "Men and Millions" was the awakening call put forth by one sect about 1915—but the millions got in the way of men. The history of theological and ecclesiastical development is besprinkled with such catchwords.

(6) It does seem strange, but it is very easy, to find slogans frequently employed in realms where one who was unsophisticated would expect to find little of the war-spirit, hurry, promotion, limitation of the range of attention or heated enthusiasm and would expect to find much of calm-

⁸ *Living Age*, April 21, 1923. 149.

ness in consideration, wide research for judgment, judicial reservation, highly critical attitudes and the like, namely, education. But, interestingly enough, the promoters, the propagandists, the zealots, have gotten in and have left a slogan-trail of their efforts. Few of us can forget, but many do not yet know, the precise meaning of "Education according to Nature," "Social Efficiency," and "The project method."

During American Education Week of 1924, the central idea for each day was distilled into a slogan, and those for the various days were: "Ballots, not bullets," "Master the English language," "Visit the schools today," "America First," "The Red Flag Danger," "Better trained and better paid teachers, more adequate buildings," "Schools are the nation's greatest asset," "No illiteracy by 1930," "Education is a godly nation's greatest need," "The dictionary is the beacon-light to understanding," "A sick body makes a sick mind. Athletes all," "Get acquainted with your neighbor." "A square deal for the country boy and girl," "A godly nation cannot fail."⁹ The part urging "visit the schools today" was repeated for each day. Of course, one sees in this program the hand of the professional patriot but it is obvious that some educators were linked in as well.

(7) We need not linger to elaborate on the employment of this device in many other fields. We must say, simply, that the numerous campaign drives for money during and since the World War, generated many slogans. The Red Cross challenged the respect and generosity of the world by declaring itself "The Greatest Mother in the World." The Y. M. C. A. insisted and demanded that "The Y stands for you; You stand for the Y."

Every party revolt within any larger whole has usually been unified and spurred on by some unforgettable slogan. The restless poor have foregathered to the strain of "Un-

⁹ *Educational Research Bulletin*, Oct. 1, 1924. 266.

reasonable profits," "A fair day's wage," "The emancipation of labor," while the contented and rich have patriotically cried back, "America for the Americans," "Law and order," and many others.

Thus we may conclude that wherever there is a division of opinion over what seems to be an important matter to some, where "heat" is generated in the division, where either side moves ahead to convert or coerce the other and requires the help of outsiders, wherever, in short, a "campaign" is organized there slogans appear. A mass movement always generates these catchwords.

5. CHARACTERISTICS

The features which make the slogan so effective are too numerous even to mention, let alone delineate in a brief chapter. A large book would be required to give all of them proper consideration; and this would involve many details as to their time and place. Many slogans do not catch on; they are like a vaccination that does not "take." Not because they are not in themselves well-made, clever, etc., but because they do not strike the right soil. A slogan cannot be "put across" by main force, although as modern advertising shows, it can be circulated so widely and repeatedly that it cannot wholly be ignored.

But some take and take well; others fall dead in spite of the pressure. In a very real sense, as some one has said, "slogans are born, not made. Many a man has been visited by a good slogan, as by an angel, unawares. Most slogans have to rely upon costly repetition for their upkeep—they are made, not born. A good many of them deserve to be 'born again and born different.' " This view suggests that there are certain essential characteristics of good slogans which are always present or usually so. Neglecting wholly the soil into which they fall, we wish now to

make such superficial analysis of the device as to have before us a number of these characteristics.

In a lecture several years ago, the "vagabond poet," Vachel Lindsay, stated that he was out to bring poetry once more to the attention of the people, and in order to do this he had to beat the *electric* sign. What he meant was that the popular mind is now so distracted, surfeited and teased by appeals that any new appeal has to have more attention-getting and gripping features than the electric sign.

But the popular mind is, at the same time, so shallow, so childishly attentive, so unguarded, so eager for new stimuli, that the slogan appeal is captivating. If it were capable of prolonged concentration, deep absorption or unapproachable fixation, this instrument would not work. Moreover, if people were universally satisfied with their lot, and not everlastingly craving for some new thing, slogans would fall harmless to the ground. Some have thought that Americans are especially superficial and easily attracted, therefore peculiarly susceptible. But however that may be, it is probably true that this device has reached its greatest perfection in this country. That is to say, if the soil is excellent, the seed is unsurpassed. The features now to be enumerated are not found attaching to every slogan, to be sure, but no slogan can survive without one or more of them.¹⁰

(a) A frequent characteristic is rhythm. The words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," make a pleasant music; there is a dignity and majesty about the sound that makes them comparable to a symphony. A large number of phrases and sentences are metrical in form and can be scanned. Examples are "Proven by the test of time," "Quickest way to duplicate," "The interest of one is the interest of all," "Woven where the wool is grown," "Handle it mechanically." Professor Henry van Dyke is

¹⁰ Cf. Starch. *Principles of Advertising*. 509.

reported to have said that the phrase, "The skin you love to touch," is highly poetical.

The words "Americanism," "Democracy," and many others are repeated as much for their euphoniousness, perhaps, as for anything else. They *sound* good. Certainly clear ideas as to their essential meanings do not warrant such frequent employment. All of which goes to show that the masses are always ready for a war-dance if some leader or ruling clique will but set the measure and beat time.

(b) The alliterative quality is very often found. We have "Foods of the finest flavor," and we have them "From contented cows." We have the "Eight with the eighty less parts." Some propose "Land to the landless," "Politics for the people," "Men and millions," "Mine to the miner," and many more.

(c) The appeal is strengthened by the combining of alliteration and antithesis. "The golden rule against the rule of gold," has played its part, as has also "Sink or swim." During the silver controversy in this country, of which cause Bryan was a supporter in 1896, some opponents of the proposition were captivated by the assertion. "The white man with the yellow metal is beaten by the yellow man with the white metal." In 1844 the watchword "Fifty-four forty or fight," almost provoked war. Probably no such excitement could have been produced by shouting "twenty-one sixteen or fight."

(d) Besides the recurrence of letters, there is often the ringing repetition of sounds. "An apple a day keeps the doctor away," "Cheaper to 'dye' than to buy," "A Kalamazoo—direct to you," "The handy candy," "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," are familiar illustrations of this feature.

(e) Le Bon says: "Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and proof, is one of the surest means of making any idea enter the minds of crowds. The conciser an affirmation is, the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it car-

ries. The religious books and legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a political issue, and commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, are acquainted with the value of affirmation.”¹¹

We have already noted examples of affirmation combined with repetition of letters and sounds. Le Bon further says: “Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, namely, repetition.”¹²

So we are faced at every angle with unabashed pronouncements such as “If it isn’t an Eastman it isn’t a kodak,” “The standard of the world,” “The utmost in—clothespins,” and “Eventually, why not now?” In such cases the facts are all in, the argument is done, it is just a question of time until the people are led away to dance to the advertiser’s tune. The doctrine of predestination had hardly more finality.

When the auditory appeal is reinforced by the visual on every hand, and every day for weeks and months and years, it is clear that none but the most resolute or darkened minds can escape being affected.

(f) Brevity has its part in making the slogan effective. After some examination and comparison, the writer found that slogans average about four words. An English writer says the ideal is one phrase of from three to six words. Thus, slogans are like coins of the realm, condensed and economical. But, as we shall see later, they differ decidedly in that they always pass current above their value.

This brevity, however, is suggestive with reference to the receptiveness and retentiveness of the popular mind. It is a fine proof of the fact that most people have poor mem-

¹¹ *The Crowd*. 141-142.

¹² *Op. cit.*

ories. If anything of an abstract or somewhat erudite nature is to stay with them, it must be pointed and brief. Few people can retain vast numbers of details. Most of us show this when we try, as we always do, to sum up arguments and points and boil them down to a single proposition or two. The sloganizer meets this universal weakness by summing up for us, by boiling down, by giving the essence.

(g) The appeal to curiosity is not infrequent. For example, "Have you tried one lately?" If the evidence is not there before us, we are apt to ask, "One what?" This awakens curiosity, and it is often an easy step to the conclusion, "Well, I'll try anything once," or "Let's take a shot."

"There's a reason" is a very intriguing slogan. "What is the reason?" we would like to know. Or again, "Ask Dad—he knows," and "Ask the man who owns one." In such cases we may note a quiet confidence on the part of those who put the question, that any examination or inquiry will reveal nothing but the merits of the goods and will surely lead to purchase. There is a subtle suggestion of flattery also, for it seems to leave the final decision with the investigator.

(h) Sloganizers are fond of punning; and here we may touch on the humorous element. Play on words may be illustrated by "Has n't *scratched* yet," "A *case* of good judgment," "Time to *re-tire*," "The *makings* of a nation," "When it rains—it *pours*," "All they 're *cracked* up to be," "Have you a little *fairy* in your home?" "The watch that made the dollar famous" is an example of a slogan that misstates the facts but does so in a wholly allowable manner; nobody is tricked by it. There is geniality and good nature in such a catchword. "Spare the spray and spoil the fruit" is an illustration of a witty turn to a famous proverb; as will be clear such a change makes it quite unforgettable; something new is closely, and cleverly, associated with what is already familiar.

Safety campaign slogans as a rule are solemn, depressing and terrifying, but occasionally a lighter vein is introduced by the advocates of caution. Some recently reported are clever and pointed. A sarcastic railroad man in the east suggests to careless motorists: "Better stop a minute than forever." Not to be outdone, a locomotive engineer offers this: "Try running into one of our locomotives. They satisfy." A Southern gentleman is credited with:

"Stop! and let the train go by,
Hardly takes a minute;
Your car starts out again intact,
And, better still—you 're in it."

(i) Of course the sentiments, and especially the sentiments connected with country, are not neglected. There are those loyal, business patriots, who propose to make "The national drink," and "The national smoke," saving features of our American life. Certain of them propose to be "Home-builders to the nation." Politicians occasionally assure us that "Trade follows the flag," although they rarely say anything about the guns following the trade. Occasionally this patriotic feature takes the form of unrelieved and unvarnished boasting; but this only adds to the attraction for certain people.

(j) Friendliness, on the part of advertisers, wins with some people. Their breezy assurances of disinterestedness and their commanding joviality, are quite irresistible. They greet total strangers with a cheerful "Good morning," and then, having observed some suspicious stains on their chins, inquire, "Have you used — soap yet?"

This is an illustration of the fact that modern business and other aggressive movements, are no respecters of persons. They have no patience with those ancient and protecting formalities by which a degree of personal privacy and reserve can be preserved. Advertising and slogans wipe these supports away. They break in and take

possession. They treat both the rich and the poor alike.

(k) Certain slogans *appear* to be meaty and unavoidable conclusions from profound reflection. They are presented to us as the results of indefatigable research, as distillations of the ages, as finalities beyond which the recipients could never hope to get. To illustrate this point, we might mention "Safety first," "He kept us out of war," "Make the world safe for democracy," "Open covenants, openly arrived at," "The dictates of right reason," "Too proud to fight." These phrases have every appearance of being the essential truths of whole philosophies, of representing solid realities. As phrases they are inimitable. As capsular philosophies, they are unsurpassed.

But herein is the deception. Who can say what they mean? The average man certainly cannot say what they involve and where they might lead. Probably the founders of them and their dispensers could not. Hence, they are a trap for the unwary.

(l) An authoritative note is sometimes sounded, in addition to the affirmative already pointed out. Many slogans are hortatory in character. And many people like this feature; they like to be commanded. Some power located in some obscure place is always telling us to "Do your bit," "Go to church Sunday," "Restore the land to the landless," "Vote for Mr. So-and-so." These commands gain ascendancy, in part, by reason of the popular tendency to mythologize, to hunt up powers to which obeisances may be made, to fall back, in an age of change and cracking foundations, upon *certainly*.

(m) Many slogans are strictly class-appeals; and of course, all the features, or any combination of them, that we have mentioned, but add to their weight. Emotions are aroused over old antagonisms. "The demand for labor," "Down with the capitalists," "Just distribution," "Change the system," are examples of this sort; but we have already touched on this point.

(n) Obscurity of origin, combined with euphoniousness, timeliness, and other features, adds greatly to the strength of slogans. When no one knows who originated the phrase, and when it grips the minds of the people because of its cleverness or timeliness, there is always a tendency for the popular imagination to invest it with extraordinary powers. This feature links in with the idea of authority. The people must have *powers* to worship. Slogans can be such powers.

Numerous other features might be included, but these will serve our purpose here. By way of summary, Professor Sumner says of watchwords and other such verbal coinage: "They are familiar, unquestioned and popular, and they are always current above their value. They always reveal the invincible tendency of the masses to mythologize. They are personified and superhuman energy is attributed to them. 'Democracy' is not treated as a parallel word to aristocracy, theocracy, autocracy, etc., but as a Power from some outside origin, which brings into human affairs an inspiration and energy of its own. The 'People' is not the population, but a creation of mythology, to which inherent faculties and capacities are ascribed beyond what can be verified within experience. . . . In all these cases there is a tyranny in the term."¹³

In his essay on "War" Sumner further says: "If you allow a political catchword to go on and grow, you will awaken some day to find it standing over you, the arbiter of your destiny, against which you are powerless, as men are powerless against delusions." He might have said this of religious, educational, industrial, and all other forms of catchwords and phrases. Passing unchallenged for a time, indeed, taken up gladly and hurried on their way, they soon, and all unconsciously, became arbiters of their owner's destinies. They become powerful factors for social control.

It might be objected that business slogans are in a different category, and such is the case. Certain funda-

¹³ *Folkways*. 176.

mental differences are observable. But these differences are in characteristic qualities rather than in effects. They all accomplish control although they do it in different ways, and in different circumstances. A very summary statement of this difference must be included. In general, religious, political and educational slogans are characterized by a real or fictitious depth of meaning, by what the Greeks called "pathos," by significant historical relevance, and they usually refer to persons, principles and situations. On the other hand, the business slogans are clever, sprightly, open-faced and friendly; they center about things and services, and are, like Topsy, historically unattached.

We may observe further that, while many slogans are complete sentences and, therefore, propositional statements, others are just subjects, flung out like wandering stars, for reception and elaboration by the popular mind; they are left to weave what halos and spin out what filaments of light they can. No difficulties arise relative to these detached and loose subjects until one attempts to connect them up with qualifying predicates. Then the snares in them appear in troops.

6. EFFECTS

We have already entered upon the discussion of this point by the presentation of certain suggestions above. Some additional development seems necessary, however, to round out the discussion.

We have entire confidence in the proposition that, in general, good slogans move people in the directions desired by their originators. The evidence for this proposition is not easy to find nor to assemble. We must beware, until we have better methods of investigation, of asserting too much for this device. But we might suggest two lines of

study which would provide some hints as to what, when pushed much further than they have hitherto been pushed, would provide the kind of proof that is desired.

(1) Some fairly satisfactory conclusions can be drawn from the experience and experiments of advertisers. A Canadian newspaper recently conducted a contest that won reader interest and increased advertising revenues. On a full page of the paper were printed the slogans of the various business firms of the city, and the people were asked to write in and tell what firms used the various slogans. The response was beyond expectation. Of the total, nearly five hundred replies were found to be approximately correct. A student of this contest says: "The fact remains that it has proven an immense success that can be duplicated in almost any center."¹⁴ When this sort of proof is gathered in sufficient quantities, we may have evidence as to the effectiveness of the slogan that will be beyond dispute.

(2) Rather less substantial in character, but certainly not to be neglected, is the opinion of various students of the subject. This opinion is formed from such facts as we have so far presented, namely, the frequency of the appearance of slogans, their skillful adaptation to the popular mind, their rapid circulation, and popular expressions of belief in them. At this point we work by inference, and there can be no doubt that such reasoning frequently goes astray. That a slogan is in everybody's mouth for a time is a demonstrable fact; that the people who mouth it are to some extent influenced by it, would seem to be a sound deduction. At any rate, noted students of the subject have felt that such an inference is safe. We have already quoted Professor Sumner. A passage from Le Bon may be helpful in this connection. He says: "In the first rank of the important factors which shape the course of history we must place the formulæ of religious, political and social

¹⁴ *Editor and Publisher*, Dec., 1924. 18.

life. In every age, after a brief period of uncertainty, the needs and the aspirations of the masses eventually find expression in short, sententious phrases. Universally accepted, they ballast the nation's mentality, give guidance to the emotions, and give rise to a unity of consciousness and action.

"These magic words need not represent the truth, nor need they be particularly definite. It is enough that they should produce an impression. Their vagueness enables everyone to see in them the embodiment of his dreams, and to find in them a solution of the problems of the day.

"These influential formulæ always come into being during the great historic periods. It was in the name of the formula, 'Dieu le veut,' that Europe hurled herself against the East in the time of the Crusades. It was in the name of a formula symbolizing the greatness of Allah that some obscure Arabian nomads founded a vast empire. Invoking the revolutionary triad (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) still engraven upon our walls, the soldiers of the French Republic conquered Europe. It was to realize their motto 'Deutschland über alles,' that the Pan-Germans dreamed of conquering the world.

"While the rational content of these popular formulæ is often very small, their mystical content is, on the contrary, very considerable. Strangers to the laws of rational logic, they cannot be explained by the reason. In the days when Mohamet was preaching the doctrine that was to revolutionize a great part of the Old World, it would have been very easy for a philosopher to prove that the Prophet was the victim of hallucinations. Yet the soldiers of the formula that gave direction to their will power were able to hold their own against the formidable power of Rome, founded an Empire which survived for six centuries and a religion which is still extant. If we seek to judge events that proceed from the mystical sources when these formulæ

derive their power by the sole light of reason, we shall never succeed in understanding the unfolding of history.”¹⁵

This is the testimony of a social psychologist as to the very large place taken by formulæ—and this means slogans as well—in modifying social evolution. We think Le Bon over-stresses their importance. Complete analyses of the world movements, which he names, would probably show that many other forces were responsible for much that he attributes to formulæ. However, once restlessness begins, it is not possible to overestimate the service rendered by slogans in rallying the people to what they believe to be a common standard, and sending them forth towards what they take to be a perfectly clear and attainable objective. But, in addition, slogans may remind people that they are unhappy, exploited, isolated or what not, and thus figure in the restlessness.

But when one asks for estimates of the precise effects of a given slogan, we simply have to admit that those estimates are not, and cannot be made up for a long time. If one should ask, for example how significant in the revolutionary war was the slogan “No taxation without representation,” no universally acceptable answer, no true answer, can be given. Sociologists and social psychologists cannot yet measure the impulses which a slogan gives to a mass movement with anything like the accuracy that a physiologist can measure the impulses which an electric current gives to a frog’s leg. Social sciences are not yet able to give such results. What was the force of certain slogans in arousing the German people to an appreciation of the splendid dream of the militarists, and gathering them into a mass-movement to gain that end? Scholars *guess* that their force was *very great*. How great? No two investigators would yet agree as to that. So we leave the general problem of the effects of the slogans in the realm of

¹⁵ *The World in Revolt*. 234 ff.

uncertainty where it belongs, and where it will remain until sociological technique is much better developed.

7. APPRAISAL

The slogan is undoubtedly effective. From the standpoint of the user of it and his objectives, we might say that this device was wholly desirable. The advertiser who gathered in a big harvest from a successful slogan would certainly be the last to condemn its use. But our view is that it is generally speaking, a deceptive method of control. We think it has grave defects, and this is the burden of the following argument.

(1) There is first of all its indiscriminate use. Anybody can start one going and can stir up the people as a strange object in a bee-hive stirs up the bees, makes them angry, interferes with their work and does plenty of other damage. A population at rest and quite content, can be thrown into a turmoil over night by a clever slogan that really "takes." Anybody may do it. There is no prohibition on the launching of a slogan. And very often it is impossible to discover who was responsible for it.

Thus, hosts of people are ruled, manipulated, shunted around, by undiscoverable authorities which, as it sometimes turns out, "to doubt would be disloyalty, to question would be sin." Conditions are bad enough when people *won't* raise questions about their authorities and ask for reasons; conditions are infinitely worse when they *can't* question because they can't discover them. Such a situation is hardly favorable to the development of an intelligent and critical population.

To many, of course, this is a most commendable feature of slogans. You can sit back out of sight and coin these formulæ and send them forth and pull the people any way you wish. And, according to some aristocrats, that is the only way the people can be satisfactorily handled. It may

not be impertinent to ask, however, when by such training the people may come to rational self-control.

(2) Possibly the most unfortunate feature of the slogan is its ambiguity. Advertising slogans are clearer in meaning; but political and religious slogans have only one certain meaning, when they are first heard. Yet a little examination and reflection always, instead of opening wide the highways of clear thinking, plunges the investigator into a morass of tangled and contradictory meanings. Take the phrase, "Back to normalcy." That sounded good to a war-weary world. It appeared to represent something desirable and attainable. Any one could have told his neighbor just exactly what it meant.

But suppose we look at it in its setting. Was President Harding philosophizing when he put that coin into circulation, or was he just playing with the people? "Back" sounded good; such a suggestion always sounds good to the standpatter and the routineer; it certainly sounded good to those who were weary of being fleeced by war-profiteers. "Normalcy" suggested—well just what it suggested. It pointed to anything that you wanted. It looked toward everything desirable. Yet it pointed nowhere, to nothing, because nobody can define what normalcy is; nobody ever saw it or experienced it; it is a total abstraction with a great deal of relativity thrown in. Yet, the phrase caught on and the people lined up to support the user of it.

What does it mean to be "True to the faith"? This is another phrase very full of vagueness. It has been, and is, a saint-seducing phrase. It awakened more animosities and precipitated more strife than it has ever dissolved or allayed. Each individual is more or less true to *some* faith, and this is "the" faith to him. A thousand people, therefore, with a thousand different creeds might all truly accept this slogan; but it is plain that they would come to blows over it the minute inquiry began. It is, therefore, a deceptive phrase.

The term "democracy" is almost as inclusive as the sky in its ability to shelter uncritical beliefs and opinions. Everybody has been, in the last few years, vociferating vigorously in favor of "Americanism" but nobody has yet given a fairly acceptable interpretation of it. Thus the method of control by slogans is full of subtlety and trickery.

(3) Growing out of what we have just said, we may point out that this device is objectionable because it perpetuates undeliberative responses. The people are rallied suddenly and hurriedly. The coiners of slogans do not present challenges to thought, but to action. We might correctly speak of a slogan as a device for the *prevention* of thought. Sloganeers want numbers of adherents, not critics. They all belong to that school of life whose motto is "for Gawd's sake, do something."

Numbers of slogans being presented for the appropriate responses, it might be supposed that the necessity of selection from among the various ones would enforce some careful scrutiny and call forth deliberate choice. It is probable, however, that the one which strikes home hardest and quickest takes the throne, and the rest are simply ignored. Moreover, it is not always that slogans really come into competition; one does not have to make a choice, one just has to accept. Thus is analysis still avoided.

(4) In proportion as one succumbs to such influences, one does not learn to think, and is therefore handicapped in those crucial situations where no slogans appear but yet a choice has to be made. Dependence upon formulæ is like dependence upon drink or drugs; their absence leaves a weakened condition, an almost helpless condition. This is seen in the conflict between theology and science. The theologians had never criticized their formulæ; they had simply swallowed them. Consequently when they were asked to overhaul them, they were horrified; they were "off the track"; they had no other place to stand.

In a Western city an enterprising firm makes a business

of suiting the people to its goods, and daily smites the senses of thousands with this, "When you think of victrolas, think of ——'s." The writer knows this slogan very well and speaks from experience when he says that these two ideas come to be so tied together in thought that they cannot be separated except with the greatest effort; the one "runs off" the other right along. When an idea regularly runs off an emotion that is pleasurable, the idea is usually accepted as true. This makes for theological, political and social stagnation. One cannot argue with disease germs. One cannot do much better, unless one has taken training in criticism, with slogans. Both germs and slogans get rooted and at home in the system before the host knows what has happened. It is almost too late, in many cases, then.

The emotional life of man assumes and supports the absoluteness, the finality, of its objects. Since slogans touch the emotional life in the subtle ways indicated, they tend to become absolute. Only reflective thought qualifies and limits, and so escapes the tyrant. Since habit is so largely the arbiter of our daily choices, those who help to make our habits exercise control over us. Sloganeers do this with the people right along. They secure action first, and then call for consistency of attitude. The person is crippled.

We may close with a statement from Mr. Colvin, taken from an article on slogans. "One of the most disastrous," he says, "was 'self-determination,' a slogan obviously of foreign origin, since it is not even good English. It had been first used on the northwest frontiers of Russia, where the Finns and Lithuanians, and other more or less subject races, were to be detached from the Russian Empire."¹⁶ The formula was taken up by Mr. Lloyd George and hurtled abroad by that loquacious gentleman, and it has been used ever since to "our infinite injury in Ireland, in Egypt,

¹⁶ *Living Age*, April 21, 1923. 152.

in India and in Africa, and wherever there is an alien race under the British Empire.” This shows as clearly as any example can, the mischief wrought by the irresponsible “broadcasting” of slogans. This idea has threatened to dismember the British Empire—which may or may not be a good thing. But it offers to lead the alien races nowhere; because nobody can define the term.

CHAPTER VIII

PROPAGANDA

1. INTRODUCTION

AT the close of the World War discerning persons began to marvel at "the unanimity with which millions of men and women had conformed in their thinking and in their actions to what certain leaders wanted." Vast sums of money had been raised for government loans and philanthropic work. Citizens of this professedly free country had consented to universal conscription, had cut down their daily use of sugar, had closed their factories for certain days, and had deprived themselves of gasoline for their cars. All this they did and much more, voluntarily and enthusiastically—apparently. To an extraordinary degree the people not only in this country but in many others, co-operated heartily in carrying out programs involving radical and painful changes in their every-day life.¹

This extraordinary unanimity and enthusiasm in painful deprivations! How may we account for it? Professor Strong says: "These millions did not pass through this remarkable change without pressure; they were not ordered to do so; they freely responded to suggestions presented in skillfully conducted propaganda." If this explanation may be accepted—and it seems to the writer to be quite correct—we have some evidence for the existence of another effectual control device, and also a justification for the study of it.

(1) At the outset we cannot afford to overlook a suggestive fact relative to the origin of the term. There are

¹ Cf. Strong. "Control of Propaganda as a Psychological Problem," *Scientific Monthly*. 14: 234.

two main varieties of *propagational* processes: (a) those which contain their own dynamic and need no help to speak of from outside, examples being the natural growth of living things. In such, the drives are inherent. Then there are (b) those reproductive processes which require *external aid, processes which have to be artificially encouraged, which would not take place of themselves, such as the breeding of certain kinds of plants and animals.*

Now propaganda belongs, interestingly enough, to this latter category in its very derivation. The term is related to the Latin "propagare," meaning "to fasten down layers, shoots or slips of plants for the purpose of reproduction, hence to generate, reproduce, and generally to extend or increase." Etymologically, then, propaganda is not a breeding that would take place of itself; it is a forced generation.

The term apparently was not used in early times but arose within the Catholic Church as the name of an organization, such as all religious bodies have, for the spreading of beliefs and doctrines. Specifically, it was part of the name of a committee of cardinals called the "Congregatio de propaganda fide," founded by Gregory XV in 1622. There was also a propaganda college for the training of priests.² It would seem, then, that propaganda, or correctly speaking, *a* propaganda, means a method of procedure analogous to grafting or breeding, and also the materials used in the processes. These two aspects must be kept in mind as we proceed.

(2) Upon reflection it will be clear that propaganda may be (a) open, frank, direct and honest in its methods and materials as, for example, preaching the Gospel. But in the second place (b) we have an enormous amount of promotional work which cannot be so characterized, promotional work which is covert and indirect in method, biased or dishonest in materials, selfish as to motive and aim.

² *Catholic World*. 76: 5.

And this is the sort of enterprise we usually have in mind these days when we speak of propaganda. Here, as Miss Repplier says, is "a good word gone wrong." Promotional work that was once sincere and disinterested, is still described by a term which has come to mean, also, something very different and very objectionable. It is probable that the war had much to do with investing this honorable word with sinister meanings for, in that terrible struggle, the word found extraordinary currency and—in the bad sense. Propaganda, then, may be open or secret, truthful or lying, honest or misleading, disinterested or selfish.

(3) With these considerations in mind it will be well, before proceeding further, to frame up something of a definition that may serve to catch and convey the meaning of the term as we shall employ it in this chapter. To show the difficulties of grasping this strange and shy thing, however, we may include several statements. Strong says it is the "spread of a particular doctrine or system of principles, especially when there is an organization or general plan back of the movement."³ *The New English Dictionary on Historical Principles* says it is "any association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice." It is clear, however, that this is propaganda of the earlier type. Rather more to the point is Gardiner who characterizes a propaganda as an attempt at "the creation of public opinion by the spreading of misinformation."⁴ Wreford speaks of it as "the dissemination of interested information and opinion."⁵ This writer adds a helpful suggestion by saying that it is the same as putting some medicine in a man's food without his knowledge. The editor of the *Independent* describes it as "news or opinions fed to the press or the public by a machine." President Hopkins of Dartmouth says it is "a fancy name for publicity" and is the "illegiti-

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *The World Tomorrow*, June, 1923.

⁵ "Propaganda," "Evil and Good," *Nineteenth Century*. 93: 514.

mate child of the publicity family, born of education as a Mother and begotten of special interest as a Father.”⁶ Lippmann speaks of it as the effort to alter the pictures to which men respond.⁷

It is no cause for wonder that the various writers do not always agree in their statements, since some are thinking of propaganda before the war and some since. Investigation has not gone very far; the thing itself is so new and so mysterious that it cannot always be classified. It cannot be located within the class “lies” for it is usually not all lies. It cannot be located within the class “truth” for it is never the whole truth, although one of the axioms of Crewe House, the home of British propaganda during the war, was that only truthful statements be made. It is never easy to say whether the objectionable elements are in the motives, the methods, the material or the aims. Sometimes they are in one and sometimes in another, or in all four. A difficulty is encountered by the fact that a very important feature of propaganda is to escape the label “propaganda.”

(4) Without adding another to the brief definitions given, we may help furnish the concept by distinguishing between propaganda and education, and propaganda and advertising. In education, the aim is usually to provoke thought and encourage the faithful examination of facts, as many as possible. The method is such that it may be scrutinized at any time. Criticism is usually acceptable. There is no desire to hide sources, restrict facts, work under cover. Propaganda works from secret places by devious methods and aims to bias.⁸

“The object of propaganda,” says Mitchell, “is to promote the interests of those who contrive it, rather than to benefit those to whom it is addressed; in advertisement to

⁶ *The Nation's Business*, Jan., 1923.

⁷ *Public Opinion*. 26.

⁸ Brown. “Propaganda and Education,” *The Review*. 2: 342.

sell an article; in publicity to state a case; in politics to forward a policy; in war to bring victory. This differentiates it from the diffusion of useful knowledge; the evangel of a mission; publication of the cure for a disease. In such objectives there may be a secondary advantage to the contriver, but to benefit the subjects of the effort is the leading motive. Similarly those engaged in propaganda may generally believe that success will be an advantage to those whom they address, but the stimulus to their action is their own cause. The differentia of a propaganda is that it is self-seeking, whether the object be worthy or unworthy, intrinsically, or in the minds of its promoters.”⁹

Probably a sample will be a valuable aid at this point. Some months after the war much was said in the press and elsewhere in favor of returning the bodies of American soldiers from France. The matter having been mentioned and all favorable arguments presented, and no criticism arising because a sentiment was involved, it was quite generally agreed that we ought to have our heroic sons sleeping in native, not foreign, soil. Much was written and much more was said. Steps were taken to find the necessary money and the campaign was on. All went well until someone discovered that this “campaign” was largely organized and fostered by the undertakers and casket-makers. Then it seemed clear to many that the campaign was a bubble blown about by the propagandists.¹⁰ An analysis of this example will disclose the characteristics mentioned above in the definitions.

(5) There is no doubt that propaganda was made into a fine art during the war; but it was not invented then; it is a very old device. There was propaganda in the sense of campaigning, misrepresentation, appeal to the emotions and prejudices, the dissemination of interested conclusions,

⁹ Ency. Brit. 32: 1922.

¹⁰ Strong *Op. cit.* 242. Cf. Park and Burgess. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology.* 838.

behind the movements of primitive peoples. It has been associated with war from the earliest times. The French Revolution was a triumph of propaganda, and there has been propaganda ever since to blind us to the fact.¹¹ "False as a bulletin" became a proverb in Napoleon's time, for he found that it was necessary to deceive men in order to keep up morale. He had his "Official Press, his Proclamations, his Bulletins, his Memoirs, his Monuments; all propaganda on a monumental scale."¹² Perhaps the history of the evolution of propaganda may be summed up in three words—propagation, proselytization and hoodwinking or taking captive unawares.

(6) Much more space than we can spare would be required to illustrate adequately the *extent* of propaganda during and after the war. We can introduce only one example, but this may be taken as typical.

The French were very anxious to link up American public opinion with their own doings. How did they proceed? Says Andre Tardieu: "How often have Americans expressed to me the hope that France would be content with an independent and neutral Alsace-Lorraine. How many expressed surprise when, to the statement of our rights, I added that their obvious justice made a plebiscite useless and unacceptable. A few months later their state of opinion was entirely changed. I venture to believe that the activities of my co-workers and myself, the fifteen thousand lecturers in English where young officers, with all the authority of their war record and their wounds, presented the pitiful situation of the captive provinces, had something to do with the transformation. Thousands of huge posters reproducing Henner's 'Alsacienne' with the text of the Bordeaux protest referred to above, had carried the meaning and the scope of our claim to every state in the Union. Support came from all sides. The battle was won."¹³

¹¹ Colvin. "The Gentle Art of Propaganda," *Living Age*. 317: 149.

¹² Cuérard. *Reflections on the Napoleonic Legend*. 23.

¹³ Quoted from *The Truth about the Treaty*.

While the French were doing all this, what were the English doing? Sir Gilbert Parker tells us in *Harper's Magazine* for March, 1918. They only "had ten thousand propagandists in America." What were the American leaders doing to the American people? A study of the work of Mr. George Creel's organization will show that they had a good many thousand propagandists in America.¹⁴ What the Germans were doing to haul America over to their side, and all others interested, we may know from other sources. Add to all this the work of each government with its own people, and the grand total would be stupendous. Then add all the peace-time propaganda of all the selfish organizations of all the countries, and we would have a promotional movement that goes quite beyond the capacity of the most imaginative.

(7) The sources of propaganda are not readily discovered for, as has already been pointed out, it is a feature of propaganda to escape the label. In many cases the name of some organization is attached to leaflets, press notices and letters, but the reader is not always thereby informed as to what such organizations stand for or whom they represent. Form letters and telegrams are sometimes sent from different parts of the country to congressmen, but emanate from some central and unknown place.¹⁵ Foreign news agencies have been known to telegraph all over the world *official* news as *independent* news.¹⁶ Norwegian newspapers recently revealed to an astonished world that the Foreign Office was sending out propaganda in the guise of independent news.¹⁷

In general it may be asserted that propaganda is almost sure to issue from any aggressive group seeking to have its way with the people. And we have this type of influ-

¹⁴ Lippmann. *Public Opinion*. 46.

¹⁵ *Printer's Ink*, Jan. 17, 1924. 111.

¹⁶ Bailey. "British Newspapers and Foreign Propaganda," *Living Age*. 311: 548.

¹⁷ Bailey. *Op. cit.*

ence, in varying degrees of wickedness, from parties out of power and parties in power, from special government bureaus desiring increased appropriations, from the army and navy departments, from political minorities, from blocs and cliques, from denominations and religious factions, from powerful business interests, from every sort of organized "ism," and from private individuals who have been maligned or wish to malign somebody. It would not be fair to call everything sent out by such groups insidious; but it is mostly badly biased, almost unconsciously selected as to facts, and hence wholly deceptive. The more innocent the newspaper article, the more convincing the pamphlet, the more urgent the magazine plea, the simpler the tales wafted on the wings of gossip, the neater and more effectual is the method *when* such missionaries happen to be propaganda. Recently there came from the government printing office, mailed under the franking privilege, a touching defense of the United States Steel Corporation, said enterprise being characterized as a "corporation with a soul."

2. THE MEDIA

It is an old and familiar saying that, "Nature abhors a vacuum." Almost as true is it that the propagandists abhor unused channels of communication with the people. We have now come to recognize that wherever there is any sort of connection between individuals, any communication line, there the propagandists flock to pour in their poison. We have space, however, to list but a few of these *means of access*.

(1) Fairy Tales. In the light of late events, it has become very clear that fairy tales have always been and are now used as a means of access by the propagandists. Says a recent writer: "Not without reason either did the men who set about divorcing Ireland from England—in spite

of all the Englishmen that are Irish—not without reason did these fiery patriots begin with Irish fairy tales. They revived Cuchulinin and mobilized about the legendary kings of old Ireland the grand army of the Irish ‘Little People’ and the legions of the leprechauns to make more hateful still always perfidious Albion. . . . Certain writers are alleged to have made themselves fairy-tale tellers to the Irish people, though they were mostly ignorant of the Irish tongue of those fairies and though so many of the Irish they worked upon had forgot to believe in Irish fairies—and consequently Ireland.”

And so it has been in many countries, for when the fairy tales fall into contempt or neglect, the nation’s self-consciousness is clouded, and the country is ripe for disturbances of any sort. More than once it has been hinted that Soviet Russia has proscribed fairy tales as subversive of the new order. Children’s stories like those of Uncle Hansi were a thorn in the flesh of the Germans as long as they held Alsace.¹⁸

The point is that children and ungrown adults always gladly receive such tales and take delight in them. They are a ready channel of access to the most impressionable and plastic elements in the population, where impressions remain as inexpugnable stereotypes. Also, it is most easy for artists to touch them up in ways and with materials significant for the causes they advocate. Thus, tales of origin help to explain the apparently fundamental and inextinguishable differences between peoples and promote the feeling of race superiority. Examples are the tales of the ancient Hebrews, of Romulus and Remus, of the Athenian statesmen, and of Pocahontas.

(2) History. Children and unfinished adults are easily reachable by way of historical studies and the propagandist manipulation of this medium is no difficult task; the dif-

¹⁸ Brook. “The Great Fairy Tale Propaganda,” *New York Times Magazine*, March 23, 1924.

ficult task is *not* to manipulate it. Several facts contribute to the serviceability of history in this direction. The first is that, for a long time, the writing and reading of history have been approved methods of linking the otherwise unknown past with the present. The second is that the study of history is always a requirement in school curricula. The third is that many people have developed a taste for historical studies. The fourth is that there has long existed a widespread reverence for whatever appeared in print. Finally, the achievement of satisfactory scientific objectivity in historical research and writing has been very rare, and hence most of the history has been consciously or unconsciously biased, colored, slanted.

Some of the causes of perversion, says Hearnshaw, are: unconscious prejudice such as is exhibited by Herodotus, —not to risk criticism of moderns; conscious bias as, for example, Thucydides; protagonist zeal as in the case of Orosius whose seven books of history were written against the old religions, not to find the truth but to defend it. Of course these evils are not unknown in modern times. In France the writers and teachers of history have been compelled to preach Republicanism; in Germany, Monarchism and Militarism; in Hungary, Nationalism; in Russia, Sovietism; in America, Democracy. It would be burdensome to include available examples.¹⁹

Says de Pierrefeu, lieutenant of reserves in the French army during the war, and attached to General Headquarters where he wrote the official *communiqués* and was responsible for the dispatches given out to the press: "Belligerents in the Great War did not ask their propagandists disguised as historians to be either loyal or truthful; they asked the direct contrary."²⁰

(3) The Press. Almost everybody in civilized countries

¹⁹ Cf. Taft. "Propaganda in History Texts," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*. 1925.

²⁰ *The Nation*. 118; 28 ff. Cf. Beard. "Propaganda in Schools," *Dial*. 68: 598.

reads a newspaper—one newspaper, for the most part. This is another ready means of access to the popular mind. Moreover, the newspaper, like histories, is printed and its contents come with whatever authority the printed word still possesses. More than this, most newspapers take sides on popular issues. Therefore *one* newspaper on *one* side of public questions is an excellent arrangement from the standpoint of the propagandists.

It is generally believed, but to what extent it is true it is hard to say, that most editors can be inclined one way or another by powerful influences—the advertisers, for example. But *editorials* do not do the damage. Propaganda makes its appearance in the papers, not so much in the editorials as in the *news* columns. What appears then depends upon the reporters and we are thus back on the ground taken in discussing history, for reporters are contemporary historians. With this difference; reporters are not, as a rule, as careful nor as skilled in the arts of research, nor do they have the same leisure to weigh the facts. This hurry is one limitation of which propagandists take full advantage.

Moreover space is limited so that a complete, well-rounded, artistic and finished account of an event is quite impossible. But more, the newspaper is a NEWS paper; it is for the very latest, the newest, the unusual, the spectacular, the thrilling, with the old, the common, the solid and reliable left out or kept in the background.²¹

In addition, the papers print what is handed to them by officials of all sorts and they say what they wish to say. Further, the news agencies of today are so interlocked that few men, reading a single item, could discover its origin or its purpose. Again, ever greater significance attaches to the news pages as against the editorials, and this makes the work of the propagandists much easier.

²¹ Cf. Lloyd. "Newspaper Conscience—A Study in Half-truths," *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1921.

(4) *Literary Forms.* Numbers of people are primarily caught by the *form* of the presentation rather than by the substance. They do not and will not connect up with hard facts unless these facts are disguised, sugar-coated. Such persons are captured and held by means of cleverness of statement, smoothness of diction, sleep-inducing sonorousness, dazzling ornamentation and other æsthetic features. They will read a story if it "moves," a poem if it "inspires," a play if it has a plot in it. Thus manner takes precedence over matter.

Now the propagandists know this very well and have not been neglectful of this means of access. They know, of course, that while the "form's the thing," certain morsels of the substance are taken in as well. We have already noticed this same point in discussing fairy tales. The reader should not fail to note that much poetry, drama, fiction, and other expression, becomes a medium. Because of the obscurity of human motives, it is not easy to be sure of one's ground, therefore no examples will be given.

(5) *Pictures.* The following conditions favor the free use of pictures by the propagandists. First of all, every whole-eyed person is interested in them. Second, the eye-appeal makes the deepest and most lasting impression. Third, pictures like literary forms are instantly attractive by reason of certain æsthetic qualities. Fourth, the picture is incontrovertibly self-evident; you cannot argue with it and, once having seen it, you cannot easily forget it; the only way to escape its pressure is not to see it at all. Fifth, the color effects make for idealization, that is, distortion; but this is not repugnant; it is rather more important. Such advantages are not slow to be improved by the propagandists.

Where pictures are used to direct attention to and re-enforce a text, the impact is stronger. Examples are the war-posters put forth in such profusion, and the plates in history and other textbooks.

Because the "movies" are usually set-ups for the purpose and the occasion, they may be made to tell any story or convey any impression that the authors desire. They are more effective than still pictures because they add *action*, richly variegated movement, to color and design. A still picture is but the representation of one instant in the movement. What went before and what followed that particular instant, is left to the imagination; the viewer must carry out in his own mind the logic of events. The movies save the viewer this effort. They carry out the logic of events to any desired conclusions, no consequences seeming too absurd to create an amount of conviction.²²

There is no absolute proof, but it seems undeniable that films are regularly produced and spread over the land for purposes of public solicitation. Those strips showing the army and the navy in action are not put forth merely for entertainment. Some have thought that a production entitled "The Pride of Palomar," idealized force and was calculated to stir up anti-Japanese feeling. In 1920 some German films were sold to United States distributors. One dealt with the incontinence of Louis XV, and another with the matrimonial tangles of Henry VIII. It would not be strange if these were Teutonic propaganda.²³

The cartoon is quite evidently propagandistic and hence we need not wait for examples. A statistical table is not exactly a picture, but it tends to have a similar force in the average mind. One looks over a table of figures and assumes that they are always accurately derived and computed. The total effect is one of infallibility, for the viewer is rarely able to contradict and show that figures sometimes lie. Reports of government bureaus, industrial corporations, philanthropic organizations, church agencies, and the like are continually guilty of gathering and comput-

²² Ramsaye. "The Romantic History of the Motion Picture," *Photoplay*, Aug., 1924. 118.

²³ Cf. Repplier. "Good Word Gone Wrong," *Independent*. 107: 5.

ing statistics, not to tell the whole truth, but for the purpose of winning public support.

(6) Stunts. Closely related to the "drive," which we might have paused to examine for a moment, is another means of access to the popular mind—the stunt. No definition being available, we shall have to be content with an illustration.

In May, 1923, the Western world was shocked by the news of a daring train hold-up in China. It appeared that a large band of Chinese brigands had derailed the "Blue Express" between Shanghai and Peking, and had carried off over a score of prominent Americans and Europeans to hold for ransom.

A few days later the American and British Chambers of Commerce in Shanghai joined in petitioning the American Department of State and the British Foreign Office to *intervene in force* and rescue the captured nationals.

The explanation of this outrage circulating through gossip was to the effect that the bandits were but representative of large and uncontrollable elements in China, and that the Central Government was powerless in the extremity, foreign intervention being, therefore, absolutely necessary. This argument seemed very plausible.

Some fairly reliable investigators learned, however, that the affair had been fully organized by an eminent *Chinaman* on behalf of the *Japanese*. But how could this be?

The answer given by one student is that of late Japan has been the center of a remarkable development of liberalism in the industrial areas. A comparatively moderate outbreak in the winter of 1922 and a promised greater demonstration for the following November, so disturbed the Japanese authorities that they sought out and found a device for diverting popular attention. The plan was to create this crisis in China and then offer assistance to American and British troops on the pretense that they were near at hand. This would give "external exercise" to

counteract and cure the "internal indigestion," and Japan would not appear as responsible for it all. It was a clever stunt, but the American and British governments refused to bite. The great earthquake and flood of September 1923 produced "internal indigestion" of another sort and gave the necessary diversion.²⁴

The newspapers have often played up the activities of gunmen in the midst of strife between corporations and their employees. It has been said that these gunmen were the agents of coal and steel companies and were sent out to "start something." Thus the cause of the workmen was discredited before the public.

When Roosevelt took the Panama region, the opposition press of the country set up a terrific howl. To divert popular attention, Roosevelt turned to the dead wood in the army and ordered all desk soldiers in Washington to walk so many miles, ride so many and run so many, every week. Soon the streets and the parks of the national capital were so full of apoplectic officers doing their daily stint that the whole country was set laughing and the Panama incident was forgotten. Such diversion of attention is a form of propaganda.

Many additional examples might be assembled but these show clearly what we have in mind. They show us that stunts are specially arranged events, contacts or crises, sharp attention-getters and awakeners, for the purpose of directing popular attention away from real and fundamental issues. The weakness of the people for the circus, for spectacles, for displays, for mock heroics and the like, provides an attractive opening for the selfish promoters.

(7) Memorial Demonstrations. Much less than stunts, perhaps, the creation of dark designers, but profoundly affecting, are the various memorial demonstrations so much cherished and carefully preserved by the professional patriots. The French people mourned at the Strasburg

²⁴ Gardiner. "Realities in the Far East," *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1924.

statue in Paris each year for the purpose of keeping alive and virile the determination to retake Alsace-Lorraine. On the surface it all seemed very good and very desirable. But here we have the most subtle and long-range propaganda, for the children were the principal dupes. They could not look forward to the horrors in which they would participate on the great day of recovery.

The sinister aspect of these demonstrations is that they mean one thing to the hosts of simple-minded and trusting participants and something quite different to the promoters; hence the propaganda. A long-standing memorial celebration may have new elements gradually injected into it, and these will be accepted by the masses uncritically. This method is regularly adopted as the best way to make people patriotic, to make them love their own country by hating others.

It would seem, then, that as long as public leaders encourage mass-movements to erect monuments to war heroes and then perpetually place wreaths upon them; as long as the people are taught to sing war songs and in other ways glorify the struggles between groups of the human species; as long as all this glamour and excitement are attractive to the young, there will be war. For in the process of glorification, while minds are attendant to song, story, gay attire, flower gifts, band music, parades, solemn prayers and the rest, the horrors, the losses, the unspeakable deprivations, the excruciating agonies of the struggles are forgotten. Thus the whole truth is not presented in the celebrations; the picture is false.

(8) The Radio. We have pointed out that the propagandists desire to remain anonymous. We have also to note that the human voice is one of the best promoters. Here is the advantage of the radio. Millions of people are always listening in; they are always ready for an entertaining speaker. Thus it is clear how easy it is to send out anonymous messages from the headquarters of special interests,

to fill the air with arguments against this bit of legislation or in favor of that scheme. The ability to reach so many people at one time by one speaker provides an exceptional advantage. Moreover there is no immediate come-back as is possible in an audience. It is important to notice, however, that very desirable safeguards are continually being thrown about this means of access.

We have now named but a few of the numerous means of communication occupied by the propagandists. It will be obvious to any one that there are many more. We have mentioned school histories; we might have mentioned the whole school system—under certain circumstances. We have mentioned the press; we might have included the whole art of printing. We conclude that actually and potentially, propaganda is everywhere.

3. THE METHOD

A highly important feature of the method is to put propaganda into every available channel of communication. That feature we have just now reviewed. But that, as we saw in the study of advertising, is not enough. There is an art of appeal, a method of attack, a type of impact that causes the message to carry through into the psychic processes of individuals and do its intended work. To this aspect of the movement we now turn.

(1) One feature of the method is to take advantage of the long-established authority of print and picture. This point, from the mechanical side, has already been in our minds. It is only necessary to say in addition that one cannot reason with a news paragraph or a picture as with a person. They stand there as solid, immutable realities, unaffected by one's fuming or fright. The noted reporter, Will Irwin, heads an article on propaganda thus: "If you see it in the papers it's —." ²⁵

²⁵ *Collier's Weekly*, Aug. 18, 1923.

(2) A favorite type of approach is by an appeal to the prejudices, sentiments and illusions of the people.

(a) Most people are governed to some extent by prejudices or prejudgments which have an emotional rather than an intellectual basis. They do not always know how they came to reach such conclusions as they have about race-superiority, national greatness, creedal infallibility and many other matters. These are "sets" or stereotypes which have, for the owners, a certain finality.

Now the propagandists find all these prejudices just so many handles by which they can manipulate the owners in almost any way desired. The English authorities made an appeal to the German *workers* during the war by sending over a statement of the British Labor Party war aims. The senders did not at all believe in these aims, but used them to help weaken Germany.²⁶ The most innocent headline or news items is enough often to drain off this emotion as the propagandists wish, in favor of more immigrants or against armaments or any other way.

(b) A sentiment is an idea with an emotional setting, and this emotion is always on tap. A casual remark about Mother, Home or Country often transforms indifference into generous support of some movement or bitter opposition to it—as the propagandists desire. We cannot endure being accused of disloyalty to the party. We immediately set out to demonstrate that loyalty. The propagandists know us well enough to be sure that we shall respond in this manner. This fondling of tenderness to church, party and program is one of the fine arts of the promoters.

(c) George Bernard Shaw came close to the truth when he said that the art of government is the organization of idolatry. By this he meant that the art of government involves a skillful use of illusion, for idols are always imagined to be more than wood and stone; they are supposed to contain "powers." Most of us can see what is steadily

²⁶ Stuart. *The Secrets of Crewe House*. 89.

and repeatedly pointed out to us whether it is there or not—German perfidy, capitalist treachery, labor selfishness, Catholic domination, French militarism, and all the rest. The War Department can prove to us at any time that the Japanese are preparing to take the Philippines. Professor Ross' notable chapter on this subject deals with the illusions of pseudo-consequences, social solidarity, asceticism and moral philosophy. Here coil after coil of exaggeration, imagination and ungovernable fancy are thrown about the victim, man working as does the spider.²⁷

(3) Good propagandists are skillful selectors of the facts to be presented. All students and some ordinary folks are acquainted with the difficulties of getting all of the facts in a given case, say a women's altercation. What is easier or more natural, then, than to take what is readily available, and what seems to accord with one's own conception of what ought to be—and run along? If one is defending militarism, what is easier and more natural than to present those items which support this view, and neglect conflicting ideas? If well dosed with prejudices, there is little taste for contrary evidence.

During the war we were told what the officials wished us to know. We were told what we *wanted* to know. We were told of the glorious victories of the Allies. We were always told of these—in glowing terms. We heard little of our defeats. Labor leaders always tell their hearers of the brutalities of the capitalist system, never much of its good features. So this selection goes on day in and day out—with the propagandists. An enormous amount of evidence is available with reference to this point.

(4) In what we have just said, we have come to the problem of censorship. "Without some form of censorship," says Walter Lippmann, "propaganda in the strict sense of the word is impossible. In order to conduct a propaganda there must be some barrier between the public and

²⁷ *Social Control*. 304.

the event. Access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable. For while people who have direct access can misconceive what they see, no one else can decide how they shall misconceive it, unless he can decide where they shall look and at what. The military censorship is the simplest form of this barrier, but by no means the most important, because it is known to exist, and is therefore in a certain measure agreed to or discounted."

"At different times and for different subjects some men impose and other men accept a particular standard of secrecy. The frontier between what is concealed because publication is not, as we say, 'compatible with the public interest' fades gradually into what is concealed because it is believed to be none of the public's business."

Thus the barriers exist. "It is often very illuminating, therefore, to ask yourself how you got at the facts on which you base your opinion. Who actually saw, heard, felt, counted, named the thing, about which you have an opinion? Was it the man who told you, or the man who told him, or someone still further removed? And how much was he permitted to see?"²⁸ That is the main point—How much was he permitted to see?

(5) Of course all that we have been saying is that, consciously or unconsciously, the propagandists *deceive* people; they keep them battling about in a fog of unrealities. We do not know the facts, all of the significant facts, about the recent fire where a number of people were burned, about the police-graft scandal, about the governor's moral scruples, about the president's abilities, about Germany's intentions, and so on. So if people give us certain views about these things from apparently authoritative sources, we have to believe them. We are deceived every day. *Le Courrier de l'Air*, the journal sent out by the Allies to the front lines, carried nothing but what would further the

purposes of its publishers; yet its motto was: "Truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."

Says President Hopkins: "Truth is never discovered by the introduction into reasoning of anything false, or by the acceptance of anything which may be partially error, or by the elimination of any essential verity, but these are constantly utilized devices of propaganda."²⁹

Deception may be concretely presented by reference to the "fake" newspapers and photographs of the warring powers prepared for home consumption. The English prepared information for Germany and put it in books which, by any one but a professional, could not be told from materials printed in the latter country. Most of the news from Poland after the armistice, came from hostile capitals and much of it "was pure malicious invention," says a *New York Times* editor.³⁰

We might write at great length of propaganda by (6) offering opinions as facts, (7) exaggeration, (8) repetition, (9) versatility, (10) pathos, and many others. The subtler arts of the propagandists are numerous and complicated. But our space forbids.

4. RESULTS

We now take up for the most superficial review, the question of what propaganda accomplishes. Is it effective? Since the war, most people would give an unqualified affirmative answer to this question. But what is the evidence? How can we know? After many years of research we shall probably be in a better position to make an appraisal. The following suggestions are merely tentative conclusions from what evidence we now seem to have. Since we have described this symbol-device in terms of attitudes and activities, we may give some indications of the results in the same language.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*

³⁰ April 23, 1923.

(1) Attitudes. (a) Confusion. On most important public questions so many half-truths and falsehoods are afloat that the people are confused; they do not know what to accept and what to reject; and they have no way of finding out what the truth is. The present writer would give a good deal to be able to make up something like a scientific judgment upon the Russian experiment, but he cannot get at the facts. The same is true with the capital-labor controversy, taxation issues, philanthropy, capital punishment, the extent of bootlegging, the depravity of sex literature, and many other problems. He remains in a daze, half stunned. And he finds many like himself.

(b) Suspicion. A very natural result of this uncertainty, as to the facts and the reliability of authorities, is a growing suspicion of persons and reports. A recent writer is not wide of the mark when he says: "Since the purpose of propaganda is to present one side of a case, it is from its very inception a distortion of the facts and an avoidance of the whole truth.—Truth lies at the bottom of a well and we are poisoning the wells."³¹

The French situation, at one time, provides a handy illustration. General Nivelle reported to the government that the disaster of Verdun was a great success. Everybody lied so much and so consistently about the affair that when the truth was finally told, it was not believed for it was too tame, too far short of expectations.

(c) Indifference. When there is this constant overstimulation by means of unblinking falsehood and unguarded exaggeration, there comes a time when reaction sets in, when people begin to say: "When they are all so biased, so uninformed, such liars, what difference does it make? Why bother? Nobody knows what he is talking about." In such a frame of mind, the people give up search, hope and discrimination. They class the true

³¹ *Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 24, 1920.

prophet with the false scientist and make a bad mess infinitely worse.

(d) *Passion.* But while many are affected in the ways indicated, others are warmed up, inflamed, overwrought, and gathered on the tides of the most violent loves and hates. We shall not soon forget how the propagandists made us hate the Germans and the Russians, how they made us love the French and unctuously assure them, "Lafayette, we are here." These manipulators of our feelings make us abominate the Jews, the Catholics, the Fundamentalists; they make us detest Modernism, "uplift" and Bolshevism.

(e) *Belief.* A recent writer says there is hardly a German to be found today who believes that his people were beaten in the war. On the contrary, very few Americans, English or French have any doubts about the wonderful victory. The insiders know the truth; but the people are at the mercy of the propagandists; they believe what it suits them to believe out of what they hear, and the propagandists determine, by previous preparation, what the people shall see and hear.

(2) *Activities.* In studying the modifications of conduct produced by propaganda, we shall depart from the systematic arrangement of the previous pages and offer some unconnected details which will suggest certain conclusions to the student. We offer the following from what we take to be fairly well authenticated sources, but of course any one is free to challenge them and exclude according to desire or better knowledge.

(a) Mr. Will Irwin, the newspaper correspondent already referred to, assures us that the German propaganda in Holland and Denmark neutralized the blockade on imports placed by the British. But whatever the cause—and this explanation seems not unreasonable—we know from British sources that the blockade *was* ineffective, and that the war was prolonged some two years as a consequence.

(b) During the six months, June to October, 1918, the Allies dropped over eighteen million leaflets behind the German lines. What did this undertaking accomplish? Hindenburg admits that it intensified the demoralization of the German army. One of the returned German officers wrote to a newspaper as follows: "If the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard with paper only in the future."³² This fear of defeat manifested itself in the press. *Kölnische Zeitung*, October 31st, 1918, said: "What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the enemy."

(c) The aim of the Allied propaganda was to detach the Austro-Hungarians from the Germans. The great success attending the efforts in this direction is fairly well attested. The paper war helped to weaken the Austro-German offensive against Italy in 1918. It made distressing unrest a reality all through the armies.³³

(d) Mr. Irwin believes that propaganda persuaded the Germans to stand out firmly against the reparations payments. Hugo Stinnes, the great German magnate, bought forty newspapers throughout the country and soon had the people "surrounded" with ever-jealous enemies, soon had them believing that the ever-victorious army was just retreating to a new position when the armistice was declared, soon had them believing that the perfidious French were at the bottom of it all. Whereupon France entered the Ruhr. "Printer's Ink did it."³⁴

Every thoughtful person is quite well satisfied, however, that propaganda was effectual during the war. What about peace times? Does it work then? Are people manœuvred into all sorts of positions and pushed around into smooth highways already made for their feet?

(e) Every spring, according to *Northern* reports, the

³² Stuart. *Op cit.*

³³ Stuart. *Op. cit.* 40, 43, 48-9.

³⁴ *Collier's Weekly*, Aug. 25, 1923.

Georgia and Delaware peach crops are seriously threatened or badly damaged by the frosts. Then the prices of peaches begin to mount because most lovers of peaches wishing to lay in supplies, rush out to buy. In some instances these reports may be true, but in many cases they are lies put out from unknown sources.

(f) The corn crop of Kansas is killed almost every year, according to supposedly authentic information sent out from some undiscoverable center. It has been maliciously suggested that possibly this killing is mostly done in the Chicago Board of Trade. At any rate, the prices go up. And so is it with coal, wheat, melons and other common commodities. A little lying has a marvellous effect upon a buying public.

But it is needless further to multiply examples. The propagandists want certain people to behave in certain ways; and they know how to gain their end. They get what they want if they are skillful and keep up the pressure.

We have now tried to compress into a few pages what could be said adequately only in books. And whereas this is a subject that very easily "gets one going"—if we may be permitted this rather common phrase—we have erred on the side of moderation of statement and illustration. Most readers would expect something more intemperate, more striking, more flamboyant. But where human motives are so inscrutable, where sources of propaganda are so obscure, where it is so difficult, if it is not often impossible, to identify the thing, we think it is wisdom to write temperately. Later and more thorough investigation will surely reveal an influence much more insidious.

What of the future? Some think there is a better day at hand. Propaganda, it has been asserted, has been found out; the people are now suspicious and unreachable. On the other hand, there are those who cannot command language to sufficiently condemn it. President Hopkins of Dartmouth believes "it is the most insidious influence in

the world's affairs at the present time, disturbing to business, dangerous to international relations, and hostile to all that makes for righteousness." ³⁵ This view is indirectly supported by Professor John Dewey who urges that the colleges and universities are remiss in not training students to recognize propaganda and to resist or reject it. ³⁶

We would strongly endorse this view. We must look forward, therefore, to a training that will give our citizenry adequate protection. For the future, relative to the general enlightenment, we must work toward a complete coincidence of news and truth or fact in the streams of information, toward the broadcasting of the mature judgments of experts who have canvassed the facts, toward honest, adequate and universal discussion of such judgments, and toward discussion of all of the implications of the facts. In an environment of this sort, the propagandists cannot thrive. ³⁷

³⁵ *The Nation's Business*, Jan., 1923.

³⁶ *New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1922.

³⁷ Cf. Brown. "Propaganda and Education," *The Review*. 2:342.

Note. In making comments upon this chapter, Professor Ross very pertinently says: "You overlook the big point that the drive today against liberty of utterance is directed against *puncturers of propaganda*. The dominant classes do not bother about the views of the common man; nor do they worry when a man in an important position—a pulpit, a sanctum or a university chair—leans toward socialism. What enrages them,—and I know from personal experience—is the man who goes about effectively puncturing their vast propaganda for more battleships or the open shop or lower wages or free immigration or 'business as usual' or the efficacy of advertising or the infallibility of business men, etc., or *against* the excess profits tax or the child labor amendment or the shorter working day or labor unions or freedom of teaching for High School teachers or the Non-Partisan League or public ownership or uplift work, etc."

CHAPTER IX

GOSSIP

AN old Scandinavian fable pictures the world as struggling helplessly within the slimy coils of a gigantic sea-serpent called Midyard. The social world is within the grip of no fabulous sea-monster, but it is entangled and worried by a serpentine species comprising forms running all the way from the elusive wrigglers of private life to the hydra-headed monster that throws coil after coil about nations and organizations of nations. This species is a type of communication; it is gossip.

In a quiet English village recently a young woman took her life. Investigation disclosed the fact that she had been guilty of no crime and had led, in truth, an exemplary life. But some pestilential tales, disseminated by a few garrulous old women, had gathered formidable accretions as they circulated. The young woman's good name was stolen from her and impassable barriers of suspicion were erected in all her paths. There seemed no way of relief from this entanglement except by flight or death; she chose the latter.

The coroner's jury examined the tragic circumstances and brought in the verdict: "Killed by idle gossip." This so touched the sympathies of some citizens that "an anti-gossip crusade" was organized.¹ The reporter of this incident goes on to make the assertion that "idle gossip does more harm than anything else in the world." While this is certainly an unwarranted exaggeration, there can be no doubt that gossip has an enormous influence upon our every-

¹ *Literary Digest*. 55:192. The Kentucky legislature passed an anti-gossip law in 1925.

day contacts. It is quite probable that this sad affair is but typical of many that might be charged to "idle gossip."

Up to date this device has won the attention and scrutiny of literary artists, historians and psychologists alone. But there is a vast amount of material for sociological analysis. The present chapter represents a brief study from that point of view.

1. DEFINITION

But what is this all-embracing reality called gossip? Originally the gossip was the "God-sib," that is, the person spiritually related to any one by reason of acting as sponsor at baptism.² A modified and later meaning was that of any close friend or intimate, sometimes called "my gossip." But finally the term was applied to any individual who perambulated from person to person peddling local news. Here we have a rough sketch of a *functionary*. But there gradually emerged for consideration and naming the *stock-in-trade* of the functionary and this was also called gossip. It will be worth our while to examine these two aspects of the subject.

(1) Taking up the wares or tools of the gossip first, it will be illuminating to pass in review some of the uses of the term. In the phrase, "Gossip of an Old Bookworm,"³ the symbol is employed to represent the amenities of rare book-hunting. In addition many writers have adopted the word as a suitable caption for entertaining accounts of the abilities, sayings, antipathies, eccentricities and friends of the world's notables.⁴

In 1888 the girls of North Hall, Newnham, debated the question whether life without gossip would be worth living. The vote was unanimously negative, and Miss Gladstone, the principal, defended this most just decision. However,

² For a different view see Tinsley. 11: 103.

³ *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1881; Dec., 1881.

⁴ *Cornhill*. 35: 325; 36: 185. *Spectator*. 69: 421.

she understood gossip to mean ready, informed and piquant conversation, studded with sparkling allusions to significant historical personages, a conversation that awakened an enthusiasm for humanity and gave an insight into character, a stimulating "coffee of the mind." "Foul whispering," a vulgar and shamelessly undressed tattling, was furthest from her thought.

Robert Louis Stevenson, famed for his precise use of words, employed the term to connote a critical essay, the particular example being "A Gossip on Romance."⁵ But this level is probably as noble a height as the term has ever attained in its evolution, towards the artistic and the respectable.⁶ It is worth noting also that there is a magazine published called "Science Gossip."

Looking towards the lowlands we find a far more frequent application. Illustrating an amiable spirit but a narrow and largely localized subject matter, Seumas McManus writes of the neighborhood prattle of women in "The Gossips of Killymard."⁷ The male counterpart of this type is pictured in "The Gossips of the Switch-shanty" by Hine.⁸ In both cases the spirit is non-malignant and the materials consist of neat stories of familiar individuals, incidents of the daily routine, thumb-nail sketches, illustrations of mirth-provoking attitudes, situations and mishaps. The leaning is towards the commonplace and the vulgar.

The opening story has already introduced us to a type of gossip which is prevalent, gross and vicious, and which may fall on a community like a plague. The great psychologist, Professor Jung, analyzed, for another purpose, a near-tragedy that further impresses the point. A girl of thirteen went to school one morning and related a *dream* to some of her "gossips." This dream centered upon im-

⁵ *Essays*. 220.

⁶ *New England Magazine*, O. S. 6:459. *St. James*. 1:114 ff. Tinsley. 11:103.

⁷ *Century Magazine*. 36:245.

⁸ *Century Magazine*. 40:685.

proper relations with her male teacher. The "gossips" rolled their tongues about this choice morsel and then hastened to spew it forth in all directions, omitting the apparently slight matter that it was only a dream. The story penetrated the whole neighborhood like a powerful stench and brought such recoil on the teacher that his position, professional and social, was menaced. It took much patient analysis and prolonged explaining to correct the situation and restore the innocent teacher to his rightful place.⁹

These examples show us how gossip has been understood, give a hint of its technique and prepare the way for a more concise statement. Professor Cooley tells us that the nature of gossip may be revealed by "noting three traits which together seem to make a fair definition of that word. It is copious, designed to occupy, without exerting, the mind. It consists mostly in personalities and appeals to superficial emotion. It is untrustworthy—except upon a few matters of moment which the public are likely to follow up and verify."¹⁰ No doubt gossip is copious, superficial and untrustworthy. But so are some sermons, lectures, discussions and books. These features hardly set gossip apart. Additional identifying marks might be found in its prevailing informal, face-to-face method of circulation, its near-secret or at least restricted subject-matter, its growth in geometrical progression, its hidden origins, its atmospheric omnipresence.

Our common experiences—and most of us have been gossips or the subject matter of gossip—together with the historical allusions and the features just noted, support the proposition that gossip is essentially a heterogeneous assortment of local facts and fancies about personal qualities and relations, largely vulgar and often vicious, communicated first of all through primary contacts. It has been otherwise defined as a misty rain of small talk that neither

⁹ Long. *Analytical Psychology*. 176.

¹⁰ *Social Organization*, 84.

teaches nor edifies, or more popularly, as "intellectual chewing-gum."

We all know that it is wholly unsafe to reveal certain private concerns of life to some people, since they would immediately be transmitted—and distorted in the transmission—to produce unfortunate consequences. But we also know that there is danger in concealment, if a part has leaked out, for then bright-eyed fancy plays its most capricious and humiliating tricks. To tell or not to tell! That's the question. For either way, the real world which one knows and in which one is quite at home, dissolves over night; an alien and lonely country opens before one in the morning. That is what happened to the girl in the opening story; that is what happened to the teacher.

It will help if we point out the distinction between *news* and gossip. A man by the name of Smith goes into bankruptcy, says Walter Lippmann. "Smith's friends may have known for years that he was taking risks, rumors may even have reached the financial editor if Smith's friends were talkative. But apart from the fact that none of this could be published because it would be libel, there is in these rumors nothing definite on which to peg a story. Something definite must occur that has unmistakable form.—There must be a manifestation,"¹¹ That is to say, before such information can be printed, it is gossip; and the gossip will not cease with the printing, because there is always much more to the event than can be printed. Thus we have two parallel streams of information running through the channels of communication—the printable and the unprintable. Each may start first and be the basis for the other. The printed is subject to limitations in repetition, the first statement being an undeniable standard; it may go, however, all over the world with the quoting. The unprinted is subject to no limitations in repetition for there is no original and undeniable statement available usually; it spreads,

¹¹ *Public Opinion*. 339.

however, within a narrower circle because the party may not be widely known, or we may say that it spreads in proportion to how well known the person involved is.

While this distinction between news and gossip is real, it is not usually maintained in practice; the terms are often used as synonymous. Much that gets into print is "allegation"; it is not elevated from the lowlands thereby. Says Professor Cooley: "The bulk of its (the newspaper's) matter, however, is best described by the phrase organized gossip. The sort of intercourse that people formerly carried on at the cross-road stores or over the back fence, has now attained the dignity of print and an imposing system. That we absorb a flood of this does not necessarily mean that our minds are degenerate but merely that we are gratifying an old appetite in a new way."¹²

The chief distinction between gossip and propaganda is to be found, perhaps, in the method of promotion. Propaganda, as we have seen, is "forced generation," forced generation backed up by an efficient organization. Gossip is more like natural growth; there is usually no efficient machine behind it; it spreads in a more or less casual and haphazard fashion.

(2) Turning from the stock-in-trade of the gossip, we may make a brief analysis of the trader. In the first place we may notice that the gossip, in many instances, is almost an occupational variety, although there is no official appointment behind him and no salary check ahead of him. In the second place, we cannot ignore the fact that this functionary has acquired a number of picturesque appellations, indicating the specialisms within the class. He or she is otherwise and fittingly named news-monger, scandal-monger, tale-bearer, tattler, blatherskite, gabbler, babbler, chatterer, spendthrift-of-the-tongue and the like.

Classifying roughly and from the psychological stand-

¹² *Social Organization*. 83.

point, Logan finds gossips to be of three kinds, the amiable gossip, the bore and the scandal-monger. The first is simply the communicator who is at fault in mind and not in heart, the one devoid of the slightest harmful intent, who babbles on like the mountain brook as the only known way of being agreeable. The second is that ubiquitous individual who is always found where people congregate and who talks on and on because he has no other occupation, and who likes to hear himself talk. Then there is the vindictive and dangerous tale-bearer who, on hearing any one defamed, runs instantly to that one and to others with the evil tidings, the imagination all the while outrunning the feet.¹³ This is the type described so appropriately by Robert Burns:

“Oh ye wha are sae gude yoursel,
Sae pious and sae holy;
Ye’ve naught to do but mark and tell
Your neebor’s faults and folly.”

Logan endeavors to show that the gossip is akin to the genius, in that both think by what is known technically as “total recall.” It is admitted, however, that what the genius “totally recalls” is usually of greater value to the world.

2. TECHNIQUE

The technique of the professional gossip is a highly interesting feature and most important for our discussion. Every functionary has his peculiar technique or method, and this technique is indicative of the function. The surgeon is known by the instruments he uses and the motions he makes. The clergyman is discovered through the sermon, the celebration of the Mass and other appropriate activities. As *men*, the doctor and the clergyman may easily

¹³ *Canadian Magazine*. 31:106

be confused; they can never be mistaken when observed at work.

For purposes of control, the gossip is important only when at work, with the possibility that he represents a potential which people fear. As the minister, the doctor or the lawyer, emerges from the man when occasions arise, so the gossip steps forth upon opportunity. And opportunity seems to consist in the conjuncture of some persons and a bit of a tale. The nature of this tale or information, we have already seen. Wherever people foregather in a leisurely way, in stores, at teas, on the train, at the club, there the gossip appears and the spontaneous generation begins. Thus we have two important features of the technique—leisurely clusterings of human beings and some tales.

A third feature is the group of devices employed in the exchange. There are innumerable subtle modifications and adaptations of the arts of communication which are quite peculiar to the gossips. One observes artifices such as lowering the tone or whispering, talking out of the corner of the mouth in order to prevent "listening in," cocking the eye in a knowing manner, turning the head frequently so as to keep from being surprised by eavesdroppers, leaning up close to the listener, raising the finger in a warning fashion, drawing the listeners aside for greater seclusion, a half-suppressed eagerness, the utterance of only part of the story—the remainder to be inferred, the assumption of an air of superior insidedness, the use of the I-know-but-I-ought n't-to-tell appetizer, and many others.¹⁴

Thus the gossip behaves. Some of these artifices are held in common with other communicators. No gossip uses all of them all the time. But they are, taken as a whole, the materials out of which a picture of this functionary may be constructed. Each gossip makes his own original and distinctive combination.

¹⁴ Cf. *McClure's Magazine*. 45: 34.

3. AREAS

(1) The areas of influence and operation are worthy of careful consideration. Essentially gossip is a function of primary relationships; the local community where everybody knows everybody else, is its native habitat. If there are few distractions from the outside, gossip is almost the chief substance of social relationships. Without this stuff, the community would almost fall to pieces.

With the marvelous extension of the means of communication, however, this service—or disservice—has extended far beyond the local boundaries and has reached the ends of the earth. The flood of talk occasioned by the elopement of the village clergyman's daughter is now made insignificant of the wide-sweeping tide heaved up from an opera-singer's pranks or a diplomat's folly. The unedifying stories concerning our presidents and foreign potentates are ready examples of the large areas now covered by gossip.

Gossip extends its sway through the mail service, the telegraph, the telephones, travel, and the press as we have seen. There are severe limitations upon the press and the radio. Travel, either for business or pleasure, multiplies face-to-face contacts and widens the area for the spread of tales. The commercial traveller may be likened to the honey-bee which goes about seeking the honey but leaves a trail of fertilizing pollen everywhere.

The chief barriers to the spread of gossip are the cost of sending the messages, such as would attach to long-distance telephoning and telegraphing. Governments and large organizations do not find this a barrier, however. In the second place there is the barrier of a strange language. The ordinary person cannot usually overcome this, but of course wealthy organizations may secure translators. A third barrier is lack of interest in the persons involved. There is no lack of interest about *any* person in the local

community; all know his name or know about him and are made alert at the mention of something wrong. Alertness and excitement dwindle, however, as the distance widens and the names become less familiar. Much depends, of course, upon the type of tale. Certain news about insignificant people will travel further than certain other news about significant persons.

The ever-spawning assemblies such as conventions of all the organizations of the country, the pageants, the exhibits and fairs, the athletic meets and the like, help to push out the boundaries and provide channels for the dissemination of tales. Never were there more fertile opportunities for sending tattle around. It is becoming notorious that many attendants upon such gatherings are there for what they call the "inside dope," almost more than for anything else.

"Above all," says Lippmann, "there is the talk of the soldiers, which blows back from the front and is spread about when they are on leave. . . . For weeks prior to the American attack at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne-Meuse, everybody in France told everybody else the deep secret."¹⁵ In "The Growth of a Legend" van Langenhove tells us that the German armies had hardly entered Belgium when strange rumors began to circulate. They had reference to the horrible atrocities which *Belgian* people, instigated by the clergy, committed upon the invaders. They were disseminated with great rapidity among the troops; the *liaison* officers, the dispatch riders, the food convoys, the victualing posts assured their diffusion. "As a silent listener, seated on the boulevards, I have noticed how curious people, men and women, question the wounded who are resting there, suggesting to them answers to inquiries on the subject of battles, the losses, and the atrocities of war; how they interpret silence as an affirmative answer and

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* 43.

how they wish to have confirmed things always more terrible. I am convinced that shortly afterward they will repeat the conversation, adding that they have heard it as the personal experience of somebody present at the affair.”¹⁶ This is one of the best available studies of how war conditions create a readiness, an eagerness, to hear, to exaggerate and to transmit, impossible tales.

Everywhere these accounts were the subjects of ardent comment; in the village streets, in the councils held upon the doorsteps and the public houses, in the trams and in the parks, the matters became the chief topics of conversation. Such stories, like all gossip, never assumed a definite and final form. They always remained malleable stuff on which each narrator worked with something of the artist's skill until they were evolved into something wholly different from the originals.¹⁷

(2) Looking at the question of area from the ethnographical or ethnological point of view, we may note that no race is destitute of gossip. We are familiar with its rapid circulation among the whites. Contact with negroes in this country uncovers abundant evidence of its presence and virility there. Returned missionaries report its existence among the Chinese and the peoples of India. An evangelist among the latter informs the writer that he always urged the native converts, after they had attended worship on Sunday morning, to go out into the fields and take up their usual tasks because he found that otherwise they sat about and were drawn into interminable and blighting gossip.

The Soviet envoy at Peking complained of the treatment accorded him by the press. Commenting on this, Eric von Salzmann, the veteran China correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*, says: “He (the Soviet ambassador) vastly over-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* 5, 215, 224, and many passages.

¹⁷ Cf. Park and Burgess. *Op. cit.* 816 ff.

estimates the China press. Public opinion in this country is made in a different way. It pursues invisible channels peculiar to the Orient, of which most foreigners know nothing. Reports of what the Russian ambassador has said circulate with the speed of the wind from tea-house to tea-house, from mouth to mouth. By highway and byway, by railway and riverboat from the center to the farthest confines of the Empire, people are saying everywhere: 'Liberty is dawning, and this Russian is its herald.' ''¹⁸

(3) It is evident also that no *class* is free from this type of communication. Wealth widens the area of contacts; it does not necessarily refine the mental contents of those who have it. Among the poor, where "the air currents of the world never ventilate the mind," human intercourse would almost cease to exist if gossip were to be proscribed. Here one finds tragic absorption in the insignificant minutiae of the daily grind. There is positively talented recounting of inconsequential—to outsiders—details. There is intellectual incest of the grossest sort. The only antidote is a "thriller" of some sort and this is repeated until threadbare.

The professional classes do not make an exception. Nor is either sex free of trafficking in such debased currency. It is frequently charged that women gossip more than men. There is probably little truth in the charge, although more men are interested in the impersonal than women. Men have, for the most part, more contacts than women, and this would support the belief that men are the worst gossips. Each sex has a cycle of gossip of its own, wheels within wheels.

(4) Employing the term *area* in the sense of subject-matter, it is obvious that while some matters lend them-

selves more readily to this human predilection, there is nothing of human interest that is wholly unavailable. We wish to emphasize the fact, however, that people gossip most freely about *departures from the code*, departures on the side of over-aggression, departures on the side of looseness, relaxation. Slight or great deviations in sex-relations are everlasting themes among us. The sex-code, the religious code, the political code, in short, the ethical standards of the time and place, furnish the norms for comparison. Any variation from these is the stuff of gossip, is occasion for wild rumors. A telling passage from Walpole's story, "The Cathedral," will summarize what we have endeavored to say in this section.

"Where did the whispering start? Who can ever tell? Our Polechester whispering was carried on and fostered very largely by our servants. As in every village and town in Glebeshire, the intermarrying that had been going on for generations was astonishing. Every servant-maid, every errand-boy, every gardener and coachman in Polechester was cousin, brother or sister to every other servant-maid, errand-boy, gardener and coachman. They made, these people, a perfect net about our town.

"The things that they carried from house to house, however, were never the actual things; they were simply the materials from which the actual things were made. Nor was the construction of the actual tale positively malicious; it was only that our eyes were caught by the drama of life and we could not help but exclaim with little gasps and cries at the wonderful excitement of the history that we saw. Our treasure-hunting was simply for the fun of the thrill or the chase, not at all that we wished to harm a soul in the world. If, on occasion, a slight hint of maliciousness did find its place with us, it was only because in this insecure world it is delightful to reaffirm our own security as we watch our neighbors topple over. We do not wish

them to topple, but if somebody has got to fall we would rather that it were not ourselves." ¹⁹

4. MOTIVES

An intensive and prolonged study would be required to uncover and list the motives, reasons or excuses, or whatever they may be called, which are offered as accounts of why people gossip. Do they gossip, as they flatter, solely and expressly to control others? This is the question we are especially interested in.

(1) One motive is the dread and the discomfort of isolation. We are all acquainted with a fundamental disposition to seek companions. But once in their presence, normal human beings do not usually remain inarticulate. If they converse, however, it is on the level of their mental contents. Now if the affairs of the larger world do not ventilate their minds, the only materials of exchange are the babbling of the neighborhood, the chit-chat, especially the startling and shocking variables. Gossip is one way of escaping the depressing tedium of a narrow life. One sees this well portrayed in Sinclair Lewis's "Main Street."

(2) Gossip also is motivated by vanity and self-esteem. There are some persons in every neighborhood who strive by every known means to gain the ascendancy over others. If they possess those undisputed and easily recognizable intellectual, sympathetic or technical qualities which invariably draw forth admiration, they may resort to no inferior means. Lacking these qualifications, however, and yet desiring most earnestly a "place in the sun," they resort to trickery. Most of us know how empty a victory this is but we ever go on winning it.

For example, these persons meet friends or acquaintances and by hinting around or by brazenly open announcement, convey the impression that they are on the *inside* of

¹⁹ Walpole. *The Cathedral*. 159 ff.

something from which the others are generally excluded. They have a "hunch," or they have "heard," or some "inside" person told them that very unusual conditions were prevailing in the bank, down at the barracks, in the parsonage. They may make a feint or two of telling the great secret and then remember a pledge they made to their informant, or think they should not involve anybody, or guess they had better wait a while.

Now all these artful stratagems serve their purpose beautifully; they whet up the appetites of the listeners; they exalt the insider and degrade the outsider; they put the outsider at the mercy of the insider; they fix for a brief time an in-group and an out-group relation. What does all this do but evoke hero-worship, childish stuff to be sure, but yet most gratifying? Talking down the absent, as Professor Hayes observes, is one way of maintaining a position of superiority.²⁰

(3) It is evident, also, that gossip may be a form of personal relief. Some people are so constituted that they cannot or wish not to carry the burden of a dark and awful secret. Yet it is known that people are accidentally put in possession of such dark secrets, and they are so constructed that the whispered infamy must be shared. The "conscience money" sent in for taxes and the payment of back debts, the voluntary confessions of crime and other self-enforced forms of revelation bear witness to the reality of this motive. They suffer when they conceal; they feel happy when they reveal.

(4) Curiosity plays its sly rôle in promoting gossip. There is the never-failing interest in how others get along through life's trials and perplexities. Yet so much of our success is secret. Some there are who *must* know what is going on around them. They may ask directly and thus call forth a flood of information from those who have it to spare. But they may proceed more subtly and volunteer

²⁰ *Sociology and Ethics.* 247.

a little themselves by way of starting things. They may say enough to awaken the memories of the other party and cause him to say: "Oh, that reminds me. Did you hear about Miss So-and-so?"

(5) Then there is always the desire, on the part of some, to maintain social solidarity. It is a familiar fact that many people assume that their particular order was founded and is maintained by supernatural agencies. And to these people, the agencies transmitted the right to keep other people in line. Therefore departures from the established routine are affronts which they cannot ignore because the Powers would hold them accountable.

Let us say that there has been a military reverse, or a calamity of some sort. Evidently, so they reason, somebody has sinned. Who is he and what was done? Gossip buzzes about this until a culprit is found. Even after that new aspects of the situation continually appear and furnish material for endless talk. Thus gossip is essentially a primitive device for protection, a uniting of forces in the midst of calamity, a re-centralization, a method of re-grouping and at the same time of extruding foreign elements. It is known that sheep and cattle huddle together in a storm. Gossip is a human way of huddling together. Of course it might be said that this process is hardly rational and that *fear* is the motive we have in mind.

(6) There is also the vigorous motive of revenge. Some vindictive persons are found in every community; some are sick with jealousy; some have a "root of bitterness," as we shall note later; some have an almost sublime detestation of mock heroics; some have a genuine love for tragedy.²¹

Keeping persons with such attitudes in mind, let us recall the superior-inferior, the "in-out" relations discussed in the chapter on flattery. If flattery is a device used to lift people "up" and "in," gossip is a device to pull the

²¹ Cf. *Living Age*. 267: 694.

high-placed and the respectable down and out. Observe how gossips like to tattle something damaging concerning the bishop, the university president, the society leader. After an encounter with blatherskites, they find themselves well-armed with deadly weapons. These they will not only use themselves but share with others who will use them, knowingly or unknowingly, to cut people's throats.

Thus it happens that many folks yet flee to "cities of refuge," in one form or another, to escape the disastrous consequences of scandal-repercussions.

It will be evident that these motives fall into two groups; first those which, like much giving of rewards and praise, are purely expressional and look not beyond the act; second, those which definitely and positively look toward control. Number three above, and others not mentioned, belong to the first group; the rest belong to the second; these have no other important signification. Of course we are mainly concerned with this second group in this chapter.

Here, then, is a vast network of activities, a sly aggression, a positive pressure. But more than this, gossip is a vast and incalculable potential, a dreadful possibility. What is its function in society? We take the view that, actively and potentially, it serves to prevent departures from the accepted social code. This is a conclusion based upon the fact that people gossip mainly about such departures, upon the fact that the motives are such as we have indicated, and upon the further fact that certain definite social effects seem to be closely connected with its use. The first and second points have already been discussed. We now turn to the third.

5. EFFECTS

Gossip is made possible by association, it is a social form, and it has some important consequences which we must now examine. It will not be possible to enumerate, let

alone expand, all of the effects of gossip. There are innumerable so-called minor results which must await further study.

The general proposition that gossip is an effectual means of control is well stated by Professor Park. "In spite, however, of the industry with which the newspapers pursue the facts of personal intelligence and human interest, they cannot compete with the village gossips as a means of social control. For one thing the newspaper maintains some reservations not recognized by gossips, in matters of personal intelligence. . . . It is not so with the gossips, partly because in a small community no individual is so obscure that his private affairs escape observation and discussion, partly because the field is smaller. In small communities there is a perfectly amazing amount of personal information afloat among the individuals who compose them."²² This is the conclusion. What support is there for it?

(1) Gossip makes and unmakes leaders. Whispering of the more amiable kind, the kind that borders on intelligent discussion, constructs reputations, good reputations, for citizens of which they are quite unconscious. It quietly gets to be the talk that So-and-so is the man or the woman for this or that particular office. He or she is said to have unusual gifts and to be eminently fitted for the place. The talk goes on until public opinion is made. Almost everybody comes to see the situation that way. Then a hint to the unknowing hero, a gesture in reply and the election takes place.

As historical examples—and much history is but condensed gossip—we might mention Dr. Samuel Johnson who was brought before the world by the inveterate gossip of Boswell, Mrs. Delong who was made immortal by that incomparable tattler Fanny Burney, and also Carlyle.²³

²² *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1915.

²³ Cf. *St. James*. 1: 110 ff.

This condition might be regarded as ideal for a democracy, for we like to think of democracy as a condition of affairs where the office seeks the man. But of course there is an almost unavoidable shadow stalking this ideal. A few pages back we noted the inevitable tendency of gossips to exaggerate. Linking this fact with the popular election just mentioned, it becomes clear that a reputation which is quietly prepared for the modest person, is usually overdone. The artistry of gossips, even friendly whisperers, creates something unattainable. The mythologizing propensities of enthusiastic friends make a rôle which cannot be played. The leader rarely turns out to be what he is conceived to be. Yet he must, if he succeeds, blend his own personality with the popular conception of it. But this cannot be done without compromise. Hence whispering starts anew, but out of the other corner of the mouth; it begins to criticise and undermine; it deflates popular allegiance; the idol tumbles with a crash and the tragedy of it is terrible to behold and an agony to endure. Gossip is thus an unavoidable tax on distinction and, like all other taxes, it has to be paid.²⁴

There would be little difficulty in showing that the fall of Cæsar was partly due to gossip. Socrates felt that prejudice and suspicion had been active factors in "the destruction of many good men before me, and I think they will be so again. There is no fear that I shall be their last victim." Prejudice and suspicion are energetically promoted by gossip. There is no room for doubt that scandal-mongering figured conspicuously in the lives of Sir Walter Raleigh, Marie Antoinette and Queen Elizabeth. Whisperings menaced the careers of Shakespeare, Dreyfus and Edgar Allan Poe. The mishandling of Poe by his first biographer, who depended largely on gossip, had much to do with the beclouding of his name.²⁵

²⁴ Cf. *Frazer*. 100: 97.

²⁵ Le Galliené. "The Psychology of Gossip," *Munsey's Magazine*. 48: 123.

The present writer felt his own loyalty to an outstanding British author oozing away rapidly after listening to some tales disseminated by a prominent English "Lady."

There are exceptional persons, like John Brown for example,²⁶ who "carry on" in spite of all opposition, who are never down until they are out. But the most of us are ruined privately when public esteem vanishes, so much does our opinion of ourselves depend upon public opinion, so much are we sustained in good works by community or national confidence. Then are we led to the principle, "as well do as be said to have done."²⁷

A recent writer on Oberammergau provides an illustration. "Behind the performance of the Passion Play," he says, "there is all-pervading preparatory passion to spare. Men and women have gone insane over their rôles; only 'unblemished women' being permitted to act, girls have deferred their marriage for years, on the hint that they might be chosen for one of the Marys; and at least one Judas sought to hang himself."²⁸ Thus a *hint* of possible opportunity leads to one kind of life. A hint of vanishing public confidence leads to tragedy. It requires no great imagination to hear whispering in the background.

A study of the "hobo aristocracy" that leads a pathetically detached life in the midst of society, like some persistent remnant of a decadent civilization, would disclose the existence of many fallen heroes. Then, of course, there is the further disservice of keeping good men out of office because they refuse to take chances with a whimsical and gossiping public. The relation of these services to the maintenance of the *status quo* seems obvious.

(2) Gossip functions as a morale builder. This is especially clear when there is need of rallying the people to the support of some cherished custom or belief, although support for radical ideas and programs may be gained the

²⁶ See *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov., 1922.

²⁷ Cf. Bogardus. *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. 70.

²⁸ Reyhers. "Christ in Oberammergau," *Atlantic Monthly*, Nov., 1922.

same way. The following incident, related by one of the writer's students, shows how it may work and probably does work. He says:

"I was playing six years ago on a western academic football team. We had played seven games and were victorious in all of them. Our last game of the year was with an academic team that had not been defeated in nine years. This team was filled up with ringers and had on the squad nine men who had played college football, two of whom were members of Camp's mythical All-American team. It would have been no disgrace to lose to them and we would still have been considered the Western Academic champions.

"Anyway on Monday and Tuesday we practiced with that 'I don't care' attitude and the coach was very wrathful. Wednesday a rumor was around the school to the effect that we were afraid of our next opponents and were 'yellow.' Everyone seemed to be talking about it and eyeing us as quitters. This gossip aroused our ire and for the rest of the week we worked like demons with the idea of winning or dying. We won, and the following week the coach said he had started the rumor to get us raving mad and in the right mood for the game. We had no fight in us until we heard the gossip."

We think it safe to say that if an uncomplimentary story can be sent abroad to produce such effects upon a football team, it can serve in many other social relationships to the same end; we think it can ginger up a political campaign, put new life in an effort to wipe out the debt of a church building, add zest to the putting across of a city bond issue and serve in many other ways.

(3) Gossip—and here we include newspapers—is by far the largest factor in the production of an unreal world. It is the unfailing source of the pictures most of us have in our heads unless we are critical and careful students. But these pictures of people, governmental, religious, industrial

and other affairs, are very different to the actualities.²⁹ There is so much of rumor and half-truth and mere report floating about unmothered and unattached that there is little certainty about what is true or false. Our conceptions of Republicans, Democrats, Autocrats, Bolsheviks, Mayors and County Treasurers, are hardly ever free from grotesque features. For example, compare the orthodox picture of Queen Victoria with that of Lytton Strachey, or the view of W. Z. Foster held by Judge Gary with that held by the I. W. W. and it will be obvious that most of us do not live very near the realities. We do not know, if we have listened to gossips, what the facts of life are. If what we have heard falls in line with our prejudices, we swallow it as people eat oysters for the first time—without ever putting their teeth through them.

“In our time,” says Lippmann, “the printed record, such as it is, checks the exuberance of the individual’s fancy. But against rumor there is little or no check, and the original story, true or invented, grows wings and horns, hoofs and beaks, as the artist in each gossip works upon it. The first narrator’s account does not keep its shape and proportions. It is edited and revised by all who played upon it as they heard it, used it for day dreams, and passed it on.”³⁰

Bricks are made by forcing the soft clay through certain molds and then fixing the forms by burning. Conceptions are perfected in a similar way. The rougher molds or categories—to drop the simile—through which gossip is forced are sex, age, class, race, status and nationality. Within these are ever finer meshes like religious and political affiliations, profession, family tradition, taste and the peculiar mood of the hour. Then the shapes are retouched by the presence of others, the absence of others, one’s attitude toward the reporter, the shape in which the story

²⁹ Cf. Lippmann. *Op. cit.* 3 ff.

³⁰ *Op. cit.* 170.

comes, the hour of the day or night, the condition of one's finances, one's health, one's wife's health, one's mother-in-law's health, the sensitiveness of the auditory centers and whether or not one is really listening.

Into such complexes the report comes and through them it goes, transfigured and transposed in spite of the utmost sincerity and the holiest of resolutions to reproduce faithfully. Those who are skilled and who really make an honest effort to re-portray accurately often fail. We can begin to imagine, then, that the results are preposterous where there is little skill and less scruple. The marvel is that the results retain any resemblance to the original whatsoever.³¹

In reproduction, one discovers distortions in the vocal aspects, words being omitted or added or differently emphasized. The pantomimic features undergo modification as well—the speaker may just have returned from a lesson in elocution! A pursing of the lips, a lifting or arching of the eyebrows, a slight wave of the hand, a suggestion of eagerness or apathy—all of these and many more make fundamental differences in the ultimate meaning extracted from the reports and, of course, essential differences, in what is transmitted.³²

What does this mean for order? It means that numbers of people are afraid to vary from the code in the slightest degree; it means that they are under a heavy restraint; it means that they submit to indignities and endure sufferings from which they might escape did they not fear the talk that would be started by movements towards freedom; it means that vast numbers become listless, cowardly, unnatural routineers; it means that original ideas regarding religion, politics, sex-relations and economic questions are suppressed. Thus does gossip function towards the maintenance of what is.

³¹ Cf. Bryce. *The American Commonwealth*. 2: 76 ff.

³² Cf. Lippmann. *Op. cit.* van Langenhove. *Op. cit.* 118 ff.

(4) A vast amount of whimsical mass-action in support of any given order can be charged to gossip. It can be charged to gossip because—to reason precariously—it cannot be charged to anything else. There is this indirect type of proof, but history is replete with evidence. The “Jew’s House” in Lincoln, England, has long been associated with the legend that the Jews once practiced infant-sacrifice there during their pastoral feasts. No one can prove that they did. But this belief, circulated in some fashion, has been a factor in the organized hatred and the vicious persecutions of Jews in England and in other countries. It is said that this belief has been largely responsible for some of the massacres in Russia during recent years. No incontestable evidence has ever been forthcoming to establish this wickedness. Newspapers and books could not circulate such a legend. There is only one way in which the notion could be circulated and that is by gossip.”³³

The witch persecutions in England and America are familiar examples.³⁴ Everybody seems to have been convinced that there were witches. But how was this assurance gained? Newspapers did not contain incontrovertible evidence; official and reliable diagnosis did not establish the fact. The truth is that the assurance came out of the “whisperings of the herd.” Odd details of behavior were noted. These were reported as described above. The reports fell upon minds saturated with the belief in demoniacal possession. Two and two made four—or five, or ten, or any number desirable. The neighbors gathered and whispered and worked themselves up into murderous action.

Who is a witch? Who is a heretic? No scientific, that is to say, no verifiable tests have been or ever can be in-

³³ Cf. Le Gallienne. *Op. cit.*

³⁴ Cf. *New England Magazine*. 6: 36 ff.

vented to determine these types. Newspapers do not define them—and of course could not before they were invented. Courts of law do not know of these types—until they are already defined and branded by local communities. The plain fact is that they are defined by gossip. And gossip is used as a whip to drive people into persecuting organizations. It is a device for building local loyalties and moving people against common enemies, or so-called enemies. It may serve the narrower order but be inimical to the inclusive society.

We can observe this mass action in connection with rumors coming along continuously concerning advances or recessions in stock prices, wheat production, sugar possibilities, automobile sales and the rest. Some of this is propaganda, as we have seen; much of it is of the nature of orphan tales originating in obscure social pockets and spreading about the land, gathering stupid and credulous people into eddies and waves of social movement.

The fearful, worked up by such stories, often groundless rumors, rush to buy securities, sugar, automobiles and whatever else they believe will be scarce. No one can estimate the amount of money that is exchanged on the basis of "tips" on sure things. There is, as we write, sudden strength in the coppers because it is rumored that the surplus has been reduced, because of large buying orders from abroad, because of merger prospects. So the formula runs, day after day, and the people are "taken in."

Many additional uses of gossip might be mentioned, some of them favorable to the maintenance of the social order and some of them unfavorable. We may summarize by saying that the fear of being burned keeps people out of the fire, and the fear of being talked about keeps numbers from tampering with the social code. If these people value a good name and public esteem more than they do a sense of freedom from some irksome restraint, they will

stay in line. If the situation is reversed, they may make a run for it. Then gossip unites the faithful against the traitors and they are ostracized or otherwise punished. Gossip is, then, an ever-present force and a potential which men turn to fight at their peril.

CHAPTER X

SATIRE

THE Scriptures inform us that the prophet Elijah challenged the people of his day to a test of the powers of their respective gods. Accordingly, the worshipers of Jehovah and of Baal, respectively, built altars, piled the fuel thereon, placed the offerings and then drenched everything with water. Then the followers of Baal began to call for fire from their deity to consume the sacrifice. They began to call in the morning; they continued until noon. At that time, no fire having come, Elijah "mocked them, and said, 'Cry aloud; for he is a god: either he is musing, or he has gone aside, or he is on a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth and must be awaked.'" ¹ This is a fine example of ironic satire, and it will help us to become acquainted with this instrument in relation to the modification of human conduct.

Broadly speaking, satire might be described as *formal* and *informal*. By informal satire we mean that type of verbal or pantomimic thrust which takes place in the ordinary, every-day, face-to-face relations. It is so versatile, whimsical, individual, that none but an artist could capture it. Gossip is well-charged with it. We have chosen the easier course, therefore, and wish to draw illustrations from, and discuss the subject by reference to, *formal satire*. For one thing, the materials are handier and more available. For another, the artists have already worked on them and given them shape. In addition, most students, by reason of their literary studies, are already familiar with the sources—a large gain.

¹ I *Kings*. 18: 25 ff.

1. DEFINITION

A wholly satisfactory definition of satire seems quite beyond the powers of literary interpreters as yet. Even certainly to recognize the satirical is something of an achievement. So diverse are its forms and so swiftly changing are its manifestations and such queer company does it keep that one is never sure of dealing with many-sided multiples of the same thing or with several distinctive elements. The matter is so Protean that we cannot fathom it; it is so versatile as to defy successful pursuit. Perhaps the most that can be done is to indicate certain marks by which satire is generally recognized and then include ample illustrations. Indeed it might be safer to speak of the satiric spirit and thus avoid the accusation of arbitrary neglect or of including too much.

"Stated in brief, satire is humorous criticism of human foibles and faults, or of life itself," and seems to be a force directed especially against deception in any form.² While satire is an unanalyzable mixture of humor and criticism, it must not be inferred that all humor is critical or all criticism humorous. Very often the term is employed to denote humorless criticism which has actually slipped over into denunciation, invective or heavy reprehension. On the other hand, it is often used to signify uncritical humor which is mere jocularly or facetiousness. Juvenal and Johnson are recognized satirists but they exhibit a minimum of humor. Horace and Lamb are also satirists but they display a minimum of criticism. The fact is that both elements are spread out so thinly in opposite directions as to reach vanishing points, and what is left is not satire any more than hydrogen is water.

Professor Dewey has reminded us that the ideal state of mind is "a nice balance between the playful and the serious." In the realm of satire—and in other realms

² Russell. *Satire in the Victorian Novel*. 5.

also, we judge—just where that happy medium may be found is impossible of statement. We can see that satire is a fabric woven from a double strand, “the blue of criticism and the red of wit,” yet it has been mostly conceived as composed largely of the former.³ But the evidence for including the latter is ample. Horace gives us the first finished formal satire and also an analysis of this newest literary type. He thought of its function as that of exposing crime, but insisted that the work might be performed with courtesy and gentle touch since weighty matters are more easily settled sometimes by jest than by grim aspersion. Persius says of him:

“Sportive and pleasant round the heart he played,
And wrapt in jests the censure he conveyed.”

Using the Aristophanic vehicle of comedy to carry his satire, Johnson reiterated the Horatian theory. A writer of the Restoration period carried out the tradition, and Young was its spokesman in the eighteenth century. There is evidence also from Fielding, the first satirical novelist, who says: “I have employed all the wit and humour of which I am master in the following story (Tom Jones); wherein I have endeavoured to laugh mankind out of their favourite follies and vices.” He says further: “Few men, I believe, do more admire the works of those great masters who have sent their satire—if I may use the expression—laughing into the world. Such are the great triumvirate, Lucian, Cervantes, and Swift.”

The encyclopedia assures us that, “Satire in its literary aspect may be defined as an expression in adequate terms of the sense of amusement or disgust excited by the ridiculous or unseemly, provided that humor is a distinctly recognizable element, and that the utterance is invested with literary form. Without humor, satire is invective; without literary form it is mere clownish jesting. . . . This

³ Russell. *Op. cit.* 7.

feeling of disgust or contempt may be diverted from the failings of man individual, to the feebleness and imperfection of man universal, and the composition may still be satire; but if the element of scorn or sarcasm were entirely eliminated it would become a sermon."

For a final word by way of definition, we may appeal to Mr. G. K. Chesterton. "The essence of satire," he says, in his brilliant Introduction to Dickens' *Martin Chuzzlewit*, "is that it perceives some absurdity inherent in the logic of the position, and it draws that absurdity out and isolates it, so that all can see it. Thus, for instance, when Dickens says, 'Lord Coodle would go out; Sir Thomas Doodle wouldn't come in; and there being no people to speak of in England, except Coodle and Doodle, the country has been without a government'; when Dickens says this, he suddenly pounces on and plucks out the one inherent absurdity in the English party system, which is hidden behind all its paraphernalia of Parliaments and statutes, elections, and ballot papers. . . . This is the great quality called satire; it is a kind of taunting reasonableness; it is inseparable from a certain insane logic, which is often called exaggeration. . . . True satire is always of an intellectual kind; true satire is always, so to speak, a variation or a fantasia upon the air of pure logic. The satirist is the man who carries men's enthusiasm further than they carry it themselves. He outstrips the most extravagant fanatic. He is years ahead of the most audacious prophet. He sees where men's detached intellect will eventually lead them, and he tells them the name of that place—which is generally hell."

Satire is not only a sort of insane logic but is a last resort of logic. After showing one position to be right—which is logic, all other positions must be shown to be wrong—which is satire.⁴ But after adding chapter to chapter, by way of attempted definition, we would have

⁴ Cf. *Atlantic Monthly*. 85: 256.

to admit that the instrument we have in mind is not compressible within the stiff and stifling bounds of any brief statement. It is a force diffuse and extended, permeating the political, religious and "social" worlds, suddenly and spiritedly halting this trend, snapping at that innovation and freakishly holding the main line of defense. It is comparable to the whine, growl or bark of the watch-dog,—a warning of something worse to follow.

2. FORMS

The forms of satire are listed by Matthews, especially as found in verse, as the genial satire of society exemplified by Horace, the satire of contemporary politics illustrated by Juvenal and the personal and literary satire of Boileau and Pope respectively.⁵ Russell gives three forms, namely, the romantic, the realistic and the ironic, especially as found in the Victorian novel.⁶ Other writers make different classifications, but they are often not more than other names for the same things. Russell's classification will serve our purposes admirably. Before entering upon this, however, we must point out that some of the discussion at this point applies to laughter as well, and the elaboration of the technique of laughter, in the following chapter, must be thought of in this connection. Space does not permit of mention, let alone expansion, of all features of both instruments in both chapters.

(1) The Romantic. Chesterton points out that men's enthusiasm is carried further by the satirists than they themselves would carry it; the logic of their position is drawn out to its most absurd conclusion; the matters discussed are exaggerated so as to become fantastic and incredible. "Thackeray," he says, in a comparison of Dickens and Thackeray, "carried a man's principles as far

⁵ *Harper's Magazine*. 109: 294.

⁶ *Op. cit.* 59, 84, 121.

as that man carried them; Dickens carried a man's principles as far as they would go. Dickens in short (as people put it) exaggerated the man and his principles; that is to say he emphasized them. Dickens drew a man's absurdity out of him; Thackeray left a man's absurdity in him.

"Of this last fact we can take any example we like; take for instance the comparison between the city man as treated in the most satiric of his novels, with the city man as treated by Dickens in one of the mildest and maturest of his. Compare the character of old Mr. Osborne in 'Vanity Fair' with the character of Mr. Podsnap in 'Our Mutual Friend.' In the case of Mr. Osborne there is nothing except the solid blocking in of a brutal dull convincing character. 'Vanity Fair' is not a satire on the City, in short, except in so far as the City is a satire on the City. But Mr. Podsnap is pure satire; he is the extracting out of the City man of those purely intellectual qualities which happen to make that kind of a City man a particularly exasperating fool. One might almost say that Mr. Podsnap is all Mr. Osborne's opinions separated from Mr. Osborne and turned into a character. In short the satirist is more purely philosophical than the novelist. The novelist may be only an observer; the satirist must be a thinker. He must be a thinker, he must be a philosophical thinker for this simple reason: that he exercises his philosophical thought in deciding what part of his subject he is to satirize. You may have the dullest possible intelligence and be a portrait painter; but a man must have a serious intellect in order to be a caricaturist. He has to select what thing he will caricature." ⁷

This quotation is introduced to identify the romantic with exaggeration, insane logic, the fantastically incredible. Almost any aspect of human life may be treated in this way—persons, institutions, ideas, attitudes; all may be

⁷ *Op. cit.*

made absurd, impossible, by softening certain features and emphasizing others so that things appear out of shape and ridiculous. Dickens' art was most brilliantly displayed when he found an opinion that had not a leg to stand on and gave it two legs to stand on.⁸ A most clever and entertaining example of this exaggeration is found in the Freudian comedy entitled, "Suppressed Desires." Here the position taken by the great psychologist is expanded and distorted to such an extent as to break down of its own weight. It is not poor science confuted by better science; it is very good science made funny by its possible implications. The Freudian "wish" is sent out into the world like a clown to compel, not understanding, but laughter.

"Huckleberry Finn, to the loving, thoughtful reader, is among other things an epic of the injustice, the inconsistency of sophisticated man and his social system, seen through the eyes of the New World on the Mississippi where tradition, in the fresh, crude light, showed its seams of decay. There is a tract upon slavery . . . and another upon dueling, and a third on social distinctions and a fourth upon conventionalized religion."⁹ Mark Twain was a humorist; but he was also a critic, and there was severity in his combination.

We have been speaking altogether of the verbal expression of the satiric mood. The cartoon shows us this same exaggeration, this overdrawing, this ridiculous logic, in line form. No vehicle is more effective for the masses. The objectionable thing is portrayed so that all persons with eyes cannot fail to recognize it; cannot fail to laugh and at the same time to criticize.

(2) The Realistic. As persons may be restrained from courses of action which will eventually lead them into fantastic and absurd performances and relations, so it has

⁸ Chesterton. *Op. cit.*

⁹ Canby. "Literature and Democracy," *Century Magazine*, Jan., 1920. 398.

been assumed that they might be checked by showing that their adopted pathways led straight to "hell" as Chesterton said. Realistic satire is the sort that shows, with unflinching accuracy, what the terrible realities of life are.¹⁰ It provides ordinary folks with telescopes and microscopes so that they may have a look at the center of things.

Where the romantic type is used as a vehicle of satire it is employed expressly for that and for no other purpose. Realism, on the other hand, is a public carry-all, in which satire is allowed a place along with the other actors.¹¹ This form ruthlessly, yet humorously, tears off masks, burns off the varnish and joyfully pricks the bubbles of pretension. Wit, invention and exaggeration are the predominant features of the romantic, whereas humor, interpretation and exposure characterize the realistic type of satire. There are various subdivisions of this form but they cannot be included here.¹²

"Realism in writing is carried to such a pitch in 'The Old Bachelor' that husband and wife," says Meredith, "use imbecile connubial epithets to one another."¹³ This is dreadful, but it is also humorous; it is merciless exposure, but it provokes our mirth. In Dickens we find the thorough yet amusing laying bare, turning inside out, of such institutions as the school system, the orphanage homes and the prisons, in addition to the party system already mentioned. In reading about these features of society, one weeps and laughs by turns and, withal, criticizes and engages in a crusade against them. *Pecksniff* and *Uriah Heep* stand out as examples of characters, the one representing duplicity and the other humility—and nothing much beside. This makes them romantic, untrue to life; but these quali-

¹⁰ Cf. Summer. *Folkways*. 577.

¹¹ Russell. *Op. cit.* 83.

¹² Cf. Russell. *Op. cit.* 87.

¹³ *An Essay on Comedy*. 13, note.

ties are exaggerated only to be the more cruelly—and obviously—attacked. Concerning these Russell says: “Uriah might be discomfited when his mask was publicly torn away, but the Pecksniffian duplicity was no mere flimsy detachable mask. It was the very skin of his face; indeed it was more than skin deep; it was the stuff of his soul. He could therefore be imperturbable though felled to the floor, a dignified martyr, grieved but gracious under calumny, unquelled by those who had assembled to do him dishonor.”¹⁴

In the downfall of *Becky Sharp*, a quite natural and human hypocrisy comes to its almost tragic end. “The theme of vaulting ambition o’er-leaping itself is a favorite with Thackeray, and he did some good apprentice work on it in *The Fatal Boots* and *The Yellowplush Papers*. From Trollope we have a subtle but satisfying picture of a trap into which a certain amorous Rev. Mr. Slope was beguiled by a clever lady. Mr. Slope was madly in love but hardly knew it. The signora spitted him, as a boy does a cockchafer on a cork, that she might enjoy the energetic agony of his gyrations. And she knew very well what she was doing.”¹⁵

Lucy Roberts was the justifiable pride of Trollope. “She is indeed,” says Russell, “a sunny, breezy English maid, endowed with charm, enterprise, and a resourcefulness that could outwit with dignity the titled dowager who did not want to be her mother-in-law.”¹⁶ She illustrates realism in many sayings but the following must suffice. In tears and breathless excitement she admits the reality of her love and then says: “I’ll tell you what he has; he has fine straight legs, and a smooth forehead, and a good-humoured eye, and white teeth. Was it possible to see such a catalogue of perfections, and not fall down, stricken

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* 102.

¹⁵ Cf. *Barchester Towers*. 299.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* 188.

to the very bone? But it was not that that did it all, Fanny. I could have stood against that, I think I could, at least. It was his title that killed me. I had never spoken to a lord before.”¹⁷

(3) The Ironic. We have here a term of increasing vogue. Originally it meant dissimulation in speech; and its use presupposed an ignorance that sought for enlightenment. According to Bishop Thirlwall, irony has two forms, the verbal and the practical. “The former is the rhetorical device whereby a certain idea or circumstance is implied by its statement in terms to the contrary or opposite effect. The latter is the contrast between the real and the apparent state of things, or between the expected and the eventual, commonly described as the Irony of Fate.” To these Russell adds a third, dramatic irony, which is really a subdivision of the second.¹⁸

On the extreme right wing, irony slips into sarcasm which is, as its etymology would signify, a flesh-tearing, or at least, a heart-rending performance, belonging, as Bishop Hall would say, to the “toothed division” of satire. On the left wing may be found banter, jocularly, amiable playfulness. It is common to hear fond parents addressing their adorable youngsters as “young scamps,” “incorrigible rascals,” and the like when they really mean something very different. Admiring youth is occasionally found speaking lovingly of an elderly gentleman as “an old fraud.”

The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is an illustration. Meredith speaks of irony as “the honeyed sting which leaves the victim in doubt as to having been hurt,” and probably there is no better way to characterize it. “Glittering generalities” sneered Choate, referring to the Declaration of Independence. “Yes,” was Emerson’s

¹⁷ *Framley Parsonage*. 259.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* 121.

noble and effective reply, "they *do* glitter—those truths in the Declaration. They have a *right* to glitter."¹⁹

Illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely. These must serve to give us a hint of the nature of this force the reality of which is unquestioned no matter how various and contradictory the definitions and interpretations. Humorous criticism, with widely varying amounts of both humor and criticism, is with us every day and in countless situations. Its influence in social relationships cannot be ignored.

3. SOURCES

What is the fountain source of satire? Many students of human life have observed that it falls mainly into a pattern of attraction and repulsion. As each human being grows to maturity his activities are organized about certain centers. He gradually generates an attitude which is a compound of his original nature and the opinions, ideas and attitudes of his group. This attitude supplies him with criteria by which he judges the facts of daily experience or the world at large and finds them or it empty or full as the case may be. At any rate we soon see him actively approving or condemning and thus assuming the rôle of critic. Nobody knows precisely why this is so. But we can observe that it is so. If there were no objectionable features in life there would be no criticism—and no satire. If there were no critics there would be no criticism. All we can be sure of yet is that the source of satire, like the source of other activities, is to be found in the impact of certain conditions upon certain constitutions.

Nothing can be gained by one-sided views, therefore. Yet the views of satire have usually been one-sided. Numerous scholars, Aristotle and Bergson for example, have

¹⁹ Ogden. "Political Satire," *International Quarterly*. 8: 218.

insisted that satire had its origin or source in the life-situation; that is, they have interpreted it objectively; they ignore the mirthful or the critical person.

On the other hand, there are plenty who give a wholly subjective explanation. Says Horace:

“Wolves use their teeth against you, bulls their horn;
Why, but that each is to the manner born.”

Byron re-echoes this idea thus:

“Satiric rhyme first sprang from selfish spleen;
You doubt—see Dryden, Pope, St. Patrick’s Dean.”

George Bernard Shaw gives us this: “Besides, Gertrude despises everyone, even us. Or rather she doesn’t despise anyone in particular, but is contemptuous by nature, just as you are stout.” Graham Wallas makes ridicule one of the chief political impulses.²⁰

We may say, however, that the truth of this matter awaits delineation. Horace and Byron would not be regarded as authoritative psychologists. One is never sure that Shaw means what he says. Wallas is worthy of respect in this connection. Probably the matter is summed up as well by Russell as by any one. She thinks that those who have an inborn tendency to make nice distinctions, accurate discriminations and possibly rigorous judgments, will not fail to criticize. Those who are naturally alive to the ridiculous will not fail to reveal that disposition. Those who combine both sets of qualities, whether inherited or acquired, turn out to be satirists. Such can hardly escape their mission as long as they are articulate.²¹

4. OBJECTS

The objects of satiric attack are without number.²² Everything of which satirists disapprove or in which they

²⁰ *Human Nature and Politics*. 30.

²¹ *Op. cit.* 6 ff.

²² Cf. Sumner. *Folkways*. 578.

may notice some flaw, is grist for their mills. There is Thersites, the dealer in personalities, scoffing and gibing at the *élite* with the audacity and aplomb of a court fool; there is Reynard, the satirical rogue, who not only discovers the failings of his fellow-citizens, but employs them for his own ends; there is Alceste the misanthrope or, as Meredith calls him, "the critic of everybody save himself," but yet one who lifts his strictures out of the merely personal and attaches them to a general interpretation of life; there is the *Hebrew Adversary*, Satan, who is a cynic with a scientific enthusiasm for experimentation, who impugns motives, fleers at fair appearances, prides himself on superior insight, and questions the price for which a prosperous Job serves God; there is the melancholy Jaques who denies indulging in personalities the while he snubs the too oratorical Orlando and evades the overly talkative Duke, and who reviews the career of man and sees him proceeding with pompous futility through his seven ages to an ignominious end.²³

Three rather loose classes of objects have been suggested—individuals, institutions and types. (1) As examples of the first it may be recalled that Disraeli, in his *Coningsby*, made the Honorable J. W. Coker into the politician "Rigby," Lord George Manners into "Henry Sidney," and Lord Hertford into the "Duke of Monmouth." Theodore Hook was the original of Disraeli's Lucian Gay and of Thackeray's Mr. Wagg. Gerald Massey played the title rôle in *Felix Holt*. In the *Dunciad*, Pope calls names thus: "My H—ley's periods, or my Blackmore's numbers." Much of the *Rolliad* centers about one person. And thus examples might be multiplied.²⁴

(2) When one introduces the subject of institutions, the list is very long indeed. One finds society, the state, the church, the school, art and ideals. Under these general

²³ Russell. *Op. cit.* 2 ff.

²⁴ Cf. Russell. *Op. cit.* 170.

heads may be found frequent references to the press, mercenary marriages, the enforced idleness of women, red tape, fashion,²⁵ politics, law, charities and corrections, labor, capital, the clergy, foreign missions and Christian civilization in general. If one wishes to classify doctrines and theories under this general head, there are many amusing thrusts at militarism, pacificism, higher criticism, Darwinism, evolution, democracy and autocracy.

(3) The words most often penned in satiric mood, perhaps, are Vice and Folly. But of course these fine large entities are definable only in the light of the times when they were ridiculed, vituperated, lampooned or otherwise disapproved; they are quite baffling subjectivities. Juvenal concluded that it was impossible *not* to write satire from the fact that the number of fools in the world was infinite, and this is said by Hereford to be "the fundamental axiom of all satire." Horace took the fool for his target while Juvenal specialized upon the knave. Skelton attacked knavery while Taine, Swift, Dryden and Barclay directed their darts at both folly and knavery. Defoe includes these two and adds pride. Fielding was most caustic against vice.

The important point for us to notice is that these types represent those deflections from the norms of human conduct which the satirists thought most serious and dangerous. A list of these types would include as a minimum hypocrisy, snobbishness, sentimentality, fanaticism, vulgarity, vanity, deception. Fielding says: "Great vices are the proper objects of our detestation, smaller faults of our pity; but affectation appears to me the only true source of the ridiculous." Of the two forms of affectation—if one may so classify—Fielding chooses hypocrisy while Bergson selects vanity.²⁶ Of Byron, the last of the great poetic satirists, it was claimed that he was "attacking not

²⁵ Sumner. *Folkways*. 192.

²⁶ See the following chapter.

virtue, but false sentiment, false idealism, and false faith. His satiric spirit is engaged in tearing down what is sham and pretense and fraud.”²⁷

5. EFFECTS

In turning to the effects of satire within the various fields of its application, we face a most difficult if not an impossible task. When one asks what satire has actually done, or can do, in changing human relations in ways favorable to social order, no answer, such as the faithful scientist would insist upon, can be given. Probably the results which we should most prize if we could know of them, are beneath the surface. Satirists occasionally bring down some variants; but they mostly prevent variants from being born. Although this instrument arouses anger and stubbornness in some bosoms, generates enmity and a desire for revenge in others, it is mostly repressive; it aims to create a widespread fear of becoming its objects so that self-criticism and self-restraint are imposed. At any rate sensitive and proud people do not like to risk a trial of its strength. We hazard a few propositions merely as hints for further study.

(1) Some students of the subject emphatically deny that satire is an effectual instrument. Says Sidgwick: “Satire is the weapon of the man at odds with the world and at ease with himself. The dissatisfied man,—a Juvenal, a Swift, a youthful Thackeray,—belabors the world with vociferous indignation, like the wind on a traveller’s back, the beating makes it hug its cloaking sins the tighter. Wrong runs no danger from such chastisement . . . Satire is harmless as a moral weapon. It is an old-fashioned fowling piece, fit for a man of wit, intelligence, and a certain limited imagination. It runs no risk of having quarry; the world to it is one vast covert of lawful game. It goes

²⁷ Feuss. *Byron as a Satirist*. 180.

atravelling with wit, because both are in search of the unworthy." ²⁸

Even Byron had his misgivings as to the value of his keenest cutter. In his *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*—an exceedingly bitter tirade—he declares that vice and folly will

“More darkly sin, by Satire kept in awe,
And shrink from ridicule, though not from law.”

But of course something is gained if *public* sinning is prevented. In the *Scourge of Villainy*, Marston gives expression to some doubts thus:

“Now, Satire cease to rub our gallèd skins,
And to unmask the world’s detested sins;
Thou shalt as soon draw Nilus river dry,
As cleanse the world from foul impiety.”

After showing that it is dangerous to satirize what the masses believe in, Sumner says: “These facts limit very much the high moral function sometimes ascribed to satire. It never gets into action until the mischief is done. It never squelches a folly at its commencement.” ²⁹ Tucker thinks it always attacks to destroy, not primarily to reform.” ³⁰ Thus one might multiply opinions in the negative. We pass the point that they are only opinions, and half-hearted opinions at that, and raise the general question: What sort of work is satire designed to do? It is pointless to say that a gun is no good because it won’t peel potatoes; it was not constructed to peel potatoes. It is equally pointless to say that satire will never “cleanse the world of foul impiety”; no satirist ever was so foolish as to hope that it would. Satire was not intended to win great victories in the battles of life. It is not suitable for

²⁸ *Essays on Great Writers*, “Some Aspects of Thackeray.”

²⁹ *Folkways*. 579.

³⁰ *Verse Satire in England before the Renaissance*. 8.

war at all and fails against the gigantic and lurid evils of the age. One cannot be ironic, sarcastic or insidiously witty about murder, rape or treason.

(2) The work of satire is rather the *discovery* of enemies and the display of their weak positions and the offering of challenges to battle. To employ a huntsman's figure, satire is intended to "beat up the game," so that other social control devices may be set in operation to bring it down. It has not inappropriately been described as a "literary constabulary" which might go where the law could not. Says Gifford: "To raise a laugh at vice . . . is not the legitimate office of satire, which is to hold up the vicious as objects of reprobation and scorn, for the example of others, who may be deterred by their sufferings."

Another way to present the service of satire is this. Satire—and all of its kindred arts—is the private detective force of the government of Manners; it looks out for, and heads off, those slighter and stupider variations which are not criminal but yet have the seeds of criminality or obnoxious anti-sociality in them. This point is worthy of all emphasis, but since we touch on it again in the discussion of "Laughter," we pass it for the present.

(3) The opinions of students of satire are worthy of notice. A few quotations may be selected to represent the substance of volumes. "It is quite beside the mark," says Dawson, "to say that we do not like satire. It is equally beside the mark to say that we have never known such a world as this. The thing to be remembered is that in all ages the satirist of manners has been of the utmost service to society in exposing its follies and lashing its vices. It is the work of the great satirist to apply the caustic to the ulcers of society; and if we let our dislike of satire overrule our judgment, we shall not only record our votes against a Juvenal, and a Swift, but equally against the whole line of Hebrew prophets."⁸¹

⁸¹ *Makers of English Fiction.* 77.

"The fear of ridicule," says Dugas, "is the most dominant of our feelings, that which controls us in most things and with most strength. Because of this fear one does 'what one would not do for the sake of justice, scrupulousness, honor or good will'; one submits to an infinite number of obligations which morality would not dare to prescribe and which are not included in the laws." Says A. Michiels: "Conscience and the written laws form the two lines of ramparts against evil; the ludicrous is the third line of defense; it stops, brands and condemns the little misdeeds which the guards allowed to pass. . . . More precisely it is a special unsociability, one which escapes all other penalties, which it is the function of laughter to reach. What can this unsociability be? It is the self-love in each of us in so far as it has anything disagreeable to others in it, an abstraction of every injurious and hateful element."³²

Professor Vincent assures us that "the competing group derides many a dissenter into conformity. This derision may be spontaneous, or reflective and concerted. The loud guffaw which greets one who varies in dress or speech or idea may come instantly or there may be a planned and co-operative ridicule systematically applied to the recalcitrant. Derision is one of the most effective devices by which the group sifts and tests the variants."³³

Relative to private, personal modification, Hannay says: "Horace leaves you wiser; Juvenal, indignant but aspiring; Swift, angry but better; Lindsay, amused and in good nature; Burns, tingling with rage but full of hope; Erasmus, improved and delighted. The great satirists have all a healthy effect."³⁴

(4) Some light as to the work of satire may be found by consulting our own experience. How do we personally react to it? Are we braver, more inventive, more inclined

³² Quoted in Park and Burgess. *Op. cit.* 373.

³³ "Rivalry and Social Groups," *American Journal of Sociology.* 12: 471.

³⁴ Preface to *Satire and Satirists.*

to have our own way and swagger about as we like, after an encounter with the satirists, or are we more fearful, more modest and restrained? We think the writers quoted above were not wholly unmindful of the effects of satire upon themselves as they wrote. We write, as we think they did, with the feeling that the satirists could and would produce more suffering in us, had they occasion to notice us, than a swarm of hornets. Could such testimonies be gathered up by the hundred, we might ultimately have something in the shape of scientific proof. Until such time, the proposition that satire is an effective instrument of control must be left in the air.

6. EFFICIENCY

Assuming that satire does work in favor of the social order, the question arises: How efficient is it? In view of the uncertainty as to what it actually accomplishes, we cannot be dogmatic at this point. The best we can do is to suggest some reasons why it may be effective.

(1) Satire is an instrument which, in its literary form (formal satire), only the gifted can use. The tyro cannot use it, except informally, for in his hands it becomes, as has been said, mere "clownish jesting." We can hardly think of a more powerful combination for the reformer to have than insight and satire.

(2) With the increasing density of population and the rapidly perfected means of communication, the attention and the satire of more people may easily be focused upon any one absurdity, pose or person. Certainly a part of the strength of ridicule is to be found in the numbers engaging in it. Surely part of its strength is in its promptness.

(3) Escape becomes increasingly impossible. There are so many keen-eyed and sharp-penned searchers after variation, and especially after variations of certain types, that

the risks of code-jumping are becoming increasingly greater.

(4) Modern education tends to heighten self-consciousness and thus increase the fear of ridicule.

(5) Satirical expression is a sort of social weather-gage upon which the ungifted may look and by which they may be warned. As variations increase in number, satire increases in quantity; as they increase in wickedness, satire increases in pointedness. One may keep tab on the trend of the times by following the satirical expressions which the times call forth.³⁵

Of course, it would be possible, on the contrary, to elaborate on its indiscriminateness as to persons, institutions, and other objects and also as to its methods; we must not forget, also, that many satirists have written when angry, or bitter, or ill, or poor, and thus with a disturbing bias. It would be possible to show that they have overstated, understated, misstated, and otherwise have gone wide of the mark. These are weaknesses which have militated against its effectiveness.

7. FUTURE

There are those who bemoan the death of satire, and if they are right, the problem we have been considering in this chapter is of historic interest only; if satire is dead, then it has no future. It is worth while, then, to notice the arguments advanced by those who think satire is about done for. We have space only for the briefest statement.

(1) There is a more prevalent and deep-seated optimism in the world today than ever before, therefore satire will disappear from lack of exercise. From this, in answer, it might be inferred that satire is a thorn plucked from the bristling branches of pessimism which, of course, is not the

³⁵ Cf. Campbell. *Satire in Early English Drama*. 115.

case; to ignore the comic element is to misunderstand the whole matter.

(2) The newspapers, with their swift and infallible readiness, make its use unnecessary, the bewailers say. This, in answer, is utterly to misconceive the newspaper. The newspaper is just one more channel. There may be less of satire in books, but the total output is probably not less. Then, there is the cartoon and that amazing growth, the comic strip. Was there ever more of this?

(3) The efficient laws of libel have drawn its sting thoroughly. There is something to be said for this point—as far as formal satire is concerned; names cannot be mentioned as they once were. Yet satirists are versatile people; they do not need to call names; they can single people out without calling names. But satire is directed to institutions, ideas, fads, etc., and, with few exceptions, there are no legal barriers, here.

(4) There are many other moral censors, such as journals, lectures, etc. And so there are. But it is possible to answer that these are just so many more mediums for satire. It is also possible to say that there is plenty of work for them all.

(5) The age is more sentimental and takes less joy in the agonized writhings of those stung by satire. This, in answer, is simply a question of fact which we hold to be unproven. There are those who tell us that the original nature has undergone no essential modification within historic times.³⁶ If man has undergone no great change, he is hardly more sentimental; it would seem strange that he had become decidedly sentimental within the last fifty years; there are plenty of evidences, as we shall point out in the last chapter, that man is still cruel enough.

(6) Women count for more at the present time and do not as readily resort to this expedient as men. Women are more numerous in power; this is a fact. That they

³⁶ Cf. Ogburn. *Social Change*. 284 ff.

do not as readily resort to this expedient as men, seems open to question. If women do not use formal satire as much as men, we have heard of "catty" women, and we have also heard that women like to talk.³⁷

Less dogmatic, and rather more plausibly stated, are the views of Wells (not H. G.). He also thinks satire is going out. (1) The acceleration of our present-day life, the flowing past us of fads and fancies in rapid succession, the whirlwind of affairs in which we are all caught,—these leave no time to write or read. (2) We are more tolerant, that is to say, we do not become excited over many of the so-called abuses against which the earlier satirists tilted, but regard them as harmless foibles which will soon disappear of their own accord. (3) It seems to be a question whether the twentieth century stimulates and fosters and rewards earnestness and sincerity—outstanding characteristics of the satirists—sufficiently to keep them alive.³⁸

Such arguments, we think, come near, if they do not actually fall into, that particular satirical area which we have called the ironical. A very recent writer does not make a single gesture to avoid that region. Satire has declined, he says, because the satirist no sooner shows himself than he is taken up, petted and pampered so that he may be gentle and suppress his bilious outbursts. He is kept down by shrewd publishers who do not wish any subscribers alienated. He is persuaded to put up bagatelles for his attacks and is led to avoid real objects.³⁹

But it seems incredible that satire is dead. There are more people in the world than ever before, and probably more fools; there are as many skulking vices; deception yet abounds; fads, fancies and crazes run their riotous course as ever; political chicanery has not been wiped out; educational shams abound; economic sophistries yet befuddle the multitudes. Satire could not have died from lack

³⁷ Schaeffaur. "The Death of Satire," *Fortnightly Review*. 93: 1190.

³⁸ *A Satire Anthology*. Introduction, xxi.

³⁹ *Atlantic Monthly*. 85: 256.

of nourishment; it could not have died for lack of appreciation for there is a deep hunger for cleverness; it could not die from poverty for able writers were never better paid. We find difficulty in reaching the conclusion that satire is dead although, as is freely admitted, our illustrations have been mostly selected from earlier periods; but that was a matter of convenience, not of dearth of material. Satire is not dead; it may have changed its dress.

In conclusion bear in mind that satire is a device with a long social history. Much has been written and more has been spoken in the satiric mood. There has been gradually evolved a vast popular dread of having this instrument applied. These two facts—the quantity of satire and the universal fear of it—when put together yield something akin to certainty that this device has been a powerful social control agency.

CHAPTER XI

LAUGHTER

1. DEFINITIONS

IN discussing satire it was pointed out that the two components are criticism and humor. No attempt was there made to analyze either or to weigh their respective impacts upon individuals or groups. There might be a disposition, on the part of some, to suppose that satire derived its chief "punch" from the critical element, and that humor served merely to soften down its ferocity and, of itself, was of no force. That such is not the case, that humor or laughter, as we shall now speak of it, is a very effectual device on its own account, it is the purpose of the present chapter to show.

Laughter must not be conceived narrowly and crudely as merely that which Goldsmith had in mind when he referred to "the loud laugh that spoke the vacant mind." We are not especially concerned with the boisterous, physical "haw-haw" or the raucous "guffaw" of the card-table or the smoking-room, although these have their force. Laughter is much more, infinitely more, than this and it may, as we shall see, speak a very full mind indeed. It must be conceived as a very inclusive term for a great variety of expressional modes, all revealing an attitude toward life. And that attitude is one of vigorous protest, its forms of revealment are essentially social devices, and its work is of a social nature.

One does not read or reflect very far upon this subject before realizing that the greatest thinkers of all ages have been engaged upon it. Even to name them is to call the

roll of the ablest minds—Plato, Aristotle, Schopenhauer, Hobbes, Kant, Lipp, Sully, Bergson—to mention but a few. And such a realization raises the question of what more can be said. But worse yet, the nature of laughter, and “why we laugh” are still unsolved problems.¹

Careful study of the lucubrations of these minds, however, makes it quite clear that there is a very important aspect of the subject that is yet to be developed, namely, the social effects. Laughter—whatever its nature—is. Laughter—no matter why we laugh—plays a vigorous part in human relations. Laughter works. Were it not for the work of laughter, and the laughter potential, human society would be a very different construction. We have to ask, then, what laughter, using all its ingenious forms of expression, actually does. We have to ask not for the total work of laughter but primarily for its work in maintaining the social order.

We have said that laughter is an attitude employing various artistic and inartistic forms of expression. It will be conducive to clearness if we pause a moment to reflect, along with some of the students of the subject, on what this means. Spencer thought of laughter as the indication of an effort which suddenly encountered a void. Kant said: “Laughter is the result of an expectation which of a sudden ends in nothing.”² Hobbes held that “laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory, arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with infirmity in others, or with our own formerly.” This is known as the Moral Degradation Theory and was held substantially by Aristotle, Bain and others. This statement emphasizes the feeling element in laughter.

In contrast may be presented the Intellectual Theory of Kant, Lipp, Schopenhauer, Hazlitt and Bergson, which describes laughter in terms of what intellect discovers of

¹ Cf. Gregory. *The Nature of Laughter*. Has an extended bibliography.

² Bergson. *Laughter*. 85.

contrariety, incongruity, sudden modification of thought, dissolved expectations, surprise,³ mechanical inelasticity, automatism, absent-mindedness, in life.⁴ The point is that the characteristics of our world just enumerated are not "felt" but "perceived" and laughter is the natural response to them.

A third theory is that of Sully who seems to find the explanation of laughter in activity. He thinks it is an expression of the principle of play.⁵ From this standpoint laughter is largely an expression of relief from restraint, a way of gaining freedom, a kind of carelessness or license that is within the law, a form of play. This is the Activity Theory.

Sidis thinks "allusion to human stupidity is the root of the comic."⁶ Carpenter claims to have found an explanation so simple and so plain that he wonders nobody ever thought of it before. To him laughter is just a glorying in being sane, in having reason, a rejoicing in mental health.⁷

And so the proffered explanations go on—interminably. But after analyzing them all, one still wishes to ask: What is laughter?

Many phases of the subject tempt the student aside, but since we are interested only in the relation of laughter to social control, we shall confine ourselves to three topics: (1) The Method or Technique, (2) The Objects, and (3) The Social Effects in so far as they exhibit control.

2. THE METHODS OF LAUGHTER

Laughter has seized upon every available medium of expression, and indeed has invented where nothing suitable was already made. Then in addition there are prob-

³ Cf. Sully. *An Essay on Laughter*. 125.

⁴ Bergson. *Op. cit.* 10. Cf. Schmalhausen. "Marginal Notes on Laughter," *Open Court*. 35: 361 ff.

⁵ *Op. cit.* 149.

⁶ Cf. Bruce. "Why Do We Laugh?" *Outlook*. 104: 820.

⁷ "Laughter, A Glory in Sanity," *American Journal of Psychology*. 33: 419.

ably immense stores of laughter-energy unexpressed—an avalanche ready to fall on luckless mortals if a satisfactory outlet is ever discovered. The method or technique of laughter may best be presented in synoptic fashion, tracing its history in outline from source to destination.

(1) Let us say that Stephen Leacock, the Canadian humorist, finds elements in modern literature that awaken his “sense of humor.” Now he might be content to laugh silently and in isolation, as most of us do because we lack an adequate medium. With an impulse to make known his attitude, however, and being favored with a refined medium, he chooses to laugh publicly. Not only that, but he chooses to enlist the laughter of others already of the same mind and also those whom he may be able to convert. Other men, finding elements in life that they did not like, would act in other ways. Some would preach, some would criticize, some would swear. Leacock is attempting to *laugh* and to *organize* laughter. The energy so accumulated he hopes to apply to certain objectionable features of literature and life, having in mind a cleansing work in the realms of form, style and matter. (We might take other humorists and other objects of laughter for illustrative purposes.)

With these aims in mind, how does he proceed? For one thing he lectures; for another he writes essays. Here are two means of conveying his message from himself to the point of application, namely, the word way and the eye way. The assumption for the present is that the persons laughed at, the real objects of the laughter, are reachable, that they come to hear him lecture (not usual); that they read his books, that they read reviews of his books, that they join circles of gossip where his ideas are discussed, or in some manner acquire more or less correct impressions of his purpose. We assume that his message is carried home to the laughable, that is, “hits the target”; but more of this later.

But any attitude, idea or feeling may employ this technique or method, these purely mechanical means of conveyance. A scientist, a preacher of hate, a prophet of gloom, a "red" radical may lecture and write books—employ the word way and the eye way. There is nothing distinctive about these methods, nothing that laughter and laughter alone uses. We must look deeper for the essentials, for we have already hinted that laughter has its own favorite methods and can use no others; poaching is prohibited by the nature of things.

(2) The word way and the eye way employed by Leacock and other laughers are, of course, a peculiarly individualized form of art; no two humorists laugh alike. Yet there are common features and these are what we have in mind here. But when we come to consider these features of laughter we have stepped indoors, as it were, and find ourselves surrounded by a very different environment. For the art-forms of laughter differ from the externals of words and print, in just the same way that color, texture, design, atmosphere in a picture differ from the canvass, paint, frame and brush. In passing from lectures and books to these special forms, we are passing from mechanics to art.

The lecture that an eminent philosopher gives is a genuine lecture, of course; it is characterized by heaviness, intricate reasoning, gravity and erudition. The lecture that Leacock gives is a lecture, of course; but it is characterized by lightness, nimbleness, flash, surprise, challenge, wit, clever turns of the phrase. The book that Kant writes produces no smiles, no side-splitting (head-splitting, rather) effects; he was not laughing when he wrote it; he was not a humorist. On the other hand, people always join in the fun with Leacock, Mark Twain and other laughers. What is the difference? It is somewhat in the subject matter, of course, but much more in the form of treatment, in the form of art used.

(3) The lectures and books of Leacock and other humorists are peculiar lectures and books. Being so individualized they are not compressible into scientific categories; they elude accurate description. Roughly we may say, however, that the forms of art used by laughers are comedies, puns, jests, conundrums, anecdotes, epigrams, bon mots, jocularities, parodies, cartoons, hits and many others. But what are these? A full treatment of the technique of laughter would require detailed analysis of each form. But even after the most searching study, there would be something in each jest, cartoon, parody or comedy that could not quite be grasped; and it could not be grasped because these forms lead us back to the nature of laughter, which, as we have seen, is indefinable.

Anticipating for the moment, we may point out that what is effected by these means is a mental reconstruction of the laughable, the imagination of auditors or readers is quickened sufficiently to see what the humorist sees. Then a laughter mood is evoked and becomes contagious, and this becomes a feature of the humorist's method. He desires to involve as many others as possible in a laughter-aggression upon the laughable. He wishes to organize a crusade of laughers. The stage is a place and a medium much employed by humorists, and the reason is not far to seek. The stage is peculiarly adapted to the full portrayal of every sort of objectionable characteristic, every degree of exaggeration, foible, vice. Here the deeper subtleties of life that are laughable can be set up so clearly that even unimaginative persons can see and join in the crusade. Here, laughter can be made choral, and the objectionable thing can know it is found out.

This feature of the laughter technique may be compared to the broadcasting by radio or to the sowing of grain. There are always waiting listeners just as there is always waiting soil. The expectation is that some of the humorist's message will percolate through to the precise point of

need. But if the technique of laughter consists in holding before the people what is laughable, the question at once arises, What is laughable? We have already been introduced to that question in quoting certain definitions of laughter. But since we found that no fully satisfactory definitions are yet forthcoming, the most we can do is to help out our imagination by drawing up a list of objects which people actually laugh at, with the naïve assumption that what people ordinarily laugh at *is laughable*.

3. THE LAUGHABLE

(1) It should be clear at the outset that the laughable is found only within the human realm. We do not laugh at objects or occurrences in the non-human world unless they have taken on significance from association with man. As Bergson says: "A landscape may be beautiful, charming, and sublime or insignificant and ugly; it will never be laughable. You may laugh at an animal only because you have selected in it some human attitude or expression. You may laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of in this case is not the piece of straw or felt, but the shape that man gave it—the human caprice whose mold it has assumed."⁸ Man has been characterized as "an animal which laughs" but might just as well be described as the animal which is laughed at. The only laughable affairs are human affairs.

(2) But what, within the human realm, is laughable? Some writers hold that everything within this area may be laughable.⁹ Our space is too limited to enter into fine distinctions at this point. It will be quite sufficient to take up one list of laughable affairs, and we choose the list prepared by Sully.¹⁰

⁸ *Laughter*. 3.

⁹ Cf. Carritt. "A Theory of the Ludicrous," *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1923. 552.

¹⁰ *An Essay on Laughter*. 87. Somewhat modified.

(3) Before setting out this list, however, another point should be noticed. "Our laughter is always the laughter of the group," says Bergson. Any human affair may be laughable to somebody, but not any one human affair to everybody. We cannot push our laughter across certain group boundaries. A man was once asked why he did not weep at a sermon when everybody else was shedding tears. He replied, "I don't belong to the parish." What he meant, if translated into terms of humor, was that he did not see the joke. This is what we Americans mean when we say that the English have no "sense of humor." Of course, they can't see our jokes, at least the more subtle of them, because they do not belong to our parish; nor can we see theirs any more promptly. Many comic effects are incapable of translation into another language for this reason; so much depends upon local color. Laughter is, then, largely a function of the mores of each group. With this qualification in mind, we may proceed with Sully's list of laughable affairs. In one form or another we laugh at:

(a) Those features of human behavior characterized by oddity or novelty, in words, dress and action, and at whatever is exaggerated or made extravagant. For example, the clown's speech, dress and contortions.

(b) Deformities of some kinds, in the human frame, and the activities occasioned by them. Illustrations might be stuttering, a very large nose, extreme cases of bow-legs, freckles.

(c) Moral deformities of certain kinds; temper, vanity, conceit, porcine obstinacy, stupidity, excessive humility.

(d) Breaches of order and rule, if not too serious; for example, a very tall boy in a class, big words of little children, "all out of step but Jock," father's hat on the baby,—a classic example, Charley Chaplin's shoes.

(e) Small misfortunes such as people getting in a "fix," losing a hat or umbrella in the wind, the awkward and some-

what embarrassing situations, undignified demeanor of the haughty and lofty.

(f) The obscene, especially in the more vulgar circles.

(g) Pretense, make-believe, humbug, imposture, affectation, such as may be found skillfully treated in "Huck Finn."

(h) The lack of expected knowledge or skill, always the theme of clowns; doing wrongly as, for example, trying to hang up a coat where there is no hanger, and repeating it; linguistic mistakes of foreigners, bringing in irrelevancies, exhibiting prejudices.

(i) The incongruous, unfitting, illogical in relations and in argument. The attack on Evolution has largely been of this order.

(j) Verbal plays, witticisms, bon mots, clever turns of the phrase.

Summing up, Sully says, "Most, at least, of our laughter at the odd as opposed to the customary, at the deformed, at failure in good manners and other observances of social life, at defects of intelligence and of character, at 'fixes,' and misfortunes—so far as the situation implies want of knowledge—at the lack of perception of the fitness of things and at other laughable features, may undoubtedly be regarded as directed to something *which fails to comply with a social requirement*, yet is so trifling that we do not feel called upon to judge the shortcoming severely."¹¹ This is the central point for our discussion.

(4) Bergson, the French philosopher, has given this subject very earnest study and finds that the laughable in life may be summed up under the head "mechanical inelasticity." He says: "We must understand laughter in its environment which is society. The comic appears whenever a group of men concentrate their attention on one of their number, quiet their emotions and call into play pure

¹¹ *Op. cit.* 139.

intelligence. What is the point on which their attention will have to be concentrated? A man running along the street stumbles and falls; the passers-by burst out laughing. They would not laugh at him, I imagine, could they suppose that the whim had suddenly seized him to sit down on the ground. They laugh because his sitting down is involuntary. Consequently it is not his sudden change of attitude that raises the laugh, but rather the involuntary element in this change—his clumsiness, in fact. Perhaps there was a stone in the road. He should have altered his pace or avoided the obstacle. Instead of that, through lack of elasticity, through absent-mindedness and a kind of physical obstinacy, *as a result in fact of rigidity or momentum*, the muscles continued to perform the same movement when circumstances called for something else. That is the reason of the man's fall and also of the people's laughter."

After examining many cases of the laughable, he deduces certain laws relative to the comic in forms, movements and character.¹² With respect to the latter he concludes that "rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness and unsociability are all inextricably intertwined and all serve as ingredients to the making up of the comic." These characteristics are illustrated by the puppet customs officers who met the bedraggled, shipwrecked passengers and asked them "if they had anything to declare." One thinks also of the German policeman who, on meeting a lady emerging from a "verboten" park, compelled her to retrace her steps and go out where she entered, instead of giving her a lecture and letting her go.

These examples of the laughable will be quite sufficient to indicate those types of human affairs which people ordinarily find very comical. Our third problem is to study the effects of laughter and especially to point out how this force operates in the direction of social control.

¹² *Op. cit.* 23, 29, etc.

4. THE EFFECTS OF LAUGHTER

Testimony and illustration are not lacking concerning the effects of laughter. All writers agree that it is highly instrumental in society, and very efficiently so. Bergson speaks of "the utility of its function, which is a social one."¹³ It must have "social significance" and is a sort of "social gesture." It pursues the utilitarian aim of general improvement. So the comments multiply. We shall try to disclose the reasoning behind these conclusions.

The first type of evidence in support of our position that laughter functions in the fields of social control is found in the fact that *nobody likes to be laughed at*,—unless highly paid for it. This is so obvious that it needs only to be called to our attention. It is so important, however, that to neglect it would leave something to be desired in any argument. With this feature in mind, we may the better understand that laughter is an instrument aimed directly at this essentially human attitude. The task in hand, then, is to show that this instrument, agency, or force, what you will, is irregularly let loose against this tender spot and produces some important consequences. That is one side of it.

The other side is found in the equally obvious, but not to be neglected fact that everybody—agelasts, that is, non-laughers and misanthropes excepted—likes to laugh; and everybody likes to laugh *with* others. But in this case laughter is not something thrust against the raw, something with a sting or a paralyzing poison in it; it is a supporting bond, it is a tonic. In this case the laugher is uplifted while the laughed-at is depressed. Here we have our familiar pattern of social activities and attitudes, namely, attraction and repulsion. In the one case the effects, speaking in very broad categories for the moment, are in the nature of closer coöperation, solidarity, social

¹³ *Op. cit.* Cf. Sully. *Op. cit.* 154.

sympathy; while in the other they work for dispersion and dissolution. Laughing *with* people, attracts; laughing *at* people, repels. Whatever is given, therefore, in the following discussion will belong logically under one or the other of these heads, although no attempt will be made to so place it. In either case, let it be especially observed, social control is demonstrated.

A most important line of evidence helping us to cross the ever bothersome cause-effect chasm, we judge, is that of the investigator's experience and feeling. How does laughter affect him and his social relations? What does he do when laughter springs up in his neighborhood? If the laughers look directly at him while they laugh or have him informed that he is in mind all the while, what does he do? Does he join in and swell the chorus? We imagine that he does nothing of the kind. What does he do in the contrary case when laughing people are looking in some other direction and inform him that they are laughing at some other person? We imagine that the answer to this is clear.

We may generalize somewhat, then, from our own experience and not go far astray in assuming that where people laugh *together* at something else, they will feel and behave very differently from what they do when they laugh at each other. That the latter sort of laughter can arouse anger and revenge is suggested by Walpole.¹⁴ "The people were laughing, . . . for that he would never forgive Brandon as long as he lived." A man may go heroically against a strong wind, but that does not prove that he does not feel it keenly. Indeed, the forward projection of the body, the uncertain tread, the falterings and sallies, all go to show that he does feel it.

So it is with laughter. We never can tell just what happens inside people when they become the objects of laughter, but they often give revealing signs. A grit-

ting of the teeth in the face of a gale of laughter may be a sure sign that the tender spot has been reached. We should not expect too much, therefore, in the shape of convincing revealments.

Moreover, the chief results of laughter are largely negative, let us say. What occurs is mostly what does not occur, what is repressed, kept unborn. The positive aspect will not be neglected, of course, but the student is encouraged to use the imagination and picture to himself the heavy restraint which laughter exercises in its field, and also to picture what would occur in society could laughter be abolished for a time. All this will make for conviction favorable to the position here taken—laughter is a powerful social control device.

(1) There can be no reasonable doubt, we think, that laughter and the possibility of laughter inspires fear in many people.¹⁵ This, of course, is but a restatement of the obvious truth that people do not relish being laughed at. But there is an additional point to be remembered; fear is paralyzing in its effects. Then it follows that some people simply cannot go on against laughter as they go on against the wind; they are made helpless by it, and simply retire from view. This is saying something more than that they do not like it. Bergson believes that one of the functions of laughter "is to intimidate by humiliating," and we may say that humiliation is a near-paralysis condition conducive to a desire to sneak away and be out of it. It is a fact that fear makes some people stupid, and when the stupidity of persons and groups is under discussion, this fact must not be forgotten.

What does this mean from the point of view of human ingenuity? Why are there not more geniuses? Can any relation between laughter and this social lack be established? Has fear of being laughed at anything to do with it? We often find that the gifted are extremely sensitive.

¹⁵ Sidis. *The Psychology of Laughter*. 51.

They are most easily assailed through the fear-complex. But if we are inclined to assume that this is somewhat far-fetched, we may take another tack. There can hardly be any doubt that infinitely more wild fanaticisms, eccentric notions and crack-brained undertakings would be launched upon society were not the loud laugh that speaks the conservative mind always on tap. Now, since so many ideas and inventions turn out to be "lucky hits," that is to say, the products of minds not known to be unusual, it is not difficult to see that, rearranging affairs just a little, another set of innovations would also be "finds." At any rate, the fear that laughter evokes is not inspiring and illuminating; it does not encourage invention.

We surmise that the crowd of innovators is always with us and would be in greater numbers but for the laughter-potential. Most of their innovations are repudiated at first. Some of them are definitely bad. It is very valuable to have something that can nip these in the bud. Often the law cannot reach them until they have grown to the point of positive menace. But laughter is instantaneously operative; it never sleeps; it is the ready means which society uses to avenge itself of liberties taken with it.¹⁶ Special cases of all sorts show this. The budding speaker, the incipient inventor, the hopeful writer, the comic entrepreneur, the uplifter, the class-jumper, the long-haired prophet, all sooner or later feel the paralyzing effects of laughter, if a heavier hand is not placed upon them. Laughter is ever their Nemesis, watchful and unfeeling. They know this; they are brought up with it; they may have daily evidence of it if they wish to experiment; and they usually do experiment with relatives, neighbors or comrades—and get laughed at for their craziness more than they get encouraged for their ingenuity. This is, and always has been, the common lot of the innovators.

(2) With this in mind we may shift the position slightly

¹⁶ Bergson. *Op. cit.* 197.

and say that laughter operates to repress separatist tendencies. To be understandable and to be able to work together most people are located within certain fairly well-defined classifications or categories. These are a part of the social system. Any new form of conduct is a threat against these classifications and it tends towards dislocation and disorder; it throws the social system out of gear. There is no conceivable order that would suit everybody. Jumping these classifications is regular exercise for certain more obtuse or conceited persons, and would be for millions but for the restraints, of which laughter is one.

It is clear that every vice, conceit and form of vanity is separatist in promise. The college boy returns to his native village with "airs," that is, out of his usual class; the girl just back from Europe with some new gesture or mode of speech, is in a new rôle; the people cannot make her out; the politician utters some new shibboleths which the people cannot quite grasp; he is in a new and undefined class.

This is really what we mean by eccentricity; it is a going about new poles; it represents, so the "herd" thinks, an abandonment of the old loyalties and routine and has within it the seeds of revolution. It may presage a bolt-ing mass movement from church, state, or social class, a divisive and weakening sally. There may be no illegality—as yet; nothing that the minions of the law can touch. But it promises something different, something incomprehensible; no one knows where it will lead.

What sort of reply can the faithful make? Without some corrective force, such as laughter, the movement might easily imperil the welfare of the group. Laughter is one of the first replies; others of another sort may follow and will follow if warning is not taken. Laughter intervenes at once; cartoons fall like hail; jokes fly about on the crest of gossip; the stage flares up in lurid protest, and so the

dreaded thing is squelched. Laughter, then, is a factor in social conservation.

But there is a contrary danger—over-rigidity. In their zeal for order the faithful clamp the system down tight and scotch the innovators indiscriminately. Nobody must move out of the prescribed ways in business, creed, or loyalty. The division of labor, the stratification of classes, trade co-ordinations, etc., all spell out in the long run an implacable system. But this makes the social structure unadaptable, implastic and hopeless. Such a system inevitably follows the ancient mammoths—to extinction.

Now as Bergson has suggested, rigidity and automatism are essentially laughable. What help is there for such a condition except to laugh at the over-zealous routineers going about their punctilious service of maintaining the *status quo*? Under such circumstances, the professional comics are let loose and assigned to this cleansing work.¹⁷ And they succeed, to some degree, by giving this objectionable thing its necessary logic—in comedy.

But laughter itself, as many have seen, is essentially of separatist disposition. It bespeaks detachment and superiority, if not caustic criticism. The laugher, in the very act of laughing, places himself apart from the thing laughed at. "Society is right," says Sully, "in her intuitive feeling that an unbridled laughter threatens her order and laws."¹⁸ From which it would follow that when people begin to laugh and continue to laugh at the politicians and their methods, at laws and their interpretations, at conventions and their requirements, at order and its rigidity, the social system is already in process of dissolution. It would seem as if the ancient Roman authorities feared something of this sort when they developed a censorship against the introduction of comedy from Athens. The tell-tale feature

¹⁷ Cf. Bergson. *Op. cit.* 176.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* 418.

of the prohibition is in the requirement that the scene of the play had always to be laid outside the city of Rome, as if to guard against attacks on Roman institutions and persons. So was it also with the medieval clergy who feared defection within the church because of the liberties taken by the comedians. Here we have illustrations of the fact that tyrants have no sense of humor.

If laughter may itself become detached from the social order and set itself up in opposition, what corrective force may be released against it? As yet there seems to be none available. You cannot reason with laughter; you cannot extinguish it, for efforts directed thereto seem but more funny.

(3) Laughter is a prophylactic against contamination from without. The ancient Hebrew authorities made much fun of the foreign religions and manners and thus endeavored to keep the people pure.¹⁹ That they did not fully succeed may be shown by many references in the Old Testament. But they greatly retarded the fusion of cultures in this way. And, in the use of this means of protection they have had an uninterrupted line of descendants.

No better illustration of the point is needed than the late controversy over Evolution. What has been the usual procedure adopted by the faithful to guard the unsuspecting? It is undoubtedly true that many able and honest leaders and thinkers have defended orthodoxy on grounds of reason and fact. But allowing full weight for all of this, there always has been a large element of comedy in the work of the guardians. Much of the popular hostility against evolution and much of the solidarity within the ranks of the "faithful" has been due to fun-making. The leaders have not overlooked the fact that to make something—idea or practice—comical is to make it something that the masses will not adopt; the simple reason being, as we have already said, that nobody likes to be laughed

¹⁹ Sully. *Op. cit.* 256.

at. The idea that "man is descended from a monkey" has been embroidered on and elaborated to such an extent that millions have just shut their eyes to all scientific evidence. For be it remembered that the figure of the monkey is one of the oldest symbols of caricature. Had it been believed that man descended from some other animal the symbol of which had not been so long associated with laughter, this type of prophylactic would not have had so much "punch" in this particular controversy. As the matter has turned out, laughter has scared off some and closed the minds of others so that "the faith once for all delivered to the saints" remains quite unadulterated in many quarters.

If laughter may serve to keep religion pure, to a degree, it may also serve in other departments of social life. In America ideas like socialism, communism and others have been attacked with laughter, and crowds of people have been driven from positions of impartial consideration. Facts and arguments have been skillfully arrayed against them, to be sure; but these facts and arguments are unknown to the masses. The most effectual attack has come from those with a more or less—mostly less—refined gift for making such notions laughable. The fear of infection has been real, in America, and no restraining hand has been placed upon the cartoonists, paragraphers, witty lectures, story-telling preachers and stand-pat professors, to stop their fun-making so that these social issues might be considered on their merits. Of course, the radicals have employed all their laughter gifts in reply.

One of the clearest examples of the use of this prophylactic is in the field of manners. Its force is most effectual in turning back the tide from foreign shores. Take the forms of speech, table etiquette, dress and the like. These are always ready to slip across boundary lines and take up their abode in other lands along with foreigners. How is culture purity to be saved to any degree from complete inundation as in the case of the United States, where

foreigners form a third of the population? You cannot reason against these things. But you can laugh and that is enough to keep the village from going over entirely to some new thing. Peals of laughter greeted the introduction of the fork into England by the "gallants of the Restoration."²⁰ As a consequence many were slow to use it. This is only an illustration of what is usual. Notice the fun made over immigrant language and dress; witness the hilarity unloosed athwart the foreign "airs" assumed by returned travelers. Not that the laughers *think* of preserving culture purity at all; that is not the way to see the matter. They just have their "risibles" awakened by these innovations and let go. The total result, looked at *after the fact*, is this line of defense against foreign infection.

Yet, if the acculturation process or fashion-exchange goes on, penetrates the defense line and becomes the "vogue" we find laughter, fickle mistress, veering about and applying itself to whipping into line the recalcitrants. This is most clearly seen in the realm of fashion. When the style is safely conducted from Paris and has "caught on" in this country, then laughter gets after those who are "out of style." "Look at that ridiculously long skirt!" "How perfectly silly that hat looks!" "What a grotesque thing that wrap is!" So laughter speaks its mind, for these words "silly" "grotesque" "outrageous" and many more are laughter words.

(4) If laughter has served and does serve as a protection against contamination from without, it is equally effectual and vigorous in testing innovations arising *within* any group. This point has already been under observation in discussing the repression of separatist tendencies. Of course the line of argument under this head is precisely the same as that already used. In reality everything new is from outside the particular area of the laughers, how-

²⁰ Cf. Ward. *English Dramatic Poets*. 2: 401.

ever large or small the area may be. With respect to foreigners, the area of the laughers is the nation or the race; with respect to political novelties it will be the party; relative to religious inventions it will be the sect; relative to city fads and fancies, it will be the rural districts. There is always an outside and an inside to every situation. People who originate do not laugh at their own originality. Other people do that.

What we have to notice, then, is that laughter is a test applied to all innovations proposed within any given group, say city, political party, church, or boys' gang. As will be clear to all, each unit is intent upon its own self-preservation and generally is not, as a group, in search of novel ideas and practices. If new things appear, laughter greets them one and all, and if they can survive the onslaught, the combat with the first line of defense, they may be recorded as having some merit and may be gradually commended to the people. Besides, laughter loses its tang after a time and novelties may endure to a time when they are no longer funny.

Forgetting for the time being a large amount of indiscriminate injustice at this point, we may note that new things ought, as a rule, to be tested, to be "ragged." Otherwise, with the amount of dissatisfaction that always prevails, the blear-eyed, crack-brained fanatics would overturn the world. Laughter is a warning that what is suggested by way of novelty, will surely have to meet some tests and there is in it the tenderest possible hint of worse things to follow unless the innovators guard their offerings. There is a very large element of public safety in this method. It is a soft answer to all neomanias and their manias. When once tested, however, and the people are assured that the propositions are not dangerous and possibly are desirable, laughter turns about and scourges away the old. Thus laughter aids social progress.

(5) Laughter is also a spur to action; it is a sharp and

telling prod to the listless and slow. "It is laughter, ridicule," says Sidis, "that arouses the spirit out of its torpor, gives the slumbering soul a shock, stings the spirit into action and further development. When man or society falls into mental turpitude it is the whip of ridicule that lashes it into mental awakening and further work."²¹ These persons are ever the butt of fun in all sections. There is, for instance, the slightly malicious laughter of the male at female incompetence in games, in ability to run, to throw a ball, to wrestle, as may be seen in the schoolboy's treatment of his sister—a theme well illustrated through literature, or the laughter of women at men doing the housework or holding the baby.²² Many stories have come down to us from the Middle Ages of the efforts of laughter to bolster up the clergy to normal levels of decency and honesty. Molière made a brave attempt to "screw up" the physicians of his time; Dickens, the schoolmasters. So it is that the fun-makers are ever on the trail of public functionaries to energize them and demand efficiency and intelligence. Oceans of laughter have been poured out on the "absent-minded professor" for the many comical situations into which this absent-mindedness has thrust him.

(6) As might be surmised, from all that has been said so far, laughter is a powerful aid in developing and retaining social co-operation. First of all it is very contagious. People laugh readily when others do and only the slightest occasion is needed. They laugh whether they see the point or not, and thus put themselves on the side of, and in sympathy with, those who start the fun, and in opposition to those who happen to be the object of it. This, of course, is imitation; but all know the very large part imitation plays in establishing and maintaining harmonious relations.

Being very contagious and joyously imitated, laughter spreads over wide areas and while emotionless or nearly so,

²¹ Sidis. *Psychology of Laughter*. 255 ff.

²² Sully. *Op. cit.* 260-262.

so far as objects of the laughter are concerned, evokes the kindest feelings for those in the circle. People who are in agreement intellectually, can further harmonize themselves in laughter. This force has much to do with the softening of animosities, the cooling off of rising indignation, the dissolving of contempt, in all sorts of public gatherings. It frequently enables meetings and committees to continue to function when otherwise they would break up. Laughter offers a unique opportunity for naturally stubborn or proud people to hold on in spite of having been worsted in the argument or the voting. A good story or a clever turn diverts attention, breaks the deadlock, makes opportunity for another beginning and enables people to forget and pass on without feeling that they have "given in." An *argumentum ad risum*, "argument to laughter," has been the means of saving many a committee, many a convention, from futility.

Laughter awakens the desire to please, in committees, in the family and in the local community. After all, "those who can laugh at the same thing must have something in common," they may argue with themselves, "and therefore why should we quarrel?" Sully thinks the practice of laughing together is a great promoter of social sympathy.²³ It is certain that the lecturers, entertainers and others who went to the front to keep the boys cheered up did much more than can ever be estimated towards linking the boys together, helping them to submit gladly to hateful officers, etc.

We have already noted that laughter helps to soften down the rigidity that ever crystallizes in human relations. But rigidity is only a form of seriousness and solemnity on the side of temperament. Laughter helps to relieve this strain by pushing folks, against their will it may be, into undignified postures and ridiculous alignments to which, after having yielded, they may the more joyously give

²³ *Op. cit.* 417.

themselves up. They thus "tune in" with the prevailing good nature and become tolerant and companionable.

(7) Laughter is especially serviceable as a *group corrective* in many ways. This will be quite apparent from what has already been said. Another point, however, may be noticed in this connection. In the chapter on satire it was noted that laughter and criticism are the "left" and "right," so to speak, of that instrument, and therefore seemingly opposed. But there is no necessary contradiction. Laughter is the assumption of a superior position in the group and therefore is a criticism of everything inferior, just as a flower-bed is a criticism of ugly surroundings; just as a good citizen is a criticism of a bad one. Laughter is a withdrawal upwards and therefore is a condemnation of all below it.

For another thing, laughter starts self-criticism. When we find that people are laughing at us we are very dense if we do not ask, "What is wrong with me?" "Why do they laugh?" Reflection is started. If the comic in character is essentially absent-mindedness, then laughter recalls the absent-minded to themselves, wakes them up out of their sleep-walking, restores them to the proper part. "What life and society require of each of us," says Bergson, "is a constantly alert attention that discerns the outlines of the present situation, together with a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adapt ourselves in consequence."²⁴ If laughter served no other purpose in society it would be of incalculable value as a means of social control.

In addition, as Bergson says, it "corrects men's manners. It makes us at once endeavor to appear what we ought to be, what someday we shall perhaps end in being." This work is accomplished because our admiration of ourselves is so intimately bound up with, and dependent upon, others' admiration of us.

²⁴ *Op. cit.* 18.

Popular laughter represents, most of all, the "common sense" point of view. This point of view is the pivot around which our lives are supposed to swing. If some swing out too far in dress, speech or other behavior, laughter goes over them like the farmer's "header" over the grain, decapitating the presumptuous ignoramus who, by thus varying, criticizes the central position.

Another picture would present laughter as a social purgative. Our imaginations are incapable of picturing the social accumulation of impedimenta in culture. Laughter helps to purge out the useless, the unprofitable, the outworn. Aristophanes' comedy helped to push over the tottering mythology of his day, and the mirth of Cervantes was a factor in disintegrating the lifeless chivalry and hollow feudalism of his time. All the way along and all the way through laughter helps to give the *coup de grace* to mere baggage.

It is a castigator of vices and follies and extravagances of any age. In this realm we may see laughter as a skillful craftsman. If there is one particular function assigned to it and if there is one particular vice which is anathema to it, vanity is that vice and the cure of vanity is that function. For vanity is the one human failing that is irresistibly laughable, since it is the most conspicuous and disgusting form of rigidity and unadaptability.²⁵ The vain person is the conceited person, learning nothing, but always laboring mechanically upwards to a position of superiority and dominance. Vanity is a conceit so dense and so noxious that only one specific can touch it. The only reply to such artificial and repellent pretensions in prolonged and inclusive laughter.

It is clear, then, that laughter is a method of maintaining group ascendancy by the method of attacking all insincere, individual claims, pretensions and novelties. No individual can laugh his way to leadership, but once there by hon-

²⁵ Cf. Bergson. *Op. cit.* 174.

est means, he may be unhorsed in a day for insincerity, pretension, conceit—in short, vanity.

(8) If laughter operates *directly* as a means of social control, as we have seen, it operates *indirectly* by affording a comparatively harmless method of “blowing off steam.” The social régime may easily become too rigid and repressive and may not yield to any corrective pressures. Under such circumstances energy, which is indefinitely restrained and suppressed, or which projects itself ineffectually against the system, may be released in a most damaging explosion. Laughter drains it off in a non-dangerous and even delightful manner. Sometimes this is done in connection with sports or popular singing. In this form, laughter is a gay reversion to the freedom of childhood whereupon the heavy hand of control has not yet been laid.²⁶ Such relief makes an otherwise unendurable existence quite tolerable. It is one method of escape. The prison regimen, the office routine, the kitchen drudgery, the army discipline, the church authority—all these may be forgotten by means of laughter. People whose stiff pugnacity and determined resistance are thus dissolved, become more amenable to other forms of social control.

Laughter may thus be used as a “moral holiday,” a vacation, an orgy, if one may so describe it, after which the old paths are resumed quite voluntarily and contentedly. Had much laughter not accompanied the struggle for woman suffrage and similar struggles all down through the centuries, the energy dammed up by the various obstructions would have been released with cyclonic destructiveness in many more cases than are now recorded.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The objects of laughter and something of its method we now have before us. With reference to its effects we

²⁶ Cf. Schmalhausen. “Some Marginal Notes on Laughter,” *Open Court*. 35: 361 ff.

frankly admit that the argument has been largely theoretical; we have not succeeded in getting clearly before us the exact details of the follow-through process as the scientist likes to see them. We have shown what laughter *ought* to do in society, rather than what it actually does accomplish. This is to fall far short of what is desirable, but the detailed evidence for anything better is not yet collected.

The particular research difficulty can now be set out. The precise function, we said, is to correct vanity. But does it actually achieve that result? Here is a very vain man. He is laughed at from all quarters. Does that laughter cure him and restore him to normal group relations, that is, does it control him? How would one obtain the evidence and what kind of evidence would one seek? The vain man never admits that he is vain. Consequently he never admits that he is being laughed at. Or if he did discover that he was the object of the laughter he would not agree that he took any notice of it. How much farther could an investigation be carried? If it were discovered that, coincidentally with the outburst of laughter, this vain man turned from his evil ways and became more sociable, the problem would still be to prove that laughter had been the chief cause of his conversion.

So it would be with the vicious, the fanatical, the excessively humble, the pompous, the pretentious—all essentially laughable characters. They do not admit these defects. They do not admit being the objects of laughter. They never would admit, when cured, that laughter had cured them. It thus appears that infinitely more research, of the purely experimental type is needed before we can make positive and final statements relative to the precise effects of laughter.

The argument for effects and for efficiency must, therefore, take this form. People never like to be laughed at—that is universally admitted. They will, therefore, avoid

doing, at least to some extent, the things that call down laughter upon them. They will avoid the poses, the pretensions, and the mock heroics which they *themselves* have found laughable in others, for they will feel sure that the same features in themselves would excite merriment in others. The convincing fact here is that we are all both the laughers and the laughed-at. We can argue, then, not merely from one side. We have had experience as subject and object. We can ourselves be the judges of what laughter accomplishes in others if we but transfer to them the type of feeling which we have experienced under similar circumstances.

In a general way it seems clear that laughter can suppress, but it cannot construct. It can dissuade men from doing this, but cannot always persuade them to do that, except as doing this is involved in *not* doing that. It may discourage them from making exasperating fools of themselves, but that it hounds them on to intelligence is not so clear. It tells people what to do chiefly by a process of elimination.

Its efficiency, in comparison with other means of control, cannot yet be made out. Here is a large field for further study in a manner not unlike that of the physicians who test out various kinds of medicine in the patient, or the psychologists who measure the reaction-time for different stimuli.

As to the tendency of laughter in the future we may report Sully's conclusion to the effect that the good old-fashioned choral laughter is on the wane. The general direction seems to be towards humor or individual laughter, which may easily go into cynicism.²⁷ This may be the direction of evolution of the laughter attitude or a description of what is taking place in the realm of its means of expression. It does seem obvious that new instruments for the expression of laughter are ever appearing. It also

²⁷ *Op. cit.* 297, 428.

seems clear that people laugh as much as ever. Sully has suggested that there is an increase of the intellectual element. But this may only be because he adopted the activity theory and therefore saw little of this element to begin with. Bergson, on the other hand holds that laughter was never without this element, indeed, was never anything else than pure intellect.

CHAPTER XII

CALLING NAMES

“**W**HAT’S in a name?” Apparently nothing according to the lovely Juliet for, she continued, “that which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.”

But would it? As a matter of fact it would *not*, since the names and the sensible qualities of objects, once vividly associated in experience, are not wholly separable thereafter; the tendency to anticipate takes care of that. Juliet herself gave unwitting expression to a certain misgiving. “’Tis but thy name that is mine enemy.” There was, then, something in a name—at least in Romeo’s name. It evidently, stood for a detested family lineage and reputation, due to inculcation, the Montagues and the Capulets having long been enemies. “Thou art thyself, though not a Montague,” she argued, silencing her misgiving—rationalizing. But “not a Montague,” then a very different self, a person with another heredity, status and outlook. It would seem that there is much in names although, as will appear, there is a great deal more in some than in others.

What would our communication be without the naming device? No one can imagine the confusion that would exist. How could people be reached and objects located in the absence of this art? Suppose a gentleman is in an audience and has to be reached. With our present naming system it is simple to have the chairman call for Mr. So-and-so. At most the identity might be confused between two or three.

In the absence of names, a long and exhaustively detailed description of the party would have to be given. If we wished to send a telegram to a man in California but did not

know his name, we should have to send a minute characterization so that the messenger, looking with our eyes, could locate him in any group. We would have to say: "This message is for the short, plump man, with black, wavy hair, brown eyes, a dimple in his chin, a gay little mustache, fat hands," etc. But hundreds of men in California might be so described unless we went into that nicety of detail where only a scientist would be at home. Moreover, a change of dress, a hair-cut, a shaving of the beard and many other customary modifications of appearance would throw the searcher off the trail. It would require a scientist to write an identifying description and it would require a scientist to make the identification.

"There is a petrified philosophy in language," says Max Müller, "and if we examine the most ancient word for 'name' we find it in *naman* in Sanskrit, *nomen* in Latin, *namo* in Gothic. This *naman* stands for *gnaman* and is derived from the root *gna*, to know, and meant originally that by which we know a thing. And how do we know things?"

"The first step toward real knowledge, a step which, however small in appearance, separates man forever from all other animals, is *the naming of a thing* or making a thing knowable. All naming is classification, bringing the individual under the general; and whatever we know, whether empirically or scientifically, we know it by means of our general ideas."¹

1. NAMING PROCESSES

The name, then, has always been a sound or series of sounds by which objects or persons are circulated in communication; it has always been a symbol, the meaning and importance of which in human affairs we have already suggested but shall now examine more minutely, giv-

¹ *Science of Language*. 1: 520.

ing attention to one particular phase of the usage. There are many types of naming processes and names. We mention four in this connection merely to help in distinguishing the particular form selected for study.

(1) There are those purely empty and arbitrary symbols by which most of us are called and known. We are "John" or "Tom" or "John Smith" or "John Adolphus Smith" or "John Alexander Adolphus Smith" or something of the sort. Such terms are merely hollow verbal conveniences to facilitate intercommunication. They are conventional names.

Numbers would do as well, since they also are empty and arbitrary devices, if the population of the nation or world were always small, such as a prison population. But when units mount up into the millions or billions, numbering becomes unwieldy. It would be very unhandy to be known in everyday intercourse as "Nine hundred and ninety thousand and seven." If each country had a numbering system of its own, emigration would work endless confusion. If there were only one system for the globe, then some luckless mortal would perpetually labor under the heavy cognomen, "One billion, five hundred and eighty-seven million, two hundred and forty-six thousand, nine hundred and seventy-seven." This would be too much; he could not endure it; society would be wrecked by such an arrangement.

Proper names and surnames, therefore, are the most convenient and economical devices available, as experience has shown. They are so serviceable in part, because they are capable of almost unlimited combinations. Their arbitrariness is also an excellent feature. As much may be said, also, for their colorlessness. *Any* man might be called "John" or "Jerry"; any woman might be "Janet" or "Pauline." Such names are universally becoming and yet are sufficiently distinguishing.

(2) Names are also scientific, that is, characterizing.

This means that they are not arbitrary and hollow, but rather appropriate and full of significance; they are revealing symbols. A term like "moron" or "Homo Sapiens" or "Pithecanthropus erectus" is assigned only after prolonged analysis. It is no impromptu designation. It is not a symbol with a meaningless center and frayed edges. It always has as precise and permanent a connotation as investigators can put into it; and it will fit nothing else. There is only one object or class of objects or persons accurately pointed out by scientific names. The term "John" does not reveal anything as to the nature of the man, sex excepted. One does not know whether to run, remain submissive or assume a defiant attitude relative to a "John" or a "John Smith." A scientific name, however, helps in defining the situation. To know that a man is called a "moron" has vastly greater significance for our behavior than to know that he is called "Tom." For, as Max Müller said, all naming is classification and scientific naming is the most deliberate and accurate kind of classification we know anything about. This is an incalculable aid to behavior, since familiarity with a class enables us to make inferences regarding the individual members.

(3) Many names are purely honorific. They are given as indices of popularly developed value-judgments. Their assignment is an evidence that some very estimable qualities are possessed by the objects or persons. For example, there are such terms as "citizen," "hero," "philanthropist," "scientist," "leader," "thinker," "crackerjack," "wizard," "ace," and "champion."

Now such names are not scientific designations but yet are revealing. They do not come from exhaustive analysis and yet they help us in defining our attitudes toward the person so named. They are often inaccurate, coming as they do from the popular mind; but they invite closer approach.

(4) We come finally to a large class of names which might be set in opposition to the honorific list in that they do not fire the aspirations of the named and so exalt them, but rather depress and discourage. They are terms of disrespect, disgust, contempt, reproach, hatred, repudiation and warning. Professor Ross calls these "humilific."

These names are unlike the first class mentioned in being assigned, for the most part, by the public at large whereas the "given" name is assigned by parents and guardians, and the surname, being a *sirename* comes as a matter of course. They are unlike the second class in origin and meaning, the origin being the people as contrasted with the scientist, and the content being indefinite as compared with the definite—the public being notoriously inaccurate in its designations. They are unlike the third class in being derogatory and degrading, in opposition to that which is complimentary and elevating.

There are likenesses, however, between this fourth class and the others. These derogatory appellations are similar to the first class in that the assignment comes soon after birth. When a child is born it soon receives a name. When an innovator (of the disapproved sort) appears he likewise soon receives a name. There is a similarity also to the second group in that a disclosure, an exhibition, of a socially significant feature is intended. Likeness to the third class is found in the source of the names—the public.

Our social order would fall to pieces if, by some accident, names of the first class were forgotten. But much confusion still remains because these purely formal and arbitrary names are inadequate to the increasing necessities of nice discrimination. Hence the formal names are lavishly supplemented, all the while, to make the control more complete. An amusing illustration of this supplementation may be given from a community well known to the writer. This community was honored—or dishonored,

as the case may be—by the presence of three men owning the name of “Jim Brown.” This was very confusing in conversation. Being indistinguishable by given name, these men became known and everywhere mentioned as “Little Jim,” “Baldy Jim” and “Devil Jim” respectively. Webb tells us also that the common sergeant of London in 1810 was Sir John Sylvester, commonly known as “Bloody Black Jack” in commemoration of his aggressions against the printers.² Another familiar example is “Bloody Mary.”

It should be observed further that names popularly assigned point out or aim to point out features vitally significant for social relations. There is no interest, such as the scientist has, in logic as such. To say that a man is a “mutt” or that a girl is a “flapper” may be very inconsequential from the standpoint of classification in *nature*; but when these names are appropriate the greatest possible importance attaches to them from the standpoint of classification in society.

We have before us, then, a method of control, a very ancient and universal folkway, a very “natural” practice. It used to be known among the school-children as “calling names.” Probably no more accurate designation can be found. The tendency, once language is acquired, seems almost as natural as eating. As we shall see, all peoples have the practice and all ages and classes employ it. Being a human usage of such universal prevalence there are sound reasons for seeking further light upon its nature and purpose. Accordingly we wish to (1) give ample illustrations of the practice, showing something of its origin and development and offer some suggestions as to classification, and (2) conduct a brief study of its meaning. The difficulties of classification are very great for large numbers of these terms are vague in meaning and of local distribution. On the other hand the problem of inter-

² *History of Trade Unionism.* 79.

pretation is not insoluble. We might call this chapter a study in epithetocracy.

2. CLASSIFICATION

(1) The orthodox religionists, true or self-appointed guardians of the faith, have always been alert to detect deviations from type and ready to hurl epithets. The most frequently heard are "blasphemer," "heretic," "scoffer," "iconoclast," "atheist," "freethinker," "skeptical," and many more. On the opposite side we can see the challenged line up and make equally reproachful rejoinders. We have heard them cry back "bigot," "Pharisee," "Puritan," "sabbatarian," "ranter," "precisian," "bluenose," and "reactionary." The disciples were called *Christians* first at Antioch (Acts 11:26), and quite probably this designation was not intended as a compliment.

(2) From a satisfied and secure economic position are hurled such names as "socialist," "syndicalist," "bandit," "Bill Sikes," "deadbeat," "scoundrel," "wage slave," "menial," "hireling," "serf," and others more picturesque but unmentionable. In 1871 seven women were imprisoned in South Wales merely for saying "Bah" to one "blackleg."³ The late Walter Rathenau says: "A fifth class is now emerging—the work-shy." The others call them the tramp-proletariat, the disgruntled, the declassed, who set their hopes on disorder. Their goal is still undetermined, their favorite expression is "bloodhound" when those in power or government troops are referred to.⁴ Here we have an indication of the retorts made by those so maligned. The economically insecure call back "rent-hog," "profiteer," "parasite," "slave-driver." The Russians have a name, "nepman," for those who have become enriched by the new economic policy.

³ Webb. *History of Trade Unionism*. 284.

⁴ *The New Society*. 56.

(3) Closely associated with the economic epithets just suggested are the political. These are especially prominent in times of war or other political excitements. Then the meticulously patriotic start out a large flock of hateful appellations such as "radicals," "Bolsheviks," "traitors," "alien enemy," "agitator," "revolutionist," "pacifist," "insurrectionist," "Red" and many more. The term "sansculotte" was given by the French to the violent republicans. The terms "Wobbly," "Syndicalist," "Parlor Bolshevik," and others usually have as much economic as political significance.

But of course the wounded do not fail to reply. We hear of "standpatter," "routineer," "tyrant," "conservative," "obstructionist," "demagogue," "Bourbon" and others of a similar type in reply. The French "Journal L'Opinion" (March 16, 1923) says: "During the war we called the Germans 'Boches,' while for the English they were 'Huns.' Now the Germans have invented a new name for us which mostly pleases them, namely 'Apaches,' and their papers are filled with the atrocities committed by the 'Apaches' in the Ruhr." So it is that political opponents have not ignored the art of name-calling.

(4) From the military parties come the hounding and re-sounding designations "deserter," "traitor," and "coward." The trade unionists fall on any one of their own ranks who takes work when others strike, with the loathsome word "scab" which can hardly be surpassed for fullness of contempt and hatred. Stanch Puritan moralists call out "Sabbath-breakers," "libertines," to those not quite so strict in their discipline. Teachers are wont to belabor their pupils with "dolts," "blockheads," "dullards," and "idiots." The amorphous public continues a veritable machine-gun fire in the form of "simpleton," "ninny," "loon," "nincompoop," "chucklehead," "ignoramus," "dumb-bell," "saphead," "mullethead." Of course those named have not been silent.

(5) Males are sometimes heard to demean each other by classification within the opposite sex, or at least the ascription of terms indicative of certain feminine characteristics. Such are "skirt," "old hen," "poor dame," "old woman." It is not certain but probably the names "snuggle-puppies" and "tea-hounds" and others of the later fashions are more or less crude attempts to accomplish this re-sexing.

(6) There are also the age-categories into which certain people are tucked by re-naming. When adults behave in certain ways they are called "babies," "cripples," "ducklings," "colts," "lambs," "weaklings," or "goslings." When the older folks grow impatient with the youngsters they emphasize infantile characteristics by calling out, "cry-babies," "sniffers," "whimperers." The young retort with "grandfathers," "graybeards," "baldheads." The following example not only illustrates the point but shows the antiquity of the practice as well. And Elisha "went up from thence into Bethel; and as he was going up by the way, there came forth young lads out of the city, and mocked him, and said unto him, 'Go up, thou baldhead; go up, thou baldhead.'"

(7) There are innumerable names for the physically and mentally defective. Attention might be directed to the flow of references to physical oddities. We hear of "red-heads," "cross-eyes," "hunchbacks," "stutterers," "bow-legs," "freckles," "beaknose," "putty-face," "pinhead," "squint-eyes." No defect is overlooked, and there has been merciless cruelty displayed, as if the possession of the peculiarities were not a heavy enough burden.

(8) One of the oldest of practices is that of framing suitable epithets for foreigners. The wide diversities in appearance and manners presenting themselves in the persons of strangers have taxed the ingenuities of persistent name-callers to a quite extraordinary degree. As a result we learn of "pig-eaters," "cow-eaters," "uncircumcised,"

"barbarian," "jabberer," "bohunk," "wap," "chink," "greaser." Ethnographical works furnish lists sufficient to supplement what may be heard in any city.⁵

(9) The efforts of city people to classify their country cousins produce many comical but none the less derogatory terms such as "rube," "hayseed," "clodhopper," "muck-worm" and "swain." But the "rustics" have not been slow in reply. For them, the towns are filled with "up-starts," "parvenus," "adventurers," "gents," "prigs," "swells," "clever guys," "fops," and "smart sets." The egotists are "cormorants," "vampires," "leeches," "vultures," "vipers," "toads," "spiders," and "vermin."⁶

(10) It is useless to try to exhaust the list so we pause to observe that a satisfactory classification of these terms is impossible.⁷ One might start with the *source* and discover that wherever there is any "we-feeling," and "consciousness of kind," and there are groups defining themselves in relation to others, the naming practice is certain to arise. One might essay a classification on the basis of degree of deprecatory feeling involved, naming such categories as the innocent laughter terms, the satirical, the hateful and those expressive of revenge. But this would not be nearly complete and many current terms could not be located within such a scheme. Inability to solve the problem of classification, however, should not nullify our efforts to take hold of the practice and gain a useful grasp of it. Certain broad conclusions stand out. High moral scruples and pretensions, either of persons or groups, do not seem to discourage the name-calling practice. It is clear, also, that excitement and disorder exaggerate the usage and carry it past mere jocularly and sarcasm into the most pronounced hatred and revenge. There is no feature more obvious than that no variation, great or

⁵ Sumner. *Folkways*. 13. Ross. *Principles of Sociology*. 413.

⁶ Ross. *Social Control*. 262.

⁷ Ross. *Principles of Sociology*. 413.

small, goes unnoticed and unnamed, objectionable variations least of all.

(11) It must be remembered, in addition, that there are quantities of ugly names which *cannot be printed* and therefore, in this writing, called to our attention. But serious reflection upon this usage will not leave such entirely out of consideration. We cannot omit saying that whatever generalizations are made for the ones mentioned are also equally applicable for the unmentionable. And we may further point out that, as control devices, these latter are the crudest and cruelest of all.

(12) Examination of the *users* of derogatory names discloses at least three types. First, there are those persons who employ this practice merely as a means of exploding more or less harmlessly. An intelligent lady was reminded of this practice and then asked if she ever adopted it and if so, why. She reflected a moment, and then admitted that she did, adding, "Oh, it is just a form of relief." Such it undoubtedly is many times. A second group includes those blind imitators of the blind who follow any hint or lead. Many of these terms are "catchy" by reason of sound, circumstance of application, or appropriateness. They are taken up almost unconsciously and passed about by those who have little idea of their meaning. Many names are classed as slang.⁸ It would be very difficult for many people to define or describe "flapper," "petter," "fuzzy-wuzzy," "drug-store cow-boy," and hundreds of others. Thirdly, there are the deliberate coiners and users of these epithets, those who constitute the backbone of the practice, and who have a rather clearly-defined purpose in mind. It is with this group that we are especially concerned.

In this connection, an important distinction must be stressed. The use of ugly epithets is largely the practice of the stupid and the ignorant—no matter what the social

⁸ Cf. McKnight. *English Words and their Background*. 37.

position—who are unable to think up arguments with which decently to combat social variation. On the other hand, a moment's reflection will show that those, at least, of the variants who vary on principle, who usually behave in an intelligent manner, make very slight use of this instrument; it is a trifling weapon to them. Name-hurling, then, is a practice of the stupid and ignorant *many* to control the individual who is "other," that is, a "heretic"; it is a device of the animal herd.

3. THE MEANING OF THE PRACTICE

The problem of interpretation, that is, answering the question of motive and meaning, may be solved in part by following six lines of inquiry. (1) Looking back into past and rather primitive usage, we find that this folkway was regarded as a *protective* device against the assaults of the Evil Eye. At the risk of introducing what Mr. H. G. Wells calls an "accumulation of desiccated anthropological anecdotes," we shall give examples to explain this aspect of the usage.

"In the Malagasy language many proper names of persons are coarse and insulting because pleasant-sounding names might cause envy. In some groups in India, at weddings women of the bride's and bridegroom's parties sing songs, each deriding and decrying the other. This is for luck. 'Praise is risky; abuse and blame are safe.' In Behar, on a certain day, sisters abuse brothers, in the belief that this will cause them long life and good luck. Hindoo parents give their children ugly and inauspicious names, especially if they have lost some children. Children, horses and asses are now disfigured among the Moslems to protect them from the risk they would run if beautiful. To save a child from the evil eye they say 'God be good to thee' and spit in its face. Amongst the Bedouins, whenever one utters praise he must add, 'Mashalla,' that is, God

avert ill. Among the Romans, soldiers followed the chariot of the triumphant general and shouted to him derisive and sarcastic verses to avert the ill to which he was then most liable. The Greeks used coarse jests at festivals for the same purpose. Modern Egyptians have inherited this superstition.”

“The Jews of Southern Russia do not allow their children to be caressed or admired. If it is done, the mother will order the child to ‘make a fig gesture’ behind the back of the one who did it. In China children are often named ‘dog,’ ‘hog,’ ‘flea,’ etc., to ward off the evil eye. Amongst the Southern Slavs one should never say, ‘What a beautiful child’ but ‘What an ugly child’ if one admires it.”⁹

Many more “anecdotes” might be included but these suffice to furnish one clue to the meaning of the practice. The aim is plainly to ward off that never-sleeping, all-seeing, jealous agency, the Evil Eye. The exact method is that of disguise, an ugly name being regarded as a diverting amulet, a device to fool this dreaded power.

We must not be understood to say that *all* opprobrious epithets or names employed by primitive people served this particular purpose. It must have been the case with them as with ourselves that there were those who merely sought relief and also those who blindly imitated. We mean, by these ethnographical references, merely to point out that the deep-seated and widely-spread belief in the Evil Eye provides us with one explanatory suggestion. That it is only one basis is evidenced by the fact that while belief in the Evil Eye is fading out, the practice of calling names is as vigorous as ever. We have to look, then, for additional explanatory facts.

(2) The popular assignment of uncomplimentary and hateful names has served always as a protest against social change and thus as a means of social control.¹⁰ We

⁹ Sumner. *Folkways*. 517-518.

¹⁰ Cf. Parsons. *Social Rule*. 104.

reach this conclusion by the consideration of several facts. First, a new name, derogatory or otherwise, is always a sign of change. Old names are sufficient until some unnamed variation appears, then the classifiers set to work; they must locate this new thing and manage it. Second, there is a striking synchronism between the periods of greatest social variation and those of most prolific name-calling. When there is an increase in immigration there is a noticeable enrichment of the names applied to foreigners. Precisely, when new movements like Bolshevism, Evolution, Higher Criticism, appear, they draw forth a variegated assortment of derisive appellations. On the other hand those times of comparative quiet and uniformity are noted also for inactivity among the name-hurlers.

In the third place, calling names is not expressive of popular rejoicing or enthusiasm over the appearance of the above-mentioned variations; it is not a method of giving prizes for the greatest novelties. Quite the contrary is the case. Calling names is a method of expressing disapproval, a device for discouraging change, a snarl that may be followed by a bite. Why is this?

Fourthly, the answer is that this is the only form of protest that can be used by many who use it. Let us see how this is so. When an objectionable variation appears, the discriminating, unemotional people may and do offer valid and pertinent criticism and thus manifest their disapproval. What method of manifesting disapproval remains for the emotional and uncritical, that is, the masses? In the less artificial societies, say a boys' gang, pugnacity runs its natural course. Protest and opposition are expressed by physical aggression; the application of force follows close upon the threat. But in well-ordered communities this is not permitted; pugnacity is denied its normal outlet, but it is not extinguished thereby; it finds some new mode of expression and the practice of calling names is one of the yet permissible modes. But the law

is making inroads—libel laws for example—upon this remaining privilege. The emotional and uncritical masses are no longer permitted to fight and thus exterminate the objectionable variations; they lack the ingenuity and the self-control to argue the thing down. What method is left but the childish practice of calling names? A “tongue-lashing” may still be given. But take the derogatory epithets out of a tongue-lashing, and you would have remaining something comparable to mint sauce without the mint.

Fifth, not only is name-calling a protest against change that is rooted in pugnacity, but it is also rooted in vanity. In showing this we have to raise the question why protest of any sort is made. Why is variation opposed? Pugnacity is not the basis of, nor sufficient to account for, all opposition. The answer to this question is that those who are comfortably adjusted to the inherited régime interpret variations as an insult to the wisdom embodied therein. There is much popular pride in what the “fathers” have done and made. Any attack on the established code or method is at the same time an attack on those who are loyal to it. Their pride is wounded; they are held to be deceived, if the point of view of the variant is taken. Any discrediting of the established order cuts down those who support it; their certainty is undermined and their loyalty is made to appear vain and foolish. Opposition can hardly fail to appear under such circumstances.

A sixth point is that name-calling is the only method available by reason of the disposition of some people. There are the pugnacious and vain; there are also the cowardly who would not fight if there were no laws against it. Yet they dislike the aggressive variants and assert themselves, according to their natures, in opposition. But they must have some compensatory device for their weakness. Calling names is such a method of compensation or supplementation. It is to them what arching the back

and bristling the tail are to the cat, namely, a way of appearing more dangerous than they really are. If the artifice succeeds and the variant withdraws, the name-calling ceases just as the cat's back and fur flatten out when the danger is passed. On the other hand, if the variant remains unaffected by this display or actually becomes more aggressive, the name-caller shrieks the louder, all the while running away to a safe distance, as children do. Then the names are hurled with more vehemence and become uglier.

That the bad-name potential is a very real factor in society nobody can deny, for few people rejoice in being assigned to the implied categories. Indeed, there are regular and decisive measures adopted for avoiding such labels for they soon become equivalent to a reputation. We have the old adage, "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches," and that is so because a bad name cannot always be wiped away *with* great riches, although a fairly thick coat of whitewash is sometimes applied to deceive the vulgar. *One* slip is often sufficient to gain a bad name, whereas a hundred conformities do not always confer a good one. Most people know that, while honorable mention comes grudgingly, a flood of dishonoring notoriety issues from a pinprick.

We have observed that calling names is a protest against change and a warning to innovators that they are discovered and had better look after their manners. It might expand our conception of this practice to mention the several classes of persons so warned. At first thought, it might seem that the positively malicious and dangerous people in society could be deterred by this means. It is probable, however, that this is too mild a form of punishment to affect them. These scurrilous epithets hurt them no more than mosquito bites hurt pachyderms. Name-calling is not equal to the task of controlling the desperate. Some other classes are readily controlled, however, in this way.

First, there are those wholly innocent and conscientious but absent-minded people, who, quite absorbed in some particular strain of affairs, easily drift toward the edges of the sacred conventional areas and quite unwittingly would commit serious and inexcusable blunders but for the raucous voices of the name-hurlers. Such persons innovate inadvertently and are speedily recalled to the straight path by this device. Indeed, a smarting epithet is often welcomed as a corrective for it is a way of seeing themselves as others see them.

Second, there are those more or less adventurous persons who, tired of the dull routine usually prescribed and yet possessing no criminal tendencies, simply love to try out popular vigilance and patience by continually testing the elasticity of social regulations. They want a little excitement but would harm no one. In some cases they wish to see how far they can go into the forbidden areas and yet get back unharmed—much as boys and girls enjoy walking out on the sands to be chased back by the waves. It seems clear that economic, religious and social taboos are continually being overstepped in this way. The idea seems to be to get a thrill or two without paying any penalties. In such cases the cry of “heretic,” or “radical,” or some other uncomplimentary and disliked term is a sufficient cue for their voluntary and hurried retirement to the familiar zones of safety.

The third class is composed of those who have criticized the time-honored ways and institutions and are convinced that they ought to be radically changed. They see the wrongs of the present system and insist on re-organization. And being quite wrapped up in their plans and proposals, they are not fully aware of all the consequences likely to stream out of their efforts. Now it is only fair to them, perhaps, that they should be called names, for they are thus given an inkling of what may happen to them if they persist. Their zeal, courage, determination, selflessness

and other qualities so indispensable to successful leadership, are mildly tested in this way. They are tested before any great damage is done and while they still have it in their power to withdraw. There is a moment of escape between the hiss or rattle of the snake, and the strike; fortunate is the man who acts promptly if he cares for his life. There is a period in society between the hurling of warning names and the ugly onslaught; fortunate is the innovator, if he is not fully consecrated to his task, who waits to be sure.

Such considerations seem to justify the conclusion that the calling of names is a form of protest against social change.

(3) Derogatory names are not only protests against change and warnings to innovators but also rallying-centers for the standpatters. As chicks flock to the mother-hen or group themselves under the nearest cover at the sound of the warning clucks, so do people turn eyes and steps towards the potential leader who has been alert enough to discern violations of sacred rules, and courageous enough to lift up the voice of protest. In such a situation people do just what they would do in the woods if somebody shouted "Wolves!" Attention is gained, action is stimulated and they look for the direction of the peril and a way of escape. They might not know what a "syndicalist" or "rogue" was but they would know by the tone of voice that it was something to avoid. They would run with others running.

Most of us are engrossed in our own particular work; we cannot know of all the perils that beset us; we cannot always be our own detectives. Consequently there is need of listening to the warning cry of others and hurrying to shelter although we are continually deceived by false alarms. The shouting of reproachful names is a signal to all persons that things are not, in the view of the alarmists, as they should be in Zion and something had

better be done about it. The fearful and stupidly loyal then line up towards the source of the cry just as good Mohammedans face Mecca when at prayer.

Under such conditions stanch churchmen sink their differences and pool their energies. The cry of "heretic," "higher critic," "evolutionist," and the like gets them united as they had not been before. Faithful, time-serving politicians are suddenly cleansed of partisanship and demagoguery when somebody howls out "communist," "alien enemy," or "Red." Such terms resounding through the community inspire instantaneously a quite unexpected amount of ready devotion in the bosoms of shallow ritualists, bigoted dogmatists, vain and useless public officials and the whole tribe of blind pillars of the *status quo*. We all remember the awakenings caused by the cry of "Huns," "spies," and whatnot during the war. It was quite normal for most of us to be somewhat fearful. We were more or less ready for warnings and there were always those who saw, or felt sure they saw, dangerous elements in society and so they kept things in perpetual turmoil. But every warning was a nucleus for social clustering. The more intelligent and self-controlled were moved in this way as well as the irrational and dull.

(4) The practice of calling names is essentially a method of social classification and therefore a means of control. It must be remembered that there are "scientific" classes which are really logical categories and exist only in the minds of the classifiers, and there are "social" classes which are genuine groups of interacting, like-minded persons. The one is the tool for research, the other a means of social control. To classify any individual is to assign him to that rank or position in the social order which the class occupies. It is to give him a definite status, to fix him at a particular level, at least as far as the classifier is concerned and all those who listen to his voice. Such a person

becomes known as of that level and is treated accordingly.

Nameless persons are unclassified and unclassifiable persons. The difficulties of classification are precisely those of finding suitably descriptive names. We have already alluded to the chaos resulting from the loss of names, even those hollow verbal conveniences known as proper names. That the picture was not overdrawn may be shown by pointing out the perplexities of the police and other authorities when they find dead bodies without identifying marks, when they succeed in running down criminals with several aliases, and when they gather in those who have lost their memories and have strayed from home. Under such circumstances, the most essential identifying mark is missing when the name is missing. A person without a head is more easily identified than a person without a name. Identification simply means relocation within the prescribed and familiar system of relationships.

Thus a derogatory name, like any other descriptive appellation, is a symbol of a fixed system of relationships, of an accepted manner of functioning, of an accustomed social position. That which is not named is a wandering, undependable, unattached and incomprehensible item. It is an uncontrolled stray amidst the general flux. A man without a descriptive name is a stranger, and strangers have always been potential enemies.

Mrs. Parsons says, "As naming (she means proper names) brings the satisfaction of classifying, so 'calling names' partakes of the satisfaction of declassifying."¹¹ But we prefer to speak of it as a leveling down process rather than declassification. People may be driven out of particular groups, but they cannot be excluded from all society any more than Cain was; there are always comrades to be found at the bottom and these maintain some sort of contacts with others. Declassification is not the proper

¹¹ *Social Rule*. 69, note.

illustrated in the case of the political leader who becomes "all things to all men" and in the case of the minister who "preaches what the people want." Departing from these norms, he ceases to profit by the lifting power of their expectation.

Thus it comes to pass that the public life of most persons is a pose or dramatization. The popular expectation sometimes grossly over-gilds mediocrity. But if persons are not by nature heroes, or leaders and dare to display their real selves, it often happens that the class-name assigned does not fit. It then fails to interpret and reveal. The people are all at sea. They cannot "place" the man, and the process of definition has to be undertaken again. But it begins handicapped by a "root of bitterness" not easily sweetened, by a measure of disappointment which may degenerate into contempt, hatred or even a desire to destroy.

Now what happens on the upper levels of social life may also occur to some degree on the lower. Derogatory names may also set norms and there is also a depressing-power of expectation as well as a lifting-power.¹⁴ We do not affirm that a lower norm has the same attractive power for the subject but when accompanied by popular expectation it frequently has a degree of "pull" in it. This is well illustrated by the saying, "I may as well have the game as the name,"—an ideal of no inconsiderable force in the conduct of many persons. A person may well come to such straits in his social relations that he would reason thus: "They call me a heretic or a clod-hopper or a pimp (or whatever it may be), therefore I must be something of the sort. I am treated as such and I may as well have the game as the name." A student recently explained in answer to the question as to whether her grades were satisfactory or not, that she was quite content for she had always been told that she was "just average." Probably she had

¹⁴ Cf. Ross. *Social Control*. 155.

been told worse things, but the point is that she had adopted the group estimate at a lower level than her school environment justified. There can be little doubt that many homes function toward the end of stereotyping the minds of growing children with "idiot," "trouble-maker," "smarty," "lout," "liar," "thief," the effects of which are clearly evident in the later conduct of those so named.

(6) Analysis of this practice shows also that where derogatory names suggest norms of conduct, that is, operate as controls, the process of distortion is furthered. The names popularly invented and applied are, as we have seen, rarely accurate descriptions. They are inaccurate because of the strong feeling element behind them, and because they are partial. Then, they suggest not the rôle of a person but rather the rôle of a *character*. For example, when a man is called a spy, a particular aspect of his life is singled out and made to stand for the whole. The public gives no attention to the fact that he may be a good father, a skillful operator, an exemplary citizen of his own country or a scholar. All these features are neglected and forgotten by the namers. To them he is not a *man* but a *spy*. Not that he is not a spy; but that he is something more than a spy in reality, not only to himself but to many others as well. He is more than a spy to the namers—if they reflected for a moment. But in the excitement and the blindness of international strife, the only part of the man seen and feared is the spy part; the rest of him makes no trouble. Hence, all those who call him a spy organize their activities to deal with nothing but a spy. They will not permit him to be a whole man. Anything different that he might attempt would only be construed as more spying. They create for him a rôle and he must play it—as far as they are concerned. This fact is continually established by our dealings with criminals. We call a man a "criminal" and then send him to prison where he is made to fit the category. He may be a criminal no more than one drop

of rain is a shower, but after prison experience, as we shall see in the last chapter, he is one all right. This holds for many other names—"socialist," "heretic," "intriguer," "Hun." All who bear these names are much more than the names imply, in reality. But if fear, hate, contempt, or other emotions are aroused, all who acquire and bear these names are so many "characters" found out and "put in their places" so far as the crowd is concerned.

4. EFFECTIVENESS

We have finally to consider in more systematic form some reasons for the effectiveness of this instrument.

(1) First, there are countless people who do not possess the energy required to hound these name-hurlers down and throttle them. A moment's reflection shows us that it would be a most arduous if not an utterly impossible undertaking. Once in circulation, these names are hardly to be recalled or repudiated. They are like wild seed, scattered and blown everywhere. One might as well try to corral the thistle-blows that fill the air. A man in California hears from a chance acquaintance that a man in New York is an "anarchist." To the Californian, the New Yorker is that and nothing much besides, as we have seen. He will assume the proper attitude, adopt a psychic "set" with respect to the man whether he ever meets him or not. Ever afterwards so far as the Californian is concerned, the man is "placed." Yet the New Yorker knows nothing of this; he has not the faintest inkling that the Californian is a keeper of his life.

Now the task of cleansing a tarnished reputation in one's own neighborhood is huge enough, so impossible often as to discourage all but the most determined. The distorted picture will lurk in many a quiet citizen's mental gallery no matter how thorough-going the corrective measures. But when one contemplates the fact that names go careering

over the land by the most amazing routes and are kept by the most unsuspected persons, the utter impossibility of ever following their perambulations is obvious. The discovery of the proverbial needle in the haystack would be child's play in comparison. No man ever can know who keeps his name.

In this connection it is important to note that some names have greater carrying power than others. Thus the term "spy" will travel further than "boob"; "anarchist" will circulate more widely than "mollicoddle." The explanation of this may be found in the social importance of the feature named, the status of the person so featured, the degree of emotion elicited, the amount of danger involved, the catchiness of the term.

Moreover, it often seems that every effort on the part of the victim to correct popular misconception does but make things worse. The gestures employed to deny the appropriateness of the terms applied often merely emphasize and scatter them more widely. A radical will but appear more radical, a rogue more roguish, a heretic more heretical, in the very struggle to inculcate a truer view. A total regeneration will not surely do it for the regeneration does not have "news" value and travel so far as the degeneration. Even this may be accepted as a new and more subtle form of guile. An impartial jury is difficult to find. If one were found, the verdict is not always accepted by the public, which often does not desire the truth. It is easy to see, therefore, how the hugeness of the task would discourage all but incorrigible optimists.

(2) In the second place, not too many people possess the ingenuity required to cleanse themselves of a hateful name. They do not have at hand, and do not know where to discover, adequate antidotes, or how to apply them if they had a supply. They are not skilled, for there is no school to train them in the arts of self-defense demanded in such an ignominious situation. They know nothing of the

tricks of self-advertisement. Appeal to the courts may be had only if the name falls within the legally prohibited class.

A device sometimes employed, when the home community is irretrievably prejudiced, is to migrate and change one's proper name in order to escape identification. Foreigners often resort to this means in order to avoid the ragging and oppression frequently applied. Cities and mining-camps contain many who aim to make a new start. But this plan does not always work. If the feature formerly named is at all conspicuous it will be discovered and relabeled, whatever the place. Moreover, the man fleeing from such a curse is often confronted by a visitor from the old home who spreads the news. It will thus be seen that it is generally easier to accept what seems like the inevitable.

(3) A third reason for the effectiveness of names—and this applies more especially to those cases already mentioned where the derogatory name is accepted as a norm—is that the feature pointed out is sometimes suggestive of a way of escape from popular neglect or deadly routine, an open door to a new adventure, a hint of some new thrill. There are plenty of people who will pay a good price for some notoriety, some release from the fixed and monotonous levels where they find themselves. There are always those who want “a place in the sun” even if the sun be in eclipse. Any rôle will do so long as it provides an outlet for a balked desire.

While persons of this class are not easily located—human motives being so inscrutable—we may have a helpful suggestion from the stage. This institution has never lacked candidates for the rôles of despicable villains, swaggering cads, unspeakable pimps and other degraded types. There are always those who will shrink and distort themselves to suit the popular demand. “But” it may be objected, “this is stage-life and that is only a pose.” But

we have tried to show that much of ordinary life is a pose and that "all the world's a stage." The stage and everyday life are not so very different after all. Hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the class we have in mind exists all around us.

It is true that no rôle in ordinary life is without its admirers. There is always enough of popular itching for monstrosities to offer a mite of encouragement to the type indicated. But such is the character of this approval that it will give derogatory names, watch the actors play the parts assigned and then, with no reason at all, turn on them with more ferocity and ostracize them completely.

(4) A final point relative to the effectiveness of name-calling may be mentioned. We have already observed that these names enter the slang of communities and circulate accordingly. Thus they get on the tongues of everybody and are instantly available for service. This, of course, adds greatly to the pressure they exert. The social atmosphere is always charged with potential abuse and this most people very well know. It seems quite safe to say that such a condition is a highly deterrent force in human relations.

In conclusion we may notice that the practice of calling names will probably increase rather than decline as evolution and differentiation proceed. Every new variation will always receive a name—if one can be invented. One may hope, however, that education, leading to a growing appreciation of what there really is in a name, will make chronic name-hurlers less vulgar and more discriminating; make names less one-sided and more truly interpretative, more conducive to better social co-ordination.

CHAPTER XIII

COMMANDS

IN Joseph Conrad's story, "The Nigger of the *Narcissus*" there is a lively sketch of a threatened mutiny. Just on the eve of the serious break, the men were brought on deck and the adamant captain faced them. " 'I'm here to drive this ship and keep every man-jack aboard of her up to the mark. . . . You have been braying in the dark *See tomorrow morning*. Well, you see me now. What do you want?' . . . What did they want? They shifted from foot to foot, they balanced their bodies; some pushing back their caps, scratched their heads. . . . He stood scanning them for a moment, then walking a few steps this way and that began to storm at them coldly, in gusts violent and cutting like the gales of those icy seas that had known his youth. . . . 'You can do no more? No, I know and say nothing. But you stop your caper or I will stop it for you. I am ready for you. Stop it.' "

He called the man who had hurled the iron belaying-pin at him the night before. " 'You know this?' asked the master. 'You are a cur. Take it,' he ordered. 'Take it,' said the captain, making a menacing gesture. 'If you don't . . . ' 'Don't tech me,' snarled the culprit, backing away. 'Then go. Go faster.' " ¹

The ship began its voyage with good will and enthusiasm prevailing within the crew. But after a time some seamen shirked; this produced irritation in others. Then storms came; the ship listed heavily; the decks were awash; the beds were soaked; the food was spoiled; drinking water became scarce. Irritation developed into general restless-

¹ Conrad. *The Nigger of the Narcissus*. 135 ff.

ness; restlessness developed into organized opposition; the mutiny was about to break. The captain interfered in the manner indicated and the outbreak was averted, the mutiny was dissolved short of disaster. In this illustration we have the merest sketch of a critical social situation and what was done therein by an authority. From the fact that Conrad was himself a sailor for many years, we may safely infer that the picture is true.

Here was a train of events rushing rapidly to a dangerous upheaval; the outlook was ominous. It was a situation calling for diagnosis and hurried treatment. The captain, after diagnosing the case, waited for the opportune moment and applied the corrective pressure—the utterance of commands being one of the first moves. Here is a device for public service. Let us study it a little.

1. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

We have inherited the term “command” from the Latin. It is composed of a prefix, “con,” meaning with, the noun “manus,” meaning a hand, and the verb “dare,” meaning to give. The original idea seems to have been “to give into anyone’s hand or charge.” From that meaning, by variation and addition, we come round finally to the notion of ordering, enjoining, bidding with authority or influence; hence to be master of, to control or to dominate. By way of a brief statement, we may say that a command is an expression of authority in a short, decisive and clarifying manner, serving to halt one line of action and prepare the way for or indicate another. If this statement is compared with the introductory illustrations, we shall have something substantial to work with. The essential features are the authority revealed, the manner of revealment and the inhibitive and directive effects.

No classification of commands has yet been made, so far as we know, except in a very limited field such as those of

the military organization and industry. But here the classifications are more practical than logical or scientific. On the basis of form of expression, we might classify them as direct and indirect. The first kind may be illustrated by the words of the captain already given. The second kind is suggested by the following. Farragut, during the Civil War, was directed as follows: "When you are completely ready . . . you will proceed up the Mississippi river, and reduce the defenses which guard the approaches to New Orleans, when you will appear off that city and take possession of it under the guns of your squadron, and hoist the American flag therein, keeping possession until troops can be sent you. . . . The department and the country will require of you success."² The difference here is mainly linguistic.

On the basis of substance, we might speak of commands as simple authoritative directions and effective inhibitive expressions. In the case of the authoritative directions, no opposition is necessarily implied. The child is told to go to bed, the workman is told to pick up the shovel, the gunners are directed to fire on the ship, the regiment is ordered to the battle-front. In such cases there is entire willingness to do what the authorities want done. The command is but a hurried, incisive way of pointing out what is to be done. Such commands are really instructions. They tell those who are ready to do something more, what to do.

The effective, inhibitive, or corrective commands—the kind we shall have in mind throughout this study—are authoritative, informative, decisive thrusts at revealed opposition, opposition of attitude or of action. One does not use them unless there is opposition, and opposition which the authorities judge to be serious and highly objectionable. The authoritative direction is simply an aid in desired co-ordination. The inhibitive command or corrective order

² Chesney. *Military Biography*. 152.

“Early in the summer of 1381, less than three years after the passing of 2 Richard II., the outbreak under Wat Tyler took place. The ostensible cause was the people’s dislike of the poll-tax of a groat a head, which had been imposed in 1377 upon every person of fourteen and upward; but the public mind was then in a state fitted for the reception of any violent impulse. The train was laid and a casual spark would ignite it. The explosion was in this instance caused by the indecent conduct of a collector of the tax towards a young female, the daughter of one Walter, a tyler, residing in the town of Dartford, who immediately with his hammer beat out the collector’s brains. The bystanders applauded the action, and flew to arms, exclaiming that it was time for the people to assert their liberty, and take vengeance on their oppressors; and the flame rapidly spread throughout the country. Walter the Tyler, or “*Wat Tyler*” as commonly called, was appointed their captain, and, by the time the insurgents reached Blackheath, their number is said to have amounted to a hundred thousand.”³

Any number of such examples might be given. Of course enlightened statesmanship would prevent such occurrences. But since we do not have enlightened statesmanship, and crises arise, what can be done?

A greenhorn might suppose that persuasion would be the normal and suitable corrective for authorities to use since men are to be handled and not animals. But persuasion is not well-adapted for crises of this sort; there is too much feeling aroused, too much excitement, too much mob-spirit. Let us go back to the ship. First of all the *captain* was undoubtedly annoyed and peevish if not angry. And he was probably justified in this. He had remained loyal, sleeplessly loyal, to his task. The seamen had shirked and conspired. What did they deserve? Rewards? Praise? To be argued with? Did they really deserve the honor of

³ Quoted in Giddings, *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*. 328.

being reasoned with? We would, as he probably did, give negative answers to all of these questions. At any rate, peevishness, or anger, is not conducive to the use of persuasion by authorities. Besides, the feelings of the men were aroused. Were they in a condition to be reasoned with? Probably not.

The authorities in the inclusive society are often irritated, excited, angry,—the mother with her children, the teacher with the pupils, the minister with the church board, the boss with the workmen, the prince with his subjects; and it is quite human for us to justify these attitudes; we can easily find excuses for this heat. But the bolters are also heated. Does the crisis call for rewards? Praise? For argument? Excitement and reason do not hitch well in a team. This is one aspect of the matter.

Another is that such situations, usually demand somewhat *hurried*, first-aid treatment. When the pot is about to boil over, something must be done at once—or it is too late. There are countless conjunctures where a moment or two, relatively speaking, is all the time that can be devoted to immediate treatment. This is so for two reasons. First, the events themselves soon flow on and reach a stage where any sort of treatment is unavailing because the damage is done. The storm may be a long time brewing, but it often breaks suddenly. There is a crucial moment before all is lost. There is in a mob hustling a culprit off to the lynching; there is in the family before the brawl occurs; there was before the World War began.

Second, the controllers, because they are human beings with the usual limitations, do not always know what to do. For one thing, they are often busy with other duties to the limit of their strength and ability. For another they cannot always think up, right “off the bat,” what is best to do in the emergency. Again they are never clairvoyants able to discover such movements in their very beginnings and anticipate them with adequate measures; they must have

some fireworks before they can discern what is going on. Not only are leaders handicapped by preoccupation, infertility of resource, lack of insight, but they are often overburdened as well and simply have not the energy to peer into the hidden beginnings of conspiracy and devise a remedial plan. Thus, whereas the events demand promptness, expedition and extraordinary skill and fertility, the controllers are stupid and slow; they are not fleet enough to keep up with the stream of events.

As such situations call for promptness, so also do they call for definiteness and brevity of first-aid treatment. If the controllers cannot have leisure to weigh issues carefully, look the situation over from all points of view, advance tentatives and withdraw them, split hairs and play with conclusions—because they are not in the mood or able and because there is no time—the best they can do is to *stop* the movement instantaneously; the best they can do is to paralyze the participants for a time; the best they can do is to hold up the movement until something statesmanlike can be done about it. The attention has to be gripped suddenly and powerfully, and held, even against passion.

What human device is equal to this emergency? We have suggested that persuasion is not. We can easily see that punishment is not for there is as yet, in the movement, nothing to punish, no law broken. Satire, calling names, laughter and criticism are too mild, too attenuated, too slow in operation, to meet such a crisis. Threatening is dangerous in such cases for it is apt to evoke instantaneous recoil.

It may be suggested that the age-old, socially generated device for life's crises is the command, the sharp, stern, incisive, challenging call, the "Hear, tremble and obey" of some royal proclamations. This is a device easily and quickly put in operation; it is a paralyzer when uttered with sufficient force; and it may include suggestions of a new and less dangerous direction.

(2) We have spoken of the social situation characterized by the headlong, precipitate crisis, and of the appropriateness of commands thereto. A crisis may arise, however, because some are too lazy, too lethargic, too slow, too heavy. The social order is endangered, as we have already pointed out, when people lag as well as when they rush ahead, when they get too far behind the procession as well as when they go too far ahead of it.

We all know the member of the household who is always late for meals, the student who always drags into the classroom after the roll has been called, the workman who never thinks of reaching his bench at the hour set for the beginning of work—and pay, the minister who never knows when to stop talking, the politician who continually has “after-thoughts,” the conversationalist who repeats and wanders off for indefinite journeys after some insignificant detail, and then forgets to come back; we all know the slacker, the coward, the absent-minded person, the timid, the reticent, the dreamer like Anatole France who was always “a day behind the fair.”

And we all know how these persons interfere with nice adjustments, perfect co-ordinations, smoothly running machinery, in the household, in the school, in the church, in industry, in government. We know how these people disrupt the social order for we have daily experiences with them and suffer the continual miscarriage of our plans. These people create crises. What is done to them?

We have already pointed out that the satirists, the laughers and the name-hurlers get after them. In addition, the commanders bring their pressure to bear on them. What is more usual than to hear impatient, irritated, almost angry authorities calling out “Hurry up,” “Step along,” “Fall in line,” “Get a move on,” “Don’t be so slow,” “Brace up,” “Come out of it,” and the like! There is a continuous machine-gun fire. It would be possible, perhaps, to use more persuasion, more praise, more rewards, in these

emergencies—were the authorities in the mood to do it. But that is just the point; the authorities are not in the required mood; they are drifting through impatience, irritation, and moderate anger to the attitude wherein they would use harsher methods of control, if these milder means did not avail. The command-device is especially adapted to this situation.

3. UNIVERSAL USE

There is little need, in this connection, for much emphasis upon the fact that commands are widely used. We wish to suggest, merely, two lines of investigation which would supply more than sufficient evidence—if there could be any unseeing persons left.

First of all there is the evidence from the large number of crises occurring in all of our life's relationships. Attention was given above to the *nature* of these crises. Some study might also be given to the *number* of them. It makes no difference that they are small and, from a later elevation, quite insignificant. At the time, and in the circumstances, the fractures of routine, the disruptions of order, produced by the overly aggressive and by the slow, are held to be very serious matters. As great importance, relatively speaking, attaches to the rupture of a marble game as to the breaking of an international compact.

If one were to start counting, therefore, the critical emergencies arising in all the fields of human interactions, in the play with blocks on the floor, in the hours for meals, in the household plan, in the community program, and on up to world organization, one would have a vast total; and if, as our contention above suggests, commands are always or very frequently associated with these emergencies, we have one line of proof.

Another method of procedure, a method not involving any inference and therefore more acceptable to some, is

to go out in society and listen, and keep count of what is ordered. One may go into the home and hear the mother, with varying degrees of severity—almost any mother—telling the children to “Sit still,” “Be quiet,” “Go out and play,” “Keep out of the parlor,” “Stay away from the cookies,” “Drink the milk,” “Stop fighting,” and the like “world without end.” Family life would be reduced to chaos and become unbearable without a liberal supply of these imperatives, so many mothers believe.

We need not follow the commander out on the playground, into the factory, the church, and elsewhere. It is sufficient to examine a realm where one might naïvely suppose that the higher forms of control ruled supreme, where, at any rate, one would not expect to find much by way of commands. If, therefore, we can find frequent use of commands in an institution where they should be least frequent, it is safe to argue that the practice is general in other departments of social life.

The schoolroom is a place where many assume that consent is cultivated by rational means, and where there is the greatest abhorrence of and the most rapid departure from dogmatic and arbitrary measures. But we shall make our case for universal use of commands by reference to this area. A visitor dropped in casually to one of the New York City schools and made a *verbatim* report of what was said and done for the most of the day. She captions her article “Any School Morning.” An examination of that report shows that commands outnumbered every other type of pressure. The teacher hardly spoke without using commands.⁴

Directions, not commands, you say? The visitor calls attention to the prevailing apathy, heaviness, lack of wholesome morale and the deep-seated opposition of that schoolroom. The situation was bad enough to be an emergency of the second type noted above. Commands were liberally

⁴ *New Republic*, Nov. 12, 1924.

used in that emergency. And while it is difficult to believe that most schoolrooms are so governed, we feel quite sure that many of them are. The proposition must remain unestablished until there are numerous other *verbatim* reports, not only from schoolrooms but also from other areas of our social life.

4. OVERT FEATURES

(1) Commands are given by means of gestures. To hold up the hand in a certain way signals "Stop." To hold it in another way orders "Go ahead." Another imperative gesture spells out "Turn to the left" or "Turn to the right." By this means, and this alone, the traffic in our streets is now directed. The mother *points* to a misplaced chair and that is interpreted to mean, "Put it back in its place." She argues for a while about going to bed. Then, in desperation, she "points" up stairs—and the child vanishes. She holds her fingers before her lips crosswise and that is taken to mean "Stop talking." The boss nods his head in the direction of the pile of bricks, and the workman leaps up to work. The music-master swings his baton in a certain way and the orchestra begins. The music goes badly and he makes a vigorous move; it stops. A volume would be required to minutely describe our commandatory gestures.

(2) Most numerous, however, are the verbal orders. The examples already given grip this point; we need not illustrate it further. It is necessary, however, to notice certain characteristics of oral commands that add to their effectiveness.

Here again, as in persuasion, the tone has much to do with the command's full impact. "Forward march," said in a mild and colorless tone of voice is not as awakening as the same words uttered in a thunderingly imperious manner. In the army, the preparatory command, such as "Attention," is given with a rising inflection, while the com-

mand of execution, such as "Forward march," is given with an even or falling inflection. Long army experience shows that this method secures the best results.

In the army and navy, and elsewhere, great care is taken to make the orders definite and clear. Stewart Waldron says military history is replete with orders that were misunderstood because they contained indefinite terms. Accordingly, such terms as "attempt to capture," "try to hold," "as far as possible," "as well as you can," are never employed. They are not clear guides to definite action and they divide responsibility.⁵

But what holds true, as to definiteness and clearness in the military establishment, holds also for other fields of endeavor. For example, workmen are not commanded to dig a ditch, build a house, drive a train. They are given minute particulars in a commandatory way. Usually pains are taken in the framing of laws to make them have but one and the same meaning to all who read. As social organization increases in complexity, the need for definiteness and clearness becomes all the greater.

In addition, also, military orders of the oral kind are as brief as possible. This is to enable the average memory to retain them uncorrupted. They are given as briskly as possible so that the wandering attention may be snapped back to the situation. There is, from long experience, a fairly well-understood limit of length and complexity.

(3) Written orders do not call for memory ability to the same degree as verbal orders, hence they are usually longer and more involved. If long and complicated commands must be given, they are generally reduced to writing. We find these written commands in letters, pamphlets and especially law-books. The latter probably represent the limit in length and complexity relative to life's requirements.

Written orders are more permanent and trustworthy for purposes of transmission. The dangers involved in *oral*

⁵ *Thirty Minute Talks*. 208.

transmission are illustrated by the case where the officer sent along the trench-line, by word of mouth, "Send reinforcements at once." Delivered at the other end of the line, the command said, "Send eighty cents at once." Such corruptions, of course, snarl up the whole proceeding.

But with written orders, all who can read may learn, and the interpretation may be verified by several people. They remain as they were written, as they were delivered, unless maliciously tampered with in some way.

We have to note, however, that written orders circulate more slowly than the spoken word. They function more slowly in crises. The telegraph, telephone and radio aid marvelously in distributing commands quickly over large areas. Larger and larger numbers of people can be held from further movements by such devices.

5. SUBTLER FEATURES

The command is one of the speediest means of sending important messages. It is a great time-saving device. But like persuasion, and other forms of control, it does not always carry through and yield the desired activity. It may be uttered loudly and clearly; it may be brief and definite; but yet it may not touch people. They may be commanded to stop their deviltry, but they may not listen. Or they may hear and not heed. What qualities of commands give them the "carry-through"? We may notice several.

(1) We are equipped by heredity with a nervous set or tension which clear, sharp, stern commands effects just as other strange and unexpected noises do. Several times, while writing this chapter, the door of the writer's study, because of air pressure in the hall, has been forced shut with a bang. Being wholly unprepared for this because preoccupied with the writing, the writer has been greatly startled by the noise. "Startled," that is the word; the noise caused him to *start*.

Thus whatever native and unconscious readiness we have for dealing with the strange and dangerous of every kind in life, we have for the command which comes with the suddenness of the pistol shot or the clap of thunder. The child kicking up mischief, the man with his arm raised to strike, the mob about to rush,—each is startled by this strange new force.

The effect of such sharp inserts is much more significant, however. The sharp command is not only a new noise, but a new noise with a meaning; it is a symbol; it creates a new situation. The thought-stream, focused upon the immediate object, is disrupted for a moment. As the threads are rapidly picked up again, this meaning is among them. A moment's reflection—which means also a moment's inaction—makes clear that the situation has changed, that the original plan is now out of date, that what was once well defined is now undefined.

In this situation, cocksureness is suddenly transformed into doubt. Moreover, because a new element has been introduced, and because the situation has become strange, a fearsome element is prominent. For, in practice, the command is usually accompanied by a directive suggestion, by a promise of something worse if the commanded do not obey. In such a plight, the subject may grasp at the directive suggestion and follow implicitly in the way indicated.

This is the skillful leader's opportunity. And it is the skillful leader who can improve such advantages, who can halt the proceedings long enough to put a different and a worthier objective in the focus of attention so pertinently and persistently that it will be adopted. It is the skillful leader who can aid, in a crisis, the re-defining process. Effective commanding, then, consists in halting the train of events long enough to draw attention to forgotten or neglected considerations, and have these organized into a

new program. This is the merest sketch of a most complicated mental process, but it must suffice here.

(2) That quality of commands which we might call *obeyableness* cannot be overlooked. When requirements are merely negative, when they simply call for desistance from what is now being done, this feature is not so obvious. Yet here, it often happens that persons can cease the activity with the greatest difficulty. When workmen are determined to strike, when children are restless and about to "break out," when a murderer is following his victim under the obsession that he will soon "get him," it is not easy to obey the command "Don't do that." To cease one line of action and remain inactive, is often a very hard task.

But the difficulties are even greater when positive commands are given. In our deplorable ignorance of human capacity, we are continually giving impossible orders and then punishing disobedience. A requirement to climb Mount Everest could not be obeyed. The command to sing like Caruso could not be executed by any person. The like may be said, often, of the commands to "Get to work," "Study your lessons," "Eat that food," "Change your ways," "Don't be a heretic." And of course we understand that when orders cannot be obeyed, they fall useless to the ground. We are not unmindful either of the fact that what often seems impossible in ordinary circumstances, becomes quite easy under the impact of unusual pressure. There is a vast open field here for nicer and more human adjustments of what is required to what is possible and reasonable, and for the study of the same.

In this connection, it is important to notice also that the larger the number of persons involved, the greater must the difficulties be in executing a specific command, the slower must the execution movement be, and the greater the possibilities for confusion and failure. Commands sometimes become unobeyable because of the numbers involved.

(3) Obedience is generally greatly delayed or withheld when commands violate basic and long-standing human agreements and standards. The command to insult the flag would not only be disobeyed, but would call forth resentment; it is a long-standing convention that we shall honor the flag. The command, for some people, to go out and torture others, would not be obeyed, for they hold that people should love and help each other. The legal requirement calling for medical examination before marriage, has been nullified in part because of the understanding that marriage is "our affair."

Legislators are all the time confronted with this difficulty. Whenever they wish to prevent some form of conspiracy, smash trusts, outlaw liquor, ban child labor, etc., they come face to face with such standards or doctrines as "right to organize," "freedom of contract," "individual freedom," "states' rights," and many others. For such doctrines, understandings, conventions, agreements, beliefs, are in the mores or the basic structure of society—our society—and most people refuse to depart from them, especially when it is profitable to maintain them.

(4) Another consideration that cannot be neglected, is the enforceableness of commands. This depends, in part, on the capacity to obey, which we have noted. But it depends also upon the machinery and the power available for securing execution. A man without legs could not effectively command a tormentor to run away and leave him alone. A small child could not command its mother. In such cases, instruments and power of enforcement are lacking.

Governments face this problem continually. When a new law is enacted a sensible legislature will always raise the question of the government's resources for enforcement. Sometimes senseless legislatures pass laws without taking this matter into consideration, and of course such laws become "dead letters." The attempt to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment has been frustrated by the inadequacy

of the machinery, by the division of responsibility between the federal and the state governments, and by the doctrines of "individual rights" and "states rights." To be wholly effective, legislative commands must be backed up by strong governments with sufficient funds to hire capable agents to bear down on the recalcitrants, arrest them, drag them into court, convict them and then punish. There is no "carry-through" apart from these essentials; commands under such circumstances "have no teeth" in them.

(5) We are thus led gradually to the question of authority. All commands made to recalcitrant people are ineffective without authority, without power. People usually like to have their own way. They will obey commands when they understand that there is more power on the other side than they have. Authority is the right and the ability to exercise superior power, to apply pressure. It seems to be derived from two main sources.

One source is the personal qualities of the commander. A prize-fighter, a doctor, a teacher, and other leaders have the authority of their physical strength, their knowledge or skill—when these qualities are recognized and understood.

Another source is the official position which the commander occupies. The commander-in-chief of the army, the president of the republic, the king, has power because of his position. The position is a status in society which, again, is recognized and honored.

But these sources of authority are transferable and can be intermingled. For example, the weak man may derive authority from the position, and the strong man may give power to a weak position. We see this worked out, often, in succession. A strong man creates a powerful office and then gives place to a weak man who becomes powerful because of the office. We have said, however, that the personal qualities and the position both have to be *recognized*. What does this mean? The answer leads us back to the nature of prestige.

(6) Authority ultimately depends upon prestige. We slip, at this point, very easily into a consideration of the mythologizing tendencies of the human race, for prestige is not any real or isolable quality that a man or an office has; it is rather what the people *believe* the man or the office has; it is a constellation of qualities that large numbers of people *impute* to the man or the position. There is a tendency to surround striking persons and influential positions with a glamour, to invest them with a substance, to enrich them out of the admirations of the masses, to worship them. Thus persons and offices do not "possess," "own," "contain," authority or power except as this adoration, worship, voluntary subjection, yields it to them. But the people do not usually understand that they confer this great boon and go on believing that power inheres in these persons and offices and is native to them. It is probable that this adoration, worship or reverence is the tap-root of prestige.

While people mythologize and impute to objects, persons and offices, non-existent qualities, and then worship them, there are many real and worthy attributes or features to help out the imagination. Professor Ross, under the suggestive caption "radiant points of social control," has neatly summed these up as follows: "The prestige of *numbers* gives ascendancy to the crowd. The prestige of *age* gives it to the elders. The prestige of *prowess* gives it to the war chief, or the military caste. The prestige of *sanctity* gives it to the priestly caste. The prestige of *inspiration* gives it to the prophet. The prestige of *place* gives it to the official class. The prestige of *money* gives it to the capitalists. The prestige of *ideas* gives it to the élite. The prestige of *learning* gives it to the mandarins."⁶

Now, numbers, age, prowess, sanctity, inspiration, place, money, ideas and learning, are genuine features; there is power in them; those who possess them can exert pres-

⁶ *Social Control*. 78.

sure because of them. But persons who possess these qualities have *added* power or authority because the masses tend to magnify such features, embroider upon them, work them up into extraordinary shapes, and then stand in awe of, look upon with mingled feelings of fear and wonder, what they have themselves largely made. Prestige is thus a name for a combination of real and imaginary attributes and popular admiration of them. We may go so far as to say that no reverence, no prestige; no prestige, no authority; no authority, no effective commands.

(7) We have already pointed out that rewards and praise are their own authority; that is, the authority inheres in them; they leave a good taste and seem self-evidently good, just as candy is self-evidently good. You do not have to prove to children that candy is good; that is self-evident.

The situation is not different with commands—*when there is reverence*. When people admire or worship authorities, they expect to be commanded and they are happy to obey; it would be a genuine hardship to oppose, disobey and desert; there is no problem here.

But our argument has assumed a social situation wherein there *is* opposition, disobedience, disloyalty. That is the essence of the crisis we have had in mind all the time. That is, we have controllers—would-be controllers—facing and commanding those who refuse to be controlled. What does analysis of this situation disclose? For one thing, commands are *not* self-evidently good; they do not leave a good taste; they do not “set” well. People will obey them, it may be, but that does not prove that they like them. Their obedience does not arise from themselves, out of their admiration and reverence; they do not have admiration and reverence for these particular controllers. If they obey under these circumstances it is because they understand that worse things are possible and choose the lesser of two evils.

They do not like these commands, requirements, because

they are thereby called away from what they now take to be good and desirable to something which does not appear to be so good; the child is taken away from *play* and sent to *bed*; the man is taken from his private pursuits and set to work.

In a situation where commands are *not* self-evidently good, one of three lines of action is sure to be taken. First, people obey *outwardly* but come in time, by means of the personal dialectic or other pressures, to bring their rebellious feelings into harmony with their actions. Second, they conform outwardly but remain permanently rebellious in attitude or spirit. Third, they refuse to obey at all and are finally fallen upon by the authorities with severity. The history of the third group we follow in the next chapters.

From the standpoint of the social order, the first result is the most satisfactory one; it is obedience arising out of consent self-created. In this instance, the work does not have to be repeated; the commands leave a good taste, the attitude is right, and the gap between the controllers and controlled is permanently closed.

The second and third cases present the greatest difficulties, the insoluble problems often. Outward conformance being but a pretense, opportunity is always secretly sought to evade, to be free of restraint, to have one's own way again. Thus the control has to be repurchased at irregular intervals. Moreover, the party of order never knows when the break will come nor what form it will take. This uncertainty is a source of endless governmental anxiety. It can only be banished when the recalcitrant is finally eliminated.

The understanding we have reached is that opposition to commands, authorities, powers, is due to lack of reverence. The obvious fact is that the recalcitrants have no admiration for the particular authorities or their methods or both. It just comes down to this: The authorities are *not*

authorities—for them. And unless disrespect can be turned into respect, irreverence into reverence, detestation or indifference into admiration, a fundamental cleavage remains as an unhealable fracture in the social system.

As a rule and except in rare cases, such a stark reality does not really materialize. The reason is that no human being ever becomes an absolute anarchist; no human being ever reaches that degree of isolation where he has *no* authorities. The fact is that all the recalcitrants select some social controllers as against others; the boy may repudiate his mother but cling to the gang-leader; the student may leave his clergyman and follow the teacher; the conscientious objector may still obey his wife. It is this arrangement that saves our social order from dissolving before our eyes.

(8) The most effective commands, then, are those which appeal not only to the emotions but also to the intellect, which not only evoke favorable attitudes but also induce reflection, calculation, quick comparison of elements in the situation. In the long run, those commands are most serviceable which stop the present movements and awaken some such train of thought as the following: "If I obey, I will have to renounce the good that I sought by disobedience. I will have to accept another good in its place. If I disobey, I may surely expect, along with the forbidden fruits, something else which the authorities will force upon me. The authorities, being more powerful than I am, will punish me in some way, possibly by a drubbing, possibly a fine, possibly ostracism, possibly death. If I disobey, I shall receive two 'rewards,'—the one that I seek by disobedience and the one the controllers will force upon me. Will the one offset the other? I wonder. I wonder—supposing an utterly selfish view—which satisfaction will appraise higher, going to jail or enlisting in the army? I wonder."

The outcome of this train of reflection varies greatly as we know. Some conclude by saying: "I guess the jail will

be a greater evil than the army. I will obey." Others take a different view. The bootlegger says there is a gambler's chance, a fifty-fifty chance, of winning his forbidden good and escaping the promised evil—and the laws seem to be enforced so as to give him some justification. Yet again, the conscientious objector reasons thus: "The good that I seek is so important, so priceless, so incomparable, of such great social value, that it entirely blots out the temporary evil, suffering, that will be forced upon me. I won't obey." And, as we all know, there is no power in heaven or in earth that can make him.

When commands can stop people for a little and awaken such a train of reflection as the first mentioned—possibly, also, the third—they have done their highest work. In producing such a reaction, they link up with persuasion in the work of supporting the social order. Needless to say, however, they are continually falling short of this excellent service. If a valuable directive suggestion is embedded in the command, and it is accepted, that is all to the good.

We might say, then, that while commands serve where there is greater opposition than was assumed when discussing persuasion, they often function simply to get the attention so that persuasion may be used, or they stop the action long enough for private reflection. For the time being, at any rate, they turn the tide back towards conformance and give larger opportunity for the higher types of control to operate.

6. APPRAISAL

The argument up to this point provides us with a more or less satisfactory basis for passing judgment upon the command-practice. In general, what may be said for it and what against it? Certain conclusions have been implied. We think it desirable to lift them out into explicit if but summary form.

(1) On the side of merit, it is fair to say that the giving of commands is one way of locating for the immature, and recalling for the mature, the centers of power in society. As the trees in the desert mark out the oases, with their hidden springs of reviving waters, so do commands point to, symbolize, the hidden sources of power.

As with rewards and praise, so with commands; they point, in general, to the main trend of social development. Like the former, the latter are located beside the highly valued social objectives—order, truth, obedience, loyalty and the like. Commands direct attention to these first by shutting out their opposites, and second by starting reflection towards these values—concrete incidents standing for types. “Go out and play,” really means that the boy should acquire *habits* of play.

Perhaps one more merit is worthy of notice. Commands operate quickly and incisively; they serve where nothing else could serve; they serve to bring sharply to the attention other possibilities that were forgotten or never heard of at the time.

(2) On the side of demerits, many points might be discussed. We shall have to be content with two or three suggestions. In the first place, we shall have to admit that social authorities do not always agree as to what ought to be suddenly stopped and what newly undertaken. Hence their use of commands will be conflicting. This is rather a fault of the agent than of the instrument, however.

A great difficulty is found in the indefiniteness of the terms used. Social authorities—parents, teachers, gang-leaders, ministers—are not like military leaders or other dealers in exact terms. They cannot always give unmis-takable directions as to the worth-while life-objectives. You can command a man to stop lying and tell the truth; but he does not always know what you mean; he does not necessarily know after long reflection. This is a difficulty of symbolism in general; it is not peculiar to commands.

Commands are often used indiscriminately and provoke unfavorable reaction. Many otherwise faithful and dependable people instantly rebel at being commanded. Some criminals can be reasoned with, they can be persuaded, they can be "jollied" around; but they resent commands; that is one way *not* to handle certain people. But we do not always know this until afterwards.

Arbitrary and dogmatic commands are often used where something more deserving should have been used. We are always so hurried and so impatient that we employ this device promiscuously and thoughtlessly. It may be judged, however, that enlightenment and self-control will work together to enable the controller always to suit the device to the need.

CHAPTER XIV

THREATS

A NEWSPAPER account of a shooting affray, as we are writing, includes the following: "According to police, W—— and his wife were walking east on L—— street, when T—— approached them from the opposite direction. They met at S—— street, and after a few hasty words, T—— pulled out a revolver and fired one shot. The husband and wife turned and started away, but T—— followed across the street and accosted them again in front of ——.

"M. A. G——, an eye-witness to the shooting, declared that Mrs. W—— opened the door of his store and asked him to call the police. G—— further asserted that he heard T—— say, 'If you don't get out of town, I 'm going to kill you.' "

During the preparation of this chapter, the writer picked up casually, and hurried through, a brief popular life of Mary Queen of Scots. He was struck by the number of times the term "threat" was used in the book, and by the number of instances when that lively and versatile lady was managed by this means. And so it is in society at large. All other less severe methods of control failing—or not having been tried—men get their way by threatening. Since this is almost the last recourse of human patience and endurance, relative to objectionable variants, the last non-physical appeal, it is desirable that we should examine its structure and inform ourselves upon the subject of its function and its effects.

By way of definition we may say that a threat is any expression of an intention or determination to inflict injury

upon or bring harm to another; it is a promise to deprive people of something of value; it is a forceful, meaningful pointing in the direction of punishments; it is the formal warning before the onslaught; it is a vigorous sign that the conduct of the threatened is determinedly opposed and must be changed.

"To threaten" and "to menace" have practically the same meaning; one is a Saxon term, the other Latin. The former, if anything, is more direct and straightforward, while the latter is less direct and more general. The distinction is indicated possibly by the statement, "He did not actually threaten me but his tone was menacing, i. e. suggested that he would threaten." When the threat is organized and directed especially to inspire fear, to deter by terrorization, we speak of it as intimidation.

1. THE SOCIAL SITUATION

The social situation, as it develops from bad to worse, must be carefully followed. By means of persuasion, satire, commands and other devices, the recalcitrants have been informed that they are violating the code and that the limits of toleration have been reached. The command, let us say, is the final word; it expresses determination, resolution. The threat expresses determination, resolution, and also a temperature rising to fever heat. The genial warmth of the persuader, the cold impartiality of the satirist and the commander, have given place to impatience, disgust, irritation, anger, or possibly hatred. The threat says as plainly as can be: "Things have gone far enough; the absolute limit has been reached—in this direction."

Now, the command and the threat go together to make a dilemma, on either horn of which, it is the aim of the authorities to throw the enemy. This combination is a method of closing all avenues of behavior save two—the way of the directive command or the way of the prescribed

punishment. Commands and threats reduce life's action-patterns from a large number to two. "Either-or,"—that is the *new* situation in which the recalcitrant finds himself. The mother—one of the social authorities—says: "Stop that noise and get off to bed or I'll give you a whipping." This is the formula, repeated with a thousand variations in all areas of our social life. Either this *or* that; all other possibilities are eliminated at a stroke.

It is possible to view the situation prior to this as revealing what is deemed a misuse of freedom. Having many avenues of procedure, being able to do a great variety of things, the individual or the group has chosen to do that which the authorities find objectionable. Then these authorities, by means of some signaling apparatus, burst forth with commands and threats. The road that the offender was following is instantly closed. But two possibilities remain. The authorities hope that by pointing out clearly that one of these roads leads inescapably to punishment, the other one will be voluntarily taken. But if the way opened by the directive command is spurned, then that road is closed and there is only one left. Freedom is gone. The culprit has elected enslavement and suffering.

Thus commands and threats combine to make a final appeal to the *human* qualities. The argument of the authorities, implicit or explicit, means this: "You have offended or you have the 'look' of offending. You cannot seem to take creative advantage of the opportunities for self-direction which social order provides. You cannot be trusted with freedom, therefore we shall reduce, we do hereby reduce, your tethering-rope a good deal. We simplify the problem for you. We shut you up to two possibilities. Behave in this way *or* take the consequences. We are impatient with you and determined. We shall make a last call to reason. The appeal to the recalcitrant is to choice between two possibilities. We tell you frankly that there are only two choices left, but we let you decide be-

tween these. If you take our directive commands and follow them, you may ultimately be free again. If you choose not to take that opening, you reduce your openings to one, and a very painful one at that. Now choose."

Even here, in a very much narrowed situation, there is a last call to reason. The appeal to the recalcitrant is to take this new and restricted area and make the best possible out of it, to look it over, think the problem out, make comparisons, pass judgments, and come out on the side that is least disastrous. It is not a very fertile opportunity, it is true; but, as a general rule, most human beings can manage themselves best when life's pathways are reduced to two, when the problems of life appear in the form of alternatives, when a single choice is all that is required.¹ A command and a threat bring these alternatives together in the most unmistakable manner. The French were converted from their determination to crush Germany by the simple proposition: "Accept the Dawes plan or see your money collapse."

2. WIDE USAGE

We cannot try the patience of readers by repeated illustrations of the use of this device. Our common human experience furnishes the evidence that it is widely used, in the home, the school, industry, the church, and in all the more loosely organized relations of human beings. The facts have not been assembled yet to show in which of these areas it is employed most frequently. The discussion of the media, methods and forces relied on, will deepen the impression that there is far more threatening than most people imagine.

While discussing commands, we chose to support the proposition that the device was extensively used, by illustrating its employment in an area where one would

¹ Lowell. *Public Opinion in Peace and War*, many passages.

normally expect to find least of it, namely, in the school-room. We elect to adopt a similar method of proof here. Officers of the law are expressly prohibited from extorting self-incriminating confessions from suspected persons. We would not expect to find the threat device employed much here. But here is an area where we find a procedure known as "the third degree," which is little else than heaping up the threats until the suspect finally "breaks down," as the newspapers describe it, and confesses. We wish to quote at some length from a Supreme Court Decision written by Mr. Justice Brandeis to illustrate this method.

"Wan was a native of China. He had come to the United States in 1916, at twenty-two as a student. In 1918, he engaged in business which proved unsuccessful. Since December of that year, or earlier, his health had been bad. He had an attack of Spanish influenza. He suffered continuously from chronic stomach trouble which led him to eat sparingly and irregularly. When the detectives entered his room unannounced they found him in bed. They had no search warrant; but they made a search of the room and its effects, including the bed in which he lay. They were accompanied by a New York police officer; but they did not arrest Wan. They requested that he return with them to Washington. He told them he was too sick. Li, who had been waiting, was called in and told Wan that both of them were suspected of the murder (of three inmates of a house in Washington occupied by the Chinese Educational Mission). Then Wan consented to go with the detectives to Washington.

"On arrival in Washington, Wan was not put formally under arrest; but he was taken to a secluded room. In the presence of three detectives, the superintendent of police, and Li, he was subjected there to questioning for five or six hours. Late in the evening of that first day, the detectives took him to the Hotel Dewey; and, without entering his name in the hotel register, placed him in a bedroom

on an upper floor. In that room he was detained continuously one week. Throughout the period, he was sick, and, most of the time, in bed. A physician was repeatedly called. It was the police surgeon who came. In vain Wan asked to see his brother with whom he lived in New York; who had nursed him in his illness; who had come to Washington at his request in January; who had returned with him to New York; and whom, as he later learned, the detectives had also brought to Washington, were detaining in another room of the hotel, and were subjecting to like interrogation.

“Wan was held in the hotel room without formal arrest, incommunicado. But he was not left alone. Every moment of the day, and of the night, at least one member of the police force was on guard inside his room. Three ordinary policemen were assigned to this duty. Each served eight hours . . . morning, afternoon and evening . . . and at least on one occasion after midnight . . . the prisoner was visited by the superintendent of police and one or more detectives. The sole purpose of these visits was to interrogate him. Regardless of Wan’s wishes and protest, his condition of health or the hour, they engaged him in conversation. He was subjected to persistent, lengthy and repeated cross-examination. Sometimes it was subtle, sometimes severe. Always the examination was conducted with a view to entrapping Wan into a confession of his own guilt or that of his brother. Whenever these visitors entered the room, the guard was stationed outside the closed door.

“On the eighth day, the accusatory questioning took a more and more excruciating form. A detective was in attendance throughout the day. In the evening, Wan was taken from the Hotel Dewey to the Mission. There, continually for ten hours, this sick man was led from floor to floor minutely to examine and re-examine the scene of the triple murder and every object connected with it, to give

explanations, and to answer questions. The places where the dead men were discovered; the revolver with which presumably the murder was committed; the blood stains and the finger-prints thereon; the bullet holes in the walls; the discharged cartridges found upon the floor; the clothes of the murdered men; the blood stains on the floor and the stairs; a bloody handkerchief; the coat and the pillow which had been found covering the dead men's faces; photographs taken by the police, of the men as they lay dead; the doors and windows through which the murderer might have entered or made his escape; photostat copies of writings, by means of which it was sought to prove that Wan was implicated in a forgery incident to the murder; all these were shown him."

There is much more, the Chief Justice making a thorough job of the description; but the method is now clear. The foreigner was treated in such a manner that, after four days more of this "degree" work, he signed a report of the interrogation amounting to a confession. The chief medical officer, in testifying, said the Chinaman was so ill that "he would do anything to have the torture stopped."

In summing up, Justice Brandeis says: "The testimony given by the superintendent of police, the three detectives and the chief medical officer left no room for a contention that the statements of the defendant were, in fact, voluntary. The undisputed facts show that compulsion was applied." ²

It may be admitted that this is an extreme case. That such pressure may be applied, however, in the very face of the law, by officers of the law, leaves little room for doubt that less extreme, but still severe, measures, similar in purpose, are regularly adopted by officers and citizens in their attempts to have their way with others. If the device can be employed, and found to work, in the prohibited areas, it can be employed and made to work in the unprohibited

² Quoted in *New Republic*. Nov. 12, 1924. 272.

areas. Few people live such pristine and unassailable lives that they can say with Brutus

“There is no terror, Cassius, in your threats,
For I am arm’d so strong in honesty
That they pass by me as the idle wind,
Which I respect not.”

3. THE MEDIA

(1) Gestures. The gestural or pantomimic aspect of threatening is a most interesting one. Speaking of individuals first we may call attention to the innumerable movements of the body that convey a threat-meaning. There is the flushed or blanched face, the quiet determined look, the knit brows, the “eye like Mars to threaten and command,” the clenched fists, the terrible pointing finger of accusation, the “towering with rage,” the “menacing approach,” the waving of arms, the pointing of pistols, wielding of clubs, and a thousand other manifestations with their infinite personal variations.³

Expressing an intent to harm gesturally is one of the easiest of our communicational efforts. Many of these arts seem so natural as never to have been learned. Children learn very early, by sad experience, instantly to read these signs long before they can read the written word. Their lives have, more than we realize, depended upon expertness here. A young apple-stealer seems to know what “chasing” means at an early age, and without explanations.

Groups also have their menacing gestures. As was pointed out above, governmental authorities set policemen about when a curious and excited crowd gathers to understand or participate in some questionable procedure. They carry out, less in modern times than earlier, public whippings and executions in part for this purpose. From Pepys’ diary, just to take a handy illustration, we learn

³ On the interpretation of facial expression see *American Journal of Psychology*, Oct., 1924. 602 ff.

that during the trial of Major General Harrison in England about 1660, the hangman was placed by his side, with a rope in his hand. "At the quartering of John Coke, the lawyer, Colonel Turner being in command, told the sheriff's men to bring Hugh Peters, another of the condemned, to view the execution. The executioner, rubbing his bloody hands, asked the unfortunate man if the work pleased him."⁴ The "history of the warfare between science and theology" is replete with all sorts of cruel treatments which served as threats to the victims and to others.

Nations make gestures. They form alliances which are correctly interpreted by other nations as threats. They build large fleets and sometimes send them to manœuvre in foreign waters, keep standing armies, build forts, establish bases, and do many other things to modify the attitudes and activities of other nations. The Russians mobilized their armies before the World War was declared, and this was taken as an irrevocable threat by Germany. The German submarines became a grave menace towards the end of 1916 and in 1917.⁵ Germany's war frightfulness was intended primarily as a threat to the Allies. After diplomatic parleys fail, it has not been unusual for the nations, through their representatives, to express some promise of injury such as diverting trade, shutting off supplies, giving preferences, calling home ambassadors and the like.

We have all of this in metaphorical language when it is said that a nation "tears its hair," "shakes its fist," "points an accusing finger," "mutters imprecations," "rattles the saber," and makes other movements calculated to inspire fear. Any startlingly sudden move of a people, because its significance cannot be immediately understood by outsiders, may be taken as a threat.

(2) Gestures may do the corrective work, and often do it,

⁴ Finger. *Pepys' Diary*. 21.

⁵ Cf. Turner. *Europe Since 1789*. 601.

quite alone. They are most frequently accompanied, however, by curt and brief or voluble and stormy oral expressions. We may note first of all the direct and straightforward expression of a threat such as we have already illustrated. The mother simply says: "I 'll give you a whipping if you don't stop that." The farmer tells the trespassing hunter: "I 'll have you arrested if you don't get off the place at once." Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

Then there is the veiled or implied threat. The mother might say to the child: "You had better stop that," and say it in such a manner that the offender could easily see that an alternative was presented, an alternative the other horn of which would be punishment.

An interesting and popular variant is the use of profanity. This is an evidence of impatience or anger, and is intended to add vigor to an expression which would otherwise lack force. A vehement condemnation, in non-theological terms, serves notice that very terrible consequences are to follow unless there is an immediate withdrawal from the objectionable ways. Of course the tone of voice is an important factor.

Closely associated with profanity is the "curse" which is so dreaded by superstitious people. We speak of cursing a person, often, when we really mean directing a flow of profanity at him. The curse is very different however. To lay a person under a curse is to put him at the mercy of forces superior to those of the speaker; it is to let loose on him the invisible and mysterious powers of darkness, to follow and wound wherever and whenever possible; it is to consign him to hell in this life.

This is probably the most terrible threat that can be made to those who believe in it. People would many times rather suffer physical torture from known agencies than to be hounded through life by unknown powers looking for an opportune moment to strike. It is so terrible because one

is quite defenseless, because there is no escape, because there is no let-up, because the agency is invisible. We may recall the curses that were laid on Cain and Ham. To promise such consequences is an effectual way of moving people as one wishes.

While employed, also, for purposes other than threatening, the heaping on of abuse, the numerous means of intimidation, the vigorous denunciations, the stinging rebukes, the heavy fulminations, and many other forms of vehement oral expression, often amount to threats; they are the beginnings of worse things. The promise of injury is not always explicit, the dilemma is not always obvious; but reflection always discovers both. We have already pointed out that calling names, satire, laughter and other means of control, are promises of something worse to follow if the hint is not taken. Regarded in this way, they are threats.

"In the year 1809 George III appointed as Head-master of Eton (a famous English boys' school) Dr. Keate, a terrible little man who considered the flogging-block a necessary station on the road to perfection, and who ended a sermon on the sixth Beatitude by saying, 'Now boys, be pure in heart. For if not, I 'll flog you until you are.'"⁶ This is the oral form of threats in a nut-shell.

Illustrating a combination of oral and gestural features, enlarged and complicated, we may quote the following: "The Kaiser's visit to the Holy Land, his proclamation of himself as protector of Islam, the incident of Manila Bay, the Moroccan difficulties, and other events of like color and betraying a certain attitude of mind, came to be cited as indicative of a threat to the peace of the world."⁷

(3) Threats are also made in writing. Written promises of harm go everywhere. Books, pamphlets and newspapers cannot carry them except in disguised form, because

⁶ Maurois. *Ariel: The Life of Shelley*. 1.

⁷ Keller. *Through War to Peace*. 101.

of certain legal restrictions upon what may be printed. But private letters, code messages, and other secret means of communication, provide wide channels for the flow of this pressure.

This type is well illustrated by the intimidating epistles sent out, at times, to union men who refuse to go on strike and to those who come along to take the strikers' places. Brief number 7 of the Bituminous Operator's Special Committee speaks of the "scabs" as being deluged with letters, mostly anonymous, but laden with threats to burn or dynamite the homes of the offenders, to shoot them in their tracks, to organize a reign of terror, to beat them up, and to do many other frightful things—if they did not do as the threateners wanted them to do.

The handbill, distributed in a clandestine fashion, and the "notice" tacked upon trees and posts, are other anonymous means of conveying threats. The report, already referred to, includes the following: "To all scabs in Cane Creek you had better take warning and leave at once while you can walk. If you stay until Sunday I am afraid you will have to be hauled away. Now this is fair warning and you better head." These notices promised dire consequences to those who did not "head" the illiterate writer's warning.

As newspaper reports show, the anonymous letter is the usual device employed by kidnapers to extort money from wealthy people. The alternative is clear-cut in this case. "Leave ten thousand dollars in a tin can under the west end of the bridge by ten tomorrow night or your son will be killed."

It might be supposed, relative to these unsigned messages, that they would have little effect because of the anonymity. But while anonymous, as far as a particular signature is concerned, the epistles—we are now speaking of workers' messages—are usually of well-known origin. Those for whom they are intended know all too well what

groups, if not what particular individuals, are attempting to communicate with them, and they know also that there is plenty of power to back up what is promised. But even uncertainty of source is an alarm-producing factor. The imagination begins to play about the situation and to conjure up all sorts of dreadful possibilities. This brings us to the problem of the force in threats and to that we must turn for a little.

4. FORCE

There are many features of threats which contribute to their force. We have already given attention to one feature, namely, the form in which they appear, form in the sense of the media through which they flow to the recipients. By this form we really mean the skill or the artistry with which they are framed up and presented, the accuracy and fulness with which they reveal what the threateners have in mind, or make a good showing if there is no power back of them.

(1) The force of threats depends to some extent upon the authority of the controller. We have already considered some aspects of this matter when discussing commands. In a given situation, a person who has the authority to command, has also the authority to threaten or could threaten if he chose to do so. The nature of that authority and its source we have already studied.

(a) But the threatening mode of applying social pressure provides opportunities for the display of power not so fully available in the use of commands. For one thing there is a better opportunity for the display of physical vigor or mere *avoirdufois*. Other things being equal, a prize-fighter of large physique could make more effective threats than a shriveled saint, a tall Patagonian than an African pigmy. This is but a detail in the general plan of choosing leaders like army officers, policemen, politicians, school principals, business managers, walking delegates, of

average size or above. When such persons resort to threatening, their physique reinforces their language and gestures.

There is an additional fact of importance in this connection. Physique is one element in authority because the strong man, the large man, is a subject for mythology; the threatened cannot help reaching the conclusion that he is really larger than he is. Thus we link in this feature with authority and prestige.

(b) But vigor of expression is another element. If the threat is made in subdued tones, mild language, and languid gestures, it lacks force unless backed up in other ways. The threat has to be vigorous enough to cut into the midst of the thronging stimuli and gain the center of attention. It is a matter of common observation that the threat-pressure is usually applied with every evidence of deadly earnestness. If this is lacking, it may be assumed that the controller is relying on some other source of power, or is not expecting himself to be taken seriously. But this vigorous expression, along with size, becomes the subject of imaginings and is easily exaggerated. Besides, the vigorous man is often enough the versatile man and able to leave the impression that other and unexpected resources are likely to be employed. Prudence requires that the threats of very earnest people be given due consideration.

(c) The amount of determination exhibited and conveyed to the subject is another feature. If the threat is expressed in such a way that the subject believes it to be the outcome of only a momentary passion, that is one thing. If, on the other hand, the idea is conveyed that this threat is but one expression of a fixed and unalterable attitude and policy, and will certainly be followed by unfortunate consequences if not given due attention, that is quite another thing. There is such a thing as the authority of a fixed and unchangeable policy. Realizing this, the recipient himself moves into a realm of certainty, and has sure bases

for making a decision. He knows that heedlessness or resistance will achieve nothing but "the something worse."

(d) If the threatener occupies a status in society which already has prestige, he acquires power from his position. The subject has already been trained, as a rule, to admit and accede to authority inhering in such. If, however, this position has not been recognized as one of power, if there is no inculcated fear of it or respect for it, then the issue is joined on the basis of unsupported personal power on the one hand and some form of punishment on the other. We simply point out here that force is based, in part, on position and personal qualities.

(2) The force of threats depends very much upon the attention, comprehension, judgment, fear and freedom of the subject. These characteristics deserve passing notice.

(a) It is clear that a command falls down if the subject is not attending. Equally clear is it that a threat falls down in the same circumstances. We have quoted the dictum, "No attention, no persuasion." We can as truthfully say, "No attention, no threats." The threat, as a mechanism, may all be set up and in operation, but prove abortive because it does not reach in and grip the one to whom it is applied.

(b) Attention may be perfect and the comprehension may fail. The subject may be lending all his senses towards a correct perception of what is transpiring; but the *meaning*, the significance, the threatener's intent, may not be clear. This occurs all the time. The mother points to the door, but the child does not see what the idea is; the policeman waves his "billy" but the passing driver does not understand the signal; the nation sends a fleet to manœuvre in foreign waters, but the people so threatened may not see what it is all about. The meaning of the signal, in such cases, does not get over, and this is a constant difficulty.

(c) Another difficulty arises where the specific point is

grasped, but the judgment is unable to function normally; there is inability to cast up accounts on all sides, give full weight to all the possibilities, and reach a decision. Many people are plagued with indecision about life's problems; they cannot make up their minds which way to go. If they are impulsive, they lunge ahead without regard to consequences. If they are daring, they may take a chance. If they are cool and calculating they may hesitate until all the facts are in. This hesitation may easily be taken as refusal to obey and the punishment may follow at once—a grave misfortune. Sometimes the threat-interference arouses a passional reaction which swamps the judgment.

(d) In addition the imagination is often defective. In the most bald and sketchy of threats, the consequences are left to be followed out by the subject. But many cannot follow the delineation in full detail and see what the threatener foresees. Moreover, the language may convey the wrong picture. A boy was told that God was like a father. Did that awaken the picture which the speaker intended? It awakened the very opposite for the boy's father happened to be a brute who generally came home drunk to break up the furniture and beat up the family. Thus language often tells the wrong story, the apperception mass of the listener not providing materials for a correct interpretation and furnishing of the conception.

(e) Another consideration pertains to the freedom of the subject. What was said while discussing commands applies here as well. If people are not free to choose, then the threat is the very beginning of torture. This point is amply illustrated in the case of Wan, the Chinaman. He was not guilty of the crime. He was not free, therefore, to make a confession of guilt. But he was threatened all the while, and the pressure was applied in such a way as to make him admit guilt. There was no true dilemma for him. His choices were actually reduced to one—suffer the repulsive duress of the police.

Many other possibilities may be called to mind. To threaten a blind man with a club is to take advantage of a fettered man. How would he know where to dodge in case he decided to refuse? There are hundreds of handicaps which human beings suffer, and which are often forgotten by the threateners.

We may say, then, that threats are effectual to the degree in which the attention is gained and held, the comprehension is acute and speedy, the judgment is agile and has sufficient facts to work on, the imagination is fertile and nimble, the fear of authority is developed and there is freedom to obey.

(3) The force of threats depends upon the degree and kind of harm promised. Observing everyday practice we may note that the injury promised is of many kinds. In general, every value of life may be subjected to withdrawal. We can mention only a few examples.

(a) One of the most frequent, in primary relations, is the promise of bodily harm or suffering. The child is promised a whipping, the playmate is promised an ear-pulling, the obstreperous student is promised a "dip in the lake," the rowdy is promised a face-punching. At whatever point some pain may be started up in the body, there is the focusing point for a threat. From bodily pain, we easily pass to bodily injury such as branding, mutilations, and the like.

(b) The loss of property is frequently promised. The delinquent taxpayer is told that he will be sued and the costs will be added to his bill, the bandit promises to sack the town, the nation promises to take the colonies. Whatever is valued as property and can be alienated, is material for threats.

(c) Threateners frequently promise the loss of opportunity. This is of various kinds, economic, educational, political, social. During the presidential campaign of 1924 the report was current that many workmen were told to

vote the "right" way or they would lose their jobs; they were also told that if any other person were elected than the candidate of a certain party, they would suffer. Not infrequently students are informed that they will be sent home if they do not settle down to work. It happens now and then that office-holders are promised a "vacation" if political horses are swapped. Social leaders are promised ostracism if they persist in certain ways.

Now, an opportunity to make a living, to go to college, to hold office, to move among the "smart set," is a highly valued privilege. To promise and assure the loss of such is an effective way of bringing the recalcitrants into line. In the political campaign referred to, the candidate favored by business interests *was* elected. Whether the threats made to large numbers of workmen had anything to do with it, may never be known; some observers suspected that they did. It is always possible to find *some* privilege in everybody's life, the deprivation of which is a severe loss.

(d) There is also the loss of reputation. Hosts of people take great pride in a good name. They would lose almost anything else first. They are immensely proud to be called honest, generous, socially-minded, respectable, and patriotic. They can be driven to almost any extremity by a threat to take away these popular estimates.

It might be objected that such persons would never be subjected to threats for they are not recalcitrant. But a moment's reflection discloses the weakness in this objection. There are few of the best people who do not make occasional slips, who do not behave in indiscreet ways. These are the threatener's opportunity, an opportunity usually improved. We may recall what was said while discussing the name-slingers.

(e) Another possibility is the threat of injury, loss of property, opportunity or reputation, to loved ones. If the persons are tough and selfish, they may care nothing for

relatives and friends. But most people are not indifferent to what happens to others. A harm to friends and neighbors is taken as a harm to themselves. Right along, fathers and mothers take the shocks of life to shield their children; they deliver themselves up to the controllers that their offspring may be spared; a twitch on the strings of love or friendship has brought many a person into the hands of the controllers. There is immense leverage here for those who know how to use it.

These suggestions and illustrations give us a hint or two as to how threats become forceful. The points may all be gathered up under three heads: the skill, position, determination and vigor of the controllers; the nature of the threat mechanism; the position, loyalties, values, comprehension and other qualities of the subjects. With so many units to be combined, the possibilities of combination run up into millions. The threatener has enormous resources at his command.

5. RESULTS

We have just said that the threatener has enormous resources at his command. The next practical question that arises is this: What results does he produce? The general answer is clear; he gets control of people's lives and modifies them according to his wishes. A few specific results are worthy of mention.

(1) The indifferent and the sluggish are awakened and caused to fall into line. The threat jars people, otherwise unapproachable, out of their aimless reverie-states and brings them abreast of the situation. Whereas satire and laughter operate somewhat more slowly to stir up the half-asleep and the stupid and prevent them from drifting out of line, threats, along with commands, do the work quite suddenly. Many times it must be done suddenly or not

at all, as we saw in discussing commands. Some people are often too drowsy or preoccupied to catch the meaning of the surrounding titter or the thin satiric dart. They have to be shaken awake.

(2) The threat sometimes acts as a deterrent for the discerning. The only point in a public execution, aside from ridding society of the offender, is to whet up the wits of the spectators and cause them to refrain from doing that which will bring them to a similar end. It is assumed that the *meaning* of the execution will circulate through gossip, organized and unorganized, and finally reach, in his secret place, the one who is meditating crime.

Now the *threat* of execution has much the same force as the execution itself in doing this. An orange on the table causes the mouth to water. But the *description* of an orange will have the same effect. We recall Pavlov's experiments with the dog and the bell. A threat of terrible consequences is supposed to be, in some sense, a substitute for the consequences; it is a symbol, and it is hoped that deterrence will be produced by the symbol rather than the reality. A threat is as near to the actual consequences as it is possible for human beings to go and stop short of the consequences.

(3) Threats set the practical reason at work. Some such train of reflection as this is apt to follow. "I was going to stay up a while longer," or "I thought I would not study but play," or "I thought I would dawdle on the job. Now, however, an obstacle has been interposed in the shape of an unexpected, unforeseen and unavoidable consequence. If I stay up I will be whipped, and I wonder if the pleasure of staying up will outweigh the pain of the whipping. If I quit studying I will be dismissed from school and I wonder if the fun of avoiding study will offset the humiliation of being sent home. If I dawdle on my job I will lose it and have to hunt another and I wonder if I will better my condition."

Thus threats present crises in life which induce thinking. It may be said that crises do not always compel thinking, but it may be answered that there is little serious thinking apart from them. Since a threat presents a new inevitability, it offers an inducement to thought. In many cases, we must judge, this reasoning issues in a verdict favorable to social order.

(4) Threats quicken the imagination and serve a helpful purpose in developing habits of foresight. The boy is promised a whipping if he does not retire immediately. Here the imagination is either linked up with and reinforced by memory—if he has already been whipped—or is set at work constructing the consequence that is promised.

There is not only the specific image for the occasion, but oftentimes the release of a generalizing tendency. "If I am to be punished for this particular refusal, I wonder if painful consequences are attachable to *all* refusals; I wonder if this is a universal arrangement."

Thus to threaten may inspire the subjects to reach forward in imagination and learn to see ends of action as well as beginnings; it may lead to a habit of recognizing that the affairs of life are extremely involved, and that trains of consequences should not be set off lightly; it may lead thus to self-control—a most desirable social gain. Threatening is a way of opening all sorts of life-possibilities before those about to act, so that they may judge beforehand whether they wish to go on. It is not the best method of doing this; it is a severe emergency method to be used when other methods fail.

6. MERITS AND DEMERITS

We have already opened up this part of the discussion. A pertinent question is this: Is this an inhuman device which ought to be cast out along with demon-worship and

other antiquated practices? Or is it still an indispensable method of control, harsh but necessary? The answer is not easily forthcoming, but some considerations, for and against, may be introduced.

On the side of merit, the observations already made when dealing with commands, may be allowed to count. If what looks like an immoral, because it is a severe and often indiscriminate method, results in hesitation, self-examination, self-conviction, self-control and a recognition of social norms and expectations, then it is fully justified in the eyes of some authorities. "Let us do evil," they say, "that good may come." The end justifies the means.

There can be no doubt, as we have seen, that threatening is an awakener, an eye-opener, a developer of alertness, an indicator of norms and expectations. As such, forgetting its harshness, it has decided social value. It does help to maintain order in society. The sleepy, the absent-minded, the stupid and those who have refused to be taught, are brought to time in this way. To those for whom order is everything, to whom the end justifies the means, there can never be any doubt of the immense value of threats, and of their morality.

On the side of demerits, as already suggested, we may say that threats often awaken nothing but resentment, stubbornness, pugnacity, the feeling of being thwarted and other socially dangerous attitudes. When this happens, threats are a damaging influence; they are themselves a threat against that which they theoretically support.

In so far as the threatener is governed by passion while attempting to control, he ceases to be discriminating and is apt to degrade himself to the level of the threatened. He is apt to misuse his power by passing immediately into the work of punishing without waiting to see whether or not the threat has the desired effect. Malice, anger, hate, strengthen the threat in certain respects, but they evoke similar passions in the threatened very often and thus make

the social situation decidedly worse; they make it so bad that punishment seems to be the only solution.

Such passions lead both parties, threatener and threatened, into the utmost extremes of near-violence if not actual physical encounter. Here again, there is no necessary proportion between the threat and its consequences, between the cause and the result. Trains of events are set off which easily pass beyond the control of anybody and turn order into chaos. Community brawls and state wars arise all the time from such small beginnings.

All sorts of possibilities arise out of threat-interactions. If made in passion, they may evoke passion and change the situation into something much worse before it can be made better. If made with quiet determination, they may evoke a similar attitude in return. When the English promised retribution to the American colonists for their recalcitrancy, the answer, voiced by John Quincy, Jr., was this: "Blandishments will not fascinate us, nor will threats of a 'halter' intimidate. For under God, we are determined that where-soever, whensoever or howsoever we shall be called to make our exit, we shall die free men."⁸

Threatening, then, is a very high order of art if it, itself, avoids being a threat. If it is to accomplish more for order than for disorder, it cannot be given over to promiscuous and amateur use. Its employment is now narrowed down largely to primary relations—state relations excepted—for threats cannot be printed as such. But in this area the device is used by any- and everybody—and dangerously. No one knows how many actual conflicts start from threats; no one knows how much potential conflict has its origin here.

The successful employment of the threat-device requires vastly more skill and good judgment than most people suppose. It is much easier and less dangerous for amateurs to reward and praise. If rewards and praise fail, then a

⁸ *Observations on the Boston Port Bill*, 1774

worse situation is not necessarily created. But if threats fail in that they are over-done, under-done, prove unenforceable, evoke threats in return and the like, then the situation is distinctly worse; threatening must succeed glowingly or fail miserably.

That is why it is necessary more and more to curtail the amateur's use of this method. It adds unnecessarily to the nervous strain of populations to be continually sitting on the rim of a volcano. The antidote, we think, is enlightenment as to its danger, and education revealing what other resources for control are available.

CHAPTER XV

PUNISHMENT

1. DEFINITION

IN general, we may say that punishment is the fulfilment of threats; it is the completion of activities of which satire, laughter, calling names and uttering threats are the beginnings; it is the imposition of a penalty, the infliction of pain or loss, the forcing of recalcitrants to suffer retribution; it is the limiting of victims to only one opening—suffering and loss. In discussing commands and threats, we had life's ways reduced to two—a dilemma. In punishment, we have these ways reduced to one—pain and privation. In punishment, of the increasingly severe sort, the culprit gradually sinks to the lowest possible level of unfreedom.

It is useful to make a distinction between the legal and the non-legal forms of punishment. In the narrow or legal sense, punishment is whatever legally constituted authorities cause, in pain and loss, to law-breakers *after* due process of law and conviction. Any pressure, pain or loss, imposed up to that time, is merely incidental, is not punishment in the strict sense of the word. But of course any one can see that people suffer deeply long before they are convicted and fined or flogged; arrest and detention are severe punishment for some people. Consequently we have to think of punishment as any sort of pain or loss inflicted by any accepted authorities for violating the rules of the social game.¹

We cannot fail to notice also that punishment is a whole

¹ Cf. Sutherland. *Criminology*. 314.

made up of three essential parts. There is first the *punisher*, whoever he may be, whether parent, gang-leader, policeman or bishop. In the second place there is the *method* that the punisher employs, the device or network of devices which he adopts to produce pain and loss. This is the part of punishment which we take some pains to set forth.

In the third place there is the victim and the way in which he takes the stroke. There is justification for the belief that if there is advantage anywhere it is here. The punisher may be never so well qualified and backed; the methods may lack nothing in artistry—but the pain and loss may not come; a penalty is whatever it is to the victim. A fine of one hundred dollars would be nothing to some rich men; it would be a very heavy penalty for a poor man. Yet some proud rich men would suffer as much from a fine of one hundred dollars as from a fine of a thousand; the humiliation would be the chief consideration, not the money. A slap in the face to some sensitive person would be more painful than a good drubbing to some tough and insensate creature. There is a vast difference in how people conceive and receive the social wrath. Erasmus, in his colloquy on the Franciscans, refers to an unnamed place where adulterers were never allowed to uncover the body, and says: “Custom has made it, for them, the greatest of all punishments.” Probably Erasmus was reflecting on how such a requirement would affect him. Many would take it very differently.²

If we remember that the victim's attitude is ultimately determinative, we shall understand how baffling a problem punishment becomes; and we shall also understand why authorities have gone to such unspeakable extremes, why they have left no stone unturned in their efforts to break through the victim's misconception and resistance and compel him to take the onslaught as it was intended.

² Sumner. *Folkways*. 190.

We are particularly concerned with society's extremity in dealing with recalcitrancy, and what is done therein. We wish to describe, therefore, the severer forms of treatment. In the preceding chapters, we were introduced to some of the so-called milder forms for, in certain circumstances, satire, calling names and threats produce pain. But after every "hands-off" expedient has been tried and the variant remains obstinate what do authorities undertake next?

What do legal and non-legal authorities undertake? For after all, if there are non-legal forms of punishment, there must be non-legal punishers. People are punished for breaking statutes; that is plain. They are also punished for departing from the social code in any important particular; that we have also to keep in mind. Much objectionable behavior is prohibited by law; but an enormous amount of it is not yet so prohibited. Is this type excused and ignored? Some of it has called forth measures more severe than those prescribed in the law. We may allow our minds to run back through the previous chapters and pick up a punitive thread; in many instances, threats, commands, satire and others prove to be punishments.

We cannot fail to note, in addition, that punishing procedures are of two main types—the non-physical and the physical. This is not the same distinction that was made in the "Introduction" between the physical force method and the symbol method. Punishment, in its severer forms, usually includes the forcing of the victim's body around to the desired spot or into the desired posture; but this is not, of itself, punishment; it is only incidental to it. The physical and the non-physical methods are both symbolic. The non-physical method employs the usual communicational devices in order to convey the desired pain—gestures and oral deliverances. To reprimand, to fine, to call names, is to use symbols. But to whip, to torture or to kill, is also symbolic. There is physical contact to

be sure; but that is thought to be necessary to the sending of the message; it is merely a more sure way of awakening ideas. In the first case, symbols alone are used; in the second case, physical pressure supplements the symbols.

A fine and a whipping both mean that authorities are displeased and are saying so. The idea makes entrance to the recipient's mind by different receptors. Since authorities cannot whip without bodily contact and physical pain, they cannot say that they are displeased without these accompaniments—if they elect to say it through whipping. They choose the painful touch, however, as one way of conveying their meaning.

But when authorities come down to the touch-contact with culprits, when they hurl their own bodies into pain-producing relations with the bodies of victims, they fall back to the animal level of control. They ignore the human, the higher symbol-interpreting part of him and treat him as a stupid creature. In so doing the punishers say: "We can't talk any more to you as a human being; we will talk to you as an animal; we will talk in the only language which you seem to understand—pain or loss; nothing else seems to work with you." Such authorities know, from experience, that animals quail under pain and yield to it; they know also that it seems to work with man. But this is the extremity of social controllers. If they have tried everything else and have been forced to this resort, although the expedient does not work, there is nothing more under the sun that they can do. We wish to see to what ruthless lengths authorities have gone in this extremity.

2. UNIVERSALITY

(1) It is quite obvious that punishment is a very prevalent practice at the present time. The newspapers keep us well informed on this point. Our own experience in

local communities confirms what the papers suggest. The individuals who do not use it, in one form or another, are almost too good for this world. Probably most of us have crushed somebody with a stinging rebuke or a blow in the face. Punishment is a feature of our institutional life, the home, the play-ground, the school, the church. It is one of the special functions of governments.

(2) We can observe a vast amount of it "looking backward." When people first began to punish, no one can say. The practice goes back as far as historical records are available. It goes back as far as tradition reveals the past, as witness the stories in the Bible. Adam and Eve were unceremoniously thrust out of the garden for what now seems like a very desirable propensity; Cain was sent wandering over the earth, as a stranger—a banishment equivalent to death.

(3) We can go lower in the scale of human development than history and traditions can take us; we can dip into ethnography and observe punishing activities among the most primitive tribes, where they are sometimes sickeningly cruel and sometimes comically mild. It is clear that punishment has a continuous history from our brute ancestors.

(4) Looking from the earliest times to the present, we note a gradual gathering up of the objectionable activities of man into the illegal class, a gradual organization of penalties and the means for their imposition, an increasing amount of ceremoniousness, a development of more subtle forms and their increasing use, a slow handing over of its processes to impersonal forces.³

(5) In some periods, especially the fanatical ages, the work has been excessively cruel. Perhaps no efforts have been more savage than those of the Church during the Middle Ages, and especially of the Inquisition. In 1184 a decretal was prepared which declared a heretic to be any

³ Cf. Ross. *Social Control*. 111-112.

one who "in any way differed in mode of life, from the faithful in general." Here is woe, indescribable and unmentionable. But other times have known as cruel, if less systematic, procedures.

3. THE SOCIAL SITUATION

The social situation in which punishment occurs must always be kept in mind. We have made an approach to a sketch in discussing the various control devices. We have endeavored to keep the eye of the reader focused upon growing divergence in belief and practice, on the part of a member or some members of the group, and increasing hostility to such divergence on the part of the authorities.

Punishment is evidence of *decided*, irreconcilable divergence, and of bitter hostility. The divergence in belief and practice is held to be insulting and dangerous. It is insulting because it is the same as saying that the old code is stupid, outworn, antiquated, useless. It is dangerous because it is apt to be imitated, to start a separatist movement that will weaken the group; and of course it is dangerous because it is a repudiation of old authorities.

If the variation does not go so far as to break law, these authorities, according to how heinous the offense is deemed to be, take a hand and mock, satirize, rebuke, vituperate, execrate, and otherwise appeal to the offenders. If the laws are broken, these authorities operate in the same way and, in addition, the legal guardians of order take the case in hand, catch the criminal, try him, convict him, deliver the sentence and see that it is carried out. Thus, as social variation passes into law-breaking, the punishment grows heavier and heavier.

We can see, on the side of the authorities, increasing interest in this divergent conduct, increasing irritation, impatience, disgust, anxiety, anger, determination, and their characteristic forms of revealment. On the side of the

innovators we can notice, among other things, stubbornness, indifference, hatred, contempt, renewed vigor in opposition, more loyalty to the variant idea and the corresponding forms of practice. The authorities grow more determined to maintain their prestige; the offenders display more open rebellion; thus the breach widens.

Sometimes it is closed by winning the rebels back to a glad and willing conformance by persuasion or the milder forms of punishment. Otherwise it is never really closed. The recalcitrants may yield for a time; but their conformance is unwilling. If they multiply, as they often do under extreme pressure, they may become numerous enough to unhorse the old authorities and take their place. But this only reverses the situation; the old authorities now become the rebels and are put under pressure. The death of one group does not settle the issue because ideas sometimes survive their originators.

4. THE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

We can hardly expect to understand the procedures soon to be described without making a hasty survey of the *assumptions* and purposes of the punishers. What they have done and still do would be wholly incomprehensible to a man from Mars; he would be unfamiliar with these assumptions and purposes. On what assumptions are the activities grounded? What do punishers aim to do? In general, the answer to the latter question is that they aim to control; they aim to maintain their order. But we must particularize a little and, in so doing, we indicate rather more precisely just what the recalcitrants do that is disapproved.

Says Hoag: "Different people and classes of people entertain different ideas of the purposes of the present treatment of criminals and delinquents, for example, these ideas differ somewhat as follows: 1, 'For the compensa-

tion of damage done; 2, to restore social equilibrium; 3, to make a lasting impression on the memory and imagination of the criminal and of others who know of his crime in order that this may act as a deterrent; 4, to awaken feelings of remorse and penitence; 5, to expiate for sin; 6, to eradicate a plague spot and prevent further spread of social infection; 7, to purify the human race by weeding out the degenerate members of it; 8, to instil fear of the law and of those who enforce it; 9, to satisfy a feeling of revenge.' There seems, says Professor McConnell, no general agreement as to whether punishment is retrospective or prospective, whether it is intended to requite the past or to mold the future. All the variations in the object of punishment may, McConnell says, be reduced to four fundamental types: *expiation, retribution, deterrence, and reformation.*"⁴

If there is such diversity of opinion at the present time, we may conclude that there was not more certainty, in the sense of verified knowledge, at any earlier time. Indeed, as we trudge back up the path of history we find less certainty but more dogmatism, and a most astonishing admixture of whimsical assumptions. Some people assumed that any one who departed from the norms of social expectancy and practice was possessed of a devil; and that of course called for measures of violence such as would make the body uninhabitable. Some held that two wrongs, in some undefined manner, made a right; thus if one man scratched out another man's eye, the victim or his representative had to scratch out an eye in return; this put everything to rights again, accounts would balance once more.

Some held that certain persons could be made to suffer instead of others, and it would be the same as if the guilty suffered. Then there was the strange doctrine that sinners could be, and had to be, purified by suffering, purified "so as by fire." Finally—but by no means to exhaust the list—there was and is the notion that high spirits are dangerous

⁴ *Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law.* 201.

and do not call for direction but for repression; hence the greatest efforts have been put forth to crush the spirit and courage of variants.⁵

While most of what has just been said, as to the assumptions and aims of punishment, has reference to violators of law, we can see that it has equal reference to the non-criminal anti-social as well. Authorities have approached those who—to use an inelegant but expressive phrase—have “bucked the mores,” in the same spirit and with the same cruelty that they have approached the criminal. And they have always been well supplied with assumptions which they took to be reasons. With this information, we can understand the ruthless and diabolical pertinacity, the refined and horrible cruelty, the hateful ingenuity, with which punishers, down through the ages, have endeavored to maintain what, to them, was the divine order of things.

5. METHODS OF PUNISHMENT

We come now to a consideration of the methods of the punishers. We have no particular country in mind, no special race, no time. The subject, if fully developed, might be discussed from all these points of view. We might describe the English, the Indian or the Japanese methods; we might study the devices employed in early times, in the Middle Ages or confine ourselves to the present. The purpose is merely to select some forms that might have been used anywhere at any time. We have in mind the historically conspicuous, the popular, methods, and especially the worst that authorities have done in their efforts to rid society of its objectionable variants; we wish, as we have said, to see authorities in their extremity.

No ultimate principle governs the order of presentation, with the possible exception of what we might call the gradual limitation of freedom until there is a sundering

⁵ Sumner. *Folkways*. 250.

of all bonds in death. It is not possible to arrange them according to the principle of origin; most of them, in idea at least, are of prehistoric origin. Nor can we successfully order them according to the standard of increasing severity; the attitudes of the victims determine that. We are not primarily interested in any principle of arrangement. We wish to keep our attention focused upon man at his wits' end in controlling man.

(1) Fines. A fine is a forcible appropriation, by properly constituted authorities, of a man's money or other property. The amount of money called for has shown wide variations. In Alfred's time, the pleasure of knocking out a front tooth cost eight shillings. If a slave were slain, only eight shillings were payable to the kinsfolk and thirty to the master. From such modest items, the sums have mounted, as wealth has increased, to enormous totals, even up to the millions of dollars. The amount has usually been determined by the nature and extent of the injury and by the rank and ability to pay of the injurer.⁶ How is this a form of punishment?

It has always been assumed, and rightly, that human beings and their property are very closely connected. So closely connected are they indeed that, taking the etymological cue, a man's *property* is that which is proper or suitable to him, is a part of him, is an extension of his self for a part of his self has gone into its acquisition or production. It is something upon which he learns to depend as he depends upon his feet or his head, a sort of outer garment of protection. Without it life assumes a very different and a gloomier aspect. Between him and it there is a continual interchange, a circulation, a vital link.

It is, then, one of his most vulnerable parts. To attack it is equivalent, in certain respects, to attacking him; it is to attack him. As Shylock said: "You do take my life when you do take the property which sustains my life."

⁶ Cf. Ives. *A History of Penal Methods*, 3.

To take it from him, then, is a very clever punishment for its loss is a real harm, a deep injury. But it is not to maim him. It is to take away part of him without disarranging his bodily functioning. Its alienation is a serious but not an irretrievable handicap. He is not left quite so helpless as he would be without an eye or a leg. Besides, the injured party might have some benefit from *this* part of him, but not from a severed hand or head. There is nothing else that you can take from one individual and give to another that would have much concrete value to the other.

Only the government can legally take away property. The illegal aspect of this type of punishment is illustrated in the methods of mobs and other lawless bands when they set out to heap up retribution. In such instances, property, in the form of buildings, jewels, cattle, crops, forests, women, and land, has been alienated by such terrifying practices as burning, pillaging, looting, poisoning and the like.⁷ It is unnecessary to comment on the fact that these procedures, or their possibilities, have always struck terror into the hearts of victims and have proved to be terrible punishments. But these extremes have been thought necessary by some authorities.

(2) Persecution. By persecution we mean "to pursue in a manner calculated to injure," to beset with cruelty, malignity, to carry the pursuit through to the finish, to harass, and even to put to death. Such features, however, would not distinguish the procedure from mob lawlessness or from certain legal forms of punishment to be considered later. The distinguishing feature is pursuit and injury *because* of adherence to a particular religious creed or mode of worship; this is what sets the method apart.

Perhaps the best way to describe this method of punishment is to watch a persecution, of a witch let us say, begin, mature and finish its dreadful work.

Let us say it is any neighborhood, and all is quiet. Of

⁷ Cf. Warner. *Landmarks in English Industrial History*. 113, 211.

a sudden, it is noticed that some woman behaves in a somewhat peculiar manner; and this is the beginning—slightly or decidedly exceptional behavior. She decides to live alone, or she keeps a black cat, or has birthmarks which some one discovers, or she has fits, goes into trances, or hears “voices” as did Joan of Arc. At any rate, something unusual arrests the attention and is marked. If the townspeople are already excited and in a witch-hunting mood, the discovery of this oddity is all that is necessary to set off the explosion. Otherwise, there are some intervening steps.

Talk starts concerning the oddity; gossip spreads the facts and fancies; there is much elaboration and falsification; enemies get hold of the news and exaggerate maliciously; the story becomes distorted almost beyond recognition.

Then an evil of some sort befalls a member of the community; somebody’s cow dies, baby falls sick, a haystack burns, a flood comes, the lightning strikes a neighbor’s house—anything.

The two events—the woman’s queer behavior and the local calamity—are readily associated by suspicious and frightened people; they *are* contemporary phenomena; that is obvious. But it is so easy, when one wishes to do so, to say that contemporary, associated or parallel phenomena, are causally connected. They reason: “Indeed, now that it has occurred to us, anybody can see that these events are related as cause and effect. That queer old woman did this. She must be a witch. She *is* a witch. That accounts for her queer behavior. That explains the death of the cow, etc.”

Thus the people rationalize, whisper and work themselves up into a frenzy. There are more whisperings, more secret meetings, more elaborations and falsifications, more shuddering at the possibilities of future troubles. Friends cease to call; neighbors avoid the place; children look

askance as they pass; relatives drop away as from a plague. She can't buy; she can't sell; she can't go to the church; she is gradually isolated.

This, of course, drives her to stranger behavior; she cannot understand it. But stranger behavior produces deeper popular conviction. There is action and reaction. There is almost a vicious circle until some person has the boldness to suggest seizure; possibly a witch-hound comes to town. The rabble gathers and jostles about, half afraid but itching for some excitement.

The victim is seized and carried off for interrogation and ill-treatment; the answers are baffling; the testimony is conflicting. Then more interrogation and ill-treatment; then the dreaded ordeal. At last the evidence is clear and unmistakable. Finally, there is the scaffold or the stake. This is a sample of persecution. The process may take years; it may take but a few days.⁸

This is the barest outline. There are indefinite refinements and variations of all the processes mentioned. One terrorizing feature is the *watching* of victims, the eyes day and night, the following of suspects about, the sudden and unexpected confrontations and accusations, the harassments of gesture and speech, the strewing of suspicions and hatred in the path—this without end.⁹ Persecution has been a very severe form of punishment.

(3) Whipping. It is a long distance from the tender switching which the fond mother gives the child, all the while assuring it that the whipping hurts her more than any one else, up to the indescribable "laying about" with a thousand or more lashes that cut like knives and leave the victim more dead than alive in a welter of blood and flesh ends. But such is the distance the ethnographer would have to travel in making an adequate description of this method. We can offer only a few hints of the more savage

⁸ Ives. *Op. cit.* Chapter II. Lecky. *History of Rationalism.* 149 ff.

⁹ Sumner. *Folkways.* 238 ff.

whippings; the milder forms—and not so mild either—are already familiar to most of us by reason of certain youthful experiences.

The instruments employed in this procedure have been of every conceivable and available variety. The bushes and trees have contributed more than their share. There have been straps composed of leather, rubber and canvas, with a narrow, medium or wide coverage. There have been whips proper, the especially prepared cutting filaments, made for horses and oxen, but cruelly misapplied to human beings. It would seem as if there had been as many appliances for lashing the body as cutting weapons for making holes and stabs in it. There have been light whips, heavy whips, flat whips, round whips, triangular whips, and all possible shades of variation between.

Perhaps the most murderously brutal device ever known was the Russian knout or the African korbash—one deadly thong, or several leathern rods or wands, to cut like knives and kill with a few strokes.

Quite familiar in name—and we hope not otherwise—is the terrible “cat” or cat-o-nine tails. It was called a cat possibly because the tails were sometimes tipped with metal claws which scratched the backs of the victims like furious felines. The naval cat was possibly the most formidable. It has been described as “being made of a piece of rope thicker than a man’s wrist, 5 feet in length over all, three of which were stiff and solid stuff and the remaining two feet ravelled into hard twisted and knotted ends.” There were varieties without number. It would be too depressing to include accounts of the perfectly ghastly results of floggings with these instruments. It is somewhat to the credit of modern people that these horrible devices have been sent under the cover of prison walls; but it is a terrible indictment that they are still used there to some extent.¹⁰

(4) Mutilations. Our imaginations have run ahead to such results while considering whips. It makes no particular difference, when the blood-lust is aroused, by what instrument, whip or knife or club, the flesh is peeled off and an ugly scar left. A Russian knout would take off an ear as easily as a slice from the back.

In ancient Mexico "he who told a lie to the particular prejudice of another had part of his lip cut off, and sometimes his ears. In the reign of Æthelstan, a man might have his hand cut off for coining, whereupon it was promptly nailed over the door of the mint. In the reign of Cnut, a woman might lose her nose and ears for adultery. In certain cases, for a man, this monarch ordered nothing less "than that his hands be cut off or his feet or both, according as the deed may be, and if he then have wrought yet greater wrong, then let his eyes be put out, or his nose and his ears and upper lip be cut off; or let him be scalped—so that punishment be inflicted and also the soul preserved."¹¹ Of course, such mutilations frequently producing death, the soul could not have been preserved in this world.

Savagery of this character was almost unmitigated in the eighteenth century in England. It is difficult to find a period in most of the civilized countries and ages when cruelty of this sort was not prevalent. No instrument has been neglected that would bruise, cut, gouge, break or otherwise disfigure the human frame. No organ of the body, no part of it, has been forgotten, tastes and fashions prevailing here as elsewhere. The nails have been wrenched off or parts of them cut away; the teeth have been knocked out or driven down the throat; the hair has been twisted and yanked out, one strand at a time, a few strands, a handful; fingers and toes have been snipped off, pulled off, hacked off; the eyes have been gouged out, burned out; the limbs have been broken, disjointed and smashed; the lips have

¹¹ Ives. *Op. cit.* 8.

been cut and pinched; the breasts have been beaten and slashed—and so on to the absolute exhaustion of fiendish ingenuity and victims. All that the soul might be preserved!

Mutilations are contrived to leave scars. What are the scars for? They are perpetual reminders to the victim. But worse, they identify him to the public; they single him out for ever as a possible source of danger; he is always, thereafter, under suspicion—with all that suspicion entails. Thus shame and mortification are added to the physical pain—a grievous burden to the end of life.

(5) Torture. Possibly some innocent person might ask: “What, is there anything more?” There is much more, infinitely more. A single attack upon a victim was not found to be sufficient in many cases; it did not always kill him! It was severe enough while it lasted; but it did not always last long enough to “convert” the sufferer.

Hence, it was a stroke of genius to find ways of continuing the pain until something desirable, to the punishers, happened. This is what we mean by torture. It continued until the victim repented or died.

The instruments devised to wring the human frame, persistently, increasingly, are too numerous even to mention here. We may pass over the gags for the mouths of village gossips and scolds, the barrels as the dress of drunkards, the revealing letters on the garments of adulterers, thieves and the like; these hardly awaken our interest; we must come to something more exciting.

Possibly some of the severest of the torture instruments were the rack, the wheel, the thumbscrew, the treadmill and the crank. The two last named were regarded, less than a century ago, as “model labour” in England, for reformatory purposes.

The crank was invented about 1846 as an improvement over the treadwheel. This “newest monster might be compared to a churn in appearance, or to a chaff-cutter, or

twenty other things, made up of a case and a handle; it was just a metal box raised to a convenient height by a support. It had a handle to be turned and a little clock-like face upon one side to count the revolutions made. The requisite amount of resistance was secured by a metal band, which could be tightened with varying force by pressing inside, upon the axle; it might be compared to the band-brake sometimes seen upon the back wheel of a bicycle. The ordinary resistance was nominally 4 to 14 lbs. The usual number of revolutions required was 14,400 per day, being at the rate of 1,800 per hour," or 30 to the minute.¹²

Imagine it. Think of grinding away, hour after hour, day after day, week after week, month after month, 30 to the minute,—and nothing coming out of the machine, no product of effort, no visible gain, nothing but weariness, hatred, madness. This is torture; a method of restoring men to normalcy.

If the civil authorities have been stony-hearted in dealing with violators of the secular law, the religious authorities have not been softer, often, in dealing with violators of ecclesiastical law, that is, with heretics. We have already noticed persecution. That is one form of torture. Let us notice another kind.

The penitential discipline, a very terrible weapon, was evolved for expressing disapproval, and enforcing a changed attitude. It was torture used to elicit confession, and then more torture was applied as punishment. Says Ives: "On confessing a crime, or being condemned, all manner of tasks and toils were laid on the penitent. Sometimes they were capricious and poetic; thus if a man had slain his kindred, the weapon with which the deed was committed could then be forged into a penal chain, and, bound therewith, arrayed in selavina, or, it might be naked, he would have to trudge away, staff in hand, to his destination, which might be some local shrine, or that of St.

¹² Ives. *Op. cit.* 190.

Thomas of Canterbury; but which might be far off, across and beyond the seas, to Compostella, Rome or Palestine. The ordinary penitent wore no chains, but he was usually required to go unarmed, to eat no flesh, to take no strong drink, and to abstain from warm baths, and sometimes he had to fulfil weird and painful conditions particularly imposed by his penitentiary; as, for instance, when Robert, called the Devil, was ordered by a certain hermit to eat only bones and scraps which had been thrown to dogs, and to be dumb and act like one insane."¹³ This is torture, and such examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

One of the truly terrible features of the Inquisition was the *delay*, and the consequent unendurable suspense, in carrying the investigations through. Victims were accused; they were brought to trial; they were obstinate because not guilty; then they were sent back home for a period, and then brought up again; they were sent away for months; they were returned to court; then sent away and returned, sent away and returned, for ten, twenty or thirty years. They were never convicted; they were never acquitted. Continual suffering followed, and loss of reputation. All admitted that this plan worked well.¹⁴ Any one who reads the monumental works of Lea, Lecky and Westermarck, understands rather better the frightful and unpredictable lengths to which the authorities went to scotch those who "in any way differed in mode of life, from the faithful in general." Nothing more savage has ever passed current under the name of "Civilization," to say nothing of religion, unless it was the World War.

(6) Banishment. This means of punishment, like the others, has taken on a great variety of forms. One popular way was to put the culprits in chains and send them into outlying regions; chain-gangs are not unknown in America even now. Then the victims were often sent to the galleys

¹³ *Op. cit.* 36ff.

¹⁴ Lea. *History of the Inquisition.* 1:418.

to strain out a miserable existence. Another way was to send them to the penal colonies, outlandish and horrible places where the suffering was continuous and unmitigated. This was called transportation.

In such colonies additional punishment was heaped on by fiends set apart for the purpose. On Norfolk Island, just to take a handy example, the victims were occasionally fastened upon an iron frame and *stretched*—one man for twelve hours in a dark cell.¹⁵ Sometimes they were hung up by one hand. Flogged and bleeding sufferers were not infrequently sent to work in a cayenne pepper mill, a device for producing madness which cannot be framed in language.

Another popular form has been imprisonment, described by Warden Osborne as “the direst punishment that can be meted out to any man.”¹⁶ Solitary confinement was instituted in Rome about 1700, as a relief from the unspeakable practice of herding men, women and children together in filthy holes. It is of interest to note in passing that the sexes are segregated in this country, but otherwise similar conditions are found.¹⁷ John Howard fostered this “reform”—solitary confinement,—in England as an improvement over what obtained. The practice is now widespread in this country and the civilized world. It is a living death if prolonged. The agony caused by such banishment from society can never be put into words. There is the small cell, the coarse food, the darkness, the brutal guard, the isolation, the silence, the idleness, and the stench in hot weather.¹⁸

Except that people have to pay taxes to maintain these institutions of incarceration, and but for the fact that there are escapes now and then, the inmates are dead as far as the outside world knows or cares. No one hears of their

¹⁵ Ives. *Op. cit.* 102, 137, 168.

¹⁶ *Society and Prisons.* 74, 77. Cf. *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1923.

¹⁷ Cf. Pound. *Criminal Justice in the American City.* 84.

¹⁸ Reynolds. “The Case of John Sobiesky,” *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1923.

daily sufferings; no one thinks of them very much; they are out and gone.

(7) Death. Every form of punishment so far considered, does not extinguish one dreadful possibility—the victim's escape, return and revenge. Authorities and citizens are always apprehensive lest this happen. And well they might be for the thing has happened many times and the toll of recoil has not been light. For the punishers have added incalculably to the original reasons or excuses for recalcitrancy.

From this dreadful possibility there is only one sure way of escape—the death of the victim, his utter annihilation. This is not usually the reason assigned for inflicting the death penalty; but it is one reason and a good one, provided severe punishment in any form has been administered. And this might be regarded as another form of banishment—banishment to that bourne from which no traveler ever returns. Death is utter safety to those who remain; death is man's utmost; death is the final silencing of the voice of protest; punishers can go no further;—and yet there are dreams.

The methods that have been employed for dealing out death are many. Achan, along with his family and cattle, was stoned; Jesus was crucified; Socrates was compelled to drink the fatal hemlock; Mary Queen of Scots was beheaded; Joan of Arc was burned; in England in 1531 a man was boiled in oil. Many have been starved; many have been strangled; many have been hacked to pieces; many have been hanged; many have been broken at the wheel; many have been shut up in iron coffins; many have been disemboweled; many have been impaled on stakes; many have been shot; many have been guillotined; many have been electrocuted; some have been asphyxiated. These have been the chief and popular methods.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cf. Sutherland. *Criminology*. 317. Bleyer. *Scientific Methods of Capital Punishment*.

(8) War. When several, many or all of these methods are organized on a large scale and applied to whole populations, we call it war. All resources, material and moral, are gathered into one hideously spectacular and destructive tide of aggression. The choice is given to the victims—submission or extermination. Unless there is extermination, we now see that there always remains the dreadful possibility of revenge, next year, a decade hence, sometime; some day the worm will turn. Then, in the face of this terrifying possibility, more force is prepared and applied to postpone the evil day. Then there is more reason for turning; more squirming. Then more pressure. A vicious circle.

6. APPRAISAL

We now have before us some representative features of a vast network of punishing procedures. Fundamentally, they are all symbols of a point of view, a world outlook, a philosophy of social life, which controllers attempt to impose upon the controlled. Moreover, they are pain-producing instruments; they stab their message home by means of suffering. They would have no significance for beings who could not suffer. We might have given this chapter a different title—The Severe Pain-makers. How shall we appraise this method of control?

(1) For one thing, they are said by some to be a cheap method. Professor Ross says: "While conceivably we might procure obedience to laws by rewards as well as by punishment, we do in fact use punishment alone. Nor is this strange, when we consider how easy is the affliction of great pains and how difficult is the affording of great satisfactions. However preferable a scale of prizes to a scale of dooms, the latter will be used as long as it is cheap to give pain and expensive to confer pleasure."²⁰ But is this a cheap method?

²⁰ *Social Control*. 106.

We may answer this in part by suggesting how much cheaper it is, from every point of view, to get a youngster upstairs and to bed saying: "Go to bed now, Jimmie," than to go through the exhausting procedure of whipping him, carrying his struggling mass up stairs, undressing it and tucking it in—providing, of course, that the first method will turn the trick at all. The former may be called the cheaper method, not forgetting the cost of preparing the boy to understand the sounds, "Go to bed now, Jimmie." It is cheaper because there is no danger of a destructive recoil.

The best that can be said for manhandling is that it is cheap only when there is absolutely no other recourse. But this conclusion, "there is absolutely no other recourse," is one of the prevalent, tenacious and unexploded fallacies of the ages; it is the result of self-justification, of stupidity, of laziness. For even after vigorous punishment, stopping short of death, the controllers can never be sure; there is no certainty that the subject really is cured. But suppose punishment is cheaper—financially,—what about efficiency?

(2) Some say punishment is very efficient. "Why, just look at the peace and order we have about us every day. Would we have this without the system of punishment and the fear which it inspires?" Of course the answer, in their view, is plainly in the negative. But there is a tremendous assumption here. It is that all human beings are really ferocious brutes, caged and held in check by this system, who would, except for it, leap at each other's throats and so exterminate each other leaving nothing but a desolation of bones. This assumption is worthy of careful examination, but we must leave it now and pass to the question of what is *wanted*.

Efficiency is stated partly in terms of what is wanted. A machine that is built for the making of automobiles, but that actually delivers pop-corn balls, is not efficient; the

manufacturer did not want pop-corn balls. So with the mechanisms for *delivering order* in society. That is what is wanted by the punishers; they never want or admit that they want chaos. Does punishment make for a better social order?

Let us admit that it contributes something to that end. But let us not neglect the evidence to the contrary. There is a growing body of evidence to the effect that punishment, especially the severer forms, actually produces disorder. No man living knows more about what prisons—one form of punishment—produce than the late warden of Sing Sing prison. He presided over an especially and expensively built plant for the manufacturing of social order. This is what he says. “Year after year our prisons have been turning out men crippled in body, broken in mind, calloused in soul. ‘Do you know how a man feels when he leaves an institution of this kind?’ one of the Auburn prisoners, a third term, once asked me; ‘I’ll tell you how I felt at the end of my first term. I just hated everybody and everything; and I made up my mind to get even.’”²¹ “To get even”; that was the all-consuming passion of this man after passing through society’s severest correctional machinery. This is only one case, to be sure; but Warden Osborne thought of it as typical.

Can a method of treatment, supposedly designed to extinguish hate or social indifference and awaken affection for order, be called efficient when it produces such results? Was society worse or better off after its handling of this man?

But there is more—and worse. Punishment is one of the best means known for spreading socially dangerous ideas. Taking the large look for the moment, there is no more effectual way to awaken an interest in objectionable doctrines than by persecuting and destroying their promul-

²¹ Osborne, *Society and Prisons*. 75. Tannenbaum. “Facing the Prison Problem,” *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1922.

gators. One gives publicity to these notions in this way; one makes martyrs out of the founders; one creates objects of worship. Christianity would never have taken such a hold on the world if its founder and his followers had not been killed. If we want heresy to die out and be forgotten, stamping on it is not a sure method to that end.

Thus, the system of punishment is self-defeating. It may deter cowards and weaklings; it reinforces and invigorates brave and determined people. Pain does not necessarily unconvince the convinced—whatever else it may do. It may work for self-centered brutes with short memories, but not for men with foresight and passionate devotion. We do not speak of a procedure as efficient which delivers back to society subjects afflicted with what Professor Miller appropriately calls “oppression-psychoses,”—minds diseased by repression.

Such is the result often where the punished variants stand for certain ideals and believe that they are right. The case is hardly different for professional criminals. By arrest and incarceration, the criminal becomes a hero to his gang; he is more highly respected; he is regarded as more or less of a martyr; his enemies—the authorities—become the enemies of his followers; there is a strong inclination to imitate; he is imitated. Thus punishment actually calls forth more crime.

(3) Some say punishment is indispensable. The majority of people have been thoroughly indoctrinated with that old Solomonic theory; “Spare the rod and spoil the child,” and they cannot seem to wander very far from that view when discussing the subject—at least in theory. But actually hundreds of thousands of *homes* get along in perfect order without the violent “laying on of hands,” or the laying on of anything else that wounds deeply.

A personal letter from John Collier, who knows the Indians from intimate contact, says: “Within families in the Pueblos, banter and ridicule are used where we would

use whippings or other kinds of punishment. The whole thing seems tied in with the Pueblo philosophy or art of life, which is hostile to the idea of coercion, and much concerned with preserving genial human relations.”²² But then, some retort, the Indians are uncivilized!

Even among us, where the notion of punishment prevails, the thing itself is absent, except in the milder forms suggested, from countless homes; and these homes are ordered and successful. As in the homes, so in the schools, in the factories, in the church, in the daily intercourse of millions. Some useful people get through life without severe punishment. Punishment is not indispensable to them.

It is said, however, that the severer forms of punishment are indispensable to *some* people; that is, there are those in our midst who cannot be kept in order in any other way. But how do we know this, and who are they? That people *are* punished severely is no argument—keeping in mind human bungling—that they *ought* to be punished. Have all other correctional methods been tried first, and have they failed utterly? There is never any way of answering such inquiries. Mothers who will say that they have tried “every other way” and have failed, are often too ignorant to know what other ways there are. It is well known that government officials rarely try any other ways. This is another ancient assumption.

(4) This assumption is mentally contemporaneous with another, namely, that such recalcitrants *can* be successfully appealed to and corrected in this way. It is said that we cannot do the work in any other way, but we *can* do it in this way. We have already seen that this is very doubtful. Punishers are easily deceived; they are, of all people, the most gullible. They easily get the *bodies* of the victims under control and punish them; but they do not always get the self-starting apparatus in their power; that lies too deep for any such probing.

²² Feb. 9, 1925.

The punished may yield ostensibly; but at that moment they become hypocrites, two-faced, and begin to lead a double life. The openness, frankness, honesty, simplicity, so characteristic of young children, and so necessary to successful human relations, are displaced by secretiveness, reserve, suspicion and other dangerous attitudes. One hideous device of a Frankish king was to drive sharp spikes under the nails of the victims. This, he asserted, always induced confession.²³ It probably did. But what was gained? Did the intense pain prove the falsehood of the previously professed views? Did the victim love the king ever afterwards and rush to serve him the more loyally? It would not be strange if he too, determined to "get even."

Thus the punishers whip, stretch, pound, twist and otherwise manipulate the poor human frame, only to find themselves further away from their goal in the end than they were in the beginning. That has happened times without number. That is happening all the time. The punishers have the body, when they can catch it, but not the Man; not the *man* until he inwardly assents and approves.

But what sort of a civilization is it that *reasons with people* only by pain? Is this the lowest or the highest logic? Is there any logic at all in artificially induced pain? When scientists assemble to convince each other of the truth of the atomic theory, would they do well to proceed by making each other suffer as much as possible? When social authorities regularly *associate* pain and certain kinds of conduct, they are not reasoning at all; they are erecting arbitrary connections between phenomena, and passing them off as necessary connections and consequences. For the most part this is deception.

(5) Punishment easily becomes indiscriminately brutal, wasteful and foolish; it is so easy to go beyond all bounds and overdo. This happens when the punishers are angry,

²³ Ives. *Op. cit.* 73.

when they are wrought up. This danger is recognized and guarded against in the legal provision that the punishing procedure must be put in the hands of impartial and calm judge, juries, wardens and others.

But even here, we get indiscriminate brutality when the victims are congenitally dull and cannot grasp the message supposedly conveyed in the whacks, the pillory or the dark cell. These persons simply do not know what these pain-makers are trying to say to them. Again, there is brutality when the punished are sick and helpless, when they cannot conform and already have an extra burden.²⁴ These cases are so clear that further comment is unnecessary. Then there is certainly brutality when a mob gathers up a suspect and hurries him off to a frightful death, without a trial.

But even in the impartial machinery, there is brutality; it is the usual brutality of the machine. People are shaped to fit; the machinery of the court grinds on; nice, individual, personal discriminations are neglected; we have two sides battling, one for conviction and the other for release; both sides are set to win if possible; the accused becomes a bone of contention.²⁵

(6) It is hardly extravagant to say that the severer forms of punishment are simply a method of "passing the buck,"—to use a modern and expressive phrase. Let us see how this is so.

The ancient doctrine of "total depravity" says that man is sinful by nature, wholly vile and a worm. That idea has tintured our popular philosophy of life. But, inconsistently enough, the punishers, while often holding to this view, say that man is still responsible for what he does. That is, man is irresponsible and responsible at the same

²⁴ Hoag. *Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law*. Introduction by Dr. Goddard.

²⁵ Cf. Mead. "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1918.

time; he cannot help being a sinner, but he must live in harmony with the rules of the social game. This is one side.

The other side is this: The punishers never, for a moment, tolerate the idea that they themselves, are in any particular, accomplices, willing or unwilling, knowingly or unknowingly. The victims, like the Germans at the close of the war, are held to be *solely* guilty; the punishers are guiltless. They are in the same society with this man, they are bound up with him in a social complex, they are a part of him in everything except this crime. That is what they profess to believe.

But the newer fact which social investigators are everywhere bringing to light is that there is universal involvement, the fact that *all* are more or less directly implicated in the fall of any one. "Did this man sin or his parents,"—or his neighbors, or his cousins, or his grandparents, or the state? That is the old-new question. The present enlightened opinion is,—that others contribute to this man's downfall. But this idea is repugnant to punishers.

It is easy to understand, therefore, how they punish with a whole heart. They punish from a superior position; *they* are not guilty. They punish those who are beneath them, who are solely responsible and know it, who are guilty and, because of their acceptance of the tradition, admit it. They take the stroke in this frame of mind—possibly.

Thus the punishers, the authorities, also guilty *in fact*, deftly transfer their own guilt to the victims, and then wipe it all out by the methods we have named; they concentrate the wickedness of the whole community in these scapegoats. Such concentration enables the controllers and the bystanders to see and display this community iniquity just as concentrated dust is more easily displayed than diffused dust; such a procedure enables the controllers to wipe away the nauseous mess just as concentrated dust is more easily swept out than diffused dust.

This is a very clever way of doing things; but it is, in essence, a way of "passing the buck." How soon this wretched fallacy will be fully exploded, and what will happen then, are problems which we must pass over now.²⁶

(7) Not only is punishment, of the severer sort, a method of shifting responsibility, but it is also, in the last analysis, an admission of human defeat. This is the maddening fact that is ever being driven home. Suppose a murderer is hung. *He* is out of the way, that is, his body is out of the way. He can never physically bother anybody again. Is the social issue he raised, settled? Is the incident closed? Are conditions normal again?

There is a growing suspicion, prevailing ever more widely and backed up by scientific investigation, that he need not have been a murderer, that he need not have come to such an end. Are those who are in the grip of this suspicion, dreaming? No, they are being stung by new facts playing on their conscience. For, human beings, civilized beings, are asking themselves, more and more, what *they* neglected to do before that creature was born, what they neglected to do or did wrongly about his home, his neighborhood, his school, his job, his church, his recreation, his health, that he should come to such a tragic end. They are asking what they neglected to employ, or employed wrongly, by way of social pressure during the early and formative stages of his development. They are asking what unfavorable conditions were present and what favorable conditions were absent. They are asking how *they*, as well as *he*, came to fail in the arts of conformance. Thus, bit by bit, they implicate themselves in his downfall. The majority of people do not fail as he did. Why did *he* fail? Is the system of control defective? Are the shaping procedures at fault? What is wrong with the arrangement that *any one* can fail? The finger of accusation is

²⁶ Cf. Dewey. *Human Nature and Conduct*. 18 ff.

pointing more and more at the system. This is an admission of defeat.

But there is a more serious charge. The young are brought into the world untamed. They have to be tamed for order, domesticated, made at home. That is what the whole scheme is set up for. But here is *one* creature that has resisted all of the guiding and re-shaping pressures, and ends on the scaffold. The authorities have to admit—though they never do it in the open,—that they do not have, in their social organization, or have not used, the resources for taming this man. They have to admit that their system is so weak that one lone man can beat it or, at least, bring the authorities so low, in their methods, that they have to resort to extermination. This is a most humiliating admission.

Moreover, the defeat is evident in the loss of the man. He has gone. He cannot return. He is a wasted asset, for he might have been a productive citizen, otherwise conceived and treated. He was always something more than a murderer, possibly a laborer, a father, a voter; but all of these are wiped out in the murderer. It is a total loss—and no insurance. Those who cry, “Good riddance,” forget this aspect of the problem.

(8) Yet, as we have hinted several times, the *body* of the victim is the problem. Were it not for people’s bodies getting in the way of each other, tripping over each other, trying to occupy the same space at the same time, eating each other’s food, and otherwise interfering with each other, there would be no social problem as we know it. No problem of social control would arise in a society of disembodied spirits.

When the body is held fast in the pillory, the stocks, the prison, the *imagination* may wander about and the mind may meditate many things. But nobody cares about that unless said body can, at some time, follow and execute the plan hatched up. As long as we understand that there is

no communication except by means of bodies, we have gained a great deal when the bodies of recalcitrants are under control. Indeed that is the main thing that we ordinarily want to do. The only question is as to the best method.

But once the body is in hand, extraordinary care has to be taken never to release it again to freedom tinctured with "a root of bitterness." This is fundamental, for the body, so released, adopts the same old practices, and the work has to be done all over again. This is the way we do it now, for the most part; and this is what makes the punishing procedure so maddening—and expensive. The fear of recoil is also a constant source of pain.

(9) The effect of punishment upon the immediate offenders, is one thing; its effect upon the *bystanders*, its effect as a deterrent, is quite another. Punishment is proposed as a deterrent to crime. But investigators differ. Some authorities insist that it is a most effective and necessary preventive. They argue that none of us like it, and that most of us are afraid of it. They occasionally say what *they* would have done had there been no such thing. The fallacy here is in overlooking the blinding effects of passions such as anger and jealousy.

But others say that punishment is not a deterrent.²⁷ Criminals often say this, and of course they must have something worth while to say on this subject; they know at least what effect it had on them. Thus, after thousands of years of experimentation with this device, there is utter disagreement as to its value. We do not yet know whether it is a preventive, whether it is effective, or whether it is too costly.

The objects of punishment, then, as indicated earlier in the chapter, remain largely unrealized. We are just blindly groping along. And this is the exasperating and humiliating fact disclosed by modern investigations; and

²⁷ Pound. *Op. cit.* 23, 24. Mead. *Loc. cit.*

no one of the devices we have studied has received so much scientific attention as punishment, with the possible exception of advertising.

Such being the situation, it would be simply elementary common sense to lay more stress, as a social policy, upon the controls which operate more efficiently because they operate earlier in life and more humanely. And that, we note, seems to be the present slow but sure tendency. In other words, we are learning very slowly to treat men as men even when they seem to us to be something less than men.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

WE have now made a surface examination of some characteristically human symbol-devices employed in the work of controlling individuals and groups. We have covered the long traverse between rewards and punishments; one extreme to the other. We have sampled the best that authorities can do—reasoning together; the most kindly,—rewards and praise; the worst and most fiendish—punishments.

From the cradle to the grave, these and other tools that we have merely mentioned, are busy; there is no possible escape. Defective in structure and clumsily or wickedly applied as they are, these instrumentalities are the only means available for the domestication of the young, for the maintenance of the social order. There can be no effectual appeal for anything that human ingenuity and experience have not produced and proven workable. Men used to think that their social order was divinely ordained and stayed. But the gods do not help man out of social chaos; man helps himself out. If he upsets the world as he did in the World War, he must set it right himself. If he regards one kind of social arrangement as more desirable than another, he has to use his wits to create it and maintain it. And he has no instruments but the means of control discussed and others; he has no other recourse.

After our rather hasty survey of a few of these control devices, it seems worth while to draw attention to some conclusions or generalizations which are fair inferences from the evidence assembled.

(1) It will be quite clear, we think, that control by the methods discussed has been accompanied by and charged

with a very large amount of primitive or childish *feeling*. Looking back, we recall a great deal of impulsiveness, freakishness, whimsicality, changeableness, inconsistency, that could be traceable only to highly emotional states. Everywhere we have witnessed very sentimental people, gushing people, angry, resentful, moody and stubborn people, catching up these instruments in enterprises of defense and aggression; and handled while in such conditions, the tools have served the feelings rather than the intelligence.

For example, when some highly meritorious public service has been rendered, the people often rush off to reward the hero; and in their tumult of joy they lose all sense of proportion and fitness and shower forth testimonials regardless of fitness or cost; they not infrequently reward and praise the wrong persons. On the other hand, when some unfamiliar theological or political doctrine is floated about, many people instantly, spontaneously, recklessly uncork their vials of ridicule, laughter, vituperation and threats, if they do not lead the originators of such notions to the stake.

It would seem that variation from the social code provides a test which few authorities can yet meet in a satisfactory manner. We used to notice that when the hill became steeper or the ruts deeper, the team of horses suddenly accelerated its pace and became more eager. Now there is something like this in the work of control. When variants appear, of whatever sort, the authorities become heated and excited, irritable and impatient, because of the "monkey wrench" in the wheels—unnecessarily thrown, they think. This is an obstacle; the body prepares for a rush; an emotional out-pouring is inevitable; any available weapons are caught up; the results are not always rational. This passionall response to social variation is a very serious difficulty.

(2) There is a consequent lack of skill. These devices are not an instinctive equipment such as the cat has in its

claws. We have to learn how to use them just as we have to learn how to play the piano. But a person in a tumult of joy or passionately angry could never learn to play the piano very well. We have seen people lose their powers of coherent speech when dominated by some passion. Nervous and fitful people do not make good sharpshooters; deliriously happy folks do not praise in appropriate and measured terms; raging, angry people do not contrive and accurately pay home suitable threats; insanely jealous persons cannot argue logically and convincingly.

It was said of Robert Louis Stevenson that he was so skillful in his use of terms that he could—to use a figure of speech—tap an egg with a sledge-hammer without breaking the table. Little social control is exercised with such delicate artistry. Skill is the ability to use enough praise, flattery, persuasion, satire or punishment *to do the work required*,—and no more. But all the while there is obviously too little or too much; rarely that nice adjustment of means to ends which spells out expertness. We judge, therefore, that these devices are used clumsily and erringly most of the time. Authorities notice a variant; then they lunge forth, right and left, striking everything down, innocent and guilty alike. When they are deeply stirred they “lose their senses” as we say.

This point is particularly well illustrated in our discussion of punishment. There we saw that controllers fall upon trivial offenses with terrific and crushing blows—a total waste; and they fall on dangerous criminals sometimes with comical lightness; a hungry bread-stealer goes to jail for a year, while a railroad-stealer is fined “one dollar and costs.” This utter and imbecile disproportion between pressure applied and work to be done, is evidence of unskill. If we cure meddling, pomposity, heresy, and other forms of social diseases with the same expertness—and we do—as we cure crime, we have plenty of proof of inexpertness.

For skill is a matter of efficiency as well as smoothness and precision of execution. We not only fail to get the best results with least effort; we get results, all the while, that we do not want. Threats, instead of curing heretics, make more heretics; rewards, instead of stimulating loyal effort, often make parasites; satire, instead of correcting vanity, makes people angry and revengeful. And these things occur because the work is inefficient.

It is important to notice, relative to skill, that these instruments can never be kept away from the masses. We can pass laws permitting only responsible and trained persons to carry guns and use them; we can never pass laws permitting only responsible and trained persons to laugh, satirize, threaten, reward and punish. These devices are part of the mores; they are public property; they are communally owned; anybody uses them who *can* use them or wants to try to use them. This is a very cruel but unavoidable arrangement.

Consequently when skillful artists wing an objectionable innovation, all the amateurs start shooting their miserable pop-guns in imitation; and amidst the general racket something probably happens, but nobody knows exactly what. An expert laughter starts a crusade against certain offenders, and then all the bunglers follow; and amidst the general uproar something probably occurs, but nobody can say what. Mother whips the young sauce-box; then father gets angry and whips the child some more—or turns on mother. There is always this amateurish imitation—and the resulting confusion. This is democracy, in one aspect.

(3) These instruments are rarely articulated and organized into one mighty engine of control; for the most part they are disconnected and antagonistic. The picture we get is that of some rewarding and praising the very novelty which others threaten and punish; some persuade the innovator to struggle on while others command him to stop; propaganda works against education; advertising works

against instruction in thrift. There are all sorts of inconsistencies and neutralizations of this character. This is the situation at any given time.

Moreover, we see the same thing historically. One age stones the prophet who is worshipped by another; what is laughed out of court at one period is hugged and acclaimed at a later time. Everywhere is this lack of organization, design, agreed-upon purpose.

Of course, what we are really saying is that the *authorities* who employ these instruments are in conflict. There is little widespread certainty as to social aims. Some people want a democratic order and employ devices calculated to construct it; others want a monarchical order and set to work, in these terms, to build it. Some wish a static order; others want a "changing order changing orderly." So the conflict goes on; and these instruments are pitted against each other. Professor Cooley says: "You can resolve the social order into a number of co-operative wholes of various sorts, each of which includes conflicted elements within itself upon which it is imposing some sort of harmony with a view to conflict with other wholes."¹

It is worth noting in passing that this condition of conflict is the state which the average individual calls *freedom*. There is no such thing as absence of constraint, of pressure. There are only different degrees and directions of pressure. Freedom is the privilege of choosing which of all these differently weighted and variously applied pressures, one will yield to and obey. If all of these instruments ever could be harmonized, articulated, organized into one gigantic system and consistently trained on one spot, we would have the most abject slavery the world has ever seen. The nearest we come to a realization of this condition is when the nation is engaged in war, when a great crisis arises. Then we have, as our recent experience proves, a condition of repression and limitation which is most galling.

¹ *Social Process*. Chapter 4.

(4) We have to notice in addition that the instruments of control are continually employed by the *enemies* of any given group as well as by its members. With what instruments does the innovator defend himself when he is attacked by the stand-patters? With what weapons does a hostile group attack another? Neither can go outside of the general culture; neither can find available any weapons but the kind we have mentioned. If the Bolshevik wants to overturn our government, as the professional patriots are always saying, he has no other means than these. He cannot lift the government out with his hands, dynamite it out, and set it away. He has nothing to fight with that the patriots do not have. We have to use these symbol-devices to maintain our order; he has to use the same ones to overthrow it.

This means, of course, that any given set of authorities know, in advance, what the tactics of enemies are in a general way. They know that the enemies will use satire, propaganda, threats, illusion, personal ideals and the rest. They know that if they, themselves, cannot draft the gods to help them maintain their system, the enemies cannot draft the gods either. Neither side has an advantage here. Differences which are advantages do arise, however, in the degree of skill developed. This skill is displayed in combining these instruments, weighing them, making them more pointed, and nicely adjusting them to the work to be done.

The advantage is always with the conservative authorities because they have the masses back of them; masses steeped in these ways of life, fitted out with the traditional stereotypes, fairly comfortable and certain. The masses are always more numerous. They do not like to be "on the march" all the time. They like comfort, contentment, certainty. Woe to the innovators if the masses become aroused against them.

(5) While there have been over-much passion, too little skill and other serious defects, we cannot fail to notice certain trends towards improvement. The first one we shall mention is the increase of popular interest in the subject of control. Everywhere there is a greater concern as to the foundations of social order. Scientific inquiry is proceeding apace. There is better knowledge of human nature and its behavior under various pressures; this is evident in the studies of race and class psychology. Scholars are now fairly well informed upon the causes of "neuroses," "psychoses," "complexes," and other abnormalities produced by inefficient control methods. This scientific interest in the problem is part of it.

But the people themselves have a new interest. We can see this in at least two movements. One is the pathetically blind faith in laws. Our people choose representatives and send them up to assemblies which grind out statutes, ever more statutes. And popular trust in this process is touching. It is, of course, hard to see that more laws make more crime. We do not always enforce the laws we have; but the people, through their representatives, go on endlessly producing more.

There is a growing faith in education, and this is evidence of increasing popular interest. Better teachers, better teaching, better school buildings; these demands show that the subject of social control, while not defined as such, possibly, is much on the minds of more and more people. We might almost be said to have a "complex" on education, and we have a growing faith in public discussion as witness the organization of some two hundred and sixty open forums in recent years.

This popular tide of interest has many sources. One of them undoubtedly is the increasing numbers of innovators, radicals, fanatics, and other disturbers of the peace. More intelligent people *threaten* the old order in state, church

and industry than ever before. They cannot be ignored or neglected. We are compelled to deal with them. We are compelled to whet up our instruments for the fray.

(6) The trend of the times—if the study of our control devices gives us a reliable hint—is in the direction of less repression and more *evocation*. Past experience has made one fact stand out in pristine clearness: You can't tramp on people or hold them under indefinitely. The minority-nation flareups within the last decade are but in line with the trend. The movement of labor into defensive and offensive organizations is consistent with the main direction. The "Youth Movements" in the various countries are but illustrations of what we have said. The thousand and one ways in which the capitalists are revamping their system to be less cruel are evidence in point. Human leaders are having their eyes opened to the truth that repression is dangerous.

Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this trend is in Education. Although our picture in discussing "Commands" was not very reassuring, there are increasing numbers of experiments with the young in which the control is other than repressive. Everywhere one finds more respect paid to the pupil's personality, to his native endowments, to his individual curve, to his mental age and to his health.²

There is proof not only in the actual experimentation, but also in the definition of educational ideals and aims. The view of the educational process now coming slowly to prevail, and the standard to which the necessary machinery is being adjusted, is that education is just *life at its best*. According to this conception, the young shall not be cramped, warped, twisted and stuffed into the age-old and by-gone traditional patterns and molds, but shall be allowed and encouraged to *grow* normally, grow as they can grow, with all phases of their nature receiving respect and the required nourishment. The idea is that *life in school*

² For examples see Dewey's *The Schools of Tomorrow*.

shall show the young what the good life is, make it win-
some, encourage its adoption, so that when these "edu-
cated" people go out into the larger society they will strive
to lift others to their level. In this sense, the school is be-
coming a breeding-place for innovators, for variants of the
highest type, for leaders. It is aiming to take the rising
generation and draw out of it, for social welfare, all the
hereditary and acquired potentialities that may be found
there. This is vast gain.

(7) Finally, there is a discernible enlargement of the
rôle of reason; passion decreases, reason increases. The
continual applications of science to the problems of con-
trol show this. We may refer to the treatment of crime,
again, for illustration. The present handling of criminals
is very stupid and ineffectual as we saw. But it is slightly
more intelligent, in its adjustment of means to ends, than it
was five hundred or a thousand years ago. The sciences of
psychology, sociology, physiology and others, are now em-
ployed more and more in the effort to understand crime,
to get at its causes. The arts of medicine, psycho-analysis
and such are being employed to prevent it. If popular
"talk" can be trusted, more attention is now given to the
larger problem of maladjustment.³

The present promise is well summed up by Professor
Cooley. He says: "Family discipline has become more
a matter of persuasion and example, less one of mere au-
thority and the rod. In the school, mechanical modes of
teaching, enlivened by punishment, have given way to sym-
pathy, interest, and emulation. In the church we are no
longer coerced by dogma, forms, and the fear of hell, but
are persuaded through our intelligence, sympathy and de-
sire for service. Governments, on the whole, rely more
upon education, investigation, and public opinion, less upon
the military and police functions. In armies and navies

³ Cf. Leatherman and Doll. "Maladjustment among College Students,"
Journal of Applied Psychology. 8: 4. It gives examples and bibliography.

harsh discipline and awe of rank are in part supplanted by appeals to patriotism, fellowship, and emulation, and by cultivating that spiritual condition known as morale. In prisons there is an increase of methods that, by appealing to intelligence, responsibility, and honor, tend to elevate rather than degrade the offender.”⁴

Putting all of this into the phraseology of this book, we might say that threats are less frequently made or are made somewhat more discriminatingly; commands are framed rather better relative to the tests of efficiency which we noted, namely, obeyableness and enforceableness; propaganda and advertising were never more brilliantly conducted; people now know better how to devise and throw into service a slogan; there is less maudlin praise; rewards are given more judiciously; persuasion is sloughing off its grosser features. In fact, selection is operating in all of the control-mechanisms and the worst features are being eliminated in favor of “sweet reasonableness” as the control par excellence. Men must at last have their way with each other by reasoning themselves together. This is Man calling to Man.

Struggle between the various social authorities and their followers, we judge, will always go on. The expectation is that it will not so frequently as in the past, deteriorate into a carnage. This is probably the greatest social problem in the world today—how to make the struggle for order itself orderly. Possibly reason is the very essence of the human order.

⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Chapter 12.

PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS CITED

- Bergson, H. L. *Laughter*. Macmillan. 1911.
- Bernard, L. L. *Instinct*. Holt. 1924.
- Bode, B. H. *Fundamentals of Education*. Macmillan. 1921.
- Bogardus, E. S. *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. Century. 1924.
- Boswell, James. *Life of Johnson*. 2 vols. George Newnes. London. n. d.
- Calkins, E. E. *The Business of Advertising*. Appleton. 1915.
- Campbell, E. M. *Satire in Early English Drama*. Heer. Columbus, O. 1914.
- Case, C. M. *Non-Violent Coercion*. Century Co. 1923.
- Clark, N. M. *Common Sense in Labor Management*. Harper. 1919.
- Conrad, Joseph. *The Nigger of the Narcissus*. Doubleday. 1914.
- Cooley, C. H. *Social Organization*. Scribner. 1909.
- Dawson, W. J. *The Makers of English Fiction*. Revell. 1905.
- De Weese, T. A. *Principles of Practical Publicity*. Jacobs. 1908.
- Dickens, Charles. *Martin Chuzzlewit*. Dutton. 1907.
- Dostoevski, F. M. *The House of the Dead*. Dutton. 1911.
- Eliot, C. W. *A Late Harvest*. Atlantic. 1924.
- Garofalo, R. *Criminology*. trans. by R. W. Millar. Little Brown. 1914.
- Gildings, F. H. *Readings in Historical and Descriptive Sociology*. Macmillan. 1911.
- Gregory, J. C. *The Nature of Laughter*. Harcourt Brace. 1924.
- Groves, E. R. *Personality and Social Adjustment*. Longmans. 1924.
- Guérard, A. L. *Reflections on the Napoleonic Legend*. Scribner. 1924.
- Hall, S. R. *The Advertising Handbook*. McGraw. 1921.
- Hayes, E. C. *Sociology and Ethics*. Appleton. 1920.
- Hendrick, B. J. *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*. 2 vols. Doubleday. 1923.
- Hoag, E. B. *Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law*. Bobbs Merrill. 1923.
- Hocking, W. E. *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. Yale Press. 1918.
- Hollingsworth, H. L. *Advertising and Selling*. Appleton. 1913.
- Hoxie, R. F. *Trade Unionism in the United States*. Appleton. 1917.
- Hudson, Frederic. *Journalism in the United States*. Harper. 1873.

- Ives, G. A. *History of Penal Methods*. Stokes. 1914.
- Jung, C. G. and Long, C. E. *Analytical Psychology*. Moffat. 1916.
- Keller, A. G. *Societal Evolution*. Macmillan. 1915.
- Keller, A. G. *Through War to Peace*. Macmillan. 1918.
- Lea, H. C. *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*. 4 vols. Macmillan. 1906-7.
- Lea, H. C. *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*. 3 vols. Macmillan. 1906.
- Le Bon, Gustave. *The Crowd*. Macmillan. 1910.
- Le Bon, Gustave. *World in Revolt*. trans. by B. Miall. Macmillan. 1921.
- Lindeman, E. C. *Social Discovery*. Republic Publishing Co. 1924.
- Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion*. Harcourt Brace. 1922.
- Lowell, A. L. *Public Opinion in Peace and War*. Harvard Press. 1923.
- McDougall, William. *Introduction to Social Psychology*. Luce. 1914.
- McPherson, William. *The Psychology of Persuasion*. Dutton. 1920.
- Matthews, J. B. *The Tocsin of Revolt*. Scribner. 1922.
- Maurois, André. *Ariel: the Life of Shelley*. trans. by Ella D'Arcy. Appleton. 1924.
- Meredith, George. *An Essay on Comedy*. Scribner. 1923.
- Miller, A. H. *Leadership*. Putnam. 1920.
- Miller, H. A. *Races Nations and Classes*. Lippincott. 1924.
- Ogburn, W. F. *Social Change*. Huebsch. 1922.
- Osborne, T. M. *Society and Prisons*. Yale Press. 1916.
- Park, R. A. and Burgess, E. W. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago University Press. 1921.
- Parsons, E. W. *Social Rule*. Putnam. 1916.
- Pound, Roscoe. *Criminal Justice in the American City*. Cleveland Foundation. 1922.
- Rathenau, Walter. *The New Society*. Harcourt. 1921.
- Robinson, L. N. *Penology in the United States*. Winston. 1921.
- Ross, E. A. *Principles of Sociology*. Century. 1920.
- Ross, E. A. *Social Control*. Macmillan. 1922.
- Russell, F. T. *Satire in the Victorian Novel*. Macmillan. 1920.
- Sidis, Boris. *The Psychology of Laughter*. Appleton. 1913.
- Small, A. W. *The Origins of Sociology*. Chicago University Press. 1924.
- Spencer, Herbert. *The Principles of Sociology*. 3 vols. Appleton. 1904.
- Starch, Daniel. *The Principles of Advertising*. Shaw. 1923.
- Stuart, Sir Campbell. *The Secrets of Crewe House*. Doran. 1920.

- Sully, James. *An Essay on Laughter*. Longmans. 1907.
- Sumner, W. G. *Folkways*. Ginn. 1907.
- Sutherland, E. H. *Criminology*. Lippincott. 1924.
- Todd, A. J. *Theories of Social Progress*. Macmillan. 1918.
- Tozzer, A. M. *Social Origins and Social Continuities*. Macmillan. 1925.
- Turner, E. R. *Europe Since 1798*. Doubleday. 1924.
- van Langenhove, Ferand. *The Growth of a Legend*. Putnam. 1916.
- Wallas, Graham. *Human Nature and Politics*. Knopf. 1921.
- Walpole, H. S. *The Cathedral*. Doran. 1922.
- Warner, G. T. *Landmarks in English Industrial History*. Macmillan. 1899.
- Weeks, A. D. *The Control of the Social Mind*. Appleton. 1923.
- Winans, J. A. *Notes on Public Speaking*. Author. 1911.

INDEX

- Absent-mindedness essentially laugh-
able, 282
- Abuse of rivals as flattery, 92
- Actions as flattery, 89
- Activities and propaganda, 207
- Activity-patterns, 5 ff.
- Activity theory of laughter, 262
- Addresses, praise in, 63
- Admirable, maintained by praise, 77
- Admiration, 334
- Adventurous, called names, 304
- Advertising,
control device, 150
costs of, 136
creates habits, 154
creates wants, 155
definitions of, 134
functions of, 142
history of, 135
mediums of, 141
technique of, 138 ff.
volume of, 136
weaknesses of, 155 ff.
- Advertising agent, 139
- Advertising and propaganda, 188
- Affirmation and slogans, 171
- Agreements violated, 330
- Aims of this study, 30
- Alertness and threats, 360
- Allied propaganda, 208
- Alliteration and slogans, 170
- Alternatives, 340 ff.
- Amateur threats, 361 ff.
- Ambiguity and slogans, 181
- Amenability and praise, 75
- American Indians, use of controls,
387
- Anglo-Saxon punishments, 377
- Anonymous letters, 350
- Antagonism among controllers, 398
- Appeal to reason, 133
- Approved objects and values, 24
- Arbitrary commands, 338
- Argument, 131
- Arrangement and order, 3
- Artifices of the gossip, 218
- Artistry in control, 27
- Athletics and flattery, 103
and rewards, 34
and slogans, 166
- Attention and advertising, 142
and threats, 353
- Attitudes, 291 ff., 364
- Attitudes created by propaganda,
belief, 207
confusion, 206
indifference, 206
passion, 207
suspicion, 206
- Assumptions of punishers, 369
- Authorities, 27, 331, 333, 337, 341,
345, 365, 366, 369, 371, 404
- Authority in advertising, 145
in flattery, 107
in print and picture, 201
- Automatism essentially laughable,
275
- "Back to normalcy," 181
- Bad-name potential, 303
- Banishment, 380
- Behavior, 374
- Belief, 207
- Bodily harm, 355
- Book dedications as praise, 70
- Brawls, 119
- Brevity and slogans, 171
- British blockade, 207
- Business and slogans, 165
- Candidates for degraded rôles, 313
- Caricature, 277
- Cartoons and propaganda, 197
- Catchwords, 159
- Cat-o'-nine tails, 376
- Cause and effect, 27, 251, 285
- Censorship and propaganda, 203

- Challenge, a method of persuasion, 128
 Changing order, 132, 399
 Chatter and control, 121
 Cheapness of punishment, 383
 Chinese banditry, 198
 Chinese language tones, 115
 and gossip, 221
 Christianity, 386
 Church, its punishments, 379 ff.
 its rewards, 35
 Class-appeals and slogans, 174
 Class distinctions and rewards, 52
 Classes aided by flattery, 100 ff.
 Classification of mental devices, 18
 Collective representations, 308
 Colors in advertising, 141
 Comedies kept out of Rome, 276
 Comic—see laughter.
 Commands,
 appraisal of, 336 ff.
 classification of, 316
 definition of, 316
 examples of, 315, 322
 in school, 324; in relation to
 threats, 341
 merits and demerits of, 337
 most effective, 335 ff.
 overt features of, 325 ff.
 situations where required, 318
 subtler features of, 327 ff.
 universality of, 323
 Commendation, 59
 Communication, 17
 Complex, 401
 Comprehension, 353
 Compromising leaders, 10
 Compulsion, 343 ff.
 Conditioned reflex, 24, 358
 Confession elicited, 379
 Conformance, 334
 Confusion, 206
 Conscience, 123
 Contamination, 276
 Contemporary events causally re-
 lated, 374
 Contentiousness, 121
 Controls,
 aim of, 20
 authority of, 21
 classification of, 18 ff.
 cost of, 20
 other forms of, 119
 Controllers and intelligence, 23
 and weakness, 26
 Conversation and persuasion, 116
 and praise, 65
 Conviction in advertising, 144
 Convincing talker, 115
 Coöperation and bad names, 306
 Cost of rewards, 50
 Crank, the, 378
 Crewe House, 188
 Crises, social, 11, 322
 Criticism in satire, 238
 Curiosity
 and gossip, 225
 and slogans, 172
 Curse, the, 348

 Dangers in slogans, 182 ff.
 Death, methods of, 382
 Death of satire, 256
 Debates, 117
 Deception in propaganda, 204
 in slogans, 174
 Declassification by names, 307 ff.
 Dedications, 70
 Delays in punishment, 380
 Democracy, 182
 and flattery, 106
 and gossip, 229
 and rewards, 37
 Departures from the code, 223
 Dependability, a feature of order, 4
 Desires kindled by persuasion, 127
 for recognition and response, 72 ff.
 Determination and threats, 352
 Deterrence, 393
 Deterrents, 358
 Difficulties of commanding, 329 ff.
 Dilemma, 340, 363
 Directions and commands, 317, 341 ff.
 Disagreement, 111
 Disapproval by calling names, 301 ff.
 Discussion, 116
 Disruptive factors,
 internal, 9
 external, 8
 Divisions of the population, 12
 Domestication, 392
 Dramatization, 309

 Eccentricity and laughter, 274
 Economic epithets, 294

- Economy of symbols, 17
- Editorials and propaganda, 195
- Education,
 - definition of, 402
 - faith in, 401 ff.
 - in relation to propaganda, 188 ff.
 - in relation to rewards, 34
- Effect and cause, 27, 286
- Efficiency of punishment, 384
 - and skill, 397 ff.
- Emotional life, 183
- Enforceableness of commands, 330
- English propaganda in America, 191
- Epithetocracy, 294
 - flattering epithets, 81
 - humiliatic epithets, 294 ff.
- Ethics of control, 25
 - of persuasion, 130
- Ethnography, 367
- Evil that good may come, 360
- Evils of advertising, 156 ff.
- Evocation by rewards, 45 ff.
- Evolution attacked by laughter, 277
 - by calling names, 301
- Expectation indicated by names, 308 ff.
- Extremity, of society, 365, 371
- Exuberance of fancy, 232

- Factionousness, 121
- Facts. selection of in propaganda, 203
- Fairness, sense of, 123
- Fairy tales and propaganda, 192
- Faithful, their attacks on innovators, 274
- Fear,
 - in persuasion, 127
 - of gossip, 233 ff.
 - of laughter, 272
 - of threats, 353
- Feeling in social control, 396
- Fines, 372
- Fixed policy, authority in, 352
- Flattery,
 - advantages of, 96 ff.
 - and attitudes, 100 ff.
 - areas of operation, 93 ff.
 - definition of, 81
 - effects, 99
 - flows upward, 94
 - fondness for, 85
 - in a democracy, 106
 - insincerity of, 91
 - methods of, 86 ff.
 - objections answered, 82
 - probably increasing, 107
- Foibles of the great, 86 ff.
- Folkways, 6 ff.
- Follow-through, see cause and effect.
- Folly as object of satire, 250
- Formulae, 177 ff.
- Freakishness in work of control, 396
- Freedom, 399
 - loss of, 341 ff.
 - and threats. 354
- French propaganda in America, 190
- Friendliness of advertisers, 173

- Gestures,
 - in commands, 325
 - in persuasion, 113
 - in threats, 346
- Ghost-fear, 6
- Good names, 303
- Goods as effective advertising, 138
- Gossip,
 - aids to diffusion, 220 ff.
 - areas of influence, 219 ff.
 - categories through which it goes, 232 ff.
 - characterization of, 214 ff.
 - definition of, 212, 214
 - effects of, 227 ff.
 - examples of, 211, 221
 - materials for, 212 ff.
 - motives for, 224 ff.
 - persons doing it, 216 ff.
 - relation of to the genius, 217
 - technique, 217
- Governments, problems of, 330
- Greeks and praise, 80
- Group ascendancy by laughter, 283
- Groups affected by flattery, 100 ff.
 - make menacing gestures, 346
- Guardians of order, 97, 294

- History and propaganda, 193
- Hobo aristocracy, 230
- Home and rewards, 33 ff.
- Homesickness, 74
- Human defeat in punishment, 391
- Humor in satire, 238
- Hypnotism in advertising, 148

- Ideals and flattery, 103
- Identification, 288
- Illusions, appealed to by propaganda, 202
- Imagination and threats, 354, 359
- Imitation as flattery, 91
- Improvement, 401
- Indefiniteness in commands, 337
- Indifference, 206
- Indiscriminate use of slogans, 180
- Indispensability of punishment, 386
- Individuals as objects of satire, 249
- Industrial rewards, 35, 45 ff.
- Ingenuity, lack of, 312
- Inhibitive commands, 317
- Injustice and laughter, 270
- Innovators, 8, 10, 111, 273, 275, 278, 301, 304, 305, 368, 400, 402
- Inquisition, 367, 380
- Inscriptions as praise, 68
- Institutions as objects of satire, 249
- Instruments,
 - of control, 27
 - of punishment, 378 ff.
 - of the unprivileged, 94 ff.
 - used by enemies, 400
- Interest and advertising, 143
- Intimidation, 349 ff.
- Ironic satire, 246
- Japan and China, 198 ff.
- Judgment in threats, 354
- Knout, the Russian, 376, 377
- Knowing and names, 289
- Korbash, the African, 376
- Laughter,
 - definition of, 260 ff.
 - defects of, 286
 - effects of, 270 ff.
 - everybody likes to laugh, 270
 - future of, 286
 - illustrated by Leacock, 263 ff.
 - limits to its influence, 266
 - methods, 262
 - nobody likes to be object of, 271
 - objects of, 266 ff.
 - represents common-sense point of view, 283
 - theories of, 261
- Laws, faith in, 401
- Leadership, 283, 320, 328
- Leaders and gossip, 228
- Lectures, 118
- Legal punishment, 363 ff.
- Legislators, difficulties of, 330
- Life-patterns, 9
- Listening as flattery, 89
- Literary forms and propaganda, 196
- Logic, of pain, 388
- Loved ones, injury to, 356
- Lying in propaganda, 206
- Managed by flattery, 84
- Manners and laughter, 277
- Mass-action and gossip, 234
- Masses, 7, 10
 - and control, 398, 400
 - what is wanted, 11
- Membership in society, 7
- Memorial demonstrations and propaganda, 199
- Memory and advertising, 147
- Methods of ascendancy, 95
- Middle Ages, 367, 371
- Military orders, 326
- Moral degradation theory of laughter, 261
- Morale and gossip, 230
- Mores, 6 ff., 28
- Mottoes, 159
- Movies and propaganda, 197
- Mutiny, 315, 318
- Mutilations, 377
- Mythologizing, 229
- Name-calling,
 - classification, 294 ff.
 - conventional names, 290
 - effectiveness, 311 ff.
 - future of the practice, 314
 - importance of, 292
 - meaning of the practice, 299 ff.
 - honorific, 291
 - humilific, 292
 - rooted in pugnacity, 302
 - scientific names, 290
 - who are named, 304
- Namers, 298 ff.
- News, 195
 - and propaganda, 195
- Newspaper, its materials, 216
- Norms suggested by names, 309, 313

- Obedience, 330, 334
- Oberammergau and gossip, 230
- Obeyableness of commands, 329
- Opportunity, loss of as punishment, 355
- Opposition, 111
- Oral threats, 347
- Ordeal, 375
- Order, characteristics of, 3 ff.
- Overpraise as flattery, 90
- Parasitism and rewards, 52
- Parental name calling, 310
- "Passing the Buck" in the treatment of crime, 389
- Passion, 207
- Patriotic epithets, 295
- Penitential discipline, 379
- Persecution, 373
- Persons as objects of satire, 249
- Personal distortion, 310
- Personal relief and gossip, 225
- Persuasion,
 - appeal to fairness, 123
 - appeal to pride, 124
 - to a sense of responsibility, 123
 - to sympathy, 125
 - challenge in, 128
 - drives on fear in, 127
 - effects, 128 ff.
 - forms of, 113 ff.
 - future of, 131
 - highest form of, 131
 - hindrances to, 131 ff.
 - illustrations of, 109 ff.
 - kindling desires by, 127
 - merits and demerits of, 129 ff.
 - methods of, 110
 - need of, 111
 - stirring up prejudices by, 126
 - substance and subtlety, 122
- Phraseocracy, 158
- Physical methods of control, 14 ff.
- Physique and threats, 352
- Pictures and propaganda, 196
- Playgrounds and rewards, 34
- Pleading, 120
- Political epithets, 295
- Politics and rewards, 35
 - and slogans, 164
- Posing, as a life habit, 309
- Practical reason, 358
- Praise,
 - amenability of praisers, 75
 - compensation of, 75
 - defined, 56
 - displays the admirable, 77
 - effects of, 75 ff.
 - expressional features of, 61
 - merits and demerits of, 79
 - objections answered, 58
 - prevalence of, 59
 - supplements rewards, 76
 - survival value of, 77
 - three levels of, 58 ff.
- Prejudices, 126
 - and propaganda, 202
- Press and Propaganda, 194 ff.
- Pressure by calling names, 314
- Prestige, 331 ff., 353
- Pretension attacked by laughter, 283
- Profanity and threats, 348
- Promises of injury, 355
- Propaganda,
 - dangers in, 210
 - definitions of, 187 ff.
 - examples of, 189, 198, 199, 208 ff.
 - extent of, 190 ff.
 - history of, 189
 - kinds of, 186 ff.
 - media, 192 ff.
 - origin of term, 185 ff.
 - puncturers of, 210, note.
 - results of, 205 ff.
 - training needed to recognize, 210
- Propagational processes, 186
- Property, loss of, 355, 373
- Prophylactic of laughter, 276
- Protest by calling names, 301
- Psychology of advertising, 142
- Psychoses, 401
- Public opinion, 28
- Public speaker as a persuader, 129
- Punishers, 364
- Punishment,
 - appraisal, 383 ff.
 - assumptions in, 369 ff.
 - definition of, 363
 - freakishness in, 397
 - future of, 393 ff.
 - in relation to order, 385
 - methods of, 371 ff.
 - theory of, 369 ff.
 - types of, 365

- universality of, 366
 - when used, 368
- Punning, 172
- Radical differences in gestures, 114
- Radicals, attacked by laughter, 277
- Radio and propaganda, 200
- Realistic satire, 243
- Reason, 403 ff.
- Reasoning,
 - by pain, 388
 - use of, 118, 131 ff.
- Rebels, 369
- Recalcitrants, 334, 340, 361, 363, 368, 371, 387, 399
- Reflexes, 24
- Reiteration in advertising, 144
- Relationship as a feature of order, 3 ff.
- Relationships, 5, 307
- Religion,
 - kept pure by laughter, 277
 - promoted by slogans, 166
- Repetition in advertising, 144
- Reputation, loss of, 356
- Resolutions as praise, 71
- Responsibility awakened, 123 ff., 389
- Restraint, amount of, 26
- Revenge and gossips, 226
- Reverence, 332, 333
- Reversion by laughter, 284
- Reviews and praise, 66 ff.
- Rewards,
 - and attitudes, 47 ff.
 - a social practice, 33
 - classification of, 36
 - definition of, 36
 - effects of, 44 ff.
 - future of, 54
 - merits and demerits, 50 ff.
 - technique of, 37 ff.
 - two purposes in, 34
- Rhythm in slogans, 169
- Ridicule, 280
- Ridiculous in rewards, 43
- Rigidity as an object of laughter, 268 ff.
- Romantic satire, 241
- Safety slogans, 173
- Satire,
 - and logic, 240
 - approval of, 253
 - definition of, 238 ff.
 - denials of value in, 251
 - Dickens' use of, 240
 - effects of, 251
 - efficiency in, 255 ff.
 - examples of, 237
 - forms of, 237, 241
 - future of, 256
 - kinds of, 237
 - objects of, 248
 - sources of, 247
 - variations of, 246
 - work of, 253
- Scars, 378
- Scarcity of goods, 208 ff.
- Selecting the facts in propaganda, 203
- Self-criticism started by commands, 333 ff.
- by laughter, 282
- "Self-determination," 183
- Self-esteem and gossip, 224
- Sentiments, definition of, 202
 - appealed to by propaganda, 202
- Separatist tendency of laughter, 275
 - repressed, 274
- Sex taboo, 10
- Shibboleth, 160
- Skill and threats, 361
- Skilled craftsmen and advertising, 140
- Skill, lack of in control, 396
- Slogans,
 - appraisal, 180
 - areas of operation, 162
 - athletic, 166
 - business, 165
 - characteristics of, 168 ff.
 - deception in, 174 ff.
 - definition of, 161
 - effects of, 176
 - famous examples, 162 ff.
 - history of, 161
 - in education, 167
 - in newspapers, 159
 - kindred terms, 158
 - origin of, 160
 - political, 164
 - religious, 166
 - war, 163
- Social classification by names, 306

- Social climbing, 99
- Social control,
 - beginnings, 24
 - definition of, 12, 13
 - ethics of, 25
 - illustrations of, 13
 - methods of, 14 ff.
 - necessity of, 11
 - problems of, 12
- Social coöperation, aided by laughter, 280 ff.
- Social change, 8, 10
- Social classes, 8 ff., 12, 25
- Social crises, their causes, 11
- Social order, 4, 5, 22
- Social responsibility, 389 ff.
- Social solidarity and gossip, 226
- Society, definition of, 7
- Solitary confinement, 381
- Sources of names, 297
- Stage compared to real life, 313
- Standard-complexes, 7
- Straps, as instruments of punishment, 376
- Statistics and propaganda, 197
- Stunts,
 - in advertising, 147
 - in propaganda, 198 ff.
- Superior-inferior relationships, 93
- Suspicion, aroused by propaganda, 206
- Symbol method of control, 15 ff.
- Symbols,
 - aim of, 19
 - authority in, 21
 - clarity of meaning, 21
 - classification of, 18 ff.
 - cost of, 20
 - degree of intimacy in, 21
 - degree of mechanism in, 21
 - illustrations of, 16
 - meaning of, 15 ff.
- Sympathy. appeal to, 125
- Systems of symbols, 16, 27
- Taskmasters controlled by flattery, 100
- Testimonials, as examples of praise, 70
- Tests necessary for innovators, 279
- Thanks and praise, 58
- "Third degree" as a method of punishment, 343
- Thought-patterns, 7
- Threats,
 - authority in, 351
 - definition of, 340
 - force in, 351 ff.
 - illustrations of, 343
 - in letters, 350
 - media for, 346
 - merits and demerits, 359 ff.
 - results of, 357 ff.
 - when used, 340
 - wide usage, 342
- Tolerance, index of, 28
- Tone of voice.
 - in commands, 325
 - in persuasion, 115
- Tools of order, 395
- Torture and punishment, 378
- Traditions, 367
- Types as objects of satire, 250
- Undeliberative responses, 182
- Unmentionable names, 298
- Unreality and gossip, 231
- Vanity and gossip, 224
- Verbal orders, 325
- Veiled threats, 348
- Vice, as object of satire, 250
- Victims of punishment, 364, 392
- Vigor of expression, 352
- War and slogans, 163
- War as punishment, 383
- Waste in punishment, 392
- Watchwords, 158
- Whipping, 375 ff.
- Whips, 376
- Witch, 374
- Witch persecutions, 234
- Worship, 59
- Wrangling, 119
- Written orders, 326
 - threats, 349

